The SEC’s Second-Hand Socialism
by
Michael S. Rozeff
by Michael S. Rozeff
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Every day brings
a new surprise or two from our home-grown financial central planners.
Did they study some Soviet theorists? They didn’t have to. They
merely had to grow up in the American political, educational, and
media system, our democracy being the disguised socialism-communism-fascism-plutocratic-kleptocracy
that it is. They merely absorbed their socialism second-hand.
Once in power,
which means once placed in the closed circle of power, our commissars
act accordingly. People like Paulson and Bernanke and Cox can act
in no other way, being the cowards and creatures of the system they
are. They cannot withstand the pressures to conform and survive
in the circle of power when combined with their own warped understanding.
What is that
closed circle? It is the to-and-fro movement of money among: banker-investment
banker-central banker-campaign contributor-lobbyist-Congressmen-regulators.
What hath the
SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) now wrought? It hath banned
short-selling in 799 financial stocks until October 2, 2008. Such
power! To be able to stop people from trading on a dime. And this
in the supposed bastion of capitalism. What a terrible advertisement
for capitalism and free markets, except that we don’t have them.
The next time someone speaks about the free market, or blames the
free market for falling stock prices, remind them of this action.
Isn’t this what Murray Rothbard called "violent intervention"
in the market? You bet it is. Murray, they are dreaming new dreams
of interventions that you (and I) never conceived of.
An action like
this deserves a few words, reactions that is, not many, even if
I thought I had better things to do today.
The financial
stocks have rallied sharply. But we do not know the size of the
effect of the short-selling ban because simultaneously came the
blockbuster news of a Resolution Trust type entity to bail out the
banks. That possibility has driven up stock prices too. It will
take a few careful studies to determine what effect the short-selling
ban may have had on prices. But the theory of it is clear enough.
And it can guide our understanding.
Short-sellers
that have an impact on market prices are a specialized breed of
investor. They work to discover negative information. They work
to discover when stock prices are over-valuing a company’s stock.
They then borrow stock and sell it. By the usual market processes
of price discovery, which are noisy and subject to volatility, that
negative information may then get impounded in prices, showing up
as lower prices if the short-sellers are on target in their assessments.
Enron stock, for example, was in a declining mode for some months
before its ultimate crash.
Banning short-sales
is a partial closure of the market. The SEC, it goes without saying,
has no natural right to do this. Such violence is uncalled for in
a society that values freedom. Our leaders are upholding something
vastly different than liberty, namely, a despicable old boy network,
and they and their pals are the old boys.
The immediate
effect of the news of such a ban is that traders anticipate that
the flow of negative information will be dampened for a while. That’s
one conclusion. There are some ways out, however. One can sell short
in a synthetic way. One can write a call option and buy a put option.
Will the SEC also stop all options trading in the 799 stocks? So
far, they have not. Short sellers can trade by writing calls and
buying puts. However, this approach may not work well if the option
prices have also been impacted adversely. That is possible because
the call buyers and put sellers on the other side of the trade may
want to sell short in order to even up their positions. In short,
the SEC has thrown a monkey wrench into the options markets as well.
Another possibility is that the short selling will go offshore.
This will be slowed down by the cartel of offshore regulators who
follow the SEC leadership. The United Kingdom has done some short-selling
banning of its own.
If traders
think that the negative news won’t be developed and get into stock
prices for a while, they will bid up prices. The existing short
sellers then have an incentive to cover their short sales pronto.
These two sets of buyers will tend to drive prices higher. We get
a sharp short-covering bear market rally, induced by the SEC.
This causes
great volatility in the market as prices jump sharply and later
fall back. Since prices are rising above their equilibrium values,
the odds are they will fall back. Those who hold the stocks long
are given a chance to sell out, so that even without short-selling,
a counteracting price pressure arises.
The short-selling
ban no doubt results in some net price gain for a while. This means
the SEC has succeeded in preventing the markets from reaching equilibrium
for a while. When that period is slated to come to an end and short-selling
is expected to resume, those who hold the stock long have a second
chance to sell out and front-run short-sellers. They are merely
selling stock they already own, so they do not violate the short-selling
ban. The SEC hasn’t gone that far yet as to close down the markets
entirely.
The SEC ban
changes the expectations of short-sellers. They now do not know
when another such ban might occur. They face greater risk. They
have a reduced incentive to investigate to find negative information
and get it impounded into prices. They have a reduced incentive
to sell short, even after the ban is lifted. They have an increased
incentive to sell their research to companies that ordinarily hold
long positions. But this avenue is not particularly attractive.
The result
is that the SEC has reduced the market’s efficiency. Stocks can
go along at overpriced levels for longer periods of time, and then,
wham, the bad news comes out in one lump sum, at which point the
volatility rises sharply as the price collapses. This means that
investors at large cannot be as sure as they once were that prices
accurately reflect available information, especially negative information.
They will require higher returns to compensate them for that added
risk. They will also require higher returns to compensate for the
added risk of regulatory interruption and interference in the stock
market.
Meanwhile,
will the SEC ban on short sales actually prevent the prices from
attaining their equilibrium values at some point in the future?
This is highly unlikely. It may take longer, but the market will
learn how badly off these financial institutions are. For many of
them, it knows already and the prices are now trading at artificially
high levels.
The SEC is
another New Deal monstrosity like Fannie Mae. In 1982, Roberta Karmel,
who was an SEC commissioner, published Regulation
by Prosecution.
Karmel, who
was a Democrat, heavily criticized the SEC. In a
paper that I published in 1990, I summarized her criticisms
as follows:
- The SEC
has a prosecutorial and legalistic orientation that conflicts
with regulation designed to encourage commerce and business.
- The SEC
has been unwilling to articulate clear law enforcement standards.
- The incentive
structure of the SEC is perverse. It rewards the making of new
rules and new enforcement work that are unwarranted.
- The SEC
has displayed "historical intransigence in refusing to accept
exemptions from registration as a legitimate part of the scheme
of the federal securities laws."
- The SEC
has opposed needed reforms in order to maintain its own freedom
of action to expand securities regulation.
- The SEC
has over-regulated the investment company industry.
- The agency
structure shifts the focus of regulation from its center (the
Legislature) to an agency that by itself is unable to accommodate
major regulatory changes. Government becomes slower and less accountable
to the needs of the electorate.
- The SEC
has a tendency to be on the side of increased disclosure and to
serve the constituencies who benefit from it.
- The SEC
has stifled creativity and innovation in corporate disclosure.
- The SEC
has displayed inattention and ignorance of the effects of its
regulatory actions on small business capital formation.
- The SEC
has imposed slow and burdensome review procedures for filings
to raise capital on small business.
- There has
been a serious curtailment of the private placement market through
attention to legal positions rather than the economic impacts
of policies on enterprises.
- There has
been an unnecessary prevention of sales of letter stock (unregistered
offerings of stocks already possessing a secondary market.)
- There has
been too high a degree of restriction against new issues at the
expense of eliminating the possibility of new ventures.
- The SEC
has generated slow and uninformed treatment of companies in bankruptcy
proceedings.
- The SEC
shows a tendency to protect all investors against their own greed
regardless of the cost.
- The SEC
has a tendency to act against capital formation.
In sum, the
SEC, according to Karmel, was anti-business and especially anti-small
business.
It
is now 2008 and 26 years have passed. We can now add many more items
to Commissioner Karmel’s list. The SEC has greatly expanded its
regulation on insider trading, on national market exchange systems,
and on disclosure. It has even butted into the pricing of stocks
in pennies rather than eighths.
Now we find
it banning short sales so as to support stock prices. If the U.S.
had a claim to standing above your everyday banana republic, it
is fast abandoning that claim. Our government is fast turning into
a joke manned by clowns who aren’t even funny. Does anyone take
what they are doing seriously?
September
20, 2008
Michael
S. Rozeff [send him mail]
is a retired Professor of Finance living in East Amherst, New York.
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© 2008 LewRockwell.com
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