A Recipe for Disaster
by
Lawrence S. Wittner
by Lawrence S. Wittner
On
May 27, the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference,
designed to shore up the international commitment to creating a
nuclear-free world, concluded in shambles. According to Dr. Mohamed
ElBaradei, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
gathering accomplished absolutely nothing. He added:
We are ending after a month of rancor . . .
and the same issues continue to stare us in the eyes.
Originally
signed in 1968 and entering into force in 1970, the NPT provides
that non-nuclear nations will forgo the development of nuclear weapons
and that nuclear nations will divest themselves of their nuclear
weapons through disarmament measures. Review conferences, designed
to secure compliance with the treatys provisions, occur every
five years.
For
decades, the NPT worked reasonably well. By 1997, no additional
nations possessed nuclear weapons and, through arms control and
disarmament treaties or unilateral action, the nuclear powers substantially
reduced the number of nuclear weapons in their stockpiles. As late
as the NPT review conference of 2000, the declared nuclear powers
professed their unequivocal commitment to nuclear abolition.
But,
since that time, the Republican-dominated U.S. Senate rejected ratification
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (negotiated and signed by President
Bill Clinton), India and Pakistan became nuclear powers, and the
Bush administration withdrew the United States from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, pressed forward with the deployment of a national
missile defense system (a latter day version of Star Wars),
dropped nuclear disarmament negotiations, and proposed the development
of new U.S. nuclear weapons. Furthermore, two new nations may be
acquiring a nuclear weapons capability: North Korea (which claims
it is) and Iran (which claims it is not).
This
unraveling of the NPT is a serious matter, and became the focal
point of an acrimonious debate among the delegates of 188 nations
at the NPT review conference, which opened on May 2, at the United
Nations.
The
non-nuclear nations hit sharply at the failure of the nuclear powers,
and particularly the United States, to honor their commitments to
nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, a number of countries, led by
Egypt and Iran, demanded that the nuclear powers pledge never to
attack non-nuclear nations and that Washington ratify the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty.
The
U.S. government, in turn, sought to keep the spotlight on the alleged
transgressions of North Korea and Iran. In one of the conferences
opening addresses, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Andrew
Semmel also accused the International Atomic Energy Agency of failing
to report Irans non-compliance with the treaty to the U.N.
Security Council. At the same time, U.S. officials argued that the
United States was complying with the treatys requirements.
Even
many of Washingtons traditional allies found the U.S. position
unconvincing. Apparently referring to the Bush administration, Paul
Meyer, the Canadian representative at the conference, remarked acidly:
If governments simply ignore or discard commitments whenever
they prove inconvenient, we will never be able to build an edifice
of international cooperation.
U.S.
credibility was further undermined by the Bush administrations
decision to send lower-echelon officials, rather than Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice, to represent it at the conference. According
to observers, this snub represented an attempt to undercut the significance
of the review conference and, thereby, mute the criticism that would
emerge there of the U.S. governments disdain for nuclear disarmament or
at least for U.S. nuclear disarmament.
Criticism
of the U.S. role at the conference was particularly sharp among
peace and disarmament groups. The United States has had four
weeks to demonstrate international leadership on nuclear proliferation,
remarked Susi Snyder, secretary general of the Womens International
League for Peace and Freedom. Clearly, the U.S. delegation
never wanted to strengthen the treaty. Instead, they have spent
four weeks . . . refusing to recognize agreements they made 5 and
10 years ago. According to Alyn Ware of the Lawyers Committee
on Nuclear Policy, it was impossible to prevent nuclear
proliferation while the nuclear weapons states insist on maintaining
large stockpiles of weapons themselves. It was like
a parent telling a child not to smoke while smoking a pack of cigarettes.
Given
the obviously self-defeating nature of U.S. nuclear policy, why
does the Bush administration cling to it so stubbornly? Why has
it spurned the efforts not only of the world community, but of the
U.S. governments closest allies to strengthen the NPT and
continue progress toward a nuclear-free world?
One
possible explanation is that the Bush administration believes that
it has the military capability to deter current nuclear nations
and to destroy hostile nations that reach the brink of becoming
nuclear powers. For example, if Iran continues to produce fissionable
material, Washington will simply launch an all-out military attack
on Irans nuclear facilities. Therefore, the Bush administration
sees no need to maintain the bargain between non-nuclear and nuclear
powers that was struck decades ago through the NPT. As Bush administration
officials frequently say, conditions in the world have changed,
and U.S. policy will change with them.
A
second possible explanation, which does not exclude the first, is
that the Bush administration is getting ready to use nuclear weapons
in future wars. Despite the massive advantage the U.S. government
enjoys over other nations in conventional military forces, these
U.S. forces are now overstretched in fighting an insurgency in a
small country like Iraq. Furthermore, dispatching substantial numbers
of U.S. combat troops overseas is quite expensive, and their deaths
in large numbers undermines political support for a war as
it is now doing. In this context, the development and use of nuclear
weapons to maintain what the Bush administration defines as U.S.
national interests seem quite logical to U.S. national
security managers. Ominously, the new nuclear weapons for which
the Bush administration has requested funding from Congress are
considered usable nuclear weapons: so-called bunker
busters and mini-nukes.
As
a result, the collapse of the NPT review conference of 2005 and
the hard-line nuclear policies of the Bush administration that have
contributed to it have seriously undermined the willingness of nations
to dispense with nuclear weapons. Indeed, these factors seem to
place the nations of the world back in the nuclear arms race and,
perhaps, on the road to nuclear war. Of course, popular protest
and wise statesmanship have turned around situations like this in
the past, and they might well do so again. But, in the meantime,
we should recognize that evading disarmament commitments and plunging
forward with nuclear weapons development and use is a surefire recipe
for disaster.
May
30, 2005
Lawrence
S. Wittner [send him mail]
is Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany.
His latest book is Toward
Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement,
1971 to the Present (Stanford University Press).
This
article originally appeared on the History
News Network.
Copyright
© 2005 History News Network. Reprinted
with author's permission.
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