Anarchism/Minarchism:
Is a Government Part of a Free Country? Edited by Roderick
T. Long and Tibor R. Machan. Ashgate, 2008. Xi + 196 pages. An MP3
audio version of this book review, read by Dr. Floy Lilley, is
available for download.
Libertarians
of course believe in the free market; if you find someone who
favors the government provision of medical care or education,
e.g., you know immediately that he is not a full-fledged libertarian.
But how far can one take the free market? Can it handle absolutely
all the essential services of society, including defense and justice?
Here libertarians split: some, the individualist anarchists, answer
yes, but others, often termed minarchists, decline to go this
far. (Samuel Konkin coined the term "minarchism," but
he is not mentioned in this book.) They contend that these services
need to be supplied by a monopoly agency: within a given territory,
this agency can forcibly exclude other agencies from competing
with it. Often, but not always, as Tibor Machan anxiously reminds
us, minarchists favor taxation to pay for these services. Anarchism/Minarchism
offers a very useful survey of this controversy, with essays,
mostly by philosophers, on both sides.
In one respect,
though, the book is surprising. The most frequent criticism of
anarchism among economists is that defense and justice are public
goods, i.e., goods characterized by jointness of supply and nonexcludability,
which the free market cannot efficiently supply. Though Roderick
Long briefly mentions the public-goods argument, it receives little
attention in the book. Quite the contrary, the principal criticism
of anarchism posed by the minarchists here represented is that
a free society requires an objective, uniform law code, a demand
anarchism cannot satisfy.
The minarchists
derive this criticism in large part from Ayn Rand. John Roger
Lee (now, I regret to say, deceased) poses the essential point
concisely: "Anarchistic libertarianism illegitimately and
self-defeatingly presupposes the existence of contract law in
its account of how law and its enforcement would come to exist
and have an ongoing role in an anarchistic society" (p. 18).
Lee's argument rests on a suppressed and highly contestable premise.
Why does the existence of contract law require a state to create
it? As we shall see later, the view that the state created contract
law is false; but here, it is important to realize that Lee has
advanced a much more extreme claim. His assertion is that contract
law conceptually requires a state.
Why should
one believe such a thing? Suppose people for the most part accept
a libertarian scheme of rights this, by the way, was the
only circumstance in which Murray Rothbard considered viable an
anarchist polity would they not have, contrary to Lee,
contract law without a state? (The issue, once more, is for now
not whether this is likely but whether it is possible.)