The Assassination of President McKinley
by
Richard Wall
by Richard Wall
An interesting
study could be made of "Presidential Exposure." That
it is dangerous is clear, yet recent Presidents, and none more
than Johnson who seems to have a manic compulsion to make physical
contact with as many citizens as possible, have considered it
a necessary part of their job.
~
Dwight Macdonald, A
Critique of the Warren Report, 1965
Kingmakers
and Rough Riders of the Apocalypse
Kevin Phillips
is a former Republican Party campaign manager, prolific author and
chameleon-like political commentator. His latest book, American
Theocracy (favorably reviewed here
by Professor Alan Brinkley of Columbia University), sparked a much-reported
question to President George W. Bush at his press
conference in Cleveland, Ohio on March 20th as to whether he
believed recent events are portents of the Apocalypse.
In reply, the
President embarked on a 4-minute long digression about the war on
terrorism and eventually stated, "The threat from Iran is, of course,
their stated objective to destroy our strong ally Israel. That's
a threat, a serious threat. It's a threat to world peace; it's a
threat, in essence, to a strong alliance. I made it clear, I'll
make it clear again, that we will use military might to protect
our ally, Israel."
In 1898 the
25th president, William
McKinley, had stated in his war message to Congress justifying
US military intervention against Spain in Cuba, "It is no answer
to say that this is all in another country, belonging to another
nation, and is therefore none of our business. It is especially
our duty, for it is right at our door. […] The present condition
of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace."
A
reviewer of Phillips’ 2003 book
on McKinley, who held office from 1897 to 1901, charges the author
with hauling him up from a relative obscurity into the second tier
of important presidents just in order to satisfy a personal theory.
"His thesis," the reviewer writes, "is that McKinley
was an important president, and the thing that makes him important
is that he illustrates Phillips' career-making mega-theory about
realignment politics. It's a campaign strategist's view of history."
True enough,
but what's wrong with having a theory? And, as the fateful rise
of Karl Rove
shows, we need to pay attention to campaign strategists’ views of
history, however much we may abhor them as persons. Men like Rove
are the gurus, gray eminences, cardinals and kingmakers to the modern-day
queens, and wield tremendous power and influence behind the scenes.
It was that
most original and celebrated of campaign strategists, Mark
Hanna (18371904), who helped to put McKinley into the
White House in 1897, but whose protests were passed over when it
came to selecting a running mate for McKinley’s second election
campaign in 1900. McKinley chose Theodore
Roosevelt, Assistant Navy Secretary at the start of his first
administration, later Governor of New York and a war hero popular
for having led his band of "Rough
Riders" into battle in Cuba during the Spanish-American
war of 1898. On being overruled in this matter, Hanna is reported
to have exclaimed, "there's only a life between that madman
and the Presidency."
As
indeed it turned out, when on September 6, 1901 Leon Czolgosz (pronounced
"Cholgosh"), an American-born child of Polish immigrants
and a self-confessed anarchist, fired two bullets at point-blank
range into the 58-year old McKinley as he was receiving visitors
in a line at the Pan
American
Exposition
in Buffalo,
New York. McKinley died on September 14th from a gangrenous infection
in the wounds from one of the bullets, which had penetrated his
abdomen. Theodore Roosevelt was sworn in as the 26th president later
the same day.
(Mis)underestimating
the President
One of Phillips’
arguments is that much of Theodore Roosevelt’s policy in his first
term, in which he retained McKinley’s cabinet team, had been foreshadowed
and prepared by McKinley, and that this makes McKinley a neglected
and underestimated progressive. Since policies take time to come
to fruition across presidencies, and since the ruling classes devoted
much effort in the 1890s to their attempts to understand, absorb
and neutralize the energy of popular protest – including taking
the country into a "splendid little war" in which Roosevelt enthusiastically
participated, this in itself is no major insight. But it is important
that it be stated, so that we may rescue some historical understanding
of continuity and change from the mire of political deception, wishful
thinking and jingoist victors’ histories of the period.
Phillips’ argument
applies as much to foreign as to domestic policy: for example, the
idea of negotiating with Colombia to build a canal so that the US
Navy could have faster access to the Far East was conceived under
McKinley. Confronted by the Colombian Senate’s rejection of the
proposal, action-man Roosevelt seized the necessary land to create
the new state of Panama and build the Canal at significant cost
to the American taxpayer and riding roughshod over international
law.
Everything
Does Not Change Overnight
There is a
popular misconception that events like the installation of a new
president "change everything overnight." They did not
then, and do not do so now, however much people may want or need
change. The historically overlooked American
pacification of the Philippines was not completed until July
1902, 10 months into Roosevelt's first term and after three years
of bloody conflict. In our time, the Bush II administration’s post
9/11 anti-terrorism legislation was foreshadowed by anti-terrorism
laws in the Clinton era following the 1995 Oklahoma
City
bombing
and the World
Trade Center bombing
of 1993.
As Professor
Brinkley says, Phillips has "a rare gift for looking broadly
and structurally at social and political change, describing a series
of major transformations, and demonstrating the relationships among
them." To understand events, we should look at the seeds of
those transformations and the links of continuity over the longer
term.
That long-term
view shows that there are no real differences between the two main
parties on issues such as "the war" (then and now) and that, come
the election, things do not immediately change for the better. In
fact, quite often they get worse, giving rise to that well-known
saying that each US president, sooner or later, makes you long for
the days of the one who went before.
Unfortunately,
political power players today are all too willing to exploit the
laziness and cynical inertia of those who have seen through the
false dichotomies but do not have the will to do anything about
it. They do so, for example, by supplying to a sound-bite and game-obsessed
culture the slick presentation of news and elections as passing
and fast-moving competitive entertainments, in which the winner
takes all while fundamental political issues remain unresolved.
George W. Bush said in that same Cleveland press conference that
decisions on US withdrawal from Iraq will be "for the next
President."
Read
My Lips – The Original Master
Even though
McKinley, as the first president to use the phone intensively, was
technologically innovative, in his America it was more a question
of reinforcing the old political tradition of saying you’ll do one
thing and doing something else altogether. That much is amply demonstrated
by the stark contrast between what he stated in his inaugural addresses
and the policies which were actually implemented under his rule.
"You may
be sure that there will be no jingo nonsense under my administration,"
he said to anti-imperialist former Civil War general and senator
Carl Schurz
in 1896, following it up in his first
inaugural speech in March 1897 with these words:
"We
want no wars of conquest; we must avoid the temptation of territorial
aggression. War should never be entered upon until every agency
of peace has failed; peace is preferable to war in almost every
contingency."
Would you have
guessed from the above that during McKinley’s first term the United
States would go to war with Spain over Cuba just over a year later,
launching the United States into a century
of war and overseas intervention?
The
Man in the Mask
McKinley is
said to have embarked on his second term in March 1901 intending
to focus on domestic policy, but again, you wouldn’t have known
it from his second
inaugural, filled with echoes of "enduring freedom,"
invocations of overriding imperial destiny past and future, and
pre-Wilsonian zeal to spread the dream:
The American
people, intrenched in freedom at home, take their love for it
with them wherever they go, and they reject as mistaken and unworthy
the doctrine that we lose our own liberties by securing the enduring
foundations of liberty to others. Our institutions will not deteriorate
by extension, and our sense of justice will not abate under tropic
suns in distant seas. As heretofore, so hereafter will the nation
demonstrate its fitness to administer any new estate which events
devolve upon it.
When he came
to talk about the independence movement in the Philippines, he said:
The most
liberal terms of amnesty have already been communicated to the
insurgents, and the way is still open for those who have raised
their arms against the Government for honorable submission to
its authority. Our countrymen should not be deceived. We are not
waging war against the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands.
A portion of them are making war against the United States. […]
We will not leave the destiny of the loyal millions in the islands
to the disloyal thousands who are in rebellion against the United
States. Order under civil institutions will come as soon as those
who now break the peace shall keep it. Force will not be needed
or used when those who make war against us shall make it no more.
At a time when
George Orwell was not even in his cradle, McKinley had earlier given
a nicely Orwellian designation to his policy towards those he called
his "little brown brothers" in the Philippines: he called
it "benevolent assimilation." "We come, not as invaders
or conquerors," he had told them, "but as friends, to
protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in
their personal and religious rights." When the insurrection
was eventually suppressed in 1902, this literally devastating policy
had cost the lives of an estimated 25,000 rebels, 200,000 civilians,
and 4,000 American soldiers.
It is significant
that in his own time, and far beyond it into the twentieth century,
not many saw through McKinley’s mask of austere, self-effacing affability
to the brazen deceptions and shrewd control underneath. He was generally
thought of as being "amiably weak." But future Secretary
of State John Hay was one who did so: after a visit to McKinley
during the 1896 election campaign, he wrote to Henry Adams, "I
was more struck than ever by his mask. It is a genuine Italian ecclesiastical
face of the fifteenth century. And there are idiots who think Mark
Hanna will run him." Adams, himself a tortured spirit of those
unsettled times, was to remark perceptively that McKinley was "easily
first in genius for manipulation" and described him as "an
uncommonly dangerous politician" even before the ruling Republican
Party had begun to agitate for war with Spain in the immediate aftermath
of McKinley’s electoral victory over William Jennings Bryan.
New American
Frontiers
To
understand the origins of the Spanish-American war, the contradictions
between stated policy and actual events, and above all the nature
of the personalities involved, there is no better starting point
than Walter Karp’s The
Politics of War, first published in 1979 but still a neglected
masterpiece, despite valiant attempts to publicize it – by Lewis
Lapham of Harpers magazine,
who was instrumental in bringing out the new edition in 2003, by
the whole editorial team at the The
Last Ditch website, which published a comprehensive appreciation
of Walter Karp in 2002, and by a number
of writers
on
this website and elsewhere
on the web.
As Frederick
Jackson Turner pointed out in 1893, the reality and the idea of
the frontier had always provided the mythology and the escape valve
for American expansion. But in 1890, at Wounded
Knee, the United States had reached its Western physical limit.
This had produced a form of psychological-existential crisis in
the American mind:
Up to our
own day American history has been in a large degree the history
of the colonization of the Great West....The frontier is the line
of the most rapid and effective Americanization....The frontier
promoted the formation of a composite nationality for the American
people....The legislation which most developed the powers of the
national government, and played the largest part in its activity,
was conditioned on the frontier....
To the frontier
the American intellect owes its striking characteristics.
That coarseness and strength combined with acuteness and inquisitiveness;
that practical, inventive turn of mind, quick to find expedients....What
the Mediterranean Sea was to the Greeks, breaking the bond of
custom, offering new experiences, calling out new institutions
and activities, that, and more, the ever retreating frontier has
been to the United States directly, and to the nations of Europe
more remotely. And now, four centuries from the discovery
of America, at the end of a hundred years of life under the Constitution,
the frontier has gone, and with its going has closed the first
period of American history.
~
Frederick Jackson Turner, "The
Significance of the Frontier in American History," 1893
What Karp demonstrates
is that, while from 1895 onwards there was undoubtedly some genuine
and comprehensible public concern at conditions in Spanish Cuba,
the ‘large policy,’ of effectively expanding the frontier by taking
it overseas, was a convenient way of absorbing the severe domestic
discontent arising out of the prolonged economic, social and cultural
crisis of the 1890s. To this end, Cuba was conveniently close to
hand. Added to which, it had long been a ‘desirable object of conquest’
for the American empire: as early as the time of the war with Britain
in 1812, members of Congress had agitated for American territorial
expansion into (British) Canada, and (Spanish) Florida and Cuba,
primarily to secure export markets.
But was the
large policy, which has its successors today in preventive
war and the goal of securing the frontier
of outer space against all possible comers, sufficient to channel
and disperse the profound economic and cultural discontent of that
troubled end of the century? That is a much larger issue, in which
the question of the anarchist assassin's motivation comes into play:
already in 1901 it exercised the minds of those
who were debating the state of mind of Leon Czolgosz and deciding
his fate.
The Anarchist
unmakes what the Kingmaker has made
McKinley, who
like many of his successors liked to press the flesh of ‘ordinary
people,’ was unfortunate to have been president at a time when some
in the anarchist movement saw men and women in positions of executive
power, whether elected or not, as symbols of oppressive regal and
faceless government, to be removed by
force. In Europe, the idea of ‘propaganda
by the deed’ – especially bombing – had penetrated anarchist
circles and displaced less violent forms of dissent. Prominent European
figures, including King Umberto of Italy and Empress Elizabeth of
Austria, had been assassinated by anarchists of this type.
In the US,
the fact that those who subscribed to these views were usually immigrants
– or the children of immigrants created a fear of dangerous aliens
in the American mind. In 1903, 2 years after McKinley's assassination,
and in the time-honored bureaucratic tradition of devising legislation
today to deal with yesterday’s problem, US immigration legislation
was revised to provide for the exclusion (and deportation if they
were already in the country) of any person "who disbelieves
in or who is opposed to all organized government, or who is a member
of or affiliated with any organization entertaining or teaching
such disbelief in or opposition to all governments."
Czolgosz, when
asked to explain himself at his trial, justified his crime on the
grounds that he had done his duty: he did not feel "that one man
should have so much service, and another man should have none."
This sparked
a debate about individual moral responsibility. Was the anarchist
solely responsible for his actions, or had he been (de)formed by
the social, economic and cultural evils of the society in which
he lived? Had Czolgosz been driven insane by the inhuman, listless,
frustrating conditions of his life? Emma
Goldman, who was briefly arrested and quite harshly treated
in the aftermath of the McKinley assassination because she was claimed
by Czolgosz to have been an inspiration to him, certainly thought
so, as her October 1901 article, ‘The
Tragedy of Buffalo,’ demonstrated:
"An act of
violence is not only the result of conditions, but also of man's
psychical and physical nature, and his susceptibility to the world
surrounding him. […]
That violence
is not the result of conditions only, but also largely depends
upon man's inner nature, is best proven by the fact that while
thousands loath tyranny, but one will strike down a tyrant. What
is it that drives him to commit the act, while others pass quietly
by? It is because the one is of such a sensitive nature that he
will feel a wrong more keenly and with greater intensity than
others.
It is, therefore,
not cruelty, or a thirst for blood, or any other criminal tendency,
that induces such a man to strike a blow at organized power. On
the contrary, it is mostly because of a strong social instinct.
It is generally
believed that men prompted to put the dagger or bullet in the
cowardly heart of government, were men conceited enough to think
that they will thereby liberate the world from the fetters of
despotism. As far as I have studied the psychology of an act of
violence, I find that nothing could be further away from the thought
of such a man than that if the king were dead, the mob will cease
to shout "Long live the king!"
The cause
for such an act lies deeper far too deep for the shallow multitude
to comprehend. It lies in the fact that the world within the individual,
and the world around him, are two antagonistic forces, and, therefore,
must clash.
Do I say
that Czolgosz is made of that material? No. Neither can I say
that he was not. Nor am I in a position to say whether or not
he is an Anarchist; I did not know the man; no one as far as I
am aware seems to have known him, but from his attitude and behavior
so far (I hope that no reader of "Free Society" has believed the
newspaper lies), I feel that he was a soul in pain, a soul that
could find no abode in this cruel world of ours, a soul "impractical,"
inexpedient, lacking in caution (according to the dictum of the
wise);
Anarchism
and violence are as far apart from each other as liberty and tyranny.
I care not what the rabble says; but to those who are still capable
of understanding I would say that Anarchism, being a philosophy
of life, aims to establish a state of society in which man's inner
make-up and the conditions around him, can blend harmoniously,
so that he will be able to utilize all the forces to enlarge and
beautify the life about him. To those I would also say that I
do not advocate violence; government does this, and force begets
force. It is a fact which cannot be done away with through the
prosecution of a few men and women, or by more stringent laws
this only tends to increase it."
Leon Czolgosz
was put
to death in the electric chair at Auburn state prison on October
29, 1901. In a gesture heavy with the symbolic desire to purge evil
from society absolutely, sulfuric acid was poured over his body
to dissolve it. The issues of personal moral responsibility, societal
degradation and distribution of wealth and privilege remain as pressing
today as they were on that sad day at the turn of the last century.
References
Books
Diner, Steven
J. (1998), A
Very Different Age: Americans of the Progressive Era (New
York, Hill and Wang)
Joll, James
(1980, 1964), The
Anarchists (Harvard University Press)
Johns, A.
Wesley (1970), The
Man Who Shot McKinley (New York: A. S. Barnes & Co.)
Karp, Walter
(2003, 1979), The
Politics of War: The Story of Two Wars Which Altered Forever the
Political Life of the American Republic 18901920 (New
York: Franklin Square Press)
Kolko, Gabriel
(1995), A
Century of War (New York: W. W. Norton & Co)
Lears, T.J.
Jackson (1981), No
Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American
Culture 18801920 (New York: Pantheon Books)
Morgan, H.
Wayne (2004, 1970), William
McKinley and His America (Kent State University Press)
Phillips,
Kevin R. (2003) William
McKinley (Times Books – American Presidents Series) Phillips,
Kevin R. (2006) American
Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil and Borrowed
Money in the 21st Century (Viking Books)
Rauchway,
Eric (2003), Murdering
McKinley : The Making of Theodore Roosevelt's America, (New
York, Hill and Wang)
Rosenberg,
Emily S. (1982), Spreading
the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion 18901945
(New York: Hill and Wang)
Williams,
William A. (1966, 1961), The
Contours of American History (Chicago: Quadrangle Paperbacks)
Williams,
William A. (1972, 1959), The
Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. Norton &
Co.)
Articles
Mark Gado,
The
Assassination of William McKinley
Lewis L. Gould,
William
McKinley (Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia)
Wyatt Kingseed,
The
Assassination of William McKinley
Other Links
Legacies
of the Spanish-American War
Mark Trexler,
The
McKinley Assassination site
University
of Buffalo Libraries, The
Legal Aftermath of the McKinley Assassination
University
of Buffalo Libraries, Anarchy
at the Turn of the Century
White
House, William
McKinley Page
April
1, 2006
Richard
Wall (send him mail) is
currently reading for a PhD in American History at the University
of Birmingham, England.
Copyright ©
2006 LewRockwell.com
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Wall Archives
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