Terror
Famine
by
Thomas E. Woods, Jr.
by Thomas E. Woods, Jr.
As
with all totalitarian regimes, Bolshevik Russia looked fearfully
upon any expression of national feeling among its captive peoples.
Bolshevik propaganda concerning the rights of the various nationalities
within the Russian orbit masked the regime’s fear of the power of
nationalism.
In
early 1918 Russian leader V.I. Lenin attempted to force a Soviet
government on the people of the Ukraine, who just one month earlier
had declared their independence. The short-lived Soviet government
in the Ukraine attempted to suppress Ukrainian educational and social
institutions; we even hear cases of the Cheka, an early forerunner
of the KGB, shooting people for the crime of speaking Ukrainian
in the streets.
Although
the Ukrainian people eventually re-established their republic later
in 1918, their victory was fleeting. Lenin would doubtless have
wanted to incorporate the Ukraine into the Soviet system in any
case, but he was particularly adamant about securing control of
the Ukraine because of its great resources. In particular, the Ukraine
boasted some of the most fertile soil in Europe – hence its nickname,
"the breadbasket of Europe."
By
early 1919, a Soviet government had once again been established
in the Ukraine. But this new Soviet government was another failure.
These events were occurring during the Russian Civil War, and the
help of rival factions contributed to a second victory for Ukrainian
independence.
Lenin’s
regime learned a valuable lesson from these two failures. According
to Robert Conquest, "The conclusion was reached that the Ukraine
nationality and language was indeed a major factor, and that a regime
which ignored this too ostentatiously was doomed to be considered
by the population as a mere imposition." When the Soviets gained
control over the Ukraine for a third and final time in 1920 they
realized that they would be faced with ceaseless uprisings and resistance
unless they made major concessions to Ukrainian cultural autonomy.
And so for the next decade the Ukrainians were essentially left
alone in their language and culture. But a faction of Russian communists
could always be found who believed that Ukrainian nationalism was
a source of intolerable division within Soviet ranks, and that sooner
or later the situation would have to be confronted somehow.
Fast
forward eight years. In 1928, with Joseph Stalin securely in power,
the Soviet Union decided upon a policy of massive grain requisition
– a sanitized way of saying that they planned to seize grain from
the peasants by force. The Soviet leadership, as a result both of
poor information and of their characteristic ignorance of market
principles, had become convinced that the country was in the grip
of a grain crisis. Requisitioning worked, in the limited sense that
it provided the regime with the grain it believed it needed. But
it fatally undermined the peasants’ future confidence in the system.
From now on, the potential revival of requisitioning, which the
peasants had hoped was a barbaric aberration of the Russian Civil
War (when Lenin had called for massive grain confiscations), would
forever loom in the background. The peasants, naturally, now had
much less incentive to produce, knowing full well that the fruits
of their toil could easily be seized by a lawless regime – the same
regime that seized, in 1928, the very grain it had promised the
peasants they could freely produce and sell.
It
was only a matter of time before the regime decided to embark upon
farm collectivization, since the abolition of private property in
land was an important aspect of the Marxist program. The peasants
would be herded onto enormous state-owned farms. These farms would
not only satisfy the demands of Marxist ideology, but they would
also solve the regime’s practical problem of ensuring that an adequate
amount of grain would be supplied to the cities, where the Soviet
proletariat was hard at work carrying forward rapid industrialization.
State-owned collective farms meant state-owned grain.
Some
experts tried to warn that Stalin’s goals, both industrial and agricultural,
were entirely too ambitious, and ludicrously at odds with reality.
Stalin would have none of it. One of his economists simply explained,
"Our task is not to study economics but to change it. We are
bound by no laws. There are no fortresses which Bolsheviks cannot
storm."
Hand
in hand with Stalin’s collectivization policy was a brutal campaign
against the large landowners or "kulaks," who could be
expected to lead any resistance to collectivization. It was a Stalinist
fantasy that only the kulaks, as originally defined, opposed collectivization;
the entire countryside was united against it. (Even Pravda
reported an incident in which Ukrainian women had attempted to block
the passage of tractors arriving to begin work in collectivized
farming; the women shouted, "The Soviet government is bringing
back serfdom!") Stalin spoke of his policy of "liquidating
the kulaks as a class"; they were the class enemy of the countryside.
As time went on, the standard for what constituted a kulak became
quite expansive indeed, to the point at which the term – and the
terrible penalties that applied to all those to whom it was applied
– could be applied to practically any peasant at all.
A
history of the Communist Party authorized by the regime recorded
that "the peasants chased the kulaks from the land, dekulakized
them, took away their livestock and machinery, and requested the
Soviet power to arrest and deport the kulaks." As a description
of the reign of terror carried out against the kulaks, that sentence
does not even qualify as a bad joke. The regime, not the peasants,
directed the process. Eventually, according to one eyewitness, it
was enough to doom a man if he "had paid people to work for
him as hired hands, or [if] he had owned three cows."
The
roughly 20 million family farms that could be found in Russia in
1929 would, five years later, be concentrated in 240,000 collective
farms. Throughout much of Soviet history, it was not unheard of
for people to be permitted to own, here and there, a few acres of
land for private use. By the time Mikhail Gorbachev took power in
1985, the two percent of privately owned Soviet farmland was producing
fully 30 percent of the country’s grain – a humiliating rebuke to
those who had so boorishly claimed that socialized agriculture would
be more efficient than capitalist agriculture, or that they could
change human nature or rewrite the laws of economics.
At
the same time that Stalin turned toward forced collectivization,
he also revived the campaign against Ukrainian national culture
that had been dormant since the early 1920s. It was in the Ukraine
that Stalin’s collectivization policy met its fiercest resistance,
though the process was nevertheless largely complete even there
by 1932. But Stalin considered the continuing presence of Ukrainian
national feeling an ongoing threat to the regime, and decided to
deal once and for all with what he saw as the problem of divided
loyalty in the Ukraine.
The
first stage of his policy was directed at Ukrainian intellectuals
and cultural personages, thousands of whom were arrested and given
a mockery of a trial. Having deprived Ukrainians of people who might
have been natural leaders of any resistance movement, Stalin then
moved against the peasantry itself, where the real locus of Ukrainian
traditions could be found.
Even
though the collectivization process was largely complete in the
Ukraine, Stalin announced that the battle against the wicked kulak
was not yet over – he had been "defeated but not yet exterminated."
Stalin would now wage a war, supposedly against the kulak, among
the few remaining individual farmers and within the collective farms
themselves. Since by this point anyone who by any reasonable definition
could have qualified as a kulak had long since been driven away,
killed, or sent into slave labor camps, the coming campaign in the
Ukraine would be directed at terrorizing ordinary peasants. They
would be broken, physically and spiritually, and their identity
as a people would be drained from them by force.
Stalin
now began issuing delivery targets for grain that the Ukrainians
could not meet without themselves dying of starvation. Failure to
meet the requirements was chalked up as deliberate sabotage. Eventually
Stalin authorized seizure of the peasants’ grain in order to meet
the targets. A historian tells us of a woman who, for attempting
to cut some of her own rye, was arrested with one of her children;
after managing to escape from jail, she gathered together a few
items along with her other son and lived in the woods for a month
and a half. People were being given ten-year sentences for gathering
potatoes, or even for gathering ears of corn from the private plots
they were permitted to own.
Communist
activists claimed that saboteurs were everywhere, systematically
withholding food from Soviet cities and defying Stalin’s orders.
They made sweeps through private homes, the kinder agents leaving
a modicum of food behind for the family’s use but the more ruthless
ones taking everything.
The
result was predictable enough: the people began to starve, and in
greater and greater numbers. A peasant who did not appear to be
starving was considered suspect by Soviet authorities. As one historian
recounts, "One activist, after searching the house of a peasant
who had failed to swell up, finally found a small bag of flour mixed
with ground bark and leaves, which he then poured into the village
pond."
Conquest
quotes the later testimony of an activist:
I
heard the children…choking, coughing with screams. It was excruciating
to see and hear all this. And even worse to take part in it….
And I persuaded myself, explained to myself. I mustn’t give
in to debilitating pity…. We were performing our revolutionary
duty. We were obtaining grain for the socialist fatherland….
Our
great goal was the universal triumph of Communism, and for the
sake of that goal anything was permissible – to lie, to cheat,
to steal, to destroy hundreds of thousands and even millions
of people….
This
was how I had reasoned, and everyone like me, even when…I saw
what "total collectivization" meant – how they "kulakized"
and "dekulakized," how they mercilessly stripped the
peasants in the winter of 19323. I took part in this myself,
scouring the countryside, searching for hidden grain…. With the
others, I emptied out the old folks’ storage chests, stopping
my ears to the children’s crying and the women’s wails. For I
was convinced that I was accomplishing the great and necessary
transformation of the countryside; that in the days to come the
people who lived there would be better off for it….
In
the terrible spring of 1933 I saw people dying from hunger.
I saw women and children with distended bellies, turning blue,
still breathing but with vacant, lifeless eyes…. I [did not]
lose my faith. As before, I believed because I wanted to believe.
In
1933 Stalin issued another procurement levy, to be carried out in
a Ukraine that was now on the verge of mass starvation, which began
around March of that year. I shall spare the reader graphic descriptions
of what happened now. But corpses were everywhere, and the stench
of death weighed heavily in the air. Cases of insanity, even cannibalism,
are well documented. Different peasant families reacted in different
ways as they slowly starved to death:
In
one hut there would be something like a war. Everyone would
keep close watch over everyone else. People would take crumbs
from each other. The wife turned against her husband and the
husband against his wife. The mother hated the children. And
in some other hut love would be inviolable to the very last.
I knew one woman with four children. She would tell them fairy
stories and legends so that they would forget their hunger.
Her own tongue could hardly move, but she would take them into
her arms even though she had hardly the strength to lift her
arms when they were empty. Love lived on within her. And people
noticed that where there was hate people died off more swiftly.
Yet love, for that matter, saved no one. The whole village perished,
one and all. No life remained in it.
The
number of Ukrainian dead in the famine of 193233 has generally
been given as five million. According to Conquest, other peasant
catastrophes from 1930 through 1937, including enormous numbers
of deportations of alleged "kulaks," bring the grand total
of deaths to a mind-numbing 14.5 million. And yet if even one percent
of my students in a given year have even heard of these events,
it is a small miracle.
I
have referred here a number of times to Robert Conquest, an excellent
historian of the Soviet Union. I urge anyone with an interest in
these events to read his extraordinary book The
Harvest of Sorrow. It reads like a novel – but the story
it tells is all too real.
After
all the charges over The Passion of the Christ, Peggy Noonan
asked Mel Gibson point blank: “The Holocaust happened, right?”
A
bemused Gibson, expressing surprise that anyone would need him to
affirm the historicity of any historical event, said that of course
it did. He added that the twentieth century had been replete with
atrocities, none of which should be forgotten. He made particular
mention of the Ukrainian terror-famine, in which five million people
were deliberately starved to death by the regime of Joseph Stalin.
Naturally,
such a reply only confirmed Gibson’s perversity in the minds of
those who already disliked him. Anti-Defamation League President
Abe Foxman professed shock and disgust at Gibson’s remarks. “He
doesn’t begin to understand the difference between dying in a famine
and people being cremated solely for what they are,” Foxman said.
So that’s what happened in the Ukraine – people just somehow “died
in a famine.”
March
12, 2004
Professor
Thomas E. Woods, Jr. [send
him mail] holds an AB from Harvard and a PhD from Columbia.
He teaches history, is associate editor of The Latin Mass Magazine,
and is co-author of The
Great Façade: Vatican II and the Regime of Novelty in the
Roman Catholic Church (2002). His next
book, The Church Confronts Modernity: Catholic Intellectuals
and the Progressive Era, will be published in May by Columbia
University Press. A longer version of this article appeared in The
Remnant.
Copyright
© 2004 LewRockwell.com
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