Post-Modern Prosecutions
by
William L. Anderson
by William L. Anderson
DIGG THIS
Over the past
four years, I have written (or co-written with Candice E. Jackson)
a number of articles dealing with the dishonesty of prosecutors
in this country. The Duke Non-Rape case, as I see it, is a logical
extension to a pattern that is so egregious that all we can do now
is damage control. Justice pretty much is dead in the United States.
The final blow
in this death of a million blows has been the increasing use of
conspiracy theories by the prosecution, something that the law forbids,
but the courts let it go anyway. Like so many other trends, this
one has its intellectual underpinnings in that academic refuse pile
we call Post-Modernism.
Four years
ago, I called then-Attorney General John
Ashcroft a "post-modern bureaucrat." Unfortunately,
the post-modern application of law is not limited to Washington,
D.C. and federal prosecutors, as bad as they are. State prosecutors
are doing their best to match the outrages we see on the federal
level, and they are encouraged by judges, politicians, and the gaggle
of television talking heads that constitute a legal definition of
air pollution.
Post-Modern
Law
First, what
do I mean by "post-modern law"? It is the application
of post-modern thought to the execution of the law, both criminal
and civil. (I will concentrate only on criminal law in this piece,
however.) Second, what do we mean by post-modern thought? As I wrote
in my Ashcroft article:
(For those
who don’t know, postmodernism is a line of thinking that denies
any possibility of Truth, and is the dominant "guiding light"
– darkness? – in academe these days.) We know it also as a form
of "relativism," or what Ludwig von Mises described as "polylogism"
in his classic book Human
Action.
As Paul Craig
Roberts and Lawrence Stratton wrote in their book, Tyranny
of Good Intentions, the courtroom is a place where
we are supposed to find that thing called "truth," at
least how truth applies to the events being examined. Obviously,
it often is difficult to find "the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth," given human limitations and the
predilections of people to lie, but nonetheless those people who
are officers of the court and those who testify under oath are expected
to be truthful. Those who are not can face charges of perjury or
other sanctions, and although we know that lies tend to be the staple
of courtroom fare these days, truth still is the standard.
Furthermore,
the rules of the courtroom require prosecutors to present a truthful
rendition, or at least a reasonable account, of what occurred. For
example, if I am on trial for robbery, the prosecutor first must
establish that an actual robbery occurred, and, second, that I was
the one who committed the act. He or she is not legally free
to concoct an event that never occurred, and then pick me out at
random to bring charges. That prosecutors might do such a thing
does not change the fact that such conduct is illegal.
The rules for
the defense are different. True, defense lawyers cannot knowingly
present a false defense, but they certainly can stretch that requirement
a good bit. (Lawyers rarely are going to ask their clients, "Did
you do it?" precisely because they know that if the client
replies in the affirmative, they are going to be limited in how
they can defend that person.)
Lawyers can
try to present conspiracy theories, even if the pieces of the puzzle
are not easily fitting; it is up to the judge to set the limits
of what attorneys can present in defense of their clients. For example,
when O.J. Simpson was on trial for murder more than a decade ago,
his attorneys presented the defense that the police conspired to
frame him, led by a "racist cop," Mark Fuhrman. Although
the pieces did not exactly fit, the defense was effective enough
to have Simpson acquitted. (I will not go into the claim that the
verdict was an example of "jury nullification." It will
suffice simply to say that Simpson’s defense proved to be adequate
for the situation.)
On the other
hand, prosecutors are not legally free to act like defense
attorneys. Christopher Darden and Marcia Clark would not have been
able to claim that Simpson was a member of a shadowy drug gang or
team of assassins and not be able to introduce any evidence to buttress
their allegations. They had to stick with the real-live evidence,
period.
What happens
when prosecutors are permitted to introduce wild conspiracy theories?
We see post-modern law in action. A telling example is the wrongful
prosecution of Roby Roby Roberson and his wife in Wenatchee, Washington,
10 years ago. Roberson was the pastor of a small church in Wenatchee,
and the prosecution claimed that he and his wife were leaders of
a wild sex ring in which church services consisted of the Robersons
and people in the congregation having group sex with little children.
The charges
came from allegations that police coerced from children. There was
no physical evidence of any kind, and after investigators combed
the church grounds looking for any hint of semen or other
clues that would have demonstrated that sexual activity took place
there. They found none.
In a world
where truth mattered, such results would have meant that the authorities
either would drop the charges altogether or at least take a hard
look at the allegations. Instead, the prosecutor in the case declared
that the absence of physical evidence constituted proof
that the sex crimes must have occurred.
One has to
step back and realize what took place in that courtroom. First,
the prosecution admitted it had no real evidence, but the jury was
supposed to ignore that fact and convict because no evidence really
meant the opposite: the child sex must have happened. Second, this
dishonest nonsense was presented only because the trial judge –
who had been extremely hostile to the defense – permitted the prosecution
to present its non-evidence as ironclad proof. One can be thankful
that the jury in that case saw through the prosecution lies and
acquitted the couple. The prosecutor since then has been re-elected
three times.
The Post-Modern
Duke Case
As the Duke
Non-Rape case blunders toward an unjustified trial, we must understand
that we are now looking at a full-blown application of post-modernism
in the legal arena. First, we see many of the Duke University faculty
members writing in various venues that while they seriously doubt
that the rape, sodomy, and kidnapping charges against David Evans,
Collin Finnerty, and Reade Seligmann are true, nonetheless the young
men should be put on trial because of their race, sex, and class.
Furthermore, the Duke administration, in its various sets of talking
points, has said the same thing, except that the administration
claims that a trial will present a chance for the Duke 3 to "prove
their innocence."
Criminal trials
do not "prove innocence." The legal issue at hand is either
"guilty beyond a reasonable doubt," or "not guilty,"
period. There is no such verdict as "innocent." The fact
that a prosecutor brings charges is that someone out there believes
no matter what that someone committed a crime and that those people
on trial committed it. I have yet to hear a prosecutor after a "not
guilty" verdict claim that he or she tried an innocent person; instead,
we hear the individual on trial really was guilty, but that the
jury did not buy the truth.
Second, as
we come to understand the medical evidence being presented, we further
understand that the medical reports do not suggest that a rape even
occurred. As forensic expert Kathleen
Eckelt has noted, the examination and the accuser’s behavior
afterward (she was pole dancing at a strip club almost immediately
after the alleged rape, despite the fact that police and prosecutor
Michael Nifong claimed that her injuries were so severe she could
not even sit up) clearly do not indicate that there was a rape at
all.
Perhaps the
most "post-modern" of the prosecution claims is that the
multiple stories that the accuser told police constitute "proof"
that the Duke 3 raped her. In the aftermath of the lacrosse team
party, she told police that she was raped, that she was not raped,
that the entire team raped her, that 20 people raped her, that her
partner, Kim Pittman-Roberts, helped the rapists, that Pittman-Roberts
tried to stop the rapists, that she and Pittman-Roberts fought back,
that five men raped her, that three men raped her, and that she
was "100-percent sure" at every lineup that Brad Ross
was at the party when, in fact, he was not.
The multiple
tales would give normal people room for pause, but prosecutors are
not normal people. Kerri Paradise, a Massachusetts woman who has
been raped, has written in a November 24, 2006, letter to the Durham
Herald-Sun:
The Duke
rape hoax is just that, a hoax. I am a rape survivor and I can
tell you that a true victim will never change her story that many
times. No DNA, accuser files false charges in the past, she goes
back to pole dancing within days of this so-called rape and she
is a drug seeker.
Yet, according
to prosecutors, both Nifong and the gaggle of made-for-television
prosecutors like CNN’s Nancy
Grace are claiming that the multiple stories of rape constitute
"proof" that the rapes happened. After all, they declare,
the rape must have been so traumatic that the accuser simply
was thoroughly confused. (One of the TV prosecutors, Wendy
Murphy, already has been at the forefront of the prosecutorial
use of "recovered memories," a thoroughly-discredited
tactic which prosecutors in Massachusetts and elsewhere have employed
to falsely convict people.)
Like the Wenatchee
prosecutor, Nifong and company insist that the multiple stories
– which once upon a time would have been recognized as strong evidence
against the accuser’s claims – now constitute proof of rape.
Conversely, had the accuser told only one story which was
consistent, one can be assured that the prosecution also would have
used the account as proof that the men raped the accuser.
Thus, we see
the ultimate post-modern absurdity: conflicting accounts constitute
"proof," just as consistent accounts also constitute "proof."
In a world where truth means something, people would smell a very
large, nasty rat if a prosecutor were trying to say two mutually-exclusive
sets of accounts both are true. Unfortunately, that world
no longer exists, at least in American courtrooms.
Furthermore,
Nifong and supporters like Grace and Murphy and others claim that
the indictments themselves also establish "proof" of guilt.
(As Murphy said during one appearance on Grace’s CNN show, "Almost
99.9 percent of people indicted are guilty; you do the math.")
Of course, the indictments came as a result of the multiple stories,
so we now are expected to believe not only that the mutually-exclusive
accounts prove guilt, but also the fact that Nifong obtained indictments
using them.
One
hopes that if this case comes to trial, that the judge will recognize
the dishonesty of Nifong’s charges, or that a jury will understand
that absurdities are absurdities. I say "hope," because
right now, the post-modernists are winning battle after battle.
It is one thing when post-modern nonsense dominates a history or
English class; it is quite another when it becomes the bedrock of
modern law.
William
L. Anderson, Ph.D. [send him
mail], teaches economics at Frostburg State University in Maryland,
and is an adjunct scholar of the Ludwig
von Mises Institute.
Copyright
© 2006 LewRockwell.com
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