Systemic Risk Reduction via Failure
by
Michael S. Rozeff
by Michael S. Rozeff
One year ago,
Bear Stearns faced collapse when its short-term lenders stopped
rolling over their loans to the investment bank. The federal
government and the FED stepped in. They financed and brought
about an acquisition by the JP Morgan Chase (JPM) bank.
The reason
for this was systemic risk. The FED feared that a Bear Stearns failure
would cause the financial system to melt down when one party after
another could not pay off on contracts. JPM assured others that
Bear would honor its contracts. The chairman and chief executive
officer of JPM said "Bear Stearns' clients and counterparties
should feel secure that JPMorgan is guaranteeing Bear Stearns' counterparty
risk. We welcome their clients, counterparties, and employees to
our firm, and we are glad to be their partner."
Systemic risk
is also the reason why the federal government and FED bailed out
the AIG company. That bailout is a debacle. The government began
by paying off in full a number of major banks that were AIG counterparties.
That was not enough. The government is now into its fourth
"plan." The cash infusions have risen to $180 billion
with no end in sight. Congress has finally got around to wondering
publicly who got the money, although this has been known for
months.
It is painfully
clear that the federal government and the FED, who nurtured the
financial catastrophe in the first place, have wasted and are still
wasting trillions of dollars without solving the problem that they
set out to solve, which is systemic risk. One would hope that they
will eventually realize that solving this problem is beyond their
financial means and beyond their operational capacities. It is no
doubt too much to hope that they realize that their bailouts and
programs are not only preventing the resolution of the systemic
risk problem but also making it worse. And it is beyond hope that
they ever understand that the federal government and the FED are
themselves responsible for the high degree of systemic risk of the
financial and monetary system. They built the system.
What is systemic
risk anyway? See
here and here
for the conventional wisdom. Invariably the example of a run on
a bank will come up. Bear Stearns was such a case. The case of Long-Term
Capital Management (not aptly named) in 1998 is cited as a recent
example. The idea is that when one bank (or important company) fails,
it cannot pay those whom it owes. They may then fail to pay others
whom they owe, so that they fail. The others whom they owe may also
then fail. The systemic risk is a chain reaction of failures that
disrupts the existing financial arrangements, known ominously as
the system. God forbid that anything should happen to the
system, which is rather like the hallowed Union. Systemic risk and
bank failures will then be invoked to explain the Great Depression.
The misdirected attention will be on the bank failures, not on the
fact that the Federal Reserve System (System!) lay at the
heart of the matter.
Let us look
at this systemic risk just a trifle more deeply than our superficial
rulers or superficial court lawyers, economists, and business moguls
who can see no way out but to support the government and the FED.
Systemic risk
is a function of the risks that an individual firm takes on. A firm
that lends to a Bear Stearns is actually supposed to investigate
the credit-worthiness of Bear. It is not supposed to put all of
its eggs in one Bear basket. A firm that obtains a credit default
guarantee from AIG is actually supposed to check up on AIG and find
out if that guarantee means anything or whether it’s just an empty
promise. But if there is a great big sugar daddy or two in the background
who are known to bail out an LCTM or to supply bank reserves when
a bank gets short or to bail out an entire economy in recession
or to work with other countries to save currencies and entire weak
banking systems that are going under, and if these sugar daddies
insure bank deposits and have a too-big-to-fail policy and coddle
a select group of government bond dealers and wink at large bank
consolidations and encourage financial leverage and allow off-balance-sheet
irregularities, then the lending guards and the contracting guards
will come down. The precautions will be relaxed. The individual
firms will take on more risk and the systemic risk will rise.
Even without
federal government and central-banking sugar daddies, it is more
than possible that booms will engender undue confidence. It is more
than possible, it is factual, that banks will issue too many credits
or too many questionable credits and create an unsustainable boom.
It is very likely that firms will take on too much leverage. It
is likely that too much debt will be issued against collateral values
that are being maintained by bubble prices that are unsustainable.
Systemic risk will not disappear even with the government and the
FED removed as would-be guarantors against all ills. But firms who
must operate in a private economy will be pulled up short very fast
when they undertake excessive risks. If history does not teach and
theory does not teach, then failure is the teacher. There cannot
be a market system or a profit-and-loss system without losers. The
winners will be those who learn how to navigate the uncertainties
and who learn how to assess the risks of their counterparties in
financial dealings.
Systemic risk
is mitigated when individual firms mitigate their own risks. It
is not mitigated when those risks are centralized in a few large
firms with a government backup. That creates systemic risk.
Decentralization and risk-avoidance mitigate systemic risk. Both
of those are encouraged in money, capital, and banking markets not
controlled and regulated by the federal government and the FED.
The systemic
risk of counterparties and the systemic risk of unknown valuations
of assets held by financial firms are no closer to resolution today
than a year ago. See
here. We now have new and enhanced systemic risks.
They include the risk of the FED’s balance sheet, currency risk,
and government bond default risk. There is actually an enhanced
risk of wealth destruction due to the programs being broached by
the Obama government that promise a stagnant, over-taxed, and inefficient
economy. A drop of stock prices of 7590 percent is not out
of the question.
The way to
have stemmed the follow-on value destruction engineered by the federal
government and the FED and to have lanced the existing financial
boil was to have let Bear Stearns and AIG fail. The same holds true
today for all those fine firms that the federal government has decided
to aid, like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. They are black holes one
and all. Failure was the answer then and it is the answer now. Failure
resolves the risks. The counterparties take their losses. If some
go under, they go under. No one knows who has the losses and how
far they go. No one actually knows if there will be a chain reaction.
This includes the government. That is why failure is needed to clear
up the situation. Government cannot identify the systemic elements
much less know what to do about them. Those elements are buried
on the balance sheets of firms all over the world. Failure is the
only known method to clear up the uncertainties. The failed firms
may then re-organize and re-capitalize. Warren Buffet observed "It's
only when the tide goes out that you learn who's been swimming naked."
Failure allows investors to learn what the loans are actually worth
that are now being held by banks. Failure allows investors to sift
the good banks from the bad banks, or they start brand new banks.
They, not the government, decide who should get funding and who
should not. Failure chastens those who fail and those who do not
fail. It reduces the element of moral hazard. It gives society a
chance to learn and remember valuable lessons. The lesson today
is that the appropriate remedy for a financial firm that has failed
is to let it fail.
There
have been chain reactions in the past in which a series of failures
occurred. We survived. Business slowdowns occurred. They were inevitable
as a consequence of the prior boom’s excesses. There is no viable
theory and no evidence that government action has mitigated this
sequence of events. There is good theory and evidence that government
actions has made matters worse. In the 1930s, the NRA (found unconstitutional)
created immense confusion. The Wagner Act raised wages and contributed
to the 1937 drop in business as did various regulations of the newly-formed
SEC.
We have a year
of government and FED action behind us now, and we can see plainly
that their costly actions have not only failed, but that they have
raised the odds of new and greater failures. The same was true in
the 1930s, but that truth was submerged so that government could
justify its greater power and control. Failure is the only and correct
remedy to bring down the systemic risk and to allow a healthy set
of financial institutions to arise.
Social learning
is not easy. If we do not learn from appropriate theory, then failure
itself must teach us. But large-scale financial and economic catastrophes
do not occur often. Every 6080 years, as in 1873 and 1929
and 2007, we get one. During and afterwards, we debate what happened
and why it happened. The media and airwaves are filled with confusing
and often wrong answers. Congress enacts measures that make matters
worse. The political system encourages wrong answers and it seeks
out and supports those economists who parrot the false theories
that justify the biases of the ruling politicians. The political
system impedes social learning. That system claims to be saving
the economic system, but it is only vastly increasing the systemic
risk.
March
9, 2009
Michael
S. Rozeff [send him mail]
is a retired Professor of Finance living in East Amherst, New York.
Copyright
© 2009 by LewRockwell.com. Permission to reprint in whole or in
part is gladly granted, provided full credit is given.
Michael
S. Rozeff Archives
|