Dramatic news is filtering in from Qatar where the United States Special Representative for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad and his delegation were huddled together with the representatives of the Taliban for four consecutive days since Monday. The duration of the talks unmistakably signifies that complex negotiations have taken place. Things are moving almost entirely in the direction I had indicated in my earlier blog US officials converge on Pakistan seeking peace.
What comes to mind for a longtime observer and interlocutor in Afghan affairs will be the lines from T.S. Eliot’s poem Four Quartets, “Footfalls echo in the memory, down the passage we did not take, towards the door we never opened, into the rose garden.” The ‘foot falls in the memory’ go as far back as the forenoon of April 15, 1992 when the then Representative of Secretary-General on Settlement of Situation Relating to Afghanistan, Benon Sevan appeared in the compound of the Indian High Commission in Islamabad straight from a meeting of top Pakistani officials under way chaired by then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to transmit a tantalizing idea to New Delhi as to whether Dr. Najibullah who was stepping down from the office of president of Afghanistan within a day could live in exile in India. (The positive reply from PM Narasimha Rao came on phone within two hours.)
Or, at the very least, the footfalls in memory would go back to a chance meeting circa end-2013 or early 1994 with late Professor Ahmad Hasan Dani, the great Pakistani archaeologist, historian and Sanskrit scholar (above all a humanist and a very dear friend (originally from India and a product of Banares Hindu University.) It was from Dani that I heard for the first time about the strange happenings going on in the Pakistani madrassahs, on the raising of an army of Talibs to be assigned in a near future to Afghanistan. Dani spoke with a profound sense of foreboding that momentous events were about to unfold in Afghanistan. Against the State: An ... Best Price: $5.02 Buy New $5.52 (as of 11:35 UTC - Details)
As it turned out, both in 1992 and in 1996, an orderly transition in Kabul enjoying international legitimacy was not possible to be attained. However, in this third attempt going on in Doha, prospects look distinctly good. The tidings from Doha suggest that two crucial areas of consensus have emerged between the US and the Taliban – a road map for the withdrawal of foreign troops in Afghanistan and a guarantee by the Taliban that Afghan soil will not be used to threaten international security.
The two templates are of course inter-linked. It is unclear whether there will be a total US withdrawal from Afghanistan and a shutting down of the American bases or whether the Taliban is agreeable to a reduced US presence in a near term. Considering the robust opposition of Russia and Iran to any US military presence in their border regions, it seems improbable that Pentagon can keep its bases and the CIA its listening posts in Afghanistan.
However, Taliban’s security assurance is important in as much as it also guarantees, from the Taliban perspective, continued involvement by the international community to assist in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. Put differently, Taliban is ensuring that the international community (read Americans) will no longer ostracize it as a ruling elite. In retrospect, it was the dogged refusal of the US to recognize the Taliban regime in the late 1990s or provide it with any form of international assistance that finally prompted the latter for want of an alternative to accept the offer of financial help from Osama bin Laden.
According to the reports from Doha, a ceasefire is under discussion as well, followed by inter-Afghan talks. If so, the constitution of an interim government also becomes a real possibility. The crucial difference between 1992 and 1996 and now lies in the shift in the Pakistani position. The happenings of the past few days or weeks suggest three things: Ship of Fools: How a S... Check Amazon for Pricing.
One, Pakistan is not seeking a Taliban takeover by force in Afghanistan (even assuming that it has the capability to do so.) Two, Pakistan seems open to a broad-based government in Afghanistan (which includes Taliban or is led by Taliban.) And, three, Pakistan wants the US to remain engaged and committed to post-war Afghanistan.
However, the bottom line is that Pakistan realises that the US is making unprecedented concessions and an optimal point is at hand to close the deal. The US special representative on Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad too cannot be unaware that President Trump would relish making a big announcement on Afghanistan as a crowning foreign policy success in his annual State of the Union address before the Congress in Washington.