Civil War Spectre Spurs New Iraq Exit Plans
by
Jim Lobe by
Jim Lobe
Growing
pessimism about averting civil war in Iraq, as well as mounting
concerns that the U.S. military presence there may itself be fueling
the insurgency and Islamist extremism worldwide, has spurred a spate
of new calls for the United States to withdraw its 140,000 troops
sooner rather than later.
Although
resolutions to establish at least a timeline for withdrawal have
so far gained the support of only about a quarter of the members
of Congress, the absence of tangible progress in turning back the
insurgency is adding to fears on Capitol Hill that the administration's
hopes of stabilizing the situation, let alone giving birth to a
pro-Western democracy in the heart of the Arab world, are delusory.
"In
January, we had congressional staff hanging up on us when we called
to say that we want to discuss shifting U.S. policy from more guns
and more troops toward withdrawal," said Jim Cason, communications
director of the Friends Committee on National Legislation, a lobby
group. "Now they want to talk about it."
While
the George W. Bush administration still insists that civil war will
be avoided and current negotiations to produce a new constitution
by the middle of next month remain on track, the continuing high
level of violence and the strength and sophistication of predominantly
Sunni insurgents and foreign fighters are clearly having an effect
here.
That
was made clearest in two New York Times articles published
Sunday, including one entitled "Defying U.S. Efforts, Guerrillas
in Iraq Refocus and Strengthen," and another, by John Burns,
a veteran star Times reporter who has spent considerable
time in Iraq, entitled "If It's Civil War, Do We Know It?"
The
latter story recounted the recent intensification of Sunni violence
against the Shia community that provoked even the ever-patient Shia
religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, to whom Washington has
increasingly deferred in guiding the political transition, to call
on the Shi'ite-led government to "defend the country against
mass annihilation."
"From
the moment American troops crossed the border 28 months ago,"
Burns wrote, "the specter hanging over the American enterprise
here has been that Iraq, freed from [Saddam] Hussein's tyranny,
might prove to be so fractured
that would spiral inexorably
into civil war."
"Now,
events are pointing more than ever to the possibility that the nightmare
could come true," according to Burns, who noted that Shi'ite
militias and Shi'ite and Kurdish-led army and police units were
themselves taking increasingly aggressive countermeasures, including
abducting, torturing, and executing suspected insurgents and their
perceived sympathizers and defenders.
The
second story, by two other Baghdad-based Times correspondents,
quoted unnamed senior military officers reiterating two big frustrations
that have been heard since July, 2003: that the insurgency appears
to be "growing more violent, more resilient, and more sophisticated
than ever," and that prosecuting the war is like sowing dragons'
teeth.
"We
are capturing or killing a lot of insurgents," one "senior
Army intelligence officer," told the Times. "But they're
being replaced quicker than we can interdict their operations. There
is always another insurgent ready to step up and take charge."
Such
assessments are spurring what rapidly has become a cottage industry
particularly from the Democratic side of the political spectrum
one fueled in part by the leak in early July of a British
contingency plan that called for halving the number of U.S. and
British troops in Iraq by the latter part of 2006.
Thus,
on July 15, former Central Intelligence Agency director John Deutch
published a column in the Times calling for a "prompt withdrawal
plan," with the initial drawdown set to coincide with the Iraqi
elections scheduled for Dec. 15, that would include a timetable
for reducing the scope of military operations, while maintaining
a "regional quick-reaction force" in reserve, as well
as ongoing intelligence and training programs.
At
the same time, the U.S. would urge the Iraqi government and its
neighbors to recognize their common interest in Baghdad's peaceful
evolution without external intervention and commit itself to an
economic assistance program to Iraq "so long as it stays on
a peaceful path" and to the wider region that will encourage
cooperation.
A
more detailed plan emerged several days later from the Boston-based
Project on Defense Alternatives (PDA) calling for complete withdrawal,
except for the retention of a multinational civilian and military
monitoring and training contingent of less than 10,000 (of which
the U.S. military presence would be limited to 2,000 troops), by
September 2006.
The
plan, to take effect Aug. 1, would begin with the adoption of a
withdrawal time line, a sharp de-escalation of the war in Sunni
areas, a shift of U.S. resources to its training mission, and the
transfer of foreign military control of localities to elected officials
"without the interference of federal or coalition authorities."
"The
key to enabling total U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq within 400
days is achieving a political accord with Sunni leaders at all levels
and with Iraq's neighbors especially Syria and Iran,"
according to the report by defense analyst Carl Conetta. "The
proximal aim would be to immediately lower the level of conflict
inside Iraq by constricting both active and passive support for
the insurgency, inside and outside the country."
Like
the two other authors, veteran Middle East analyst Helena Cobban
also believes that the continued U.S. military presence in Iraq
is counterproductive to longer-term U.S. interests and is effectively
fueling the insurgency. But she goes further than the other two
authors, calling for a withdrawal strategy that is "total,
speedy, and generous to the Iraqi people."
Her
model is Israel's 2000 exit from southern Lebanon, noting that,
despite deep fears that that withdrawal would touch off "mayhem
and revenge [in Lebanon], none came to pass."
A
prior announcement of "imminent total withdrawal" would
serve to "focus the minds of Iraqis considerably," particularly
on reconstruction if the U.S. and other countries are sufficiently
generous, and "make them far less hospitable to insurgents,
especially those who get their impetus from the prospect of a prolonged
foreign occupation."
All
the authors take issue with the conventional assumption that the
U.S. military presence is a stabilizing factor without which Iraq's
descent into civil war would be more certain or bloody.
They
also argue that the administration's argument that Washington's
global "credibility" is outweighed by other considerations,
including the damage that the continued U.S. presence does to U.S.
interests in the Arab and Islamic world more generally and the reduced
ability of the U.S. to deal with other important security challenges
while it remains bogged down in Iraq.
As
noted by Deutch, continued investment in a losing proposition could
result in "an even worse loss of credibility down the road."
July
27, 2005
Jim
Lobe [send him mail] is Inter Press
Service's correspondent in Washington, DC. Copyright
© 2005 Inter Press Service Jim
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