Southern
Europe's Fiscal Crisis
by
Gary North
by Gary North
Recently by Gary North: The
Resurrection of Spade Cooley
The euro is
the focus of attention these days. This is because of a fiscal crisis
in Greece, and looming crises in Portugal and Spain. Italy could
follow.
What is the
problem? Greece is running a huge deficit in the range of 12.7%
of its Gross Domestic Product. The investment world regards a deficit
of this magnitude as unsustainable. There are rumors of default.
Spain
is running a deficit of 11.4% of its GDP. This is considered
a threat to the nation's financial structure. There are rumors of
default.
The United
States government is expected to run a deficit of $1.6 trillion
in an economy with about $14 trillion GDP. This means the deficit
will be about 11.4% of GDP. Of course, this is seen by American
economists as all right. After all, the United States is not Spain.
Treasury Secretary Geithner assured the viewers
on ABC News on Sunday, February 8, that there is no possibility
that the rating on U.S. Treasury debt will ever fall below AAA.
"That will never happen in this country." Unfortunately, he neglected
to say whether it could happen in other countries, whose credit-rating
agencies are not regulated by the United States government.
The euro is
officially issued by the European Central Bank. This central bank
acts on behalf of all 16 European nations that are part of the European
Monetary Union. Non-members are Great Britain and Switzerland.
This system
is now an aspect of the European Union, which has been in existence
since December 1, 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty went into effect.
Yet the legislatures of each of the member states of the EMU have
independent fiscal policies. They do not control monetary policy,
but they control taxes and spending.
Always before,
monetary affairs have been conducted by central banks that represent
central governments. The euro is an experiment in a central bank
that officially operates on behalf of 16 nations.
FRIEDMAN
ON THE EURO
In 2005, Milton
Friedman commented on the problem facing the euro and Western Europe.
The
euro is going to be a big source of problems, not a source of help.
The euro has no precedent. To the best of my knowledge, there has
never been a monetary union, putting out a fiat currency, composed
of independent states.
There have
been unions based on gold or silver, but not on fiat money
money tempted to inflate put out by politically independent
entities. (New Perspectives, Spring 2005).
His admission
that there have been unions based on gold was significant. He did
not pursue this, because he rejected the gold standard. He made
his reputation as a monetary theorist for his opposition to a gold
standard. He was a faithful disciple of the American theorist who
was most adamantly opposed to the gold standard, Irving Fisher.
Friedman's monetary theories were an extension of Fisher's.
Fisher believed
in fiat money unconnected to gold. So did Friedman. Fisher saw a
stable price level as the primary monetary goal. So did Friedman.
Fisher was willing to accept central banking in principle, because
he believed that central banks are more reliable than legislatures.
So did Friedman. Fisher never came up with a theory of civil government
or economics that showed how central banks could be trusted with
control over fiat money. Neither did Friedman.
Friedman believed
in the free market, but not a free market in money. He did not believe
in a full gold coin standard that is enforced only by the law of
contracts. On this point, neither do defenders of a traditional,
government-run, government-guaranteed gold standard. The question
always arises: How can citizens prevent the government from cheating?
What protects them from a government's decision to allow commercial
banks and central banks from confiscating the depositors gold? So
far, there has been no answer, other than the usual one: defeat
at the next election. But, because the confiscations happen during
emergencies major wars, economic breakdowns the public
meekly consents. Always. Friedman offered this criticism of the
present arrangement in Europe. In an interview during the boom phase
of the economy in 2003, he said this.
What's
going to make the difference is the productivity of the different
countries. But personally, as I say, I believe the Euroland is going
to run into big difficulties. That's because the different countries
have different languages, limited mobility among them, and they're
affected differently by external events.
Right now
for example, Ireland and Spain are doing very well, but on the
other hand Germany and France are doing very poorly. The question
is; "Is the same monetary policy appropriate for all of them?"
Germany and France on one hand and Ireland and Spain on the other:
it's very dubious that it is. That's why you're having increasing
difficulties within the Euroland group. As you probably know Sweden,
which had not joined the European Monetary Union, voted down doing
so and will keep its own currency.
He asked what
he imagined was a rhetorical question: "Is the same monetary policy
appropriate for all of them?" He answered no. That was because he
was a fiat money economist.
The free market-based
answer would be this: "There should be no monetary policy. There
should be only the enforcement of contracts."
Friedman assumed
that there must be economic policy. This begged the question: "Set
by whom?" The various parliaments? The various central banks? A
combination? He opposed a single central bank. He also opposed gold.
He opposed a single European parliament. That put him in a dilemma.
There is only one answer remaining: competing parliaments. This
is what we have now. This system is not working.
In 1999, he
wrote a letter to an economist. The economist used it and other
sources to write a paper on Friedman's view of the euro. On March
9, 1999, he wrote:
As
you know, I am very negative about the euro and I am very doubtful
about how it will work out. However, I am less pessimistic about
it now than I was earlier simply because I never expected that the
various countries would display the kind of discipline that was
required in order to qualify for the euro. The convergence in inflation
rates, interest rates, and so on was greater and more rapid than
I would have expected.
Still, he hoped
the deal would not go through. He wrote on April 17, 1999,
What
most troubles me as it does you is that members of the euro have
thrown away the key. Once the euro physically replaces the separate
currencies, how in the world do you get out? It's a major crisis.
As a result, I would strongly agree with your view that the euro
should be abandoned before January 1, 2002.
At the same
time, the odds are very great that it will not be abandoned. The
defects of the euro will take some time to show up; nothing happens
very rapidly in this area. There are fewer than three years to
go. Even if difficulties deriving from the euro occur in those
three years, the political system is unlikely to react quickly
enough to end the euro. As a result, I think it would be very
desirable for some systematic thought to be given to devising
some way to get out of the straitjacket of the euro after 2002.
The least Italy should do is to keep intact the plates which are
used to produce lira.
No nation
got out. They all surrendered monetary sovereignty to the European
Monetary Union and the European Central Bank.
THE
DAY OF RECKONING IS HERE
The crisis
over Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain PIGS continues
to escalate. Because they have surrendered their monetary policy
to the ECB, these nations are unable to inflate their way out of
the fiscal crisis. This leaves the following options.
1.
Default on some or all of their debts
2. Pay higher interest rates
3. Cut spending
4. Raise taxes
5. Withdraw from the EMU
6. Withdraw from the EU
7. Wait for a bailout by the ECB.
8. Choices 2-7
There is a
legal question regarding withdrawal. These nations have surrendered
their national sovereignty to the New Europe. How can they regain
it? At what price?
If they leave,
the EU will have to impose sanctions. Military invasion is out of
the question. Want to fight Spain across the Pyrenees? How about
fighting Greece in the hills? So, the sanctions would be economic.
A major one would be to impose high tariffs on these nations. The
borders would be closed.
These four
nations are ruled by politicians who cooperatively sold their nations'
sovereignties for a mess of pottage: access to northern Europe's
capital and markets. They are highly unlikely to secede.
Then what?
The EU has restrictions on the fiscal deficits: 3% of GDP. Total
debt cannot go above 60% of GDP. This goes back to 1993: the Stability
and Growth Pact. In 2005, the rule was adjusted at the request of
Germany and France. No European Union nation has honored these restrictions.
In a report, "Public
Finances in EMU, 2009," the authors described the effects of
the big bank bailouts.
Member
States have supported their banking sectors with measures amounting
to about 13% of GDP and have approved funds worth another 31% of
GDP. The largest share (7.8% of GDP in terms of measures taken;
24.7% of GDP in terms of measures approved) are guarantees on bank
liabilities, which do not affect public debt and deficits unless
they are called upon. The rest pertains to relief of impaired assets,
liquidity support and capital injections (p. 2).
So, there
are no cross-border sanctions. The rules are being violated.
This raises
a problem: the threat of a national debt default by one of the PIGS.
Greece insists that it will do no such thing. But the rates on insurance
against Greece's national default have been rising.
The Greek
government is trapped. It cannot secede. It cannot inflate. So,
it has to decide: default, higher interest rates, or run a budget
surplus. The latter is out of the question in any European nation.
So, it is down to default or raise interest rates. I think the latter
is most likely.
Or it can
wait and see if the ECB comes through with a bailout. If the ECB
does bail out Greece, this will send a clear signal: the end of
any need for fiscal responsibility by the PIGS. It will also end
any legitimate hope that the euro will become a stable, reliable
fiat currency.
CONCLUSION
The PIGS have
no ability politically to cut the costs of national government.
The welfare state mentality is universal. Politicians refuse to
slow the rate of spending. Raising taxes will tank their economies.
Politicians may try it, but there will be painful economic repercussions.
Rising interest
rates will tank their economies.
This leaves
only one possible solution: kick the can. Promise stability and
growth. Promise that they will get their financial houses in order.
The
welfare state is based on promises. All over the world, it is facing
bankruptcy. But the voters believe in the promises, and politicians
dare not tell the truth.
The PIGS are
getting no help from the European Central Bank. The capital markets
are raising interest rates. Their economies are still declining.
There is an
answer: open default by the welfare state. I mean across-the-board
default, all over the world. "We are sorry to inform you that, contrary
to our expectations and yours, Social Security and Medicare are
no longer solvent. The IOUs in the trust funds can no longer be
met. They have been shut down." This would be coupled with the refusal
of central banks to buy further debt, anywhere, for any reason.
This will
not happen.
Rising rates
and recession in southern Europe look likely. That recession will
spread across the borders.
February
10, 2010
Gary
North [send him mail]
is the author of Mises
on Money. Visit http://www.garynorth.com.
He is also the author of a free 20-volume series, An
Economic Commentary on the Bible.
Copyright ©
2010 Gary North
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