Was American Intervention in WW I Justified?

Burton Yale Pines’s work America’s Greatest Blunder: The Fateful Decision to Enter World War One is hardly a new book. (It came out in 2012.) Nor was it published by a leading commercial press, despite the author’s long, distinguished career as a Time magazine correspondent and later, as vice-president of Heritage Foundation. My one, brief contact with Pines was our joint appearance on a panel featured by the Philadelphia Society in 1986, in which we were pitted against each other as a critic and defender of the neoconservatives’ influence on the American conservative movement. Our exchanges were extremely acrimonious; and I never again saw the person I jousted with. Although I tried to locate Pines after reading his book, all my efforts (and those of two of my daughters who have far better computer skills) failed. I wanted to congratulate the author on producing his work, which presents a comprehensive case for why the U.S. should have stayed out of World War I. Pines also shows (if further proof is needed) that from the outset the American government took sides in the European conflict and flubbed every opportunity to make peace between the warring blocs.

Most of these arguments have been made before, from Harry Elmer Barnes in the 1920s down to the Cato Institute’s Jim Powell in 2009 and less dramatically, in the historical studies of Justus Doenecke. Indeed there are so many sound revisionist historians who have written about America’s participation in World War I that it would take several pages to list them all. But no matter how cogent their reasoning and evidence, these scholars have been generally ignored by the national press, and since the rise of the neoconservatives, in establishment Republican publications. This may well explain the fate of Pines’ study, which is forcefully written and heavily documented. His contentions that an honest attempt at mediating a peace would have been better than American military intervention on the Allied side and his obvious revulsion for Wilson’s “crusade for democracy” may have cost him the good will of his longtime allies.

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Let me note, however, that I don’t fully share Pines’ view, as expressed in his title, that America’s involvement in World War I somehow rendered inevitable the Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia and Hitler’s rampage through Europe. America’s participation in the Great War cost over 115,000 lives, guaranteed an unjust treaty, and helped turn the U.S. into what Walter McDougall characterized as a “crusader state,” waging what Richard Gamble has deplored as “wars for righteousness.” Those things are bad enough without having to blame Wilson’s fateful decision (which by the way enjoyed overwhelming Republican support) for happenings to which it contributed only distantly. The Weimar Republic would have survived, despite Allied efforts to wring obscene reparations from Germany’s constitutional democracy while blaming the Germans exclusively for the war they lost. It was the effects of the Great Depression and a series of contingencies, brought about largely by the scheming of President von Hindenburg’s advisers,  that brought the Nazis to power. Although the continuation of the monarchy (a possibility that Wilson raged against) might well have prevented that disaster from occurring, the Republic would have survived if other circumstances had not intervened. America’s Greate... Pines, Burton Yale Best Price: $11.67 Buy New $27.50 (as of 11:35 UTC - Details)

The Bolsheviks took power because the Russian imperial government had plunged headlong into a war from which it couldn’t extricate itself. Unlike the Provisional Government, which seized power from the tsarist regime in March 1917, Lenin and his confreres promised to pull Russia out of a bloody, seemingly endless struggle. The Bolsheviks obtained power, by allowing the Eastern front to collapse. Although Wilson’s government tried to keep the Russian war effort alive while appealing to “democratic” fraternity against “German militarism,” by the time the U.S. joined the fray, the Russian front was coming apart and the Communists were waiting in the wings. Although many grievous sins can be ascribed to the American interventionists, the Bolshevik coup d’état may not be one of them. It was the Germans who brought Lenin from Swiss exile to the Finland Station in Petrograd, in order to push their Russian enemies out of the war.

Pines also misses an opportunity to tell the full story about the sinking of the British luxury liner Lusitania by a German submarine off the coast of Ireland on May 5, 1915. Although the German government warned American passengers to stay off this “war vessel,” the death of 128 Americans as a result of the attack allowed Wilson and his pro-British government to be more open about their pro-Allied sympathies. William Jennings Bryan, the secretary of state, resigned when it became apparent in which direction the president was going; and Bryan’s successor (and the uncle of John Foster Dulles) Robert Lansing, who was passionately in favor of the Allied side, succeeded him. Pines treats as a mystery as well as catastrophic blunder the torpedoing of the Lusitania, but then drops this information: In December 2008 divers had “discovered a new piece of the puzzle” about why the ship “sank so quickly.” The subsequent report given in the British Daily Mail (December 19, 2008) affirmed that the vessel was carrying bullets and other ammunition that would be used to kill German soldiers. It sank so quickly because the contraband cargo on a ship registered as a British war vessel exploded as soon as a torpedo hit it. The same article also mentions that Churchill welcomed the destruction of the ship because he hoped it would draw the U.S. into the war.

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