Intervention and Economic Crisis
by Thomas E. Woods, Jr.
by Thomas E. Woods, Jr.
Recently by Thomas E. Woods, Jr.: Catholic
Social Teaching and the Market Economy Revisited: A Reply to Thomas Storck
No supporter
of the market economy could have been surprised when the recent
financial crisis was inevitably blamed on capitalism
and deregulation. The free market, we were told, was
a recipe for financial instability. Advocates of the free
market must confront the fact that both the Great Depression and
the current financial chaos were preceded by years of laissez-faire
economic policies, wrote Katrina van den Heuvel, editor of
The Nation, and author Eric Schlossel, in September 2008.
It is not
enough to call this a distortion of the truth. It is a grotesque
distortion, worthy of the Soviet politburo. The crisis is in fact
the altogether predictable fruit of massive government and central-bank
distortions of the economy. That may be why the free-market economists
of the Austrian School were practically the only ones to have seen
it coming.
There has been
much discussion on right-wing radio and in the conservative press
about Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA), which have been described as forms of government intervention
that contributed to the financial crisis. To a certain extent that
is all well and good: Fannie and Freddie enjoyed special government-granted
privileges, along with an implicit bailout guarantee, that allowed
them to become much more substantial actors in the secondary mortgage
market than would have been possible in a free market. Furthermore,
politicizing the lending process and cajoling banks into abandoning
traditional standards of creditworthiness cannot make a positive
contribution to the health of the banking industry.
But although
there is no question that those factors exacerbated the problems
that led to the crisis, they are not the primary culprits. Britain
has also experienced a housing collapse, even though there is no
British analogue of Fannie, Freddie, and the CRA. Moreover, no matter
what encouragements these and other institutions may have given
to home purchases, where did all the money come from to buy all
those houses and drive up their prices so high so quickly?
We should
instead focus on the Federal Reserve System, an institution few
Americans know much about but which, in addition to systematically
undermining the value of the U.S. dollar which has lost at
least 95 percent of its value under the Feds supervision
gives rise to the boom-bust business cycle.
A business-cycle
primer
Economist F.A.
Hayek wanted to understand why the economy moved in a boom-bust
pattern why there was, in the words of the British economist
Lionel Robbins, a sudden cluster of error among entrepreneurs.
Why should the people the market has rewarded in the past for their
skill at anticipating consumer demand suddenly commit serious errors
and all in the same direction?
Hayek won
the Nobel Prize for his answer.
Building on
the insights of Ludwig von Mises, who first began to develop what
is known as Austrian business-cycle theory in his book The
Theory of Money and Credit in 1912, Hayek pinpointed the
central banks artificial creation of credit as the nonmarket
culprit in the business cycle. (Economist Jesús Huerta de Soto applies
Austrian business-cycle theory to cycles that occur in countries
that have lacked a central bank in his treatise Money,
Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles.)
To understand
Hayeks point, which exonerates the free market, consider two
scenarios.
Scenario 1.
Consider what happens when the public increases its savings. Since
banks now have more funds to lend (namely, the saved funds deposited
by the public), the rate of interest it charges on loans will fall.
The lower interest rates, in turn, stimulate an expansion in long-term
investment projects, which are more sensitive to interest rates
than short-term projects are. (Think of the difference in the decline
in monthly payments that would occur between a 30-year mortgage
and a 1-year mortgage if interest rates came down by even 2 percentage
points.)
Lower-order
stages of production are those stages closest to finished consumer
goods: retail stores, services, and the like. Wholesale and marketing
are examples of higher-order stages. Mining, construction, and research
and development are of still higher order, since they are so remote
from the finished good that reaches the consumer. When peoples
consumption spending contracts, it is a perfect time for higher-order
stages of production to expand: because of peoples additional
saving, there is relatively less demand for consumer goods, and
the resulting contraction of lower-order stages of production will
release resources for use in the higher-order stages.
Scenario 2.
Government-established central banks have various means at their
disposal to force interest rates lower even without any corresponding
increase in saving by the public. (For more on this, see The
Mystery of Banking, by Murray N. Rothbard, or his shorter
classic, What
Has Government Done to Our Money?) Just as in the case in
which public saving has increased, the lower interest rates spur
expansion in higher-order stages of production.
The difference,
though, is a critical one and guarantees that these artificially
low interest rates will not yield the happy outcome we saw in Scenario
1. For in this case, people have not decreased their consumption
spending. If anything, the low interest rates encourage further
consumption. If consumption spending is not constricted, the lower-order
stages of production do not contract. And if they do not contract,
they do not release resources for use in the higher-order stages
of production. Instead of harmonious economic development, there
will instead ensue a tug of war for those resources between the
higher and lower stages. In the process of this tug of war, the
prices of those resources (labor, trucking services, et cetera)
will be bid up, thereby threatening the profitability of higher-order
projects that were begun without the expectation of this increase
in costs.
As the workers
in the newly expanded higher-order stages of production begin to
spend their incomes, they spend according to the same saving-to-consumption
ratio they did in the past. Their desire to save, and thereby to
sustain all this long-term investment, turns out to be not as great
as the distorted structure of interest rates led entrepreneurs to
believe. It becomes ever clearer that society is not prepared to
support the expansion of time-consuming higher-order stages of production.
They do not wish to save enough resources to make the completion
of all the new projects possible. The lower-order stages will win
the tug of war. Expansion in the higher-order stages will have to
be abandoned. Some of the resources deployed there will be salvageable;
others will have been squandered forever or will be of little to
no use in later stages of production.
Preventing
correction
The economywide
discoordination that reveals itself in the bust is not, therefore,
caused by the free market. To the contrary, it is intervention
into the free market, in the form of distortions of the structure
of interest rates which are crucial coordinating mechanisms
that causes the problem.
As the boom
turns into bust, the economy tries to readjust itself into a configuration
that conforms to consumer preferences. That is why it is so essential
for government to stay entirely out of the adjustment process, because
arbitrary government behavior can only delay this necessary and
healthy process. Wages and prices need to be free to fluctuate,
so labor and other resources can be swiftly shifted away from bloated,
bubble sectors of the economy and into sustainable sectors of the
economy where consumers want them. Bailouts obstruct that process
by preventing the reallocation of capital into the hands of firms
that genuinely cater to consumer demand, and by propping up instead
those firms that have deployed resources in ways that do not conform
to consumer preferences. Fiscal and monetary stimulus do nothing
to address the imbalances in the economy, and indeed only perpetuate
them.
Most observers
cheered in the months following 9/11 when it seemed as if Alan Greenspan
had successfully navigated the economy through the dot-com bust
at the cost of only a relatively mild recession. The man the New
York Times identified as the infallible maestro of our
financial system had lived up to the expectations of those
who treated him with a distinctly creepy reverence. But all he had
done was hold off the inevitable recession, and make the current
downturn all the worse. The recession of 2001 was the only one on
record in which housing starts did not decline. Thus people drew
the false conclusion amplified by the alleged experts, including
Fed economists that the housing sector is robust through
thick and thin, housing prices never fall, a house is the best investment
someone can make, and so on.
Because Greenspan
would not allow the full correction to take place, clearing out
entrepreneurial errors caused by his previous intervention, market
actors persisted in their errors for years thereafter. With the
economy having continued along its unsustainable trajectory all
that time, the bust that inevitably came was that much worse. Although
market decisions were distorted in countless areas of industry,
it was housing whose disproportionate growth was most obvious in
the most recent boom. Easy money by the Fed, combined with government
regulations that made mortgage loans especially easy and attractive,
gave rise to a housing bubble in other words, an array of
prices that were unsustainably high. Housing is a durable consumer
good generally purchased with long-term financing, so it fits in
perfectly with the Austrian analysis that artificially low interest
rates give undue stimulus to long-term projects.
Moral hazard
There has
been much discussion of moral hazard in connection with the flurry
of bailouts that began in 2008. Moral hazard refers
to peoples readiness to act with an artificially elevated
level of risk tolerance because they believe that any losses they
may incur will be borne by other people. Hence the bailouts will
tend to make major market actors even less likely to behave prudently
in the future, since if they believe they are likely to be considered
too big to fail, they have more reason than ever to
believe that they will not be allowed to go out of business, and
therefore that they may continue to make risky bets.
This critique
is correct as far as it goes, but it overlooks the related problem
that the very existence of a central bank such as the Federal Reserve
aggravates indeed, institutionalizes moral hazard.
Since there is no physical limitation on the creation of paper money,
firms know that no natural constraint exists on the power of the
central bank to bail them out of any serious trouble. (Even if the
supply of paper should be exhausted, the monetary authority can
always add zeroes to existing notes.) In our own case, financial
commentators spoke of the Greenspan put, the implied
promise that the central bank would intervene to assist the financial
sector in the event of a serious downturn. No one has a right to
be surprised when market actors behave accordingly.
Arguments over
regulation and deregulation by and large miss the point. According
to Guido Hülsmann, in his valuable book The
Ethics of Money Production,
The banks
must keep certain minimum amounts of equity and reserves, they
must observe a great number of rules in granting credit, their
executives must have certain qualifications, and so on. Yet these
stipulations trim the branches without attacking the root. They
seek to curb certain known excesses that spring from moral hazard,
but they do not eradicate moral hazard itself. As we have seen,
moral hazard is implied in the very existence of paper money.
Because a paper-money producer can bail out virtually anybody,
the citizens become reckless in their speculations; they count
on him to bail them out, especially when many other people do
the same thing. To fight such behavior effectively, one must abolish
paper money. Regulations merely drive the reckless behavior into
new channels.
One might
advocate the pragmatic stance of fighting moral hazard on an ad
hoc basis wherever it shows up. Thus one would regulate one industry
after another, until the entire economy is caught up in a web
of micro-regulations. This would of course provide some sort of
order, but it would be the order of a cemetery. Nobody could make
any (potentially reckless!) investment decisions anymore. Everything
would have to follow rules set up by the legislature. In short,
the only way to fight moral hazard without destroying its source,
fiat inflation, is to subject the economy to a Soviet-style central
plan.
Since 2007
the typical pattern has unfolded before our eyes: a financial crisis
whose ultimate cause is the governments own central bank is
blamed on anyone and everyone else, while the central bank itself
is portrayed as our savior rather than the culprit. This version
of events is then used to justify still more expansions of government
power.
It is urgently
necessary for Americans to inoculate themselves against the relentless
propaganda in behalf of the governments version of the story.
Thats why I wrote my book Meltdown earlier this year:
to set forth a persuasive free-market explanation of the crisis
that laymen can understand and use. It spent ten weeks as a New
York Times best-seller, but the Times has refused to
review it. That, in turn, is about the best endorsement I could
have asked for.
February
26, 2010
Thomas
E. Woods, Jr. [visit
his website; send
him mail] is the author of nine books, including
two New York Times bestsellers: Meltdown:
A Free-Market Look at Why the Stock Market Collapsed, the Economy
Tanked, and Government Bailouts Will Make Things Worse and
The
Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Read Congressman
Ron Paul's foreword
to Meltdown.
Copyright
© 2010 Future of Freedom Foundation
The
Best of Thomas Woods
|