The Zarqawi Phenomenon
by
Tom Engelhardt
and Dahr Jamail
by Tom Engelhardt and
Dahr Jamail
Just in the
last few days, according to USA Today, a "propaganda
video purportedly made by al-Qaeda-linked terror suspect
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi" has been released showing suicide attacks
against U.S. forces in Iraq supposedly inspired by or ordered by
him. Since George Bush first
mentioned him in October 2002 in a speech in Cincinnati as proof
of an al-Qaeda presence in Iraq, and so of Saddam Hussein's essential
al-Qaeda-ness, Zarqawi has moved ever more front and center as Iraq's
main terrorist threat. He now has an enormous bounty on his head
and is cited regularly by the President as well as other administration
officials as our enemy of enemies in that land, proof positive that
Iraq is "the central theater in the war on terror." In the U.S.,
he has come to personify the war in Iraq, his presence both a kind
of instant why-we-fight explanation for our being there and a living
justification for everything we are doing there.
Zarqawi has
indeed been a strange phenomenon of the ongoing war. Sometimes he
seems to be everywhere at once in that country, blamed for (or,
through jihadist websites, taking credit for) everything from the
latest IED attacks on U.S. troops to mortar barrages against U.S.
bases, suicide car-bomb assaults on Shiite civilian targets, kidnappings,
beheadings, even a string of bombings stretching
from Morocco to Turkey in 2003, not to speak of the resistance
of whole Iraqi cities to the American occupation, If it happens
and it's horrific, he seems to be the one responsible. His name
has more or less replaced Saddam's and Osama Bin Laden's as the
enemy of choice for the United States. He is a literal whirling
dervish of an enemy. His lieutenants or aides fall constantly into
American hands; he is reportedly at every hotspot all over Iraq
or not in Iraq at all. His organization seems to take credit
for just about every attack, every suicide bomb, every explosion
in the country. The search for Zarqawi has become an – if not the
– organizing theme of the American war in Iraq. At one point recently,
the blogger Billmon
posted the following set of typical Zarqawi headlines:
June
16, 2005: U.S. Says It Has Captured Al Qaeda Leader for Mosul Area
June 5,
2005: Militant linked to Zarqawi arrested
May 25,
2005: Top aide to al-Zarqawi arrested north of Baghdad
May 25,
2005: US: al-Zarqawi aides arrested
May 9, 2005:
Gains seen after new arrest of al-Zarqawi aide
April 19,
2005: Iraqi Security Forces Capture Two Zarqawi Associates
March 9,
2005: A Zarqawi cell "prince", six others captured in Baquba
And he suggested
the following template for the basic we-almost-got-Zarqawi
story in our press, a kind of Iraqi variant on America's Most
Wanted:
[Iraqi/US/US
and Iraqi] forces have [nabbed/captured/ arrested] [a/one/two] [senior/middle/]
[figure(s)/operations chief(s)/terrorist operative(s)] of [Jordanian/al-Qaeda-linked/Iraq's
most wanted] terrorist Abu Musab Zarqawi.
And yet, as
far as anyone can tell, Zarqawi's actual organization or network
is, at best, modest in nature and no one writing about it or him
even really knows whether the man is alive or dead, in or out of
Iraq. A look at basic press accounts of Zarqawi finds them filled
to the brim with words like "purportedly," "allegedly," "claims,"
and "the CIA believes with a high degree of confidence." And the
unnamed sources who tell us what is supposedly known about Zarqawi
are invariably anonymous "American officials" or "intelligence officials,"
the same people who once
assured us that he had a leg amputated in one of Saddam's Baghdad
hospitals. (He is now believed to be two-legged.)
How to put
together this conveniently satanic figure capable of personalizing
all the horrors of Iraq in a single monstrous body and bringing
them home to the American public in a way that the Bush administration
has found convenient with what little is known about a possibly
not-too-bright small-town thug is a curious challenge. Independent
journalist Dahr Jamail, who wrote for Tomdispatch (among other places)
from Baghdad and then came
home for a break, is now back in the Middle East and, from Amman,
Jordan, he went on his own search for the truth behind the Zarqawi
phenomenon. ~ Tom
The Zarqawi
Phenomenon
By Dahr Jamail
A remarkable
proportion of the violence taking place in Iraq is regularly credited
to the Jordanian Ahmad al-Khalayleh, better known as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,
and his organization Al Qaeda in Iraq. Sometimes it seems no car
bomb goes off, no ambush occurs that isn't claimed in his name or
attributed to him by the Bush administration. Bush and his top officials
have, in fact, made good use of him, lifting his reputed feats of
terrorism to epic, even mythic, proportions (much aided by various
mainstream media outlets). Given that the invasion and occupation
of Iraq has now been proven beyond a shadow of a doubt to be based
upon administration lies and manipulations, I had begun to wonder
if the vaunted Zarqawi even existed.
In Amman,
where I was recently based, random interviews with Jordanians only
generated more questions and no answers about Zarqawi. As it happens,
though, the Jordanian capital is just a short cab ride from Zarqa,
the city Zarqawi is said to be from. So I decided to slake my curiosity
about him by traveling there and nosing around his old neighborhood.
"Zarqawi,
I don't even know if he exists," said a scruffy taxi driver in Amman
and his was a typical comment. "He's like Bin Laden, we don't even
know if he exists; but if he does, I support that he fights the
U.S. occupation of Iraq."
Chatting with
a man sipping tea in a small tea stall in downtown Amman, I asked
what he thought of Zarqawi. He was convinced that Zarqawi was perfectly
real, but the idea that he was responsible for such a wide range
of attacks in Iraq had to be "nonsense."
"The Americans
are using him for their propaganda," he insisted. "Think about it
with all of their power and intelligence capabilities they
cannot find one man?"
Like so many
others in neighboring Jordan, he, too, offered verbal support for
the armed resistance in Iraq, adding, "Besides, it is any person's
right to defend himself if his country is invaded. The American
occupation of Iraq has destabilized the entire region."
The Bush administration
has regularly claimed that Zarqawi was in and then had just barely
escaped from whatever city or area they were next intent on attacking
or cordoning off or launching a campaign against. Last year, he
and his organization were reputed to be headquartered in Fallujah,
prior to the American assault that flattened the city. At one point,
American officials even alleged that he was commanding the defense
of Fallujah from elsewhere by telephone. Yet he also allegedly slipped
out of Fallujah either just before or just after the beginning of
the assault, depending on which media outlet or military press release
you read.
He has since
turned up, according to American intelligence reports and the U.S.
press, in Ramadi, Baghdad, Samarra, and Mosul among other places,
along with side trips to Jordan, Iran, Pakistan and/or Syria. His
closest "lieutenants" have been captured by the busload, according
to American military reports, and yet he always seems to have a
bottomless supply of them. In May, a news report on the BBC even
called Zarqawi "the leader of the insurgency in Iraq," though more
sober analysts of the chaotic Iraqi situation say his group, Jama'at
al-Tawhid wal Jihad, while probably modest in size and reach, is
linked to a global network of jihadists. However, finding any figures
as to the exact size of the group remains an elusive task.
Former US
Secretary of State Colin Powell offered photos before the U.N. in
February, 2003 of Zarqawi's "headquarters" in Kurdish-controlled
northern Iraq, also claiming that Zarqawi had links to Al-Qaeda.
The collection of small huts was bombed to the ground by U.S. forces
in March of that year, prompting one news source to claim that Zarqawi
had been killed. Yet seemingly contradicting Powell's claims for
Zarqawi's importance was a statement made in October, 2004 by Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who conceded that Zarqawi's ties to
Al Qaeda may have been far more ambiguous, that he may have been
more of a rival than a lieutenant to Osama bin Laden. "Someone could
legitimately say he's not Al Qaeda," added Rumsfeld.
The Eternal
Netherworld of Zarqawi
For anyone
trying to assess the Zarqawi phenomenon from neighboring Jordan,
complicating matters further are the contradictory statements Jordanians
regularly offer up about almost any aspect of Zarqawi's life, history,
present activities, or even his very existence.
"I've met
him here in Jordan," claimed Abdulla Hamiz, a 29 year-old merchant
in Amman, "Two years ago." However, Hajam Yousef, shining shoes
under a date palm in central Amman, insists, "He doesn't exist except
in the minds of American policy-makers."
In fact, what
little is actually known about Zarqawi sounds like the biography
of a troubled but normal man from the industrial section of Zarqa.
Thirty-eight years old now, according to the BBC, Zarqawi reportedly
grew up a rebellious child who ran with the wrong crowd. He liked
to play soccer in the streets as a young boy and dropped out of
school when he was 17. According to some reports, his friends claimed
that in his teens he started drinking heavily, getting tattoos,
and picking fights he could not win. According to Jordanian intelligence
reports provided to the Associated Press in Amman, Zarqawi was jailed
in the 1980's for sexual assault, though no additional details are
available. By the time he was 20 he evidently began looking for
direction, and ended up making his way to Afghanistan in the last
years of the jihadist war against the Soviets in that country. While
some media outlets like the New York Times claim that he
did not actually fight in Afghanistan, there are people in Jordan
who believe he did.
He is reported
to have returned to Jordan in 1992 where he was arrested after Jordanian
authorities found weapons in his home. Upon his release in 1999,
he left once again for Pakistan. When his Pakistani visa expired,
expecting to be arrested as a suspect in a terror plot if he returned
to Jordan, he entered Afghanistan instead.
After supposedly
running a weapons camp there, he was next sighted by Jordanian authorities,
crossing back into Jordan from Syria in September of 2002. Sometime
between then and May 11, 2004, when he was reported to have beheaded
the kidnapped American, Nick Berg, in Baghdad, Zarqawi entered Iraq.
Many news outlets have reported that his goal in Iraq is to generate
a sectarian civil war between the Sunni and Shia.
In September,
2004, the BBC, among others, reported, "U.S. officials suspect that
Zarqawi…is holed up with followers in the rebellious Iraqi city
of Fallujah," though their sources, as is true of more or less all
sources in every report on Zarqawi, were nebulous. During the second
siege of Fallujah, last November, Newsweek reported that
"some U.S. officials say that Zarqawi may actually be directing
or instigating events in the town by telephone from elsewhere in
Iraq." Though they too cited no specific sources and provided no
evidence for this, Newsweek then summed Zarqawi's importance
up in this way: "His crucial role in the deteriorating security
situation in Iraq, however, cannot be underestimated." Meanwhile,
the BBC was reporting that his "network is considered the main source
of kidnappings, bomb attacks and assassination attempts in Iraq"
another statement made without much, if any, solid evidence.
In the end,
the vast mass of reportage on Abu Musab al-Zarqawi amounts to countless
statements based on anonymous sources hardly less shadowy to
ordinary readers than him. He exists, then, in a kind of eternal
netherworld of reportage, rumor, and attribution. It could almost
be said that never has a figure been more regularly written about
based on less hard information. While we have a rough outline of
who he is, where he is from, and where he went until he entered
Iraq, evidence that might stand up in a court of law is consistently
absent. The question that begs to be answered in this glaring void
of hard information is: Who benefits from the ongoing tales of the
mysterious Zarqawi?
The Search
for Zarqawi's Past
My own little
journey only seemed to repeat this larger phenomenon on a more modest
scale. It was the sort of story where, from beginning to end, no
one I met ever seemed willing to offer his or her real name (or
certainly let a real name be used in an article). From second one,
Zarqawi and an urge for anonymity were tightly and perhaps appropriately
bound together. Abdulla (not his real name, of course), the man
who agreed to drive my translator Aisha and me to Al-Zarqa for this
excursion was a Jordanian, by the look of things about 30 years
old, who chain-smoked nervously throughout the trip. We decided
to go with him after running into him while I was conducting my
own informal Zarqawi reality poll in Amman.
"I know him
personally because we fought together in Afghanistan in the early
90's," insisted Abdulla, "If you like, I can show you where
he is from."
When he picked
us up on the late afternoon of the next day in his beat-up, rusting
taxi, he agreed to a modest fee that was to be paid at the end of
our excursion. As we puttered up a hillside on our venture to Zarqawi's
hometown of Al-Zarqa, he promptly pulled out a small stack of photos.
I flipped through them as we drove towards Zarqawi's neighborhood
and noted Abdulla standing in front of the huge Faisal Mosque in
Islamabad, Pakistan, a giant beard (no longer present) dominating
his flowing dishdasha.
Another picture
had him in Peshawar, Pakistan, a city near the Afghan border known
as a recruiting and staging area for the Taliban. Others seemed
to have him in the Philippines standing amid dense forest with a
gun slung over his shoulder. In none of them why should I have
been surprised did he have a companion with the now so globally
recognizable Zarqawi sneer.
A little while
into our journey, out of nowhere Abdulla suddenly said, "Anyone
collaborating with the Americans in Iraq should be killed!"
I took this
as a sign that he felt like talking, and asked him what he knew
of Zarqawi. According to him, he met the mythic terrorist in Peshawar
before being sent with him to a training camp on the border of Afghanistan
in 1990. "There are several well-known training camps in the mountains
between Afghanistan and Pakistan," he explained, "And we were in
one of those, along with freedom fighters from Syria, Jordan, Palestine,
and Lebanon."
Only fighters
for "jihad" were allowed into the camps, he continued proudly. Only
fighters who were identified by other well-known mujahideen were
granted permission to enter, in an effort to safeguard those camps
against spies. After three months of training with machine guns
and rocket launchers, Abdulla claims that he and Zarqawi headed
for Afghanistan to fight the Russians who remained there.
When I looked
at him quizzically since the Russians withdrew from Afghanistan
in February of 1989 he replied, "Many of them stayed after their
government announced they had withdrawn so we were pushing the
rest of them out."
This was already
a questionable tale, but he went right on. They were given the choice,
he claimed, of where to go in Afghanistan, and Abdulla proudly stated
that most of the mujahideen went to the "hot" areas where they expected
to find fighting. Our discussion was then interrupted because we
had completed the hop to Zarqa and arrived in the neighborhood,
so rumor has it, where Zarqawi's brother-in-law lives. We were dropped
off near a small mosque
where Zarqawi supposedly used to pray.
Abdulla says
it isn't safe for him to linger here though he doesn't bother
to explain why and we agree instead that he will call us on my
cell phone in an hour to see if we need more time or not.
So Aisha and
I begin to walk around the quiet, middle-class neighborhood asking
people if they know where the brother-in-law lives. Small
children play in the streets. Behind them young men and parents
sit eyeing us suspiciously. The wind whips plastic bags along the
roads between the usual stone houses of Jordan. Finally, we find
an old man with a white, flowing beard and tired eyes sitting in
a worn chair at the front of a small grocery stall. He admits to
being the Imam of the mosque, but when asked if he remembers Zarqawi
he dodges the question artfully.
"It is probably
true that he used to pray in my mosque," he responds tiredly, "but
I can't say for sure, as my back is to the people whom I lead in
prayers."
After this
he looks away, down the road. I assume he's wishing we were gone
undoubtedly like so many Zarqawi seekers before us. So we thank
him and walk on.
Next, we find
a woman no names given who assures us that Zarqawi is from
the Beni Hassan tribe, the largest tribe in Jordan, before pointing
to a
two-story white house with a black satellite dish on top.
"That is Ahmed
Zarqawi's home," she says softly, referring to one of his brothers
before warning, "But don't go there because they will throw rocks
on your head. They are sick of the media."
After being
sidetracked by being shown his brothers' home, we keep doggedly
asking for his brother-in-law, but everyone insists that they simply
don't know where he lives, which seems odd. Just up the hill from
his brother's home, we stumble upon a middle-aged man who is willing
to be interviewed. He's a rare find in this village that has certainly
been inundated with media, not to speak of far more threatening
visits from the intelligence and police personnel of various countries.
Like our taxi
driver, this man agrees to be interviewed on condition of anonymity.
These are, it seems, a reasonably media-savvy group of villagers.
He tells us that Zarqawi's brother doesn't know much about the mythic
legend of the Jordanian jihadi outlaw, due to the fact that he keeps
his distance from all the hoopla. He then laughs and adds, "But
all the media went to his brother's house anyway to film it, because
they thought it was Zarqawi's home!"
He then points
across a shallow valley where lines of homes sit bathed in the setting
sun. "He [Zarqawi] is from
that village, lives near a cemetery, and his father is mayor
of that district, which is called al-Ma'assoum quarter."
He claims
to have known Abu Musab since he was seven years old, as they went
to Prince Talal Primary School together. "He was a troublemaker
ever since he was a kid," he explains, "What the media is saying
about him is not true, though. Abu Musab is a normal guy. What the
Americans are saying is not true. Most of us who know him here and
in his neighborhood don't believe any of this media."
He tells us
that Zarqawi left the neighborhood in the early 1990's to go to
Afghanistan, but that he doesn't believe he is in Iraq. Along with
others in the neighborhood, he is convinced that Zarqawi was killed
in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan during the U.S. bombings
that resulted from the attacks of September 11th.
"His wife
and their three children still live over there," he adds, "But don't
go talk to them. They won't allow it." He believes Zarqawi was killed,
"100%," and then says emphatically, "If he is still alive, why not
show a recent photo of him? All of these they show in the media
are quite old."
Like so many
Jordanians, he supports the Iraqi resistance, "All Muslims should
fight this occupation because every day the Americans are slaughtering
innocent Iraqis." Zarqawi, he tells us, wasn't a fighter until he
went to Afghanistan. "Then his wife covered herself in black and
has worn it ever since." According to this man, Zarqawi has two
brothers named Ahmed and Sail. He says with a smile, "Most of the
media coming here are westerners because I think most of the Arab
media know this is all a myth."
He holds up
his hands when one of his sons brings us coffee and asks, "When
they show hostages in Iraq, why doesn't he put himself in the film?
There is simply no proof he is alive offered by the Americans or
the media."
We engage
in some small talk while drinking our strong Arabic coffee as we
sit under grape vines lacing the terrace over our heads. As the
sun begins to set, we thank him for the talk and the coffee, and
head off as our taxi driver phones.
I am walking
quickly through the streets to meet him when Aisha, whom I've worked
with often in Baghdad, reassures me: "You can slow down, Dahr, we
are not in danger here. This isn't like Baghdad where we'll be killed
after dark."
Shortly thereafter
we meet our driver. "They didn't tell you where his brother-in-law
is because his home has been raided so many times," he states as
a matter of fact. "By both Jordanian and US intelligence."
Our driver
insists that Zarqawi is alive and well in Iraq. "I'm certain of
it, because if he was dead they would show his picture and make
the announcement. He has always been so strong. When we were in
Afghanistan, any time we got a new machine to learn or French missiles,
he was the first to learn them."
He drives
us by another mosque Zarqawi is also supposed to have attended.
We are in the al-Ma'assoum quarter now and our driver tells us that
a sister of Abu Musab is the head of the Islamic Center of the district.
He then adds, somewhat randomly, that he himself has been in different
prisons for a total of seven years one of those statements you
can't decide whether you wished you had never heard or are simply
relieved you didn't hear hours earlier just as you were beginning.
"In Afghanistan
when we beheaded people it was to show the enemy what their fate
was to be. It was to frighten them."
I think to
myself grimly: Well, it works.
He adds, "The
jihad in Iraq is not just Zarqawi. It is up to Allah if we prevail,
not dependent on the hand of Zarqawi. If he is killed, the jihad
will continue there."
I ask him
about civilian casualties. Does he think Zarqawi cares about the
killing of innocent people?
"I have had
so many discussions with Iraqis to tell them that Zarqawi doesn't
instruct his followers in the killing of innocent people. If he
did this, I would be the first to turn against him. He only targets
the Americans and collaborators."
He's still
chain-smoking as we drive through the darkness back to Amman. I
pay him as we thank him for taking us to Zarqa, and then his beat
up taxi rolls off down the busy street.
The Eerie
Blankness of Zarqawi
After discussions
with our driver and other Jordanians, the only thing I feel I can
say for sure is that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is a real person. Whether
or not he is alive and fighting in Iraq or not, or what acts he
is actually responsible for there, is open to debate. On one point,
I'm quite certain, however: Reported American claims that Zarqawi
has affiliations with the secular government of Syria make no sense.
Just as Saddam Hussein opposed the religious fundamentalism of Osama
Bin-Laden, the Syrian government would not be likely to team up
with a fundamentalist like Zarqawi.
As Bush administration
officials have falsely claimed Saddam Hussein had links to Bin-Laden
and to Zarqawi, they have also conveniently linked Zarqawi to a
Syrian government they would certainly like to take out. Similarly,
Bush officials continue to link Zarqawi to the Iraqi resistance
undoubtedly another bogus claim in that the resistance in Iraq
is primarily composed of Iraqi nationalists and Baathist elements
who are fighting to expel the occupiers from their country, not
to create a global Islamic jihad.
Thus, even
if Zarqawi is involved in carrying out attacks inside Iraq and is
killed at some future moment, the effect this would have on the
Iraqi resistance would surely be negligible. It would be but another
American "turning point" where nothing much turned.
Right now,
when you try to track down Zarqawi, a man with a $25 million American
bounty on his head, or simply try to track him back to the beginnings
of his life's journey, whether you look for him in the tunnels of
Tora Bora, the ruined city of Fallujah, the Syrian borderlands,
or Ramadi, you're likely to run up against a kind of eerie blankness.
Whatever the real Zarqawi may or may not be capable of doing today
in Iraq or elsewhere, he is dwarfed by the Zarqawi of legend. He
may be the Bush administration's Terrorist of Terrorists (now that
Osama Bin-Laden has been dropped into the void), the Iraqi insurgency's
unwelcome guest, the fantasy figure in some Jihadi dreamscape, or
all of the above. Whatever the case, Zarqawi the man has disappeared
into an epic tale that may or may not be of his own partial creation.
Even dead, he is unlikely to die; even alive, he is unlikely to
be able to live up to anybody's Zarqawi myth.
Whoever
he actually may be, the "he" of Jihadist websites and American pronouncements
is now linked inextricably with the devolving occupation of Iraq
and a Bush administration that, even as it has built him up as a
satanic bogeyman, is itself beginning to lose its own mythic qualities,
to grow smaller.
I'm
sure we'll continue to hear of "him" in Iraq, in Jordan, or elsewhere
as his myth, perhaps now beyond anyone's control, continues to transform
itself as an inextricable part of the brutal, bloody occupation
of Iraq where the Bush Administration finds itself fighting not
primarily Zarqawi (or his imitators) but the Iraqis they allegedly
came to liberate.
July
6, 2005
Tom
Engelhardt [send him mail]
is editor of TomDispatch.com,
a project of the Nation
Institute. He
is the author of several books, including The
Last Days of Publishing: A Novel and The
End of Victory Culture. Dahr Jamail is an independent journalist
from Anchorage, Alaska. He has spent 8 months reporting from occupied
Iraq, and recently has been reporting from Jordan and Turkey. He
regularly reports for Inter Press Service, as well as contributing
to The Nation, The Sunday Herald and Asia Times
among others. His latest pieces from the region can be read at
his website.
Copyright
© 2005 Dahr Jamail
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