Despite
Government, Insurance Innovation
by
David Griffus
by David Griffus
DIGG THIS
I recently
bought a new (to me) car and decided that it would be a good idea
to shop around again for car insurance. Until now, I had always
been insured with my local independent insurance agent, but with
the proliferation of direct insurers like Geico and Progressive,
I thought that I could save a little money by cutting out the middleman.
I was right. I saved a lot. It doesn’t feel great to tell someone
with whom you’ve had a wonderful eight-year business relationship
with that you’ve decided to go with another company, but for me,
insurance is just a numbers game. During this process, I discovered
a concept, if allowed to be widely used, that has the potential
to change the auto insurance industry as we know it.
Progressive
Direct has a new program called TripSense, which is a small electronic
device that the driver plugs into the diagnostic port underneath
the dash on his vehicle. Made by the same company that designed
the "black boxes" in cars that provide investigators with
data to help recreate traffic accidents, this device collects data
about driving habits, including the time of day, the length of trip,
the number of miles, speed, sudden starts / stops, etc. Participation
in the program is voluntary. While the "Pay as You Drive"
(PAYD) idea is not entirely new, TripSense represents the first
real consumer application of this technology in the United States.
For insurance
companies, this is the ultimate way to accurately assess a driver's
risk profile and price a policy. This goes way beyond simply checking
credit scores and driving and claims histories. This actually monitors
the manner in which a person drives, which has the potential to
revolutionize the car insurance industry.
We know from
the teachings of Mises and Rothbard that an insurable risk is an
example of class probability, meaning that, "We know or assume
to know, with regard to the problem concerned, everything about
the behavior of a whole class of events or phenomena; but about
the actual singular events or phenomena we know nothing but that
they are elements of this class." In other words, while we
cannot predict individual accidents, we can attempt to know the
number and cost of accidents that will occur within a particular
class of drivers that share some common characteristics (e.g., type
of car, age, credit score, miles driven, marital status, etc.)
Economics tells
us that the further we are able to sub-divide the classes of drivers
into more homogeneous groups, the more we would expect insurance
prices to more accurately reflect each group’s actuarial risk. In
other words, drivers that demonstrate qualities that place them
into a "safe" class will tend to pay less for insurance
than drivers that demonstrate "risky" qualities. In a
free market, programs like TripSense will help reward safe drivers
and penalize riskier ones.
Of course,
risky drivers don’t like programs like this, nor do the government
bureaucrats. Risky drivers, like anyone else, want to pay as little
as possible for insurance. Government bureaucrats, sensing a "market
failure," want to make the system "fair" by ensuring
that insurance is "affordable" to everyone. The PAYD concept
undermines these two positions, which will probably lead to the
implications of Woods’ Law: "…whenever the private sector introduces
an innovation that makes the poor better off than they would have
been without it, or that offers benefits or terms that no one else
is prepared to offer them, someone – in the name of helping the
poor – will call for curbing or abolishing it." In other words,
the government in some places will regulate it or abolish this practice
in the name of "privacy" or "fairness."
Use this scenario
to imagine the power of the Pay as You Drive idea: a poor man, who
is required to purchase car insurance in order to drive a vehicle
in his state, has a poor credit score and is unfairly targeted for
traffic violations by his local police because of his dilapidated
car. Under the old system, insurance companies would have no additional
information on how to place this person into a class and would likely
classify this person as risky, with a high insurance premium. With
a program like TripSense, the driver knows for certain that
he can earn a discount by exhibiting good driving habits because
the insurance company is constantly monitoring him. He might think
twice about driving late at night or suddenly braking as each negative
event will reduce his discount. Pay as You Drive programs provide
direct incentive for individuals to be good drivers and to
make the roads safer. The insurance companies win by having to pay
out on fewer claims and the driver wins by paying less for car insurance.
Seems like a no-brainer, right?
It is not surprising
to us libertarians, then, that state regulations encourage exactly
the opposite behaviors. States require safe drivers to subsidize
risky drivers by forcing insurance companies to insure all drivers,
even those that they would classify as too risky to insure. Our
basic training in economics tells us that if we subsidize something,
we are going to get more if it (in this case, bad drivers). Some
states prohibit the use of certain personal characteristics (like
credit scores) in determining rates, even if the insurance companies
believe that this particular characteristic is useful in placing
drivers in different risk classes. Again, insurance companies are
forced to subsidize risky drivers.
The positive
aspects of PAYD do not necessarily mean that in a free market every
insurance company would have a program like TripSense. We can certainly
imagine that some drivers might not want to participate in a program
that monitors their driving habits all of the time because they
view it as too intrusive. To fill this consumer want, there might
be a company that makes the program optional (as does Progressive)
or does not offer it at all. However, if a company that offers a
PAYD device is able to offer substantially lower rates to safe drivers
and is able to win the business of these consumers, the non-discriminating
firm might have a difficult time attracting the safer drivers, which
might increase the class risk of the remaining pool of drivers and
subsequently place downward pressure on its profits. One thing seems
clear: this technology, if allowed to be implemented, will likely
decrease rates for safe drivers and encourage responsible behavior.
For now, TripSense
is only offered in Michigan, Minnesota, and Oregon. For safe drivers
in over-regulated and over-burdened states like New Jersey and New
York, who face some the nation’s highest auto insurance rates, this
program could not come soon enough. If government allows insurance
companies to reward safe driving, we’ll get safer roads. I just
hope that government steps out of the way and allows the market
to work its magic.
August
15, 2007
David
Griffus [send him mail]
holds a Bachelor of Business Administration from the University
of Michigan and currently works as an analyst in Ann Arbor, MI.
Copyright
© 2007 LewRockwell.com
|