'Ah! But It's Not Working?'
by
Charles H. Featherstone
by Charles H. Featherstone
Over
the years (years?!?! it has been that long?), the Bush administration
has given many reasons for the invasion and occupation of Iraq.
There
were all those weapons Iraq was supposed to have been hiding (Iraq
did, for the longest time, appear to be hiding something)
that could possibly wind up in the hands of terrorists the
same terrorists, Bush said over and over and over again, that had
attacked us without warning and pity that clear, blue September
morning. When those nuclear, chemical and biological weapons didn't
materialize, those stockpiles became "programs" and then disappeared
from speeches entirely, replaced by the noble calling of bloody
dictator removal and democracy spreading. True believers suddenly
found themselves knee-deep in spreadsheets detailing the number
of schools rebuilt, clinics opened, miles of powerlines strung,
potholes patched and sacks of garbage collected. Like so many old-time
Radio Moscow five-year plan updates.
Administration
officials, despite semi-coerced public statements of the fact that
there were no operational, ideological or financial connections
between Iraq's secular Ba'ath Party dictatorship and the religious
revolutionaries of al Qaeda (or its affiliates, associates and franchisees),
always did a very good job in speeches of linking the two, coagulating
America's enemies in a way that made some kind of emotive sense
to a great many people people. But absolutely no rational sense
to the rest of us.
Aside
from the neoconservative rhetoric of world revolution (it's hard
to tell, really, just how influential the evil geniuses of the American
Enterprise Institute actually were), none of the reasons have ever
struck me as making much sense, or at least much rational sense.
And yet, it was clear by this time in 2002 that Team Bush had decided,
come hell or high water, that war was the answer.
The
only answer. To all the various problems and enemies the United
States faced.
Three
years ago, I had just started a job as the Saudi
Press Agency's defense correspondent here in Washington. It
was less impressive than it sounds. SPA is the mouthpiece for the
government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which pretends to be
a real nation state but is really more a patch of land governed
by a reasonably savvy organized crime family. Its primary job is
to communicate the really boring facts of the day, such as:
Riyadh, Aug.
2, SPA The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah
bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud has sent reply cables to Russia's President
Vladimir Putin; Switzerland's President Samuel Schmid; Thailand's
Premier Thaksin Chinnawat; the Secretary General of Organization
of Islamic Conference Prof. Akmaluddin Ihsan Oglu and the Secretary
General of Muslim World League Dr. Abdullah bin Abdulmohsin Al-Turki.
In his cables,
the Monarch expressed his appreciation and thanks to them for
offering their deepest condolences on the death of the Custodian
of the Two Holy Mosques late King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud.
When
kings aren't busy dying, often times the news releases involve the
"discussion of matters of mutual interest and bilateral relations."
SPA also publishes wonderful "attaboy" photos of ribbon cuttings,
official
visits, and various poses royal family members looking concerned
or meeting with various and sundry foreign leaders, religious leaders,
Saudi businesspeople and whatnot.
SPA's
Saudi employees do not call it the "Sleepy People's Association"
for nothing. It is not the world's least interesting news service
Emirates News Agency (WAM) can probably honestly claim that
title. But it comes very close to it.
At
least I never had to write about "bilateral relations and matters
of mutual concern." Though whenever Bush, or anyone else in his
administration "lauded" the Saudis (it happened more often then
you think), we were right there, scribbling away. Lauding, lauding,
lauding.
(Hey,
it was a job, I needed a job, and it did not require a security
clearance, which was the only kind of work someone like me was going
to find in Washington in 2002. I do not want, and probably could
not get, a security clearance, for reasons that ought to be obvious
to anyone who has read me over the last year or so. Also, if you
think that it paid gloriously, the Saudis tend to pay "the help"
very poorly, and at SPA, I was one of the help. The job paid about
$2,700 per month, a pittance in DC, and to top it off, I was considered
self-employed for tax purposes. There are some journalists in this
town cough, cough for whom $2,700 would hardly
cover their monthly bar tabs.)
Anyway,
as I said, being SPA's defense correspondent was not very interesting.
There was very little original reporting involved, mostly rewrites
of the US press, news conferences, anything remotely related to
Saudi Arabia, that kind of thing. There was little incentive to
do original work, since Riyahd appeared to judge us on the volume
of work we produced, rather than on the quality. (Ahh, government
metrics!) And most of what I wrote never went onto the wire service
anyway, but instead probably got translated and sent straight into
the Saudi government's daily briefing packet. Someone was reading
my stuff. It just wasn't being published in any Saudi newspapers.
Or
they paid me for nothing. Which, now that I think about it and given
the nature of the government I worked for, is just as likely.
(The
only real fun I got out of the whole thing was a couple chauffeured
trips to Pentagon press briefings in cars with Saudi diplomatic
plates, probably part of whatever bulging permanent record the US
government has compiled on me. Well, that, and I got to meet Richard
Perle.)
Anyway,
in August of 2002, I stumbled across a Stratfor
analysis on Middle East Newsline that appeared to have the most
cogent and rational explanation for the Bush administration's decision
to invade Iraq. Stratfor has never been my favorite organization
(FULL DISCLOSURE: I think I applied for a job there once, and got
no farther than "thanks, but no thanks"), and I believe their president
some months ago on the Diane
Rehm Show said that in invading Iraq, George W. Bush had made
"the right decision for the wrong reason" and that Iraq was a battlefield
in the war on terror in the same way the Solomon Islands were a
battlefield in the US campaign to defeat Japan we don't mean
to kill Iraqis, he said, but it cannot be helped as we move toward
the greater goal. I'm not sure how anyone can reasonably make that
argument, but rather than comment on it here, I'll simply reprint
the entire SPA writeup I did on the original analysis, because they
are, I think, the same issue.
White
House Seeks War With Iraq to Demonstrate U.S. Power
S.P.A. Washington
The Bush
administration has decided to topple the regime of Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein despite the fact that the war against al Qaeda
is unfinished because the White House has concluded that a successful
campaign against Iraq would "shatter the psychological advantage
within the Islamist movement and demonstrate U.S. power,"
according to an analysis published earlier this week by Texas-based
Strategic Forecasting (Stratfor).
According
to the Stratfor analysis, the Bush administration has concluded
that the international Islamist movement sees its victory against
the U.S. as "inevitable" and believes that only by demonstrating
that the U.S. is "as patient, as persevering and much more
powerful than the Islamist movement" will the "psychological
structure of the Islamic world" that fosters violence against
the U.S. be changed.
"The
center of gravity of Washington’s problem [with Islamist militants]
is psychological. There is no certain military or covert means
to destroy al Qaeda or any of its murky allied organizations.
They can be harassed, they can be defeated, they can be disrupted,
but there is no clear and certain way to destroy them," the
Stratfor report said.
But by attacking
and toppling the Iraqi government, the U.S. could "undermine
[the] psychological foundations" of Islamic opposition to
the West. "If the sense of manifest destiny can destroyed,
then the foundations of the movement can be disrupted," Stratfor
concluded.
The report
says that Islamists see the 1973 oil embargo, defeat of the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan, the "perceived defeat" of the
U.S. in Somalia in the early 1990s, the success of the September
11 attacks, and the continuing survival of Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein as examples of Muslim strength in the battle with the
West.
Stratfor
said that the White House has concluded that Saddam Hussein "is
one of the pillars of the psychology aspect because his ability
to survive American power in 1991 … . [He] is emblematic of the
ability of Arabs and Muslims to resist and overcome American power."
Defeating
Iraq will show that U.S. power is "overwhelming and irresistible,"
and would aim at shattering Islamist confidence in victory, Stratfor
said. As well, battle against a nation-state and army is "something
the United States does very well." Fighting a "highly
dispersed global network" like al Qaeda "is something
nobody does well."
The Stratfor
analysis said the White House has concluded that the anti-Americanism
"permeating the Islamic world" is due to both U.S. support
for Israel and the continuing U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia. Creating
a Palestinian state "would not defuse anti-American sentiment,"
and would probably signal the start of Palestinian military operation
on pre-1967 Israel, Stratfor said.
Stratfor
also reports that the Bush administration has concluded that the
troubled U.S. relations with the Arab and Islamic world are "unsolvable."
Since the Middle East’s oil reserves are "a foundation of
the Western economic system," completely withdrawing from
the region is simply not an option for the U.S., Stratfor said.
While the
Stratfor analysis said the administration’s approach to "weaken
al Qaeda’s soul" and alter the outlook of the Muslim world
"might just work," the approach raises the psychological
aspect of warfare to the forefront and also risks a response from
al Qaeda that might be something other than capitulation.
"The
psychological consequences are never predictable," the Stratfor
report said. "Who knows how the Islamists will react in the
end?"
In
short we don't know what to do, and don't think we can beat
the terrorists, so we'll beat up on someone else and hope real hard
that scares everyone involved.
The
Stratfor piece was, near as I can tell, spot-on about Team Bush
motivations, the regime's thinking about Iraq, and especially about
what Bush administration officials thought about the "link" between
the Islamic revolutionaries and Saddam Hussein's dictatorship. It
was not a real link, but an emotional one, and assuming this was
an accurate portrayal of Bush administration feeling, a savvy conclusion
on the White House's part. Islamic revolutionaries, even as they
vilified the Iraqi dictator as a non-Muslim (they did), took a great
deal of vicarious pleasure in Saddam Hussein's continued persistence
during the 1990s gave to the Islamic revolutionary movement.
The
piece also, I believe, accurately understands the Islamist world
view. They believe God is on their side, and that with faith in
God and effort firmly grounded in faith, they will win.
I
would even go so far as to agree that solving the Palestinian "problem"
would not lessen anti-American feeling much or even dampen the appeal
Revolutionary Islam has for some Muslims. Cutting the Palestinians
loose from the Israelis is a good aim in its own right, but US policy
makers needed to "solve" this issue 30 years ago in order for that
to have any measurable effect today.
However,
if this analysis is correct, there are several significant flaws
with it.
First,
the US government simply overstated how invested Muslim revolutionaries
were in Saddam's nose-thumbing of Uncle Sam. It was a vicarious
pleasure that showed that Washington could be defied, yes, but the
revolutionaries were not heavily invested in Saddam's survival.
He was just another "jack Muslim" (my phrase) dictator whose death
or deposition would result in few tears. Saddam, who was no more
doing God's work than Bill Clinton or George W. Bush, was as doomed
for the dustbin of history as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
or the United States of America.
They
were and are much more interested in the success of
their movement than anything else.
Second,
do these planners really think I mean honestly think
that a whiff of grape and the barbarians will flee in terror?
Exactly what planet have these people been living on? This reminds
me of the Kennedy-Johnson view that enough pressure, in the form
of bombing, on North Vietnam will eventually force the North Vietnamese
to see reality and end their support for the National Liberation
Front in South Vietnam. I think the assumption was that opponents
would wilt in the face of our resolve, of American resources and
resolve.
But
they didn't. And they don't. The North Vietnamese acted as we would
act when faced with "superior" power they fought harder,
they dug in and increased their support for their allies. That is
the logical response, the response anyone should expect from
nearly any human community, voluntary or involuntary, that has been
attacked. But Washington policy makers, in their self-centered world,
assume that America is different: we would fight back if attacked,
and increase our commitment if the attacks continue. But somehow
we believe these rules don't apply if we are doing the attacking.
And despite repeated proof this view is wrong, we continue to act
as if somehow the sight of the Marines will terrify any enemy into
submission.
Al
Qaeda's response is logical and simple: take the blows, reorganize
as needed, look for whatever advantages they can find, and strike
back when and to the extent that they can.
Is
fighting a completely voluntary organization, that neither drafts
nor taxes, that has no real chain-of-command or organizational structure,
proving difficult for the government of a nation state that knows
how to do nothing but tax, command and coerce? Absolutely. But wandering
off to beat up another non-voluntary nation-state in hopes that
will prove suitably frightening is not the way to take down that
voluntary organization.
It's
also the kind of response the Israelis would take. It makes sense
that our Israel-obsessed policy elites, enthralled as they are with
the efficacy and righteousness of the Israeli Defense Forces, would
opt for a show of force similar to, say, Israel's 1982 invasion
of Lebanon, which was primarily designed to convince the Palestinians
of the futility of resistance to continued Israeli rule and control
over the West Bank and Gaza. Yes, this strategy of massive retaliation
worked in the 1950s against the largely secular and state-backed
Palestinian fedayeen. But when, exactly, was the last time this
really worked for the Israelis? Especially against non-state actors
like the PLO and the Islamist groups such as Hizbullah and Hamas?
In
fact, the Bush effort more resembles the dreaded and particularly
stupid Kennedy-Johnson concept of war "as a form of communication,"
that we are at war in the first place because our opponents doubted
our willingness to fight and our resolve. If we can prove both to
our opponents, they will eventually give way in the face of our
superior firepower and resources.
And
certainly, the supposed lack of American resolve is part of al Qaeda's
narrative. That is one of the lessons the Islamists supposedly learned
from Mogadishu. But it's important to note their view is
that our lack of resolve also stems from our lack of faith and our
lack of devotion to God's cause. It is, in their eyes, not a character
trait we can correct. Rather, it is part of our essence, of our
very nature because we are unbelievers. Only the resolve of those
fighting in the path of God (fi sabil li'lah) is really rewarded,
both here and in the hereafter.
There
is no way to communicate our resolve so that our opponents will
"get the message." We can only show we are as "patient, as
persevering and much more powerful than the Islamist movement" by
actually being all of those things.
Invading
and occupying Iraq does not get us there.
While
the Stratfor piece suggests there was some uncertainty in Team Bush
about what would happen if this did not work, I don't think there
were many doubts. The echo chamber that was the neoconservative
and militarist-nationalist brains trust was, I think, pretty convinced
that all of this, from the toppling of Saddam Hussein in a reckless
display of power to the spread of democracy and defeat of al Qaeda,
would happen pretty quickly. In a matter of months, maybe. Certainly
by now.
And
yet the appeal of revolutionary Islam, because of the occupation
of Iraq, remains as strong as ever, with governments across the
region (especially Saudi Arabia) facing a potentially serious security
crisis when all the jihadi veterans come home. Team Bush gambled
and lost. Al Qaeda is not broken "psychologically," while American
power hardly appears "overwhelming and irresistible" today in the
way it seemed in April, 2003.
As
silly as it is, the fact that the Bush administration has "rebranded"
the Global War on Terror the (equally stupid sounding) Global Struggle
Against Violent Extremism is a strangely positive sign that they
may finally! understand there is no "I'll hit him
until you give up." Whether they're smart enough to craft
a proper alternative is another thing. But at least they seem to
grasp that the original strategy has failed miserably and spectacularly.
Sadly,
it reminds me a lot of "Mr.
Neutron" episode of Monty
Python's Flying Circus. Mr. Neutron, "clearly the most dangerous
man in the world" (and played by Graham Chapman), has just walked
out of his hotel room and taken a plane to London, where he putters
around in gardens. The US government, however does not know where
he is, and the Supreme Commander of Land, Sea and Air Forces (played
by a body odor-obsessed Michael Palin) orders "a full-scale
Red Alert throughout the world" and has the US military "surround
everyone with everything we've got."
In
a following scene, Captain Carpenter (played by Eric Idle) gives
the Supreme Commander an update:
Voice:
Carpenter here, sir. We've been on red alert now for three days,
sir, and still no sign of Mr. Neutron.
Commander:
Have we bombed anywhere? Have we shown 'em we got teeth?
[Italics in transcript]
Voice:
Oh yes, sir. We've bombed a lot of places flat, sir.
Commander:
Good. Good. We don't want anyone to think we're chicken.
Voice:
Oh no! They don't think that, sir. Everyone's really scared of us,
sir.
Commander:
Of us?
Voice:
Yes, sir.
Commander
(pleased): Of our power?
Voice:
Oh yes, sir! They're really scared when they see those big planes
come over.
Commander:
Wow! I bet they are. I bet they are. I bet they're really
scared.
Voice:
Oh they are, sir.
Commander:
Do we have any figures on how scared they are?
Voice:
No ... no figures, sir. But they sure were scared.
Commander:
Ah! But it's not working?
Voice:
No sir.
August
3, 2005
Charles
H. Featherstone [send
him mail] is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist specializing
in energy, the Middle East, and Islam. He lives with his wife Jennifer
in Alexandria, Virginia.
Copyright
© 2005 LewRockwell.com
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