If You Miss the First Time, Try Firing Another 300,000 Rounds
by
Robert Higgs
by Robert Higgs
DIGG THIS
According to
the educated guess of military researcher John
Pike, the director of GlobalSecurity.org, U.S. forces have expended
at least 250,000 small-caliber bullets for every insurgent killed
in the present wars. That's a lot of misses, for which the people
of Iraq and Afghanistan are no doubt grateful. With better marksmanship,
U.S. forces could have already slain a large fraction of the people
residing in those unfortunate countries. Of course, medium- and
heavy-caliber bullets, artillery and mortar shells, rockets, and
bombs have also killed many people in the present wars, their vastly
greater force compensating for the smaller numbers expended.
The application
of overwhelming firepower in lieu of alternative tactics has long
been the American way of fighting a war. In World War II, U.S. factories
cranked out, along with mountains of other munitions,
about 41.4 billion rounds of small-arms ammunition, enough to permit
the users to take about ten shots at every man, woman, and child
alive on earth at that time. Military historians tell us that the
U.S. warriors actually concentrated their fire somewhat, so some
of the earth's inhabitants were spared exposure to that particular
risk.
Among the
many fiscal measures for which mainstream economists can credit
the current Bush administration, we may count a tremendous stimulation
of the demand for ammunition as much a blessing in bulking
up the GDP as purchases of any other final good, they insist. According
to a July 2005 report
by the Government Accountability Office, "[b]etween fiscal years
2000 and 2005, total requirements [per year] for small caliber ammunitions
more than doubled, from about 730 million to nearly 1.8 billion
rounds, while total requirements for medium caliber ammunitions
increased from 11.7 million rounds to almost 22 million rounds."
Most of
the U.S. forces' small-arms ammunition is manufactured by contractor
Alliant Techsystems (ATK), which operates a government-owned plant
located near Independence, Missouri. In 2004, however, ATK's 1.2
billion cartridges fell short of the government's demand. Army
Major Gen. Buford Blount III stated, "We're shooting it almost
as fast as they can produce it." As an emergency measure to help
make up the shortfall, the government also contracted with Winchester
Ammunition (a division of Olin Corporation) and Israel Military
Industries, Ltd.
The latter
contract did not strike everyone as a shrewd move. At a congressional
hearing, Rep.
Neil Abercrombie (D-HI), a member of the House Armed Services
subcommittee overseeing the matter, addressed Army Brig. Gen. Paul
Izzo, executive officer of the ammunition program: "Can you tell
me whose idea it was to contract with a firm in Israel to provide
ammunition to kill Muslims? I've never heard of anything so goddamned
stupid." To allay Abercrombie's anxiety, Izzo and Blount promised
to use the ammo produced in Israel only for training purposes and
to employ only good old American-made ammo for killing people in
Iraq and Afghanistan. As reporter Katherine McIntire Peters remarks,
this "distinction . . . likely has more resonance among lawmakers
than among those on the receiving end of the ammunition."
By the
end of 2005, the Army had established an acquisition
strategy for purchasing as many as 2 billion rounds of small-caliber
ammunition annually and brought in a second domestic prime contractor,
General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems, to supply the government
with 300 million rounds annually from its plant in St. Petersburg,
Florida. With ATK producing 1.2 billion rounds per year and modernizing
its plant to produce as many as 1.5 billion, the Army's overall
acquisition settled at about 1.8 billion rounds annually.
For the
four fiscal years 2002-2005, the military's small-arms ammunition
"requirements" totaled nearly 5.6 billion rounds. With approximately
3.6 billion being added during the next two years, the total for
fiscal years 2002-2007 comes to about 9.2 billion rounds. If we
assume that U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq have killed 50,000
people with small-arms fire (a high estimate, I suspect), then they
have needed, for training plus actual fighting, 184,000 bullets
per person killed. If they have killed only 30,000 in this way,
then the figure rises to almost 307,000 bullets per person shot
dead, which is roughly equal to the estimate Pike ventured two years
ago before he decided to "round that down to 250,000 so that we
are underestimating."
If we assume
that only 3 billion of the 9.2 billion small-caliber rounds consumed
by U.S. forces during the past six fiscal years were fired in combat
in Iraq, then, given an Iraqi population of approximately 27 million
in recent years, the rate of U.S. small-arms fire during the present
war works out to more than 100 shots for every man, woman, and child
in the country, or more than ten times what the world's population
received per capita from U.S. forces during World War II.
Where do
all those high-powered bullets go? Is it any wonder that check-point
foul-ups so often end with the innocent occupants of a vehicle,
many of them women and children, being shot dead, or that exchanges
of gunfire in urban settings take such a toll in persons killed
or wounded by stray shots from American guns? Iraqis have complained
repeatedly since the occupation began that U.S. troops have itchy
trigger fingers and react wildly to attacks, real or imagined, by
firing their automatic weapons almost at random into the surrounding
area. Combining tense, frightened solders, massive firepower, and
densely inhabited neighborhoods does not make for a safe environment.
Moreover,
not to belabor a point, but I do hope the reader will remember that
we are considering here only small-arms fire, to which in any realistic
account of the war we must add the expenditure of enormous quantities
of medium and heavy bullets, mortar and artillery shells, rockets,
and bombs, along with a substantial amount of old-fashioned pummeling
with boot heels, rifle butts, and assorted other clubs. The Iraqis
have not been lying in a bed of roses for the past 52 months.
Unfortunately,
the future does not appear to hold much relief for them, and many,
many more are destined to perish in the lethal thunderstorms of
U.S. bullets, shells, and bombs. Why, we might wonder, must this
madness continue? What good can it possibly accomplish? When Congressman
Abercrombie told Gen. Izzo that he had "never heard of anything
so goddamned stupid" as buying ammo manufactured in Israel for use
by U.S. military forces in killing Muslims, he might well have weighed
his words more carefully, because at least one thing has been manifestly
even stupider: invading Iraq in the first place.
July
24, 2007
Robert
Higgs [send him mail] is
senior fellow in political economy at the Independent
Institute and editor of The
Independent Review. His most recent book is Neither
Liberty Nor Safety: Fear, Ideology, and the Growth of Government.
He is also the author of Depression,
War, and Cold War: Studies in Political Economy, Resurgence
of the Warfare State: The Crisis Since 9/11 and Against
Leviathan Government Power and a Free Society.
Copyright
© 2007 Robert Higgs
Robert
Higgs Archives
|