The
State and the Flood
by
Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.
by Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.
"No
one can escape the influence of a prevailing ideology," wrote Ludwig
von Mises, and Gulf Coast residents know precisely what it means
to be trapped—ostensibly by a flood but actually by statist
policies and ideological commitments that put the government in
charge of crisis management and public infrastructure. For what
we are seeing in New Orleans and the entire Gulf Coast region is
the most egregious example of government failure in the United States
since September 11, 2001.
Mother
Nature can be cruel, but even at her worst, she is no match for
government. It was the glorified public sector, the one we are always
told is protecting us, that is responsible for this. And though
our public servants and a sycophantic media will do their darn best
to present this calamity as an act of nature, it was not and is
not. Katrina came and went with far less damage than anyone expected.
It was the failure of the public infrastructure and the response
to it that brought down civilization.
The
levees that failed and caused New Orleans to be flooded, bringing
a humanitarian crisis not seen in our country in modern times, were
owned and maintained by the Army Corps of Engineers. The original
levees surrounding this city below sea level were erected in 1718,
and have been variously expanded since.
But
who knew that a direct hit by a hurricane would cause them to break?
Many people, it turns out. Ivor van Heerden of Louisiana State University,
reports Newsday,
"has developed flooding models for New Orleans, was among
those issuing dire predictions as Katrina approached, warnings that
turned out to be grimly accurate. He predicted that floodwaters
would overcome the levee system, fill the low-lying areas of the
city and then remain trapped there well after the storm passed
creating a giant, stagnant pool contaminated with debris, sewage
and other hazardous materials."
Newsday goes on: "Van Heerden and other experts put some of
the blame on the Mississippi River levees themselves, because they
channel silt directly into the Gulf of Mexico that otherwise would
stabilize land along the riverside and slow the sinking of the coastline."
He
is hardly some lone nut. National Geographic ran a large
article on the topic last year that begins with a war-of-the-worlds
scenario that reads precisely like this week's news from New Orleans.
It is the Army Corps of Engineers that has been responsible for
the dwindling of the coastline that has required the levees to be
constantly reinforced with higher walls. But one problem: no one
bothered to do this since 1965. That's only the beginning of the
problems created by the Corps' levee management, the history of
which was documented
by Mark Thornton following the last flood in 1999.
Only
the public sector can preside over a situation this precarious and
display utter and complete inertia. What do these people have to
lose? They are not real owners. There are no profits or losses at
stake. They do not have to answer to risk-obsessed insurance companies
who insist on premiums matching even the most remote contingencies.
So long as it seems to work, they are glad to go about their business
in the soporific style famous to all public sectors everywhere.
And
failure of one structure has highlighted the failures of other structures.
The levees could not be repaired in a timely manner because roads
and bridges built and maintained by government could not withstand
the pressure from the flood. They broke down.
And
again, it is critical to keep in mind that none of this was caused
by Hurricane Katrina as such. It was the levee break that led to
the calamity. As the New
York Times points out: "it was not the water from
the sky but the water that broke through the city's protective barriers
that had changed everything for the worse…. When the levees
gave way in some critical spots, streets that were essentially dry
in the hours immediately after the hurricane passed were several
feet deep in water on Tuesday morning."
Indeed,
at 4pm on Monday, August 29, all seemed calm, and reports of possible
calamity seemed overwrought. Two hours later the reports began to
appear about the levee. A period of some twelve hours lapsed between
when the hurricane passed through and when the water came rushing
into the city. There is some dispute about precisely when the levees
broke. Some say that they were broken long before anyone discovered
it, which is another outrage. There was no warning system. There
is no question that plenty of time was available between their breakage
and the flooding to enable to people to make other arrangements—and
perhaps for the levees to be repaired. People were relieved that
the rain subsided and the effects of Katrina were far less egregious
than anyone expected.
That's
when the disaster struck. The municipal government itself relocated
to Baton Rouge even as the city pumps failed as well. Meanwhile,
the Army Corp of Engineers apparently had no viable plan even to
make repairs. They couldn't bring in the massive barges and
cranes needed because the bridges were down and broken, or couldn't
be opened without electricity. For public relations purposes, they
dumped tons of sand into one breach even as another levee was breaking.
But even that PR move failed since most helicopters were being used
to move people from spot to spot—another classic case of miscalculation.
Many bloggers had the sense that the public sector essentially walked
away.
But
the police and their guns and nightsticks were out in full force,
not arresting criminals but pushing around the innocent and giving
mostly bad instructions. The 10,000 people who had been corralled
into the Superdome were essentially under house arrest from the
police who were keeping them there, preventing them even from getting
fresh air. A day later the water and food were running out, people
were dying, and the sanitary conditions becoming disastrous. Finally
someone had the idea of shipping all these people Soviet-like to
Houston to live in the Astrodome, as if they are not people with
volition but cattle.
After
evacuations, the looting began and created a despicable sight of
criminal gangs stealing everything in sight as the police looked
on (when they weren't joining in). Now, this scene offers its own
lessons. Why don't looting and rampant criminality occur every day?
The police are always there and so are the hoodlums and the criminals.
What was missing that made the looting rampage possible was the
bourgeoisie, that had either left by choice or had been kicked out.
It is they who keep the peace. And had any stayed around to protect
their property, we don't even have to speculate what the police
would have done: Arrest them!
Now,
in the coming weeks, as it becomes ever more obvious that the real
problem was not the hurricane but the failure of the infrastructure
to work properly, the political
left is going to have a heyday (here
too). They will point out that Bush cut spending for the Army
Corp of Engineers, that money allocated to reinforcing the levees
and fixing the pumps had been cut to pay for other things, that
we are reaping what we sow from failing to support the public sector.
The
ever-stupid right will come to the defense of Bush and the Iraq
War that has completely absorbed this regime's attention,
pointing out that Bush is actually a big and compassionate spender
who cares about infrastructure, while demanding that people recognize
his greatness, along with all the other pieties that have become
staples of modern "conservatism."
But
this is a superficial critique (and defense) that doesn't get to
the root of the problem with public services. NASA spends and spends
and still can't seem to make a reliable space shuttle. The public
schools absorb many times more—thousands times more—in
resources than private schools and still can't perform well. The
federal government spends trillions over years to "protect" the
country and can't fend off a handful of malcontents with an agenda.
So too, Congress can allocate a trillion dollars to fix every levee,
fully preventing the last catastrophe, but not the next one.
The
problem here is public ownership itself. It has encouraged people
to adopt a negligent attitude toward even such obvious risks. Private
developers and owners, in contrast, demand to know every possible
scenario as a way to protect their property. But public owners have
no real stake in the outcome and lack the economic capacity to calibrate
resource allocation to risk assessment. In other words, the government
manages without responsibility or competence.
Can
levees and pumps and disaster management really be privatized? Not
only can they be; they must be if we want to avoid ever more apocalypses
of this sort. William Buckley used to poke fun at libertarians
and their plans for privatizing garbage collection, but this disaster
shows that much more than this ought to be in private hands. It
is not a trivial issue; our survival may depend on it.
It
is critically important that the management of the whole of the
nation's infrastructure be turned over to private management
and ownership. Only in private hands can there be a possibility
of a match between expenditure and performance, between risk and
responsibility, between the job that needs to be done and the means
to accomplish it.
The
list of public sector failures hardly stops there. The outrageous
insistence that no one be permitted to "gouge" only
creates shortages in critically important goods and services when
they are needed the most. It is at times of extreme need that prices
most need to be free to change so that consumers and producers can
have an idea of what is needed and what is in demand. Absent those
signals, people do not know what to conserve and what to produce.
Bush
was on national television declaring that the feds would have zero
tolerance towards gouging, which is another way of saying zero tolerance
toward markets. If New Orleans stands any chance of coming back,
it will only be because private enterprise does the rebuilding,
one commercial venture at a time. Bush's kind of talk guarantees
a future of mire and muck, the remote possibility of prosperity
and peace sacrificed on the altar of interventionism.
Moreover,
every American ought to be alarmed at the quickness of officials
to declare martial law, invade people's rights, deny people the
freedom of movement, and otherwise trample on all values that this
country is supposed to hold dear. A crisis does not negate the existence
of human rights. It is not a license for tyranny. It is not a signal
that government may do anything it wants.
This
crisis ought to underscore a point made on these pages again and
again. Being a government official gives you no special insight
into how to best manage a crisis. Indeed the public sector, with
all its guns and mandates and arrogance, cannot and will not protect
us from life's contingencies. It used to be said that infrastructure
was too important to be left to the uncertainties of markets. But
if it is certainty that we are after, there is a new certainty that
has emerged in American life: in a crisis, the government will make
matters worse and worse until it wrecks your life and all that makes
it worth living.
September
2, 2005
Llewellyn
H. Rockwell, Jr. [send him
mail] is president of the Ludwig
von Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, editor of LewRockwell.com
and author of Speaking
of Liberty.
Copyright
© 2005 LewRockwell.com
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