The purpose
of reconciliation is to identify suitable targets for budget reductions
in order to reduce spending. Therefore, it is quite odd that the
Financial Services Committee would use reconciliation as a vehicle
to consider the Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act, as this
act could increase the possibility of future bank failures, and
thus increase federal expenditures. The bill does this by expanding
the federal government's unconstitutional control over the financial
services industry. This bill also raises taxes on all financial
institutions. Therefore, I must oppose this bill.
I primarily
object to the provisions in this legislation which may increase
the premiums assessed on participating financial institutions.
These "premiums,'' which are actually taxes, are the premier
sources of funds for the Deposit Insurance Fund. This fund is
used to bail out banks who experience difficulties meeting their
commitments to their depositors. Thus, the deposit insurance system
transfers liability for poor management decisions from those who
made the decisions, to their competitors. This system punishes
those financial institutions which follow sound practices, as
they are forced to absorb the losses of their competitors. This
also compounds the moral hazard problem created whenever government
socializes business losses.
In
the event of a severe banking crisis, Congress will likely transfer
funds from the general revenue into the Deposit Insurance Fund,
which could make all taxpayers liable for the mistakes of a few.
Of course, such a bailout would require separate authorization
from Congress, but can anyone imagine Congress saying "No''
to banking lobbyists pleading for relief from the costs of bailing
out their weaker competitors?
Government
subsidies lead to government control, as regulations are imposed
on the recipients of the subsidies in order to address the moral
hazard problem. This is certainly the case in banking, which is
one of the most heavily regulated industries in America. However,
as George Kaufman, the John Smith Professor of Banking and Finance
at Loyola University in Chicago, and co-chair of the Shadow Financial
Regulatory Committee, pointed out in a study for the CATO Institutes,
the FDIC's history of poor management exacerbated the banking
crisis of the eighties and nineties. Professor Kaufman properly
identifies a key reason for the FDIC's poor track record in protecting
individual depositors: regulators have incentives to downplay
or even cover-up problems in the financial system such as banking
facilities. Banking failures are black marks on the regulators'
records. In addition, regulators may be subject to political pressure
to delay imposing sanctions on failing institutions, thus increasing
the magnitude of the loss.
Immediately
after a problem in the banking industry comes to light, the media
and Congress will inevitably blame it on regulators who were "asleep
at the switch.'' Yet, most politicians continue to believe that
giving more power to the very regulators whose incompetence (or
worst) either caused or contributed to the problem will somehow
prevent future crises!
The presence
of deposit insurance and government regulations removes incentives
for individuals to act on their own to protect their deposits
or even inquire as to the health of their financial institutions.
After all, why should individuals be concerned with the health
of their financial institutions when the federal government is
ensuring that banks follow sound practices and has insured their
deposits?
I would also
like to reiterate the irony that this is being considered as part
of reconciliation designed to achieve budget savings. While the
technical changes made in the deposit insurance program may provide
some minor budget savings, increasing the risk of a taxpayer bailout
of financial institutions is the equivalent of recommending someone
take up smoking to avoid lung cancer. If this committee, and Congress,
really wanted to cut spending, they would look at ending the numerous
subsidies to large corporations and financial institutions provided
by programs under this committee's jurisdiction.
Finally,
I would remind my colleagues that the federal deposit insurance
program lacks constitutional authority. Congress' only mandate
in the area of money and banking is to maintain the value of the
money. Unfortunately, Congress abdicated its responsibility over
monetary policy with the passage of the Federal Reserve Act of
1913, which allows the federal government to erode the value of
the currency at the will of the central bank. Congress' embrace
of fiat money is directly responsible for the instability in the
banking system that created the justification for deposit insurance.
In
conclusion, this Deposit Insurance "Reform" imposes new taxes
on financial institutions, forces sound institutions to pay for
the mistakes of their reckless competitors, increases the chances
of taxpayers being forced to bail out unsound financial institutions,
reduces individual depositors' incentives to take action to protect
their deposits, and exceeds Congress's constitutional authority.
I therefore urge my colleagues to reject this bill. Instead of
extending this federal program, Congress should work to defund
programs that distort the market and enrich powerful special interests
and work to prevent the crises which justify government programs
like deposit insurance, by fulfilling our constitutional responsibility
to pursue sound monetary policies.