The Prussian Monarchy Stuff
by
William S. Lind
by William S. Lind
DIGG THIS
A
bright young man who served on a panel with me at an intelligence
conference earlier this year said during a break, "A lot of
us read your On
War
columns, but there are two things we don’t get. We don’t get
your dislike of technology and we don’t get the Prussian monarchy
stuff." Readers interested in the former may turn to my piece
in an early issue of The
American Conservative. But with the shadow of 1914 looming
ever larger over us, I thought this might be a good time to explain
"the Prussian monarchy stuff."
Of
course, like all real conservatives, I am a monarchist. The universe
is not a republic. My specific attachment to the House of Hohenzollern
grew as I began to comprehend the Prussian/German way of war, and
its vast difference from the Franco/American approach. Maneuver
warfare, aka Third Generation war, was created and developed under
the Prussian monarchy; it was conceptually complete by 1918. That
is not a mere accident of history. The Prussian monarchy was willing
to trust its officer corps, and allow officers who were difficult
subordinates to rise, to a far greater degree than most other governments.
It understood that Prussia, a poor country, needed to be rich intellectually,
including in ideas about war. There was an intimate connection between
the Prussian virtues, which have vanished from the Brave New Federal
Republic, and the evolution of maneuver warfare. Old Kaiser Wilhelm
I represented those virtues well; though Emperor of Germany, when
he wanted to go somewhere, he went down to the railway station and
bought a ticket.
Given
the centrality of maneuver warfare to my work, this might be explanation
enough. But there is more. As both a cultural conservative and an
historian, I realize that the last chance of survival our Western,
Christian civilization may have had was a victory by the Central
Powers in World War I.
To
most non-historians, World War I is a vague and distant memory,
faded photographs of guys in tin hats standing around in mud-filled
trenches. In fact, it was one of two cataclysmic disasters of Western
civilization in the Modern period (the other was the French Revolution).
In 1914, the West put a gun to its collective head and blew its
brains out. No, it wasn’t the fault of Kaiser Wilhelm II, whom history
has treated most unfairly. As Colonel House wrote to President Woodrow
Wilson after meeting with the Kaiser in 1915, it is clear he neither
expected not wanted war. A World War became inevitable when Tsar
Nicholas II, not Kaiser Wilhelm, very reluctantly yielded to the
demands of his War and Foreign Ministers and declared general mobilization
instead of mobilization against Austria alone.
Once
war occurred, and the failure of the Schlieffen Plan guaranteed
it would be a long war, a disaster for Western civilization was
inevitable. Still, had the Central Powers won in the end, the civilization
destruction might not have been so complete. There would have been
no Communism, nor a republic in Russia; a victorious Germany would
have never tolerated it, and unlike the Western Allies, Germany
was positioned geographically to do something about it. Hitler would
have remained a non-entity. Prior to World War I, the best major
European countries in which to be Jewish were Germany and Austria;
Kaiser Wilhelm would never have allowed a Dreyfus Affair in Germany.
The vast Jewish communities of Central and Eastern Europe would
have held their traditional places in multi-nation-empires, instead
of becoming aliens in new nation-states. It should not surprise
us that in World War I, American Jews attempted to raise a regiment
to fight for Germany.
Even
more importantly, the Christian conservatism – more accurately,
perhaps, traditionalism – represented by the Central Powers would
have been greatly strengthened by their victory. Instead, the fall
of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian monarchies let the poisons
of the French Revolution loose unchecked upon the West, and upon
the world. The Marxist historian Arno Mayer is correct in arguing
that in 1914, the United States represented (as a republic, with
France) the international left, while by 1919 it was organizing
the international right. America had not changed; the spectrum had
shifted around it.
Thus,
when Americans and Europeans wonder today how and why the West lost
its historic culture, morals and religion, the ultimate answer is
the Allied victory in 1918. Again, the fact that World War I occurred
is the greatest disaster. But once that had happened, the last chance
the West had of retaining its traditional culture was a victory
by the Central Powers. The question should not be why I, as a cultural
conservative, remain loyal to the two Kaisers, Wilhelm II and Franz
Josef, but how a real conservative could do anything else.
Nor
is this all quite history. Just as the defeat of the Central Powers
in 1918 marked the tipping point downward of Western civilization
and the real beginning of the murderous Twentieth Century, so events
in the Middle East today may mark the beginnings of the 21st
Century and, not so much the death of the West, which has already
occurred, but its burial. The shadows of 1914, and of 1918, are
long indeed, and they end in Old Night.
Note:
In response to an earlier column, a reader asked for recommendations
of some books on the fin de siecle and Kaiser Wilhelm II.
From the military perspective, the two best works on the former
are Barbara Tuchman’s The
Guns of August and Alexsandr Solzhenitsyn’s August
1914. The most balanced biography in English of Kaiser Wilhelm
II is The
Last Kaiser: The Life of Wilhelm II by Giles MacDonogh.
August
2, 2006
William
Lind [send him mail]
is an analyst based in Washington, DC.
Copyright
© 2006 William S. Lind
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