George Bush I: The Man Who Helped Make September 11 a Reality
by
William L. Anderson
As
Americans embarrassingly stumble into a mawkish "remembrance"
of those awful attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
a year ago, I would like to take time to "honor" (if that
is an appropriate word) the man who more than anyone else made those
attacks a reality: George H.W. Bush. While conservatives blame Bill
Clinton and Democrats still are looking to find if the present George
W. Bush Administration was culpable (it was), I would like to turn
to the real source, the man whose legacy we seem to have forgotten.
If
anything, conservatives claim that the only problem of Bush I was
the failure to "take out" Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War.
Actually, I would like to question whether or not there should have
been a war in the first place and point out that the Gulf War, for
all of the supposed glory it brought the U.S. Armed Forces, was
a huge disaster that continues to this day to have awful repercussions
upon much of the world.
To
understand the magnitude of Bush I’s folly, we need to return to
1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in early August. The previous fall,
the communist regimes of Eastern Europe had fallen and the once-formidable
U.S.S.R. was beginning to break up, as the Cold War had ended. For
people who had lived their entire lives under the shadow of all
that the struggle between East and West had been, this was a wonderful
and heady moment.
With
the end of the threat of nuclear war between the U.S.S.R. and the
USA having ended, for a brief moment, it seemed that prospects for
a larger peace could not have been greater – that is until that
fateful day when Iraq invaded Kuwait. In another era, this invasion
would have gone unnoticed, as the actions of one desert regime against
another would not have had any effect upon the world scene. However,
because of the fact that a huge portion of the world’s crude oil
comes from the Persian Gulf region, that was enough to make politicians
panic, as people began to assess the possibilities of Saddam Hussein
having control over that oil.
The
U.S. Government dealings with Hussein himself provide an informative
study of how not to engage in foreign policy. During
the 1980s, when Iraq was at war against Iran, which had held a large
number of Americans as hostage in the last year of Jimmy Carter’s
administration, Hussein was seen as a U.S. ally. Like the Muslims
who hold to the belief that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend,"
the U.S. Government courted Hussein as a "moderate" who
could stand as a bulwark in the region against the fanaticism of
the Iranian Islamic regime. After all, Iraq was a secular country,
despite its overwhelming Muslim population, and there was a thriving
Christian community there.
Even
when an Iraqi warplane attacked a U.S. ship in the Persian Gulf
in 1987, killing dozens of U.S. sailors, the U.S. Government, then
under Ronald Reagan, accepted Iraq’s apology for its "mistake"
in much the same way the U.S. Government told the public that the
deadly 1967 Israeli attack on the U.S.S. Liberty also was a "mistake."
Even when Hussein’s armed forces used poison gas against Iranian
soldiers, Iraq was still regarded as a "moderate" regime
in State Department language.
In
July 1990, however, it all changed. After the U.S. ambassador to
Iraq, April Glaspie, indicated to Hussein that the Bush Administration
would not object to an invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqis took the U.S.
at its word and sent its armies over the border, meeting almost
no resistance. (At the time, there was a legitimate dispute at the
Iraq-Kuwait border involving the Kuwaiti practice of drilling sideways
under the border to extract oil from pools in Iraq. No one seems
to have remembered that this was Hussein’s main gripe, although
Iraqis never have regarded Kuwait, which once was part of Iraq,
as a legitimate state in the first place.)
After
Iraq invaded Kuwait, Bush demanded that the Iraqis leave at once.
Saddam, once our ally, all of a sudden was a demon, a threat to
world peace and someone who was obsessed with obtaining and building
"weapons of mass destruction." The Saudi Arabian Royal
Family also privately expressed fear that Saddam (who probably was
more popular in Saudi Arabia than the corrupt rulers of the royal
family) would turn his military might towards them.
The
Saudis, as well as the Israelis and others who saw this as a golden
opportunity for a U.S. military response, began to raise the specter
of Iraq "controlling" the world’s largest single oil source.
Journalists began to write about the possible reappearance of the
dreaded "gas lines," forgetting that the chaos at the
gas pumps in the USA during the 1970s was the direct result of government
price controls on domestic crude oil and gasoline. The prospect
of the U.S. Armed Forces being able to set up permanent bases also
appealed to a number of Democrats and Republicans, not to mention
Israeli politicians who realized that dragging their best "ally"
into the Middle East morass would further cement ties between the
USA and Israel.
None
of this is to suggest that Saddam was a "good guy" or
someone one of us would want for a neighbor – or a head of state.
However, he was just as oppressive before his armies attacked Kuwait
as he was afterwards, yet the U.S. Government eagerly did business
with him. All during the 1980s he was openly developing his WMDs,
but few in this country said anything about his megalomania or his
alleged threats to humanity.
Not
surprisingly, a spate of atrocity stories sprang from Kuwait. No
doubt, some were true, but many others were false and done with
the full knowledge of the U.S. State Department. At the same time,
oil prices climbed upward, in part due to the uncertainty that understandably
ruled the markets and due also in part to Bush’s embargo on oil
from Iraq and Kuwait. Many in the government, as well as some of
the "experts" in the oil industry, were predicting prices
of $70 or more a barrel. (Oil prices actually briefly climbed to
about $41 a barrel before plummeting to about $20 after the war
began.)
What
few people were pointing out was that Saddam could not prop up his
own government without selling oil. The idea that his armies would
conquer the entire Arabian Peninsula, then withhold the vast amounts
of oil there as a way to hold the western democracies hostage needs
to be better examined, as it has always been held out as a justification
for going to war. (After the war was over, Bush crowed to a group
of enthusiastic supporters that had the USA gone to war, oil would
have gone to $100 a barrel.)
I
have no idea what goes on in the mind of a dictator, and especially
someone like Hussein. Whether or not he had the idea of grabbing
oil and holding the West hostage I cannot say. Even had that been
his plan, one has to question if it could work.
First,
his armies would have had to successfully carry such a plan of conquest,
which was not an automatic given, although Iraq had the largest
and best-equipped army in the region. The Persian Gulf area is large
and a place of hostile conditions and weather, and the more spread
out his armies would have been in this area, the more vulnerable
he and they would have been. In other words, even had he planned
to seize the entire peninsula instead of just Kuwait, I have my
doubts he could have succeeded as easily as many were saying.
Second,
oil does no one any good when it is in the ground. Withholding oil
might have gained him some short-term results, but in the longer
term, the only way he could have made the revenues necessary to
keep his government afloat would have been to sell the oil, and
lots of it. Furthermore, had he actually launched this grand scheme
instead of simply holding on to Kuwait (which is what he insisted
all along was all he had planned to do), Saddam would have been
practically inviting an invasion of western armed forces into his
country, and I believe he understood that point quite well. Instead,
he invaded Kuwait after he mistakenly believed that the USA would
not retaliate against him.
To
make matters worse, a number of different groups, from the neoconservatives
to Israel’s political allies painted this whole episode as a replay
of the Munich crisis of 1938, with Hussein being the new Hitler.
While Saddam was a pretty nasty guy with a moustache who would utter
some bad things about Israel and the Jews, to compare his regime
and its armed forces to the military machine of the Third Reich
is ludicrous. For that matter, even the vaunted Wehrmacht had
already lost steam by 1943 and was backpedaling from many of its
earlier conquests even before the Allied invasions at Normandy.
If the mighty German armed forces could not hold their own, what
makes one think that Iraq could have succeeded where better armies
had failed?
This
is not to say that Bush’s venture had unanimous support, even in
Congress, which barely granted him permission to go to war, although
no declaration of war was actually given. Unfortunately, leftists
who opposed Bush, chanting, "No blood for oil," were claiming
that had the government implemented all of the crackpot conservationist
and alternative energy schemes that had been churned out by economic
illiterates during the 1970s and early 1980s, the USA would have
been "energy independent" and would not have been affected
by the events in the Gulf. Thus, they undermined their own arguments
by trying to use the crisis to promote their own statist – and useless
– programs.
There
is no doubt, however, that many oil executives were relieved to
know Bush was going to war, as this seemed to be confirmation for
them that the U.S. Government would do anything to protect oil interests.
Furthermore, I suppose they were happy to see the implementation
of permanent U.S. military bases in Islamic countries such as Saudi
Arabia.
After
the war, Bush claimed that the great victory by anti-Saddam forces
would help create a "new world order." Indeed, we have
our "new world order," although it is not exactly what
the elder Bush thought would happen.
First,
the war made the economic situation at home even worse, something
that led to his electoral defeat by Bill Clinton in 1992. Second,
the wanton slaughter of the Iraqis, the implementation of a permanent
regime of sanctions against Iraq, and the presence of U.S. troops
on Muslim soil has enraged many Middle Easterners, giving strength
to the followers of Osama bin Laden and others who have made it
their mission in life to drive the Americans out.
Third,
the idea that the placement of U.S. bases in places like Saudi Arabia
has not made Israel any more secure. In fact, it seems that the
situation has so galvanized anti-U.S. and anti-Israel sentiment
to the point that Israel is less secure now than it was before the
Gulf War.
Last,
the Gulf War ultimately gave us the events of September 11. I have
no doubt that had the elder Bush listened to voices of reason instead
of the war hawks, the World Trade Towers would still be standing
and Saddam would just be another dictator to ignore instead of being
a vengeful head of state wanting revenge. The peaceful promises
that seemed in reach after the end of the Cold War have vanished,
and now we have an ongoing war against "terrorism," as
the younger Bush contemplates "finishing the job" that
his father began. The evil genie was let out of the bottle in 1990,
and I doubt it will ever be corked, at least in my lifetime.
September
10, 2002
William
L. Anderson, Ph.D. [send him
mail], teaches economics at Frostburg State University in Maryland,
and is an adjunct scholar of the Ludwig
von Mises Institute.
Copyright
© 2002 by LewRockwell.com
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