The Fed’s Exploding Balance Sheet: What It
Means and Reviving the Revolution
by
Michael S. Rozeff
by Michael S. Rozeff
DIGG THIS
Bernanke and
Company, who are running the U.S. central bank, the Federal Reserve
(Fed), have been very busy in the past year or so. The size of the
bank has more than doubled since August of 2007. Their assets, mainly
loans and credits they extend, have exploded from $902.4 billion
to $2.17 trillion as of December 3, 2008.
The main idea
behind all this lending is to prevent some large banks (and other
financial institutions) from failing, shrinking, or restructuring.
Behind this is the goal of maintaining the existing structure of
banking and central banking. And behind that is the goal of maintaining
government power and the existing political structure intact.
Preventing
economic collapse and maintaining the bank lending to the public
are not the central goals of those who understand these matters.
These are important to the knowledgeable authorities only
insofar as they support the goal of maintaining the existing power
structure. There are, of course, ignorant economists who think that
without government intervention, the economic and financial system
cannot survive and we will all be wandering around in bearskins
with spears. However, if the financial and economic system were
to collapse and if the government and Fed did not interfere, a free
market revival would occur with amazing rapidity. After all, the
people, the labor, the land, and the capital goods are still here,
not bombed out. If Tokyo, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Berlin, and Dresden
could rapidly recover after World War II, so can a freed-up U.S.
economy. From this perspective, keeping the economy going is not
per se what is important to those in power, because the economy
will always keep itself going without these authorities and do a
better job of it at that without them. What is important to them
is keeping the existing economy going in that it is tied
in to the existing power structure.
The alternative
course of events is anathema to the Fed and the government. That
course is to change the financial system at its roots and let alternative
means of finance and financial intermediation arise spontaneously
in a free market. That would spell the end of the Fed’s monopoly
over the forced currency in the U.S. If this were to happen, every
country in the entire world would have to follow suit if their economies
were to survive and prosper, and that would mean a large diminution
in government power and a fundamentally changed role for governments
everywhere.
The public
has given a vote of no confidence in many of these banks (and other
firms) by shifting its assets out of loans to them and instead going
into Treasury bills. The Fed is thwarting the public (and any semblance
of a free market) by making the loans that the public refuses to
make. The Treasury is helping the Fed do this. After selling Treasury
bills to the public to meet the increased demand, it is depositing
huge amounts ($440–$500 billion) at the Fed. The Fed is using that
money to make the loans that the public is refusing to make.
The battle
here is between the public and the government. The battle is economic
for the public, but for the government the battle is political;
and it does not admit defeat in these battles. The government instituted
and maintained the New Deal, despite its baleful economic effects.
Although the New Deal measures never resolved the Great Depression
and, in fact, extended its life, there was a countervailing and
far more important political consideration for the government, which
was that the depression was a golden opportunity to put in place
measures and gain powers and controls over the economy that it wanted
to.
The kinds of
loans the Fed has made as compared with a year ago include the following.
The Fed has exchanged $406.5 billion of Treasury securities for
troubled bank loans (called the TAF or Term Auction Facility.) It
has swapped $542.5 billion for foreign currencies. The AIG loan
is about $56 billion. Another $52 billion is for asset-backed commercial
paper associated with money market mutual funds and $57 billion
has gone to primary government bond dealers. Then there is $297.8
for commercial paper loans. The Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief
Program ($700–800 billion) or TARP for short is a separate deal.
New kinds of
loans, not yet on the books, but slated to appear include the following.
On November
25, 2008 the Fed announced $200 billion in loans for student loans,
auto loans, credit card loans, and loans guaranteed by the Small
Business Administration (called TALF for Term Asset-Backed Securities
Loan Facility.)
On the same
date, it announced that it will lend $100 billion directly to the
government’s mortgage lending companies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and the Federal Home Loan Banks.) It will also be buying $500 million
of the mortgage-backed securities that they package up from the
mortgage loans that they buy from banks and other institutions who
originate mortgage loans. The idea is to keep these government operations
going. Without this support and the other support the Treasury already
has given, they’d fail. As a reminder, the government took over
some $5 trillion of debts and guarantees of these government-sponsored
enterprises.
The Fed announced
on November 23, 2008 that it (along with the U.S. Treasury and the
FDIC) will support $306 billion of loans that Citibank holds "against
the possibility of unusually large losses." The Fed announced
that it "stands ready to backstop residual risk" in this
$306 billion pool of bad loans through a non-recourse loan. The
idea is to keep Citibank in operation and prevent its failure.
On October
7, 2008 the Fed stepped up its Term Auction Facility (TAF) from
$150 billion to $900 billion.
And even more
is to follow. The press reports that the Fed is considering still
more "unconventional steps." The Wall Street Journal
writes of efforts to bring down interest rates on mortgages, consumer
loans, and Treasury bonds. In other words, the Fed is preparing
to monetize debts directly, something that is clearly inflationary
and that it has been trying to avoid, despite its exploding balance
sheet that has hyped up bank reserves enormously and already carries
a huge inflation risk. The Treasury announced that it is considering
a plan to subsidize mortgage interest rates at 4.5 percent.
Every new loan
is a sign that the powers-that-be will not let up in their efforts
to revive the economy on their terms. In order for them to
keep and hold power within this system, which is their perspective,
they see no other choice. The Federal government is preparing to
spend far greater sums than now, in the process expanding its deficits
to unimaginable heights. The Fed seems unworried by that and/or
prepared dutifully to monetize a goodly share of those debts. The
public is attempting to reduce debt and save, but the government
is thwarting that by planning to increase its debt. High debt is
the hallmark of the political economy of a strong national government.
In 2007 and
2008, the Fed is doing what the Reichsbank did in 1931. We can understand
what is happening and what is going to happen by examining the Reichsbank
case.
A 1934 article
by Dr. Heinrich Rittershausen, available here,
describes the actions of the German Reichsbank They provide a striking
parallel to the actions of the Fed. All quotes are from his article.
Unlike our
Fed, which has very broad and far-reaching powers, the Reichsbank
was restricted by law to discount only good commercial bills. It
could not legally discount other credits, called "financial"
bills.
"Contrary
to these provisions, the Reichsbank, since the credit crisis of
1931, discounted financial bills to the amount of 2,000 million
marks...These financial bills were accepted in order to maintain
the solvency of the illiquid credit banks which had gone too far
with the deposit system. In this case the Reichsbank did not grant
advances on the proceeds of sales, but took over the illiquid assets
of the leading banks and of the savings banks, assets which do not
liquidate themselves but require continuous prolongation...In addition,
the Bank granted long-term credits to the amount of 1,300 million
marks to municipalities and their savings banks...Moreover, the
Bank neglected everything necessary for ensuring the disappearance
of the illegal and dangerous financial bill money and re-establishing
legal conditions."
The Fed has
far greater legal powers than the Reichsbank had to accept the troubled
assets of any company or financial institution. The point here is
not the legality of the matter. It is the action of both banks in
taking in large amounts of long-term illiquid paper of questionable
value and providing good assets and/or central bank credits in return.
The Fed’s TAF ($406 billions worth and slated to rise to $900 billion)
is the name for the Fed’s counterpart of what the Reichsbank did.
As in 1931, there is no plan in place to wind down these assets.
They require "continuous prolongation."
Rittershausen
writes: "The Reichsbank, temporarily the largest mortgage bank,
for lack of a sound banking system, prevents the re-employment of
the workless." The Fed’s $600 billion program to support the
mortgage market probably makes it into the largest mortgage banker
in the U.S. The main point, again, is that the Fed is doing what
the Reichsbank did.
For Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, and other insolvent banks with mortgage loans
that have fallen from a price of 100 to a price of 80 or 70 or 50
or 30, the solution spurned has been bankruptcy and re-organization
of the companies. Bankruptcy brings the actual market value of these
mortgages to light. It allows re-organization, which then allows
the market to resuscitate. The existing uncertainties fade away.
A fair solution is to allow mortgagees to repurchase their mortgage
at the (reduced) market prices. That requires that they re-finance
their loans from new lenders. New and free market channels of financial
intermediation are precisely what are needed. The Fed and the government
do not want this, and with very little prodding they induce weak
banks to join their relief programs. The managements of insolvent
banks prefer to remain in place. They do not want to recognize losses
and go out of business. They welcome the succor of the U.S. government
and the Fed. Now joined by automakers, the parade will soon lengthen
to include many other firms and municipalities.
"The Reichsbank
thus came to the rescue of tottering banks, and this suggested that
the State was behind them. This "quasi-State guarantee"
led the population, when the crisis was at its height, to withdraw
their balances from the sound banks..."
The withdrawal
of the population’s balances from sound banks finds its parallel
today in the withdrawal of money from money market funds, certificates
of deposit, commercial paper, and municipal securities. Interbank
lending declines. Much of this money then seeks the safe haven of
U.S. Treasury securities, whose yields then fall even as the yields
on debts with default risk rise.
According to
Rittershausen, the Reichsbank and the Government "aided the
unsound banks with approximately 2,000 million marks in subventions
and tax money. In this way they offered a masked State guarantee
to the unsound banks and indirectly deprived the sound banks of
their customers. They declared that ‘Germany’s’ credit was at stake;
that ‘Germany’ had contracted the debts; that a ‘run on Germany’
had broken out; whilst actually only the credit of a few ill-managed
banks with bank debts abroad had been shaken... Thus thousands of
banks and bank branches were sacrificed to save a few who were in
the good books of the State...In fact, the three unsound banks were
identified with the ‘German banking system.’"
The parallel
actions today are that the Fed and the Government cry "systemic
risk." They feed the public with exaggerated scenarios about
credit default swaps bringing down the financial system. (A rational
account of credit default swaps appears
here.) They cry "too big to fail," and they argue
that the health of the entire American system rests upon the failure
of a few favored banks and insurance companies like AIG. They completely
ignore freeing up the financial system to mobilize new methods of
creating money and credit.
The government
has thrown about $6 trillion into the stew. The Fed has thrown over
$1 trillion into it. Instead of a short and sharp recession followed
by a recovery, our central bank and deficit-spending political economy
is giving us a prolonged and deep depression. Business is thrown
into confusion and uncertainty. Investors run for safety. The bad
loans remain hidden and submerged within banks and other institutions.
This paralyzes lending. The weak companies and poor managements
that should be quickly cleaned out instead are given taxpayer money.
With public debt rising, the interest costs of the national debt
rise. Capital that should be going to healthy enterprises is diverted
to government and to zombie enterprises. Inefficient enterprises
are subsidized. Serious inflation looms larger and larger as a long-term
problem. The capital markets become dependent on Fed loans, and
it is not clear how that dependence can be ended. The government
takes ownership interests in the most major banks, inducing further
inefficiency in these semi-nationalized firms and threatening control
of the allocation of capital. In this regard, the government policies
have already fostered an undue concentration of assets in large
banks. The three largest banks in the U.S. now have 38% of all large
bank assets as compared with 27% in 2003. Banks with over $300 million
in assets grew by 64% in the last 5 years, which is a very high
per annum number, but the three largest banks grew by a still higher
130%. In short, the actions of the government and the Fed are throwing
a giant monkey wrench into the operations of banks and capital markets
in intermediating capital from savers to businesses. The likely
result is a prolonged slowdown in economic growth and more government
control over the economy.
What needs
to be done? The main thing is to end the reign of forced currency
such as the Fed’s. This will ensure that inflation and deflation
cannot ever occur because these are both results of a forced currency.
With competition in money, any issuer that issues too much currency
will suffer a loss in value of the currency. That will, however,
be a local matter and not affect the entire economy as a forced
currency does. Without central bankengineered inflations and
deflations, the large-scale and widespread business cycles will
be greatly mitigated and may even disappear, although business fluctuations
and failures will no doubt still occur. If there is too little currency,
competition will ensure that more will be produced. We need not
worry about the supply of money anymore than we worry about the
supply of corn flakes. Money supply and credit are only problems
when monopoly central banks attempt to control them, for they have
no known ways of measuring what they are, how much is needed, where
it is needed, or who should get it. These kinds of questions are
always ideally solved by free markets.
There will
always be a need for standards of value in which to express prices.
Let the free market decide the matter by competition. Persons have
a right to try out any standard of value they wish to. It is highly
likely that gold will become a medium of account (a standard of
value), which would mean that media of exchange would be quoted
in terms of fixed amounts of gold. For example, the "dollar"
might come to be standardized at 1.5 grains of gold. (The Constitution
empowers the government to set such a standard of value.) With an
end to a single Fed forced currency, there can be any number of
media of exchange. Any person or persons has the right to issue
currency. In a free market, every person has a right to conclude
contracts with any medium of exchange that is agreeable to the parties
to the contract. No one should be obligated to pay in gold involuntarily.
Legal tender laws that force acceptance of payment in any medium
should be repealed.
The harmful
policies and actions of the central banks and the government in
response to recessions, such as occurred in the 1930s and are occurring
now, are, in a deep sense, not "policy errors" or "policy
mistakes." That language suggests that there exists a set of
correct policies under the existing political structure
that will resolve economic problems. That is a misleading way to
think about the issue. The policies that central banks and governments
choose are nearly always what these institutions do by law, under
the generally-held expectation that they will alleviate economic
problems. Occasionally a wise and beneficent ruler comes along who,
within the system, mitigates its evil actions. Usually, the really
important and fundamental policy errors lie buried elsewhere. The
deepest policy errors are lodged in the public’s expectation and
belief that central banks and governments can alleviate recessions
and in the public’s giving these organizations the legal power to
do what they do (or tolerating their power grabs). Further errors
lie in listening to mistaken experts who continue to justify these
counterproductive methods and laws, and in failing to learn from
experience that the policies that central banks and governments
use to fight recessions make them worse and turn them into deeper
recessions and depressions.
Within the
current political setup, central bankers would have to stop being
central bankers and legislators would have to stop being legislators
in order to play a constructive role in recessions. (While this
can happen and sometimes does happen for short periods, it is not
the equilibrium outcome.) The public would have to stop believing
in the magical powers of central bankers and legislators to get
economies going, using their usual nostrums of borrowing, spending,
subsidizing, taxing, and printing money. The public and government
officials would have to stop listening to the many economic experts
who are selling Keynesianism. Subsidizing mortgage rates at 4.5
percent so that more people can go into more debt to buy homes and
hold up home prices would have to be laughed off the stage as the
kind of bankrupt economic manipulation that got us into this mess
in the first place. The public would have to stop running to government
for its favors, and the politicians would have to lose the power
to sell these favors.
But
if all of this is to change, it means that the basic political arrangement
has to change. To change matters fundamentally, various leopards
have to change their spots. A revolution in ideas needs to occur.
Government power has to be seen as inherently inimical to society,
for it is the very existence of that power that ensures its attraction
to the public and its use. The public has to stop looking for free
lunches where there are none. It has to stop believing in government
as the tooth fairy. The public has to stop believing in a government
that, again and again, augments its own position and power while
pretending to fight recessions with methods that make matters worse
and lay the groundwork for more booms and busts. The public has
to understand that its welfare is best assured by building upon
the liberty-promoting ideas that circulated at the time of the American
Revolution. That revolution was won on the battlefields and lost
in the State House in Philadelphia in 1787 and thereafter. The public
needs to understand what its rights are and that they are being
immensely abridged by government. It needs to know that restoration
and augmentation of these rights is the only proper course to take
and the only course that promises a lasting and bountiful prosperity.
This is a tall
order. The problem is educational in part. The problem is also a
social coordination problem. If we all reject big government together,
we all generally benefit while some interest groups lose their goodies;
but no one knows how to coordinate this transition. It sometimes
occurs, however, as when the U.S.S.R. fell. And sooner or later,
American politics will come in for a radical restructuring. The
outcomes of that will be better if we now converse and educate each
other continually in these matters. We need to entertain concepts
that seem radical today but were not radical to those who fought
for and articulated the ideals of American independence. Better
to consider these matters now than when the system is collapsing
around our ears.
December
8, 2008
Michael
S. Rozeff [send him mail]
is a retired Professor of Finance living in East Amherst, New York.
Copyright
© 2008 LewRockwell.com
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