Don't Say He Didn't Warn You
by
Gary North
by Gary North
Paul Volcker
was Chairman of the Federal Reserve System's Board of Governors
from late 1979 until late 1987. He oversaw the reversal of FED monetary
policy that had prevailed throughout the 1970s, an inflationary
policy that had produced the price inflation of the Nixon years,
the floating of the dollar in 1971, two recessions (1970/71 and
1975), and two major oil price hikes. OPEC learned in 1971 that
the West would tolerate the nationalization of Western oil companies'
property when Libya confiscated properties owned by BP and Bunker
Hunt. OPEC also realized that a dollar unbacked by gold would soon
be cut in value. OPEC was correct about both assumptions, as it
proved in 1973 and 1979: price hikes.
Beginning
in October of 1979, the FED stopped using fiat money to create low
short-term interest rates. Volcker announced the new policy when
silver was heading for $50/oz and gold was heading for $850/oz.
Both prices were hit for one day in January, 1980 and then started
down. Meanwhile, short-term T-bill rates soared to over 21%, the
highest in modern history. Carter got a recession in 1980; Reagan
got a much bigger one in 1981. But this unpalatable medicine reversed
the rate of price inflation.
On Friday, the 13th of August, 1982, Mexico's government announced
that it was considering the nationalization of Western banks and
threatened to default on its foreign debt. The world's banking system
teetered on the brink of paralysis. With Volcker acting as the coordinator,
Western central banks responded by promising doses of liquidity
(fiat money) and loan renegotiations. In September, the Mexican
government did nationalize all private Mexican banks and took over
the control of capital flows.
The weekend of August
13 marked the beginning of the U.S. stock market boom that lasted
until 2000, with only the one-day worldwide correction of over 20%
in October, 1987 – Greenspan's first week on the job –
to mar the boom. The FED adopted monetary inflation, thereby ending
three years of tight money.
Volcker testified before
Congress on a regular basis, as required by Federal law –
the only law that Congress enforces on the quasi-autonomous FED.
At 6 feet 7, he is an impressive figure. He imitated Red Auerbach,
the coach of the Boston Celtics, who would light a cigar when he
thought a game was as good as lost for the Celtics' opponent. Volcker
puffed cigars at Congress. In contrast, Greenspan, a far less impressive
figure, has adopted a linguistic strategy to befuddle rather than
overpower Congressmen: verbal smoke rather than tobacco smoke. Both
approaches work just fine.
Volcker generally was
forthright. He basically told Congress to fly a kite. He told them
what he was going to do, and then he did it. They never laid a glove
on him. He had a well-deserved reputation for not sugar-coating
bad news.
VOLCKER'S LATEST
WARNING
On April
10, The Washington Post ran an article by Volcker: "An
Economy on Thin Ice." He began with an optimistic paragraph.
The U.S. expansion
appears on track. Europe and Japan may lack exuberance, but their
economies are at least on the plus side. China and India –
with close to 40 percent of the world's population – have
sustained growth at rates that not so long ago would have seemed,
if not impossible, highly improbable.
This assessment is consistent
with the press releases of major brokerage houses. But the optimism
faded in the next paragraph.
Yet, under
the placid surface, there are disturbing trends: huge imbalances,
disequilibria, risks – call them what you will. Altogether
the circumstances seem to me as dangerous and intractable as any
I can remember, and I can remember quite a lot. What really concerns
me is that there seems to be so little willingness or capacity to
do much about it.
The question is: What
can anyone do about it? The trade imbalance soared under Clinton,
who ran budget surpluses (because the annual $140 billion raid on
the Social Security Trust Fund was not assessed as a deficit). It
continues to soar under Bush, who is running a $420 billion deficit,
plus occasional surprise assessments for the Iraq war, plus the
usual $140 billion raid on Social Security.
We sit here
absorbed in a debate about how to maintain Social Security –
and, more important, Medicare – when the baby boomers retire.
But right now, those same boomers are spending like there's no tomorrow.
If we can believe the numbers, personal savings in the United States
have practically disappeared.
What policy can reverse
this? Foreigners are buying investment assets; hence, the foreign
trade deficit. Baby boomers are not buying assets, along with the
other American age groups. This has to do with confidence in the
future. Foreigners want in on the deal. Americans imagine that retirement
will be as profitable as working for a living. Both groups will
find that they have made a forecasting error of major proportions.
What holds
it all together is a massive and growing flow of capital from abroad,
running to more than $2 billion every working day, and growing.
There is no sense of strain. As a nation we don't consciously borrow
or beg. We aren't even offering attractive interest rates, nor do
we have to offer our creditors protection against the risk of a
declining dollar.
Most of the time, it
has been private capital that has freely flowed into our markets
from abroad – where better to invest in an uncertain world,
the refrain has gone, than the United States?
More recently,
we've become more dependent on foreign central banks, particularly
in China and Japan and elsewhere in East Asia.
Volcker goes on to
say that this has kept Americans loaded up on consumer goods. It
has kept prices low. It is all quite comfortable for all concerned.
He neglects to mention those for whom things are not so comfortable:
(1) foreign consumers, who are facing higher prices because Americans
are buying goods produced in their countries; (2) American manufacturers
and their employees.
The difficulty is that
this seemingly comfortable pattern can't go on indefinitely. I don't
know of any country that has managed to consume and invest 6 percent
more than it produces for long. The United States is absorbing about
80 percent of the net flow of international capital. And at some
point, both central banks and private institutions will have their
fill of dollars.
The problem is, the
willingness of foreigners to invest here is like any other mania.
It goes on longer than anyone who identifies it as a mania believed
was possible. It is like the dot-com mania of 1999 or the housing
mania today in Los Angeles County.
I don't know whether
change will come with a bang or a whimper, whether sooner or later.
But as things stand, it is more likely than not that it will be
financial crises rather than policy foresight that will force.
This is an important
prediction. A financial crisis, unlike a policy change, is not debated
publicly. It hits without warning.
There is a
wide area of agreement among establishment economists about a textbook
pretty picture: China and other continental Asian economies should
permit and encourage a substantial exchange rate appreciation against
the dollar. Japan and Europe should work promptly and aggressively
toward domestic stimulus and deal more effectively and speedily
with structural obstacles to growth. And the United States, by some
combination of measures, should forcibly increase its rate of internal
saving, thereby reducing its import demand.
The fact that he would
refer to "establishment economists" is revealing. This
is the terminology of a dissenter. But Volcker is not an obscure
newsletter writer. At one point, he was the most powerful economic
decision-maker on earth.
Japan has been pursuing
massive government deficits since 1990. It has been following Keynesian
stimulus policies according to Keynesian textbooks. It has still been
in recession mode for almost 15 years. Europe is doing the same. Most
nations are ignoring the limits on deficits set by treaty. "And
the United States, by some combination of measures, should forcibly
increase its rate of internal saving, thereby reducing its import
demand." What combination of measures? The only ones that make
sense are the abolition of the capital gains tax and the end of the
double taxation of corporate profits. Establishment economists, being
Keynesians, want no part of either policy. Neither has a political
chance during the second term of a wartime President.
But can we, with any
degree of confidence today, look forward to any one of these policies
being put in place any time soon, much less a combination of all?
The answer
is no. So I think we are skating on increasingly thin ice. On the
present trajectory, the deficits and imbalances will increase. At
some point, the sense of confidence in capital markets that today
so benignly supports the flow of funds to the United States and
the growing world economy could fade. Then some event, or combination
of events, could come along to disturb markets, with damaging volatility
in both exchange markets and interest rates. We had a taste of that
in the stagflation of the 1970s – a volatile and depressed
dollar, inflationary pressures, a sudden increase in interest rates
and a couple of big recessions.
ACT NOW!
Volcker is using a
tried-and-true sales strategy: create a sense of unease; then offer
a solution. The problem is, the salesman's solution is always "new,
improved, and pain-free – with no money down and two full
years without interest." Volcker's isn't. Yet he uses the direct-response
copywriter's words: "Act now!"
The clear
lesson I draw is that there is a high premium on doing what we can
to minimize the risks and to ensure that there is time for orderly
adjustment. I'm not suggesting anything unorthodox or arcane. What
is required is a willingness to act now – and next year, and
the following year, and to act even when, on the surface, everything
seems so placid and favorable.
When the copy writer
says "Act now," he always offers a benefit for acting
now. You get a special premium of some kind, or a discount, or something.
But Volcker offers no immediate reason to act now.
What I am talking
about really boils down to the oldest lesson of economic policy:
a strong sense of monetary and fiscal discipline. This is not a
time for ideological intransigence and partisan posturing on the
budget at the expense of the deficit rising still higher.
But the FED already
is slowing the rate of monetary inflation. It is allowing short-term
rates to rise. This was Volcker's strategy in late 1979 and 1980.
The FED has no other standard policy tool available, other than
raising bank reserve requirements, which has not been done in my
adult lifetime. As for fiscal discipline – the government's
obligation – which form should it take?
Cut taxes, leave
spending as-is, and let the economy boom? (supply side).
Raise taxes and keep
the Iraq war going? (nobody's solution)
Raise taxes, get
out of Iraq, cut military spending, and raise domestic spending?
(Teddy Kennedy's solution)
Raise taxes, get
out of Iraq, cut all spending? (nobody's solution)
Cut taxes, cut spending,
stabilize the money supply, get out of Iraq, and then shut down
all of the Federal regulatory agencies. (Austrian School solution
– Cong. Ron Paul and no one else.)
Volcker ends his essay:
A wise observer
of the economic scene once commented that "what can be left
to later, usually is – and then, alas, it's too late."
I don't want to let that stand as the epitaph of what has been an
unparalleled period of success for the American economy and of enormous
potential for the world at large.
CONCLUSION
Volcker has been sounding
the alarm for months. The markets pay no attention. If Greenspan
were this forthright, the capital markets would respond in minutes
– downward.
The truth of the analysis
is not the question in the minds of establishment investors. What
matters is the short-term power of the analyst.
I did not believe Volcker
in October, 1979, when he announced what he was going to do. I should
have. I believe him this time.
I think you should,
too.
April
13, 2005
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© 2005 LewRockwell.com
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