Greenankeism
(Or, Beware the New Yellow Peril)
by
Thomas J. DiLorenzo
by Thomas J. DiLorenzo
Ever since
the crash, Alan Greenspan has been almost as hard to spot in public
as bin Laden has been. Like bin Laden, we hear from Greenspan every
once in a while via a well-scripted speech. Unlike bin Laden, however,
Greenspan does not take responsibility for his actions.
The "maestro"
of worldwide prosperity (as he was called during the boom) first
blamed the crisis on an undue or irrationally exuberant faith in
capitalism. The Fed had nothing whatsoever to do with the real estate
bubble, he informed a congressional committee. More recently, he
blamed the whole mess on Asians who, unlike most Americans in recent
decades, tend to save some of their income. Greenspan’s replacement,
Ben Bernanke, also embraced this "Yellow Peril" explanation
for the crisis in a March 10 speech before the Council on Foreign
Relations. This latest rendition of what might be called Greenankeism
goes as follows, quoting Bernanke:
[I]t is impossible
to understand this crisis without reference to the global Imbalances
in trade and capital flows that began in the latter half of the
1990s. In the simplest terms, these imbalances reflected a chronic
lack of saving relative to investment in the United States . .
. , combined with an extraordinary increase in saving relative
to investment in many emerging market nations [especially] East
Asian economies . . . . Like water seeking its level, saving flowed
from where it was abundant to where it was deficient, with the
result that the United States and some other advanced countries
experienced large capital inflows for more than a decade . . .
The problem
with this, says Bernanke, is that "the risk management systems
of the private sector" failed to "ensure that the inrush
of capital was prudently invested." In addition, there was
too little government "oversight of the financial sector of
the United States."
Every bit
of this is wrong. As economist Robert Murphy has discovered, there
indeed was in increase in savings in the "emerging economies"
during the housing boom in the U.S., but it continued on during
the bust as well. How can increased savings by East Asians
cause both an increase and a decrease in interest rates?
In addition,
Murphy found that the global savings rate actually declined
during the early 2000s compared to what it was during the preceding
fifteen years. Thus, if one counts all capital flows, economic
reality is the opposite of what Greenankeism says it is.
In addition,
it is worth noting that the Fed employs hundreds of economists both
as direct employees and as contract employees, and many of them
are supposed to keep track of international capital flows. If Greenspan
and Bernanke are so certain of the calamitous effects of such "influxes"
of capital, why weren’t they warned about it? Why didn’t they warn
us before the bust? These are rhetorical questions, of course.
As Frank Shostak
has noted, Greenspan and Bernanke define "savings" merely
as the amount of U.S. dollars that "emerging economies"
held. What this represents is a change in who owns the dollars,
not an increase in dollars. The fall in long-term interest rates
that fueled the boom (and the accompanying massive mal-investment)
can only be caused by the Fed’s money creation, which increases
the total amount of dollars in circulation.
Bernanke’s
statement that there was too little regulatory oversight of financial
institutions is preposterous nonsense. The Fed itself exerts massive
regulatory control, as do myriad other regulatory institutions,
from the FDIC to the IRS, Office of Thrift Supervision, SEC, Comptroller
of the Currency, Congress itself, and dozens of state regulatory
agencies.
For more than
thirty years the Fed has enforced the Community Reinvestment Act,
which has forced banks to make hundreds of billions of dollars in
bad loans to un-creditworthy, "sub-prime" borrowers in
the name of the government’s overall policy of "affordable
housing." Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored
enterprises, "securitized" these loans to take the risk
away from lenders (supposedly). Even banks and other lenders that
were not under the thumb of the Fed regulators and the CRA participated
in the sub-prime lending spree because if they didn’t, their government-controlled
competitors would – at least during the boom – out-earn and outcompete
them. As Bernanke himself said in a March 30, 2007 speech entitled
"The Community Reinvestment Act: Its Evolution and New Challenges,"
so-called securitization of bad, sub-prime loans "expanded
. . . in part reflecting a 1992 law that required the government-sponsored
enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to devote a large percentage
of their activities to meeting affordable housing goals" (emphasis
added).
The Fed also
threatened mortgage lenders with gigantic fines for violating the
equal opportunity lending laws in a widely-distributed (to lenders)
publication entitled "Closing the Gap: A Guide to Equal Opportunity
Lending," published by the Boston Fed. This government publication
instructed mortgage lenders to: 1) ignore traditional measures of
creditworthiness for "minority and low-income consumers";
2) ignore traditional underwriting standards for the same group;
3) ignore traditional ratios of mortgage payments to monthly income
as well; 4) ignore "lack of credit history" for minority
and low-income consumers; 5) seek Fed assistance in finding a different
property appraiser if the original appraisal does not "come
out right"; and 6) rely on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase
the bad loans. This is one example of how Bernanke defines "not
enough oversight of financial institutions."
Either Ben
Bernanke has no understanding of how markets work and is equally
ignorant of the massive regulatory influence the government has
on housing and financial markets, or he is lying through his teeth
when he says that under-regulated markets have run amok. The former
is a possibility since Bernanke is a "macroeconomist."
So-called macroeconomics has never been real economics but rather
an endless series of engineering-type models purporting to guide
politicians in centrally planning an economy. In the bizarro world
of macroeconomics all capital is the same, and all workers are the
same, as one big lump, expressed as "K" and "L"
in the models. Relative prices and their role in allocating resources
in a market economy are mostly ignored, while "economic aggregates"
are said to influence "the" price level.
In macroeconomics
it is taken as a given that markets are incapable of allocating
resources in an acceptable way; that’s why there is supposedly a
need for macroeconomic central planning in the first place. No such
"failures" are assumed on the part of the macroeconomic
central planners.
The opportunity
cost of studying macroeconomics during one’s formal education is
that that time is not spent learning real economics – the economics
of human action and the market process. Nor is it spent studying
political economy or the effects of the interaction between the
economy and the state. Instead, one spends one’s time trying to
make sense of obtuse mathematical models and graphs that sometimes
take ten or more weeks of a college semester to "build"
and interpret. Such is the witchcraft of macroeconomic "models."
Models that utterly failed to predict or explain the current crisis,
I would add.
During
the Q&A session after Bernanke’s Council on Foreign Relations
speech he took on an extraordinarily smug and arrogant tone as he
explained that, during his academic career at Princeton, he was
aware of "a few" people in the economics profession who
believed that markets did a better job than central planners like
himself, but that he hoped "there are no longer any people
like that around." "We’re all socialist central planners
now" is essentially what he was saying, some two decades after
it was proven beyond all doubt that attempts to centrally plan an
economy invariably lead to nothing but economic and human catastrophe.
The
main purpose of Bernanke’s speech before the Council on Foreign
Relations was to promote the creation of a new super central-planning
agency that he called the "Systemic Risk Authority." This
central planning agency would pursue "close supervisory oversight"
of all risk taking by financial firms. It would be one big monopoly
regulator with "consolidated supervision of all systematically
important financial firms." Of course, the government itself
would determine which firms were "systematically important,"
and empire-building bureaucrats would eventually decide that ALL
firms qualified to be "supervised" by them.
Either
Ben Bernanke is completely ignorant of the vast literature on the
causes of the failures of socialist central planning, the economics
of bureaucracy, the economics of public choice, the economics of
regulation, the field of law and economics, and of markets, risk
taking and entrepreneurship, or he is simply another evil, opportunistic,
egomaniacal, empire-building bureaucrat who lives in a world of
delusions surrounded by equally delusional sycophants. No group
of government bureaucrats could ever conceivably possess and process
the millions upon millions of pieces of information that go into
the day-to-day risk assessments of thousands of financial institutions
in an economy the size of the U.S. And even if they could, there
would not be any market feedback mechanism, whereby good risk assessments
are rewarded with profits and bad ones penalized by losses. There
are no profit and loss statements in government, and thus no means
of measuring success and failure. In fact, in government, failure
is success: the worst the performance, the greater amount of funds
that is "thrown" at the problem.
Such an "Authority"
(and its congressional sponsors) would be relentlessly lobbied by
financial corporations to prohibit the risk-taking and investing
by their rivals and to allow their own equally risky ventures. "Rent
seeking" (or plunder seeking, if you will) would become even
more rampant than it already is, becoming a major engine of wealth
destruction. Bernanke is oblivious to all of this, even though it
is something that any graduate student in economics should know.
To paraphrase P.J. O’Rourke, author of Parliament
of Whores, a book about Congress, giving Ben Bernanke –
or any Fed chairman – money-printing ability and regulatory power
is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenage boys.
March
21, 2009
Thomas
J. DiLorenzo [send him mail]
is professor of economics at Loyola College in Maryland and the
author of The
Real Lincoln; Lincoln
Unmasked: What You’re Not Supposed To Know about Dishonest Abe
and How
Capitalism Saved America. His latest book is Hamilton’s
Curse: How Jefferson’s Archenemy Betrayed the American Revolution
– And What It Means for America Today.
Copyright
© 2009 by LewRockwell.com. Permission to reprint in whole or in
part is gladly granted, provided full credit is given.
Thomas
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