Iraq u201CUptick,u201D Superpower Downtick?

Quote of the month (November, 1967)

“In November, as their plans gelled, General Westmoreland embarked on a whirlwind tour of the U.S. to testify before Congress and drum up support for the Johnson Administration. u2018With 1968,’ he said, speaking before the National Press Club in Washington, u2018a new phase is starting … we have reached an important point where the end begins to come into view.’ In a televised news conference, he used the phrase u2018light at the end of the tunnel’ to describe improved U.S. fortunes, repeating almost word- for-word a prognostication made by French General Henri Navarre in May of 1953.” (General William Westmoreland, then Commander of American forces in Vietnam, announced that he saw the light at the end of the famed tunnel less than three months before the Vietnamese began their nationwide Tet Offensive. He was also known for saying, “The Oriental doesn’t put the same high price on life as does the Westerner,” a sentiment that undoubtedly helped account for the numbers of deaths we were willing to inflict in South Vietnam.)

Quotes of the month (March 2005)

“Gen. John P. Abizaid, commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East, said yesterday that the strength of the Iraqi insurgency is waning as a result of momentum from elections, and he predicted Iraqi security forces would be leading the fight against insurgents in most of Iraq by the end of 2005.” (Ann Scott Tyson, Iraqi Insurgency Is Weakening, Abizaid Says, the Washington Post, March 2, 2005.)

“[Lt. Gen. John F. Sattler, ] the top Marine officer in Iraq said Friday that the number of attacks against American troops in Sunni-dominated western Iraq and death tolls had dropped sharply over the last four months, a development that he called evidence that the insurgency was weakening in one of the most violent areas of the country.” (Eric Schmitt, “Insurgency Loses Ground, Top Marine In Iraq Says,” the New York Times, March 18, 2005)

“In the privacy of their E-ring offices, senior Pentagon officials have begun to entertain thoughts that were unimaginable a year ago: Iraq is turning the corner… u2018This is still a tough fight. We don’t want anyone to think that it is not,’ said retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney, a military analyst who strongly supports Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. u2018But the momentum is in our direction…’ A military source in Iraq declined to give raw number of attacks, but said, u2018There has been a decided downward trend in the number and lethality of attacks since the January 30 elections.'” (Rowan Scarborough, Pentagon begins to see Iraq momentum shift, the Washington Times, March 28, 2005.)

“In the last two years, you have accomplished much, yet your work isn’t over. Freedom still faces dangerous adversaries. Terrorists still want to attack our people. But they’re losing. These terrorists are losing the struggle because they’re under constant pressure from our Armed Forces, and they will remain under constant pressure from our Armed Forces. (Hoo-ah!)” (George Bush, President Discusses War on Terror, Ft. Hood, Texas, April 12.)

Quotes of the week (April 21—23, 2005)

“The suspected attack on the helicopter and the recovery of so many Iraqi bodies — whether or not they were killed in a single episode last weekend — speak to the continued virulence of the insurgency. A relative calm prevailed for a time and attacks against American troops fell sharply after the Jan. 30 elections. But violence against Iraqis has been rising, and there have been many recent strikes on American patrols. ‘It is a fact that in the last week or two, there’s been an uptick,‘ the Pentagon spokesman, Lawrence Di Rita, said Thursday.” (Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Robert F. Worth, A Private Copter Crashes in Iraq; 6 Americans Die, the New York Times, April 22, 2005.)

“Despite claims that the insurgency in Iraq has declined, an internal Army analysis finds that attacks haven’t necessarily lessened in recent months, but rather appear to have shifted away from U.S. troops to more vulnerable Iraqis… The report also concludes that Iraqi insurgents seem to be staging increasingly sophisticated attacks on both Iraqi and U.S. forces… In recent months some senior U.S. defense officials have suggested that the Iraqi elections held in January and stepped-up U.S. raids have badly hurt the insurgency. Based on recent successes targeting insurgents and building Iraqi security forces, defense officials have hinted that the U.S. military would be able to reduce its numbers in Iraq later this year.” (Gregg Jaffe and Yaroslav Trofimov, Iraq Insurgents Change Their Focus, the Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2005. In print, this piece had the subhead: “Attacks Aren’t on the Wane, Increasingly Target Iraqis, U.S. Army Report Concludes.”)

“I would say that things are becoming more unstable here on the ground and every day you can just see people are a little more scared.” (An Australian “contractor” identified only as “Rodge” on Australian radio. Iraq Deteriorating: Australian Contractor, The Age, April 22, 2005.)

“Violence is escalating sharply in Iraq after a period of relative calm that followed the January elections… Many attacks have gone unchallenged by Iraqi forces in large areas of the country dominated by insurgents, according to the U.S. military, Iraqi officials and civilians and visits by Washington Post correspondents… u2018Definitely, violence is getting worse,’ said a U.S. official in Baghdad, who spoke on condition of anonymity… In city after city and town after town, security forces who had signed up to secure Iraq and replace U.S. forces appear to have abandoned posts or taken refuge inside them for fear of attacks.” (Ellen Knickmeyer, Insurgent Violence Escalates In Iraq, the Washington Post, April 23, 2005.)

The Tunnel at the End of the Light

Okay, okay, Iraq’s not Vietnam. For one thing, just about no one there speaks Vietnamese. Oh, but here’s a similarity, almost no Americans sent into Vietnam spoke Vietnamese (including diplomats); and almost no Americans sent into Iraq spoke Arabic (including diplomats). Oh, but here’s a difference, the iconic photos of the horrors of the war in Vietnam were largely taken by a series of remarkable war photographers like Don McCullin, Eddie Adams, and Catherine Leroy (whose book Under Fire: Great Photographers and Writers in Vietnam is just out); on the other hand, the iconic photos of the Iraq War were not taken by our embedded photojournalists, but on digital cameras by a group of prison guards.

Obviously the two places/wars aren’t the same and let’s toss in another difference for good measure. The two wars occurred at different moments, allowing the crucial players in only one of them to refer to the other. So, while in the Vietnam era people spoke of the United States entering a “quagmire” (forget, for a moment, that the Vietnamese saw the matter rather differently), Americans after the invasion of Iraq worried about the “Q-word.” And they weren’t the only ones entering the pop-referentiality game. After all, as the journalist Christian Parenti wrote, the Iraqis jumped in as well — as in the Baghdad Shiite slum of Sadr City:

“On one of the slum’s main thoroughfares, al-Radhewi Street, are several walls marked with a message in English. Big block letters read Vietnam Street. Farther on, a wall bears a crudely painted mural depicting a modified version of an infamous Abu Ghraib torture photo. It is the prisoner in the hood and cloak standing on a box, arms outstretched, electrical wires dangling from his limbs. Next to him in the mural is the Statue of Liberty, but in place of her torch she holds the lever of an electrical switch connected to the wires. Below is scrawled: The Freedom Form George Bosh.”

But now that we’re deep in the mire, here’s the strange thing: No one bothers to mention the “Q-word” at all. Evidently, there are no words to adequately describe where we are — though that hasn’t stopped various military commanders and Bush administration officials from trying.

In fact, the phrases that have been cropping up ever since the January 30th elections in Iraq — “progress,” “tipping point,” “turning the corner” — rang strangely familiar. Admittedly, no general actually got up and claimed, as Westy Westmoreland did just months before the Tet Offensive of 1968, that he had seen The Light — at that tunnel’s end. In the brief double-period of euphoria after the November election in the U.S. and then the January one in Iraq, however, there was a distinct “uptick,” even an up-rush of heavily qualified but exceedingly positive statements — call it wishfulness, call it propaganda — from military men in Iraq and at home, civilian Defense Department officials, and others in the Bush administration including the President himself (see quotes above). The insurgency had, it seemed, reached its zenith — call it, in the mode of recent oil discussions, “peak insurgency” — and was now “on the wane.” It had begun the slow slide downhill toward oblivion in 2006 or 08 or 10 or… We had reached — and here, let me introduce a phrase from Vietnam that somehow hasn’t made it into the Iraq discussion yet (an obvious oversight by otherwise scrupulously repetitive people) — “the crossover point.”

That term, used by the military in the Vietnam era, referred to the moment when “body counts” would show that we had killed more of the forces of our Vietnamese enemy than they could replace through recruitment in South Vietnam or infiltration from the North. Of course, here’s a difference between the two war eras. As Donald Rumsfeld likes to say, we don’t have (or at least often broadcast) the “metrics” for how we’re doing in Iraq. In Vietnam, on the other hand, the statistics of triumph were omnipresent, regularly made public, and overwhelming. These were summed up in the military’s Measurement of Progress system, monthly reports on everything from “strength trends of the opposing forces; efforts of friendly forces in sorties… enemy base areas neutralized… and the degree of government control of roads, population, etc.”

There were figures on every form of destruction rained down on North Vietnam (sorties flown, tonnage dropped, “truck kills” and the like); while in the South, special effort went into the creation of numerical equivalents for death. Visiting Washington officials received son et lumire briefings in which death was quantified in elaborate charts and diagrams. General Westmoreland, for example, had his “attrition charts,” multicolored bar graphs illustrating various “trends” in death and destruction; while, in the field, Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell had his codified kill ratios of “allied to enemy dead,” ranging from 1—50 (“Highly skilled U.S. unit”) to 1—10 (“Historical U.S. average”). Collated, sorted out, broken down, interpreted, and illustrated, such statistics — a genuine numerology of death — flowed tidally toward policy makers in Washington.

If the American statistics of slaughter had been accepted by both sides as the ruling logic of the Vietnam struggle, the United States should have won that war any day from the mid-1960s on. That they didn’t and that the defeat in Vietnam, however sanitized and reformulated in American pop culture, remains so tenaciously in memory, especially among our military and political leaders, makes any comparison between Vietnam and Iraq a Mbius-loop-style experience. After all, our leaders implicitly, in their actions if not their words, compare the two all the time.

If there are no (or few) “body counts” in this war and the “metrics” flowing back to Washington are not proudly broadcast to the public as signs of impending success, it’s exactly because a supposed lesson of Vietnam was that our daily body-count announcements — that is, the gap between war promises and war results — was a significant factor in finally alienating public support for the war.

And yet, even without the “metrics” in constant sight, we can see the same basic pattern recurring — as in recent glowing statements about insurgency downticks that were followed, as day is night, by reports on upticks in fighting in Iraq with, it should be added, a similar slow erosion of support for the war in the United States. As Juan Cole wrote recently at his Informed Comment website: “Bush and his agendas (social security privatization, the Iraq War) continue to slide in the polls. Americans turn out to want a timetable for withdrawal of US troops just as much as Iraq’s Sunni Arabs do! (69 percent want a clear goal and don’t think Bush has articulated one.)”

Okay, and here’s another Vietnam/Iraq similarity: As was true with Vietnam, the Iraq War is being fought by the Bush administration on two fronts. In the post-Vietnam years, the war’s supporters commonly claimed that the Vietnamese had fought a two-front war — a war on the battlefield, which they had supposedly lost to the American military and a war for hearts and minds in the American homeland (as we would now call it), which they won because Americans lacked the will to take unending casualties. (And then, of course, there were all those pesky demonstrators, not to speak of the reporters who, myth had it, worked like so many demons to undermine the public will). In reality, the American government was engaged in a vigorous two-front war long before the Vietnamese were capable of weighing in. After all, Westmoreland made his infamous tunnel-and-light statements in November 1967 because Lyndon Johnson felt he needed reinforcements on the home front. He was already fighting a losing battle for the national opinion polls and so brought his general back to offer a little good news in front of the cameras.

Similarly, the Bush administration has, from the beginning, been fighting a complex two-front war (at home against both a pathetic Democratic opposition hardly willing to oppose him and what threatened to be, but hasn’t become, a formidable antiwar movement). With its carefully embedded media in Iraq, its own propaganda outlets in the mainstream in the U.S., a cowed press, and much careful planning, the administration has certainly fought a better “post-war” in the United States than in Iraq, where disaster and failure have dogged American plans every step of the way. Each break or organized “turning point” has been used here to orchestrate a chorus of positive voices and good news about the war, regularly sidelining the bad news, often for significant periods of time. The January 30th elections were only the latest round of this. (Previous major ones: the pulling down of Saddam’s statue, the killing of Saddam’s sons, Uday and Qusay, the capture of Saddam himself, and the turning over of “sovereignty” to the Iraqis).

Unlike the Vietnamese, the insurgents haven’t even attempted to open a “second front” in the United States. If anything, factions of them, via the omnipresent threat of kidnapping and murder, have helped embed the American media even further — and, in videos, some parts of the fractured insurgency have offered, as with beheadings, evidence of barbarism around which no antiwar movement is likely to coalesce.

And yet… it’s already clear that, as with the Johnson and Nixon administrations in the Vietnam era, the Bush administration is fighting a defensive “war” at home that it will not, in the long run, be able to win. It may be giving ground slowly, but giving it is, and years of debilitating fighting yet to come ensure that the war on the home front will end poorly for them.

So on the one hand, our leaders, military and civilian, have been ducking and twisting just not to be Vietnam-ish — call it the attempt to learn from the Vietnam War experience. On the other hand, like so many addicts who never went into a recovery program, they just can’t stop themselves, given some of the crude similarities between the two experiences. On so many subjects, all they have to do is open their mouths and out pops Vietnam. As for instance with their recent glowing descriptions of how successfully we’re training “our” Vietnamese (…oops, I meant Iraqis), followed by generally unhappy results on the ground; or their awkward attempts to explain the willingness of enemy Iraqis (and associated or disassociated jihadis) to die for what they believe in, and the willingness of “our” Iraqis to run from what they don’t believe in.

So much of this seems familiar; in part because it’s in the nature of our world that, as Jonathan Schell has made so clear in his book The Unconquerable World, when a superpower invades a smaller country, tenacious resistance of one sort of another will result. National sovereignty, which has proved such a weak reed for so many countries and which has often enough brought little but the sovereignty of tyranny, is nonetheless prized beyond measure on the scale of what is of value, what is essential on this planet. And the results — whether in Vietnam or in Iraq, whether the insurgents are backed by another superpower or by scattered bands of jihadis and weak states — turn out to be not that different.

Withdrawing, Forever and a Day

On the difference side of the ledger when it comes to the two wars and two eras, consider U.S. military leadership. In Vietnam, the military was fighting in the context of the Cold War. The enemy was the Soviets (or perhaps the Chinese, or both); the Vietnamese were considered their cat’s-paws. In a sense, they never existed; the fierce issue of nationalism (they had it, we didn’t) was largely ignored; the degree to which a civil war was going on in Vietnam was ignored as well. In a sense, our military leadership, right to platoon level, was not well schooled in the war they were fighting. This is, I believe, no longer true.

Recently, I listened to a TV journalist, who fought in Vietnam and was embedded with the Marines in Iraq, comment that, in occupied Iraq, the people you wanted to talk to weren’t the dopes staffing the CPA (headed by L. Paul Bremer), but the military guys; that they were the only ones who knew what was going down. The military leadership there had done its reading. They have, for instance, read William S. Lind on Fourth Generation Warfare — that is, various kinds of insurgencies no longer controlled by states, or parties that could become future states; struggles in which a state military like ours faces “no single opponent.” (“All over the world, state militaries are fighting non-state opponents, and almost always, the state is losing. State militaries were designed to fight other state militaries like themselves, and against non-state enemies most of their equipment, tactics and training are useless or counterproductive.”) They are also well aware that such wars take, at best, years to win; and that superpower militaries are not especially well-suited to fight them.

I also listened to a Lt. Colonel, presently at the Hoover Institution, who, on becoming convinced after 9/11 that his command was going into Afghanistan promptly had 1,000 copies each of two books — Lt. Col. Lester Grau’s The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan and The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet Afghan War by Grau and Colonel A. Jalali — airlifted to his forces and distributed widely. In the typical blunt way that soldiers can sometimes talk, he said that they had come in quite handy in the war to follow.

So you have a well-read, well-schooled, well-trained military that knows all too well how ill-suited it is to the struggle at hand in Iraq and, unlike in Vietnam, isn’t begging the civilians in Washington for a little more time and some more troops to finish off the job. Unlike in Vietnam, my guess is that many of them want out and would, in fact, happily enough appropriate former Senator George Aiken’s Vietnam-era suggestion to simply declare victory and — in some phased manner — go home.

In Vietnam, the military high command always wanted more. In Iraq, in a sense, they may want less than nothing at all. On the other hand, here’s a similarity with Vietnam: As was true then, so now, in Washington (and in the field) there’s a constant linguistic scramble to avoid the suggestion of defeat, which would mean thinking the unthinkable. If you were to return, for instance, to The Pentagon Papers of the Vietnam era, you would find document after document in which you can sense the chagrin, desperation, or despair that the war planners felt discussing (or often straining to avoid discussing) some version of defeat (“retreat,” “humiliation” or, in that classic phrase of the time that did reenter Iraq-speak for a while and will certainly return, “cutting and running”).

For the first time in a while, however, we’ve gotten a fair amount of talk from American officials about “withdrawal.” The President admittedly refuses to set a “timetable” for withdrawal, but one of his generals, Lance Smith, deputy commander of CentCom, which oversees the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, lately suggested that American troops “could begin coming home in significant numbers if insurgent violence is low through general elections scheduled for the end of [2005].” Some American officials have recently spoken about getting American troop strength down from the present 140,000—150,000 range to perhaps 105,000 by early 2006 if all goes well. For instance, in an April 11th piece sprinkled with qualified but hopeful comments (“‘They’re slowly losing,’ said Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, a senior aide to [Joint Chiefs Chairman] General Myers who commanded the Fourth Infantry Division in Iraq last year.”), Eric Schmitt of the New York Times reported that 105,000 figure from “senior military officials… by this time next year.” His story began:

“Two years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the American-led military campaign in Iraq is making enough progress in fighting insurgents and training Iraqi security forces to allow the Pentagon to plan for significant troop reductions by early next year, senior commanders and Pentagon officials say. Senior American officers are wary of declaring success too soon against an insurgency they say still has perhaps 12,000 to 20,000 hard-core fighters, plentiful financing and the ability to change tactics quickly to carry out deadly attacks. But there is a consensus emerging among these top officers and other senior defense officials about several positive developing trends, although each carries a cautionary note.”

At other moments, other officials were reportedly suggesting — as did Gen. Richard A. Cody, Army vice chief of staff, in mid-March — that:

“Any permanent reduction in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq isn’t likely until sometime between 2006 and 2008… For there to be any drawdown, Iraq security forces must continue to improve their ability to fight the insurgency themselves, [Cody] told reporters. The military is planning a staggered rotation of soldiers and large units that will be in Iraq between 2006 and early 2008, Cody said. That planning is expected to include the possibility of a significant reduction in U.S. forces. [Cody] said he could not be more specific in numbers or timeframe, nor did he say how a reduction would be achieved. Sending fewer or smaller units to Iraq is one possibility; shortening the time each unit spends in Iraq is another.”

Meanwhile, in England, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, his prime minister now in an election fight, was also talking “withdrawal.” According to Anton La Guardia of the British Telegraph, Straw said that “British and American troops will be withdrawn steadily from Iraq starting next year and are likely to be completely out of the country within five years.” Five years (and note that “likely”)! Or in Straw’s exact words, “over the next parliament British troops will be down to virtually nothing.”

Virtually nothing… if all goes… likely… probably… Such statements, modest as they may be, referring as they do to dates that range from 2006 to 2010 or beyond, mentioning as they do only partial troop draw-downs, nonetheless never lack their qualifiers. Here’s a phenomenon that should ring a few Vietnam bells: withdrawal as non-withdrawal. So should the increasingly anxious visits of high officials like Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Zoelick to Iraq looking for reassurance that our battered position there will not worsen.

Since we are only entering the “withdrawal” phase now, it’s worth thinking about what kind of a model the Vietnam War offers policymakers on this score. In the Vietnam era, American officials, even presidents, talked endlessly, sometimes, as with Richard Nixon, incessantly about “withdrawal.” And yet here was the odd thing, withdrawal never actually involved departure, merely all sorts of departure-like feints and maneuvers — from bombing “pauses” that only led to fiercer bombing campaigns to negotiation offers never meant to be taken up to a “Vietnamization” plan in which American ground troops would be pulled out in favor of American-trained South Vietnamese forces as our air war was intensified. (Vietnamization — like Iraqification today — was a crucial part of Nixon’s second-front campaign in the United States meant to disarm the antiwar movement, as to some extent it did. It was only in Vietnam that it failed.)

Each gesture of withdrawal allowed the war planners to fight a little longer; but if withdrawal did not withdraw the country from the war, the war’s prosecution never brought it close to a victorious conclusion either. With every failed withdrawal gesture and every failed battle strategy, the sense of Vietnam as an American “nightmare” (a word from that moment that hasn’t quite yet made it into ours) seemed to draw closer, and a feeling arose that the country had somehow been entrapped in Vietnam. (Think Q-word.)

This may be the strangest aspect of any reading of The Pentagon Papers, that secret history of the war commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara — who, speaking of parallels, moved on to the World Bank presidency, just like undersecretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz, once his usefulness in the Pentagon disappeared. No better documentation exists on the detailed nature of U.S. planning for upwardly ratcheted destruction in Indochina. Yet, among successive groups of planners one senses in the documents a growing feeling of inadvertence, helplessness, victimization, and self-pity.

Expect something similar from the Bush administration as things get worse. After all, though at least some significant part of our military leadership may want out, the civilians who took us in, don’t. Since the civilians in the Pentagon and the rest of the administration think that even from hell there’s no exit, they never planned to leave Iraq and I doubt they plan to depart now. As Donald Rumsfeld told assembled American troops during one of his surprise visits to Baghdad recently, “We don’t have an exit strategy, we have a victory strategy.” This, you might say, is a classic Vietnam-era formula for disaster.

Increasingly, observers from right-wing columnist Robert Novak to Juan Cole — who believes that, speaking of Vietnam parallels, the Bush administration has put into effect its own “domino theory,” creating something like a Shia crescent in the region — sense that it’s all in some fashion more or less over in Iraq. Assumedly withdrawal should be in the cards. But I wouldn’t hold my breath on this one. We should watch for this administration’s withdrawal maneuvers meant to hold off any exit from the country.

On the other hand — to point to another difference between Vietnam and Iraq — actual withdrawals are underway. If the Brits are taking the path of withdrawal maneuvers only, the Spanish, the Danes, the Thais, the Hondurans, the Hungarians, the Norwegians, the Portuguese, the New Zealanders, the Filipinos, and the Ukrainians have already left or are in the process of leaving, turning the “coalition of the willing” into the “coalition of the wilting.” Just two weeks ago, the Polish government, grabbing desperately at the ending of the Security Council’s mandate in Iraq, announced that their 1,700 troops would be out by year’s end; and with the Belusconi government suffering a serious setback in regional elections, the Italians now seem to be wavering as well.

We are ever more alone in Iraq; while, in Vietnam, our “coalition of the willing” — some of whom were well-paid for their willingness — hung on until very late in the game. The Republic of Korea’s troops stayed to the bitter end, leaving only in 1973 (thanks to continuing infusions of money from the Nixon administration). Except for a small training contingent that left in 1973, the Australians pulled out in 1972, as did New Zealand and Thai forces. Only the Filipinos left relatively early — in 1969.

The Sun Also Rises… Or Is It Setting?

Though we may be caught in some bizarre Mbius loop of Vietnam-like reality and twisted memories, not every image for our war in Iraq should really be coming from the Vietnam era. To take just one that was mentioned for a while, but has disappeared just when we need it most, how about “imperial overstretch”? A phrase originally from Yale historian Paul Kennedy’s book The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, it referred to the way in which empires on the wane tended to grow more belligerent and war-like, thereby stripping their national treasuries ever faster and so speeding their ends.

As an image, it seems increasingly applicable to us. After all, we know that the military is now desperately overstretched by its war in Iraq; and yet, in its planning, the Pentagon stretches itself ever further in every direction — ever more elaborate and futuristic high-tech weaponry, ever more bases, and ever more plans for the military conquest of space as well as the conquest of space on Earth once filled by the State Department or the intelligence community. Pentagon officials seem intent on capturing just about everything that once passed for public diplomacy and turning it into the property of the Pentagon and “mil-to-mil” (military to military) relations, even the creation of propaganda “comic books” for the Arab world. Here are passages from a recent Pentagon solicitation for a contractor to create such comics:

“In order to achieve long-term peace and stability in the Middle East, the youth need to be reached. One effective means of influencing youth is through the use of comic books. A series of comic books provides the opportunity for youth to learn lessons, develop role models and improve their education… Knowledge of Arab language and cultures, law enforcement and small unit military operations is desired [of the contractor]… The series will be based on the security forces, military and police, in the near future in the Middle East in cooperation with the Ministries of Interior of some of those countries… The US Army retains all rights to the intellectual property contained in these comic books.”

These days, like other Pentagon officials and military commanders, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld — who was recently in Kyrgyzstan to receive assurances from the “Tulip Revolutionaries” that we could continue to use Ganci Air Base near Bishkek as part of our globe-girdling set of garrisons — travels everywhere conducting what would once have been diplomatic business. (Ganci, by the way, was named not for some Kyrgyzstani hero, but for Peter Ganci, the New York City fire chief killed in the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center.)

On his ninth visit to Afghanistan, Rumsfeld said:

"’The progress is real…’ adding, as he frequently does when addressing U.S. troops, that on each trip to Iraq and Afghanistan he sees more improvement than is reflected in news reporting from those countries. He quoted Thomas Jefferson as having said that it is not possible to move from despotism to democracy on a featherbed. u2018That’s for sure. It’s a tough business.'”

Permanent bases are now to be nailed down in Afghanistan. Right on cue, President Hamid Karzai recently requested a “long-term strategic relationship with the United States,” including “military cooperation.” (“Officials in Washington are keenly aware of the Afghan people’s historic animosity toward any foreign military presence,” wrote Thom Shanker of the New York Times, “whether British troops of Rudyard Kipling’s era or Soviet soldiers who invaded under Leonid Brezhnev. Just as important, Bush administration officials do not wish the United States to be seen as an expansionist power eager to set up large, permanent military bases across the Muslim world”). Huge meant-to-be permanent bases, up to 14 of them, have already been built in Iraq, as elsewhere in the Middle East, and smaller versions of the same in the former Soviet ‘stans of Central Asia (including Camp Stronghold Freedom in Uzbekistan and Ganci in Kyrgyzstan) as well as in the former Yugoslavia, and are being considered for the old Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe, and so on and so forth.

Meanwhile, our troop strength is being drained by Iraq (and Afghanistan); the draft (think: Vietnam) is not yet an option; dollars are disappearing down the Iraqi rabbit hole (and into the pockets of various Bush-administration-allied private companies like Halliburton as well as into the pockets of “security contractors” (read: mercenaries) to cover all sorts of activities the military once did from KP to combat. The official spending figures for Iraq alone have now soared past $300 billion with no end in sight (and those figures are probably gross underestimates) in a war which military officials are now saying could take a decade or more to “win.” In the meantime, regional blocs are threatening to arise — and the threat they pose lies not in the military sphere at all but in the economic one. And, oh yes, our deficit soars; the trade imbalance grows by the second; the price of gas rises; the dollar grows ever shakier against the euro; the stock market shudders; and a question is beginning to arise in various global minds: Is America going broke?

Let me suggest then a final comparison, not to Vietnam at all, but to the end of the Cold War. When the Berlin Wall came down and the USSR collapsed like a house of cards in a gale, and we were left crowing about victory in the Cold War, it was suggested that we had simply spent the Soviets into their grave; that our massive arms build-up (started in the Carter years but pursued vigorously in the Reagan era and beyond) had forced the Russians to sink ever more money, far more than the USSR could afford, into its military. In essence, it was suggested that our arms build-up had bankrupted the Russians. We had overstretched them. I’m unconvinced of this myself (at least as narrowly construed), though I’ve seen it argued various ways.

But those who believed it so also believed that, as the far stronger superpower (economically speaking), the United States would be immune to the same phenomenon. The USSR had proved weak, like most empires in their final stages, but we were the new Brits of a new imperial age. On us not only would the sun never set, it was barely rising. And how long ago was that? Just a few years really — each of which now seems to have lasted about a decade.

So how’s this for a little theory of U.S. imperial overstretch? What if, as the lone superpower, we’re still endangered by a superpower — ourselves. After all, especially since September 11, 2001, the Bush administration, with global domination on the brain, opened the military floodgates, pouring money into the Pentagon and allied arms complexes. Without an imperial enemy or even a prospective regional military bloc in sight, Bush’s people launched what can only be termed an arms race of one. In a field without other contestants, we burst out of the arms gate and sprinted off at a mad pace on a long-distance run toward global military dominance for all time to come. But what if, as the stronger of the two Cold War superpowers, the destiny of the militarily overstretched empire was simply reaching us somewhat later? What if, whether the Reaganaut theory of the collapse of the Soviet Union was true or not, it turned out to apply to us? What if, that is, we are spending ourselves into an early grave, bankrupting ourselves?

In Vietnam, an economically ascendant superpower was defeated, but the defeat was a regional one. That was why the victorious country, which had been all but bombed back to the Stone Age over the previous decade, looked like the loser; and the defeated power, despite its final headlong flight and mood of gloom, still looked oddly victorious in its own country. Is it possible though, in suggesting a final dissimilarity between Vietnam and Iraq, that a long-term defeat (or even simply a stalemate of some sort) in that decimated land may turn out to look far more like a defeat in the United States as well?

Will George Bush or the next President appear one day on television to address our country’s “great silent majority,” and bitterly swear that “we will not be defeated,” as Richard Nixon did on April 30, 1970 in announcing his disastrous decision to invade Cambodia? Perhaps that President will, like Nixon, speak angrily of our country not acting like “a pitiful helpless giant.” (“If, when the chips are down, the world’s most powerful nation, the United States of America, acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world.”) But in 2006 or 08 or 10, perhaps we will have taken on the actual look of a pitiful, helpless giant and perhaps elsewhere there will be people crowing about how our country was laid low, about how the globe’s sole superpower, its last empire, had in essence destroyed itself.

[Note: For any of you interested in learning more about the Vietnam era and its unnerving language, I suggest that you consider picking up a copy of my Cold War book, The End of Victory Culture, where I discuss that strange era and from which, in dispatches like this one, I often draw material.]

Thanks to Nick Turse for invaluable research assistance and to John Brown, whose public diplomacy blog is always of interest, for sending the Pentagon comics solicitation notice my way.