Gender Is Not a Natural Law Distinction
May 21, 2016
I quote Frank Van Dun on this matter from his superb article on kritarchy in which he explains natural law:
“In order to avoid misunderstanding, we should note that not all objective or even natural distinctions enter into the definition of natural law. Age, gender, length and weight of body, colour of skin or hair, proficiency in mathematics or any number of other properties or characteristics that are or conceivably might be ‘given by nature’, are not taken into account. They are properties or characteristics of individual persons, but their presence or absence to a greater or smaller degree in any individual does not determine the answer to the question whether that individual is a person or not. In their multifarious combinations they account for a great many differences among persons, but that is all they do. No matter how different persons are in any dimension of shape or talent, they are all persons because of their innate or genetically given freedom of action, speech, thought and rational communication. In that crucial respect they are all alike.”
This is not to say that gender, skin color and other characteristics of persons cannot become matters that threaten peace, freedom and friendly relations. They can be made into matters that injure persons directly and indirectly by legislation, and that is precisely the case today. Were it not for various confusions and injuries introduced by legislation, gender would not be a subject generating controversy. This includes legislation mandating public schools and business accommodations. Furthermore, the unnecessary prevalence of legislation in all manner of human relationships and the insidious spread of supporting ideas of positive rights have generated expectations of rights among members of the public where no such rights exist.

