Why Should a Failing Automaker Receive a Bailout?
by Wilton D. Alston
by
Wilton D. Alston
DIGG THIS
Sixty-three
percent of people polled believe that ATM fees are a bigger waste
of money than lottery tickets. Thirty-seven percent believe the
reverse.
~ Compass
Bank survey, reported in "USA Snapshots" in USA Today
Just when I
think economic literacy cannot descend to a lower level, I come
across a tidbit like the one above from USA Today. (Consider: With
ATM fees you’re paying voluntarily for a service you receive.
With lottery tickets you’re paying voluntarily for, well, nothing!)
It’s at times like these that I have no doubt that monumentally
stupid ideas, like a bailout for the Big Three automakers, will
get approved by the U.S. Congress. Certainly, the fact that Congress
isn’t spending its own money plays a part. Certainly, it makes perfect
sense for an automaker to ask the government for money, since that
well has been tapped before, despite the lunacy of such an action.
Just the
Facts, Ma’am
Okay, so let
me get this straight. The Big Three Automakers – General Motors,
Ford, and Chrysler – are in financial trouble. This trouble is a
result of [basically] not being able to sell the products they make
in a high enough volume to generate revenue that is greater than
or equal to their expenses. Ergo, they are losing money. (They are
losing lots of money.) If they keep losing money, one or
more of these manufactures will have to declare bankruptcy or go
out of business, which could lead to hundreds of thousands of direct
job losses. The failure of any or all of these firms could also
lead to a substantial number of indirect job losses, as domino effects
among their suppliers, many of whom depend upon the automotive
industry, cause those suppliers to also go out of business.
I don’t think
my synopsis is unfair or misses any significant points. I also won’t
argue with the possible negative outcome(s). I have little doubt
that many thousands of normal, law-abiding citizens could
lose their primary incomes from a crash-and-burn scenario in the
U.S. automotive industry. (The best and brightest of any of the
Big Three could also end up at a competitor, making even more money!)
First of all,
any displaced worker won’t be displaced forever, if at all. Secondly,
when a business is not meeting the needs of its clientele or when
that business is mismanaged, it is supposed to go out of
business. This is what makes way for another business. Thirdly,
I’d argue that keeping a bad business operating via State coercion,
causes new businesses to be excluded from or limited in penetration
of the market. (I’ll talk about this technological and/or market
exclusion, from which I think the Big Three massively benefit,
later.)
Have a Heart!
One could debate
this issue via all manner of economic logic, and maybe I’ll get
to that later, but let’s examine this situation morally first. Is
it the responsibility of the U.S. taxpayer to make sure these automakers
remain solvent? No. Is it the responsibility of the U.S. taxpayer
to make sure that people who work for the Big Three keep working?
No. Is it the fault of the U.S. taxpayer that the Big Three are
currently insolvent? Yes, partially. (That’s not a misprint.) Taxpayers
comprise the market and, of course, it is a market response that
causes firms like GM to be losing money. GM is selling stuff that
people don’t want to buy, for whatever reason and so, few buy. GM
is supposed to be losing money! Until and unless the U.S.
automakers manage themselves in a way that: a) creates products
that people want to buy and b) at a price that supports the expenses
of the business, they should lose money. That’s the choice
that the market is destined to make, unless the government intervenes
and screws things up. (Yes, other issues are at play here, some
of them further exacerbated by the State, but the bottom line is:
A business is beholden to its customers, not the other way around.)
If the choices
made by customers eventually cause a lot of people, people who previously
made a good living dependent upon that business, to lose their income,
those are simply the breaks. Furthermore, this contraction is necessary
for a healthy economic future. (Peter
Schiff covers this situation in wonderful detail in a recent
LRC podcast.) No customer is bound by any moral responsibility to
buy from a particular vendor, no matter the eventual recipient of
the profit that business generates.
Stealing
Money and the Future Along with It
As I noted
above, the debate about bailing out the automakers has both a moral
component and an economic component. One portion of the economic
argument that I fear will get far too little emphasis is what I
termed above as technological and/or market exclusion. This
is in my view, the biggest unintended negative consequence when
the State keeps a bad business afloat. Consider these points, made
by Bart Frazier
in a recent FEE column:
Think of
what it was like 500 years ago. Plumbing was almost nonexistent.
We burned trees for fuel or cut them up to make homes. Our transportation
was defecating in the streets.
Frazier continues:
We now heat
our homes in an immensely cleaner fashion. There is now more forest
in Vermont than there was 100 years ago. Natural gas is incomparably
cleaner than energy obtained from burning wood and coal. Who could
have predicted the natural gas furnace 100 years ago? Who could
have foreseen the advent of hybrid vehicles? The free market has
ways to alleviate social ills in the future in ways that are utterly
inconceivable to us now.
My point and
I’m certain I’m not the first to make it, is this. When the State
keeps a poorly-run or inefficient enterprise running, it negatively
affects the probability of some better approach gaining ground.
When so much of the technological know-how that could be applied
to new approaches is soaked up keeping a poor one running, we all
lose. Simply put, it is as Manuel Ayau opines in his wonderful monograph
"Not A Zero-Sum
Game": "Had we achieved job security in the Stone
Ages, we would still live in caves."
All Hail
the Paradigm Pioneer
To examine
this phenomenon more deeply, I’ll need to dig into the archives.
Joel Barker, in
his 1993 book, "Paradigms:
the Business of Discovering the Future" suggested that
all paradigms have a lifespan that follows an "S-Curve,"
a picture of which I show below.

A paradigm,
using Barker’s nomenclature, represents an approach to solving a
set of problems. It can be a complicated methodology or a simple
one. It could encompass whole industries, or it could apply to particular
competitors in a specific industry. For example, how the Big Three
approach the manufacture and sale of automobiles is a paradigm.
The internal combustion engine represents a vital construct in that
paradigm. According to Barker, paradigms are developed by people
who are willing to take risks – "paradigm pioneers" –
he calls them.
In the early
days of a paradigm, immediately following its initial development
– shown as Phase A – problems are solved at a modest, yet ever-increasing
rate, until the paradigm reaches maturity. Generally there are few
people or firms applying the paradigm during the development stage.
It is unproven and frankly, the old ways of solving problems have
a "stickiness" to which I’ll return later. Recall that
the car and internal combustion engine did not immediately supplant
the horse and buggy.
At full maturity
– shown as Phase B – more and more people or firms have successfully
adopted the paradigm. By this point, massive numbers of problems
are being solved relatively quickly. (And correspondingly from an
economic perspective, massive profit is being generated, with all
the commensurate lifestyles improvements as a consequence.) For
example, the horse and buggy eventually lost all market share to
firms manufacturing cars, and society was socio-economically massively
better as a result.
It is during
Phase B, which can be quite long, that more and more entities apply
the initial paradigm in new ways and improve it incrementally.
In Barker’s parlance, people who adopt this proven paradigm are
"paradigm settlers" and they reap the rewards of the paradigm
pioneer’s risk, while not incurring much, if any, of that risk
themselves. It makes sense to copy a successful approach versus
invent one. While Henry Ford can be credited with mass producing
the first automobile, it didn’t take long for lots of people to
duplicate his approach, i.e., apply his paradigm, and for many ancillary
industries to grow up around the automotive industry. Note that
the operations of the Big Three differ from those of say, Honda
or Toyota. They each apply the automotive manufacturing paradigm
in unique ways.
You Gotta
Know When to Fold ’Em
Eventually,
a paradigm begins to get stale – depicted by Phase C – and fewer
and fewer new problems are solved. Stated differently, and again
returning to Barker’s premises, problems that the original paradigm
did not solve, or that have been discovered during its implementation,
collect during the entire life of the paradigm and eventually
begin to cry out for a new solution. It is inherent in the existing
paradigm that these problems cannot be solved by it. Unfortunately,
those who have mastered (and benefit from) an existing paradigm
are reticent to abandon it for something new. (This is the stickiness
of which I previously spoke.) There is risk. There is likelihood
of failure as new ideas vie for supremacy. The current approach
is making money! Market share is strong. Stock price is high. Why
rock the boat?
Despite the
attractiveness of continuing to "dance with the girl you brought"
visionaries and entrepreneurs will eventually seek new approaches
to solving the collecting problems. This is fortunate, because simultaneously,
any sufficiently mature paradigm will eventually be old enough that
it could fail suddenly. (As well, the effects of the problems that
collect during the useful life of a paradigm will eventually become
substantial.) Paradigms, particularly technological management paradigms,
have a natural life and will therefore eventually need to be replaced.
The struggles of the Big Three automakers – particularly when juxtaposed
against the success of Honda, Toyota, etc. – illustrates that their
paradigm has gotten stale. The march of progress is unending, and
must be so for a society to continue to enjoy an ever-higher standard
of living.
That is, unless
there is interference from without. You guessed it; this is where
the State comes in, generally to bailout those who are still riding
an old, stale paradigm for all it’s worth. New paradigms can also
be squelched if those applying an existing competing paradigm can
successfully mitigate the threat the new approach poses. Most firms
do this via actions like negative advertising, or, in the case of
both the automakers and large firms like Microsoft, actual purchase
of the competing idea. If a firm is financially strong enough to
do this, so be it. The customer is still able to decide for himself,
most of the time, unless the State controls access to the market.
Conclusion
Do you ever
wonder why all those exciting concept cars – flying vehicles and
other whatnottery – ideas conceived and presented decades ago, never
seem to hit the market? Me too. Yes, I understand that technological
probability will almost always lag behind artistic possibility.
Still, I suspect that Manuel Ayau’s truism about the Stone Ages
applies equally well to this discussion. If the horse-and-buggy
manufacturers had been bailed out, we’d probably still be cleaning
up behind our transportation. Maybe I’m being unfair, and maybe
the Big Three have applied themselves aggressively to the seemingly
interminable problems of engine efficiency, gas mileage, etc. but
I wonder. The entire environment that supports, not only the types
of cars we now drive, but also, where we drive them and how
we drive them, is rife with statist intervention. And yet, these
iconic car manufacturers need more help from the State? You’re
kidding, right?
Again,
I ask a simple question: If the Big Three’s paradigm appears to
be reaching the end of its useful life, why shouldn’t one or all
of them go out of business? If the government swoops in – toting
a gargantuan bag of stolen money – is it more likely to drive these
automakers (pardon the pun) to solve old problems in new ways or
allow them to keep on milking the same old cow? The answer seems
obvious to me. Even more obvious is this: The Big Three struggle
while other automakers make money. Says Cato’s
Daniel J. Ikenson:
…the car
industry itself is not in crisis. Even if one or all of the Big
Three failed, there would still be plenty of strong auto companies
operating throughout the United States. The Big Three currently
account for slightly more than half of all light vehicle production
and slightly less than half of all light vehicle sales in the
United States.
I read a great
quote in a recent Casey
Research Update. It comes from GATA's secretary treasurer, Chris
Powell, who says, "There are no markets anymore, only interventions."
That certainly seems to be the case in the U.S. The unfortunate
thing is, the average (read: non-Austrian-trained) citizen and the
statist
economic pundits who mislead him all seem to think we do
have a free market. Worse yet, they think that it is a failure of
that market that causes GM and its cohort to need a ton of stolen
money to survive.
At the risk
of seemingly harsh, I can only offer one answer to such an assertion:
B.S. (As an interesting aside, one
entrepreneur who would appear to know of what he speaks, particularly
when it comes to the automotive industry, agrees with me!)
December
3, 2008
Wilt
Alston [send him
mail] lives in Rochester, NY, with his wife and three
children. When he’s not training for a marathon or furthering his
part-time study of libertarian philosophy, he works as a principal
research scientist in transportation safety, focusing primarily
on the safety of subway and freight train control systems.
Copyright
© 2008 LewRockwell.com
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D. Alston Archives
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