War or Peace? Achieving Peace Among States
by
Michael S. Rozeff
by Michael S. Rozeff
DIGG THIS
The immense
bloodshed of the twentieth century, continuing unabated into the
twenty-first, combined with the increasing capabilities of developing
and launching nuclear bombs, raises an urgent and important question.
What steps should be taken to achieve greater peace among states?
What must the world’s peoples demand of their states in order that
the latter move toward greater peace?
At present,
policy analysts assume that the way to peace is via states negotiating
among themselves. This has been the premise, for example, in the
multi-decade efforts to seek a durable peace between Israel and
Palestinians. Various states conducted negotiations. These met with
partial success. Israel established relations with some nearby countries.
But the worst of the conflict still continues with no end in view.
The terrible conflicts of the past century often broke out despite
negotiations among various states.
If states make
wars, it seems logical that negotiations among states are the natural
pathway to peace among states. Talking and settling matters seems
the opposite of warring over them, and besides, what else is there?
But since war merely carries policy and political conflicts into
another realm, negotiations and war are not opposites. They are
not substitutes. As Clausewitz realized, they lie along the same
continuum; and that continuum has to do with states trying to gain
influence, advantages, and domination over one another. Negotiations,
therefore, are not natural steps toward peace. As long as states
are doing the negotiating and their incentives and dynamics remain
the same, a significant fraction of negotiations will end up in
warfare and data bear this out.
We need to
look elsewhere than to states negotiating with one another to find
pathways to peace. We need to get outside the continuum of domination.
We need to get outside the box of states.
A straightforward
theory
Because states
are political organizations that aim at holding and expanding power,
they inherently are not agents of peace but agents of domination
and its extension. This is why negotiations and war lie along the
same continuum. They are means to the same end. One state is attempting
to dominate or gain from another state. States, being political
by nature, are inherently susceptible to warfare as a means to extend
their power.
Since states
can mobilize and concentrate the resources of an entire nation or
nations, they can project far more intense and devastating warfare
than smaller political units are capable of. States can also mobilize
the population’s fear and distrust of external enemies. If peace
is the aim of the world’s peoples, then mankind by organizing itself
into states has taken a very bad turn. It has created organizations
whose incentives are to maintain and gain further power. In a certain
number of instances, where particular conditions prevail, this system
of states invariably leads to large-scale war; war being merely
a step beyond negotiations and other warlike threats and actions.
If the world
remains organized into states for the foreseeable future, then the
logical way to achieve greater peace is to reduce the state-like
qualities of all states. The way to peace is to dismantle state
institutions and restrict state powers. If their powers are scaled
back, states become less able to project themselves upon other states
and less inclined to attempt to dominate them. If the powers of
states are scaled back, then they become less able to project large-scale
war.
Leaving states
intact is not an ideal solution, the ideal being no states at all,
but weakening them is a step in the right direction. This can only
be done if a state’s people make it happen. They need to understand
that they are better off with a weaker, not a stronger state. This
is counter-intuitive knowledge at present, but some day it will
become common knowledge.
Illustration
To illustrate
these points which I have made quite tersely, I will focus on the
Israeli-Palestinian dispute. At present, the U.S. is involved as
it has been for a long time; and the U.N., which is a coalition
of states, is involved. Other states are involved as well.
The U.S. seeks
an equilibrium between the opposing parties. It has the idea that
if a Palestinian state is established that recognizes Israel, then
some sort of stability will result. The U.S. thinks in terms of
its current relations with Canada and Mexico. It forgets that those
relations were not always easy and that there have been military
incursions on both sides. It forgets the Mexican-American War. It
forgets that even today there are Mexicans who seek hegemony in
the Southwest.
More importantly,
the U.S. does not fully grasp the difficulties on the ground, on
the streets. The U.S. thinks in terms of an equilibrium in which
Palestinians will be happy once they have a state they can call
their own. But what will such a state do for the aspirations of
the everyday Palestinian? They need to travel and work, to and in
Israel perhaps. They want respect. Some demand justice for grievances
dating back to Israel’s formation. Perhaps the U.S. thinks in terms
of buying off some of these concerns with aid. The basic U.S. idea
is this: You Palestinians will have a state, and you will recognize
Israel as a state and maybe we will grease the plate and you will
all live happily ever after.
The problem
and its solution
What is the
U.S. up to? For its own reasons, it is up to Palestinian state-building
designed to achieve regional stability. This is akin to state-building
in Iraq. The theory is that states that the U.S. builds or tries
to, of a certain type that holds elections, democratic states shall
we say, will somehow channel the aspirations of the people such
that instability, war, political and religious frictions, poverty,
and barriers will decline. People will pursue happiness and peace
will prevail. This is the theory.
But this theory
is all wrong. States do not do any of those things. States merely
fasten upon society and exacerbate problems and rivalries. They
attack property and rights. They transfer wealth. They have power,
and they set off and encourage competition for power. Even the quest
for a Palestinian state is producing blood in the streets right
now, just as it has in Iraq.
Israel, already
being a state, produces the same results. If the region had no states,
the odds of peace breaking out would immediately rise. As it stands,
the path to peace for the peoples in the region lies in scaling
back the states therein. In this example, this points (1) to Israel,
and (2) not trying to create a Palestinian state. The goal should
be all the people in the region being able to move and associate
freely and work and trade freely.
Israel should
not be building walls, pushing new settlements, and attacking with
its heavy arms. It should reduce its restrictions and enhance movement
and mobility of Palestinians. In so many words, I am advocating
the diminishment and eventual dismantlement of Israel as a state.
The fact that it is a Jewish or Zionist state is not the issue here.
The fact that it is a state at all is key. I advocate the same type
of solutions for other regions in which there is conflict like this.
Sri Lanka should weaken itself and let the Tamils go. Russia should
let Chechnya go. China should let Nepal and Tibet go. India should
let its rebelling and breakaway regions go. The U.S. should have
let its South go.
Objections
and counter-arguments
The general
idea is that states exacerbate inter-state and infra-state conflict,
and the road to greater peace lies in scaling them back. This is
up to the peoples of the states. They are the only ones who can,
if they will only recognize both the justice and the benefits of
scaling back their states.
Will a people
suffer more attacks from foreign or hostile elements if it cuts
back its state’s power? This will be the standard fear-mongering
argument. Fear is a powerful motivation for a state. Will this be
called appeasement? Undoubtedly it will be labeled appeasement.
Old and mistaken ideas held by the well-intentioned will not change
overnight. Furthermore, warmongers and power-seekers will fan the
flames of fear and enmity whenever they can. Mankind does not learn
the ways of peace easily.
But reducing
the state to encourage peace is not as counter-intuitive as it sounds.
Every such reduction is an act of greater peace itself. Peace is
made by making more peace. Reducing a trade barrier is an act of
peace; the trade barrier is the hostile act. Reducing the power
of the Congress to fund the CIA and the World Bank are acts of peace;
their meddlings in overseas countries are hostile acts. Reducing
travel and communication restrictions are acts of peace; it is the
restrictions that are hostile. Keeping one’s armed forces on a tight
domestic leash is an act of peace; planting them in foreign countries
is hostile to those threatened.
Fear, mistrust,
and enmity are great enemies of peace. Opposed to them is the fact
that people know and understand in their hearts what justice means.
This too is in our nature. We may be suspicious of strangers, but
we also know at a deep level that they are the same as we are. If
a state makes a concession or power reduction that is a just one,
that is peaceful in and of itself, then the recipient side will
be reluctant to bite the hand that has been extended to it. Suspicion
and a history of hostility naturally can interfere as well as scheming
to take advantage. The road to peace is not easy when everyone has
been accustomed to warfare and the machinations of states. But if
these reductions in state powers and threats are accompanied by
discussions so that peoples on both sides come to understand what
is happening, the chance of concessions leading to attacks is reduced.
Peace can be attained when the hearts and minds of people are engaged
in seeking peace as an explicit goal and they understand that one
must work at it like anything else.
What is the
alternative? In Israel, what have its strong-arm methods got its
people? Have attacks on Israel declined? Have Israelis obtained
peace? If they suppress one form of attack, they change form. If
grievances against Israel persist and if they are enhanced by its
restrictions, the attacks against Israel will not diminish. They
haven’t yet. Israel’s enemies have waxed, not waned.
Why negotiations
fail
Israel made
political progress with its neighbors between 1991 and 1996. This
came to a halt. It was not the multilateral façade of the time that
removed the US from the picture that solved problems. The introduction
of Japanese or European states can solve nothing if the basic assumptions
remain the same that states are trying to solve these problems.
In this case,
two men, two politicians, Benjamin Netanyahu and Yasser Arafat,
help us understand why states have so much trouble bringing peace.
According to Robert H. Pelletreau who was the U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern Affairs and an Ambassador to several states,
Netanyahu, perhaps partly for political reasons, wavered between
a hard and softer line. He catered to his right and not to majority
opinion. More generally, a leader of a state is beholden to his
party and the party activists. This makes him less able to act on
behalf of the general population.
Arafat, according
to Pelletreau, was not different. "Unfortunately, in this time
of stagnation Arafat is surrendering to his worst instincts, trampling
on Palestinian human rights, stifling the press, allowing police
excesses, and condoning corruption among his associates..."
We have to
ask: What are leaders actually after? Preservation and enhancement
of their powers is one thing. They are men in the middle, but they
can’t operate without power and that is their custom. Their own
agenda is important. Somewhere down the list are their own people’s
interests, or what they personally conceive this to be. The problems
arise because the peoples of the opposing nations are not themselves
making peace. Instead, they are choosing powerful representatives
who are caught in political processes of power and who cannot personally
reconcile the many politically-motivated interests surrounding them.
We need a better way, and the better way is the market. The way
out of these political boxes is to break them. Reduce the power
of the state and thereby enhance market forces.
Think about
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the U.S. point of view. How
can one state, like the U.S., influence seriously the internal politics
of another independent state, like Israel? It can, but this takes
the sustained attention, resources, cleverness, adeptness, and knowledge
of key men. It also takes luck. This is the game being played. It
depends very highly, too highly, on the skills of a few men. It
relies heavily on their understanding the attitudes on the street
and among secondary players, like legislators. But they cannot routinely
comprehend the whole and create by political means the human equilibrium
they seek. Success may come on occasion, but the process itself
is an obstacle.
In many cases,
only the top officials of a state have the power to negotiate. The
lower officials cannot make headway because no one is sure what
their bosses really will settle for. This fact imposes even more
limits on the abilities of states to achieve peace. A top leader
has limited time, brains, skills, experience, and knowledge. He
cannot attend to too many such negotiations and can’t handle them
all well. What does he really know? Negotiation is a chess game
among rivals for power to see who can beat whom and outwit whom.
How many simultaneous chess games can a top leader play? What qualifies
him to play these games skillfully? The law of unintended consequences
will always come into play and these consequences will be relatively
large because of over-reliance on what one man knows and can accomplish.
Elections interfere
with negotiations. The rise of competing office-holders is often
a factor. The tools of the power trade are limited and involve power,
not peace. For example, Arafat sought to have the major powers use
trade as a weapon to pressure Israel. This is how men of power think.
They will turn to and use tools of power that involve pressures
and threats and inherently are anti-peace. Is it any wonder that
they often do not create peace but instead set off opposing forces
and resentments?
Negotiations
by states often do not settle matters once and for all, and they
often do not settle matters by just methods. Moving toward a supposed
equilibrium through unjust methods must ultimately fail. The failure
of Versailles is a case in point. The U.S. and Iraq never settled
their differences after their first war. Look where we are today.
The U.N. helped cause and has not settled the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict in 60 years.
States can’t
keep the peace
When it comes
to keeping the peace among disputing states, what have states come
up with? Nothing but malfunctioning political mechanisms and machines.
Beyond the usual negotiations, alliances, pressures, mobilizations,
and threats, they have come up with the U.N. The number and severity
of wars among states has increased since the U.N.’s inception. Cuellar’s
study of collective security tells us that (1) "violent
crises have continued occurring at a rate somewhat higher than before
World War II," (2) "violence (involving either protracted
conflict or multiple incidents of violent confrontation) continues
to grow as the predominant crisis management technique for a substantial
fraction of crises, going from slightly over fifty percent in the
period immediately following World War II to around seventy percent
in the post-Cold War period," (3) "‘Nonmilitary pressure’
and legal arbitration approaches to the resolution of international
crises constitute the primary conflict resolution mechanism in just
a fraction of the crises, showing almost no increase over time.
Use of mediation as the dominant conflict resolution strategy was
similarly infrequent," and (4) "But the cumulative frequency
of nonviolent means of managing conflict remains far lower than
the frequency of violent means of resolution. Indeed, the lowest
cumulative frequency is associated with adjudication, the highest
with the use of multiple incidents of violence."
In other words,
there are more conflicts than ever among states, and they are using
violence more than ever as their primary means of settling these
conflicts.
We the people
are forced to rely upon but also demand and accept the pitiful methods
of peace, tranquillity, and brotherhood brought to us courtesy of
states. We are lucky that constraining factors are at work that
bring us what peace we have. Many, many areas of the world are not
lucky.
The twentieth
century is the bloody opposite of an endorsement for the state system
of making and keeping peace. As each state interferes with another,
we get domino effects that broaden conflicts. Civil wars far worse
than inter-state wars pepper the globe. The mean number of civil
conflicts globally has risen from about 20 a year between 1812 and
1850 to 100 a year between 1951 and 1992. Furthermore, their intensity
and duration have grown. This epidemic of wars traces directly to
the malign system of states that the world has adopted. External
wars are the health of the state. Civil wars are the offspring of
the state.
The best way
to lessen the severity and incidence of inter-state wars is to lessen
the state’s power. This also will lessen the severity and incidence
of civil wars. But the ultimate solution is no state at all.
The market
solutions to human conflicts go much deeper than the supposed state
solutions, whose defects have been pointed out above. Market interactions
are limited in scope. The incentives all work toward peaceful dispute
resolution. Disputes are far more recognizable, negotiable, and
manageable. Markets change the realities on the ground. Markets
are more flexible. They give broad masses of people countless chances
to move ahead peaceably and with justice.
Summary
and Conclusions
Historical
processes of war and peace are complex when looked at in detail.
We need simplifying yet accurate theory if we are to make headway
toward peace. The theory presented above has two main premises.
One, other things equal, states are organizations geared to war-making.
This premise itself follows from another theorem of political dynamics,
namely, that states are political organizations of power that seek
to maintain and augment their power. Second, other things equal,
states enhance the destructiveness of conflicts when they choose
to make war. This follows from the fact that states have taxing
and other powers that permit them to amass the resources of entire
societies. The theory predicts that states demand enlargement of
power, or that they are constantly engaged in attempts at aggrandizement.
This can occur internally or externally, showing itself in complex
maneuvers, threats, negotiations, and alliances that end up sometimes
in wars, both civil and foreign.
We do not observe
constant warfare because the state’s attempts to gain power face
constraints. Some states are small and face geopolitical and resource
obstacles. Who their neighbors are and how they behave matter. All
states face the control of their peoples who bear the costs of war
and limit the state’s powers and intrusions; but the degrees and
types of such control vary across states. Furthermore, the benefits
of war accrue to some groups within a society and not others, adding
more complexity. Basically, there is a demand for war and a supply
of war. War and peace looked at in detail are obviously highly complex
subjects to understand fully in given cases because of the many
factors influencing the demand and supply.
Yet even a
rudimentary theory can enlighten us and help us reach some conclusions.
The state itself is an impediment to peace and an encouragement
to more and larger warfare, other things equal. Negotiations are
instruments of states to achieve aims that primarily involve power
support and extension of the states involved. Only secondarily do
they involve the welfare of the peoples controlled by the states,
and this arises through the indirect control of those peoples over
what their states do. Therefore, other things equal, the path to
achieving greater peace among states (and within states) is to reduce
the state’s powers and its access to war-making resources. This,
in turn, hinges on the people within a state. In order to enhance
their security, they need to reduce their demand for state power.
Making the state more powerful actually reduces their security.
They need to secure themselves by alternative institutions than
handing great monopoly powers of taxation and war making over to
a few chosen people. Giving in to fear and mistrust of other peoples
and to the state’s misinformation and propaganda campaigns is a
recipe for greater war and less peace.
At best, these
are rough guidelines to peace. They suggest reducing the state’s
powers. They resemble a recommendation to change directions and
move back toward a classical liberal political order. But that is
not the ultimate goal I’m recommending. That order of freedom stopped
at the boundaries of the monopoly state and permitted it to exist
and then augment itself. Reducing the state’s powers (and thus reducing
the chances of and severity of warfare) can occur in several ways.
One way is to reverse the state’s augmentations of the past while
leaving the central state intact: reduce powers to tax, to borrow,
to control money, to hamper trade, to make war, to control commerce,
to regulate, and to install welfare programs. These actions amount
to breaking the state down. But they lead to breaking the state
up and/or eliminating the central state altogether in favor of smaller
political units. If the latter can be accomplished directly, then
the political maneuvers needed to attain reductions can be avoided.
The
problem of reducing and breaking up a state is challenging. The
state is controlled and supported by organized segments of the population
who benefit from it. They are maintaining the equilibrium. Those
under the state’s control are disorganized, confused, dependent,
fearful of change, subject to constant propaganda, and apathetic.
There is much work to be done if we are to create a society and
a world with institutions that encourage peace and not war.
February
2, 2007
Michael
S. Rozeff [send him mail]
is a retired Professor of Finance living in East Amherst, New York.
Copyright
© 2007 LewRockwell.com
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