Let the Bankruptcies Roll
by
Michael S. Rozeff
by Michael S. Rozeff
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Certain financial
developments of late, commonly treated by the mainstream media as
negative, are gladdening my heart. It is sheer delight to read that
Carlyle Capital Corp. is unable to meet margin calls. Its stock
fell from $12 to $5 in one day. I hope it goes to $0. I am happy
because Carlyle is an affiliate of the Carlyle Group, which is a
charter member of the corrupt military-political-industrial complex.
It is the home, or former home, or palace, or safe deposit box of
both Bush presidents and an incredible roster of other once high-placed
officials, such as John Major, Frank Carlucci, James Baker III,
Richard Darman, Arthur Levitt, and Mack McLarty, to name a few.
Carlyle invested
$21.7 billion in mortgage-backed securities issued by two government-sponsored
enterprises, namely, the Federal National Mortgage Association (ticker
symbol FNM), known as Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan and
Mortgage Corporation (ticker symbol FRE), known as Freddie Mac.
Carlyle used excessive leverage (issuing debt of its own) to finance
these purchases. It borrowed by issuing very short-term debt known
as repurchase agreements using the mortgage-backed securities as
collateral. When these mortgage-backed securities fell in price,
the lenders demanded more capital (margin) from Carlyle. But it
had borrowed so much that it could not meet the margin calls. It
received a notice of default. Wonderful!
How long the
mighty fall before they manipulate the system to bail themselves
out is anybody’s guess. In the meantime, it is fun to see even a
token victory. Half a loaf of comeuppance is better than none.
The Northern
Rock bank in England issued large amounts of mortgage-backed securities,
financing them by wholesale sources of short-term funds such as
borrowings from other banks. In this respect, it was like Carlyle.
When its short-term sources of funds dried up, the bank failed.
England nationalized this bank. It should have been allowed to fail.
Failures are good when they are deserved. We may not learn from
them, but at least they give us the opportunity to learn. And we
need to learn a great deal.
Investors who
over-reached for yield and over-reached for yield spreads are learning
the hard way that this was a risky policy. When yields on short-term
money market funds fell drastically, the number of ultra-short bond
funds doubled. These bring in extra current yield by, among other
things, investing in mortgage and other asset-backed securities.
Although they seem like money-market funds, they are not. A fund
like Fidelity’s Ultra-Short Bond Fund maintained a $10 value for
over 4 years, only suddenly to drop to $8.61. (Some others have
fared better, depending on their investments.)
Carlyle Capital
bought debt securities of FNM and FRE, but their stocks are also
falling. The stock price of Fannie Mae, which almost hit $90 in
December of 2000 is down to $22. It fell over 10 percent on March
6 alone. I hope this company goes bankrupt along with Freddie Mac,
which is down to $20 after being north of $70 a share. The government
has no business butting into the mortgage business, so if Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac fail, good riddance.
Although I’d
enjoy seeing a complete debacle occur in these two government-created
monsters, quite possibly the government will prevent or otherwise
forestall their bankruptcies should they ever be imminent. The government
provides no explicit guarantees to these companies, and the companies
state that there are no guarantees. Nevertheless, investors have
acted as if the companies had some implicit guarantees. They have
good reason. Congress clearly wants these companies around so that
they can buy up mortgages. The political fallout from their failures
would be severe.
Investors therefore
have lent money to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac at (low) rates not
in accord with their risk. This has allowed these companies to create
and dominate a secondary market in mortgages. They bought up mortgages
originated by banks, packaged them up, and resold them as the kinds
of mortgage-backed securities that Carlyle invested in. How ironic
that a company with so many ex-politicos in it might be dented a
bit by another government-sponsored enterprise! These securities
have been turning sour because the mortgages in them are defaulting.
As a result, the yields on these debts are running 3 percent higher
than Treasury bond yields, as compared with a more typical 1 percent.
And even that premium is not as high as other troubled mortgage-related
debts.
What is this
secondary market that Fannie Mae deals in? It’s basically a used-item
or resale market. A secondary market is a market in which buyers
and sellers can trade an item, like a security, after it has been
issued. The used-car market is a secondary market. So is the New
York Stock Exchange.
If there is
no such market or if the market is limited or thin, the security
is said to be illiquid, which means that it cannot be sold or sold
quickly in significant amounts at a price near to its previous price.
When a market is illiquid, there is good reason for it. There may
not be enough active buyers and sellers to warrant an exchange.
Such a market usually becomes a dealer market.
In the good
old days, banks originated mortgages and then generally kept them
in house, that is, retained their ownership. They were illiquid
loans. The secondary market in home mortgages was very limited.
Some items
have secondary markets and others do not. There is no natural financial
or economic law that says that every loan or security must have
a secondary market, liquid or not. A secondary market develops spontaneously
if conditions and circumstances warrant it. Otherwise, it doesn’t.
Farmers used
to write illiquid forward contracts to sell their corn production.
Later, the futures markets, which provided far more liquidity by
standardizing the contract and by other risk-control methods, came
to displace the older forward contracts. Put and call markets used
to operate as an illiquid dealer market and with ads in Barron’s
until the Chicago Board Options Exchange devised standard contracts.
On the other hand, there are thousands of bonds that are unstandardized
and that have illiquid secondary markets.
Entrepreneurs
devise secondary markets if it pays them to. E-bay created or enhanced
many secondary markets. There is no need for government to foster
or encourage secondary markets where none naturally exist or where
they are illiquid. In such cases, there is no secondary market because
it does not pay to have one.
When the government
steps in, as it did in 1938 when it created Fannie Mae, it does
so to benefit some special interest groups. The government draws
resources into an uneconomic use and it undermines the primary market
in various subtle ways. This happened in the secondary mortgage
market.
Banks used
to hold mortgages and not resell them. Fannie Mae gave the banks
a way to sell their mortgages. Since Fannie Mae borrowed at privileged
rates, due to the implicit government guarantee, and bought mortgages
from the banks, the banks benefited.
Bank capital
is limited, and the amount of mortgages they can carry is therefore
limited. But if a bank can originate a mortgage and then sell it
to Fannie Mae, then with the same capital it can increase the number
of its mortgage originations. Its profits go up. Its incentive and
capacity to push mortgage loans rises. This distorts economic activity.
In the good
old days when the banks both originated and held the mortgages,
they faced several risks, and good bank management required that
they manage these risks. They generally borrowed short and lent
long. They borrowed by issuing short-term securities such as CDs.
They lent by making long-term mortgage loans. The short-term interest
rates they paid were usually lower than the long-term rates they
received. A liquidity problem arises when the short-term rates exceed
the long-term rates. Another problem arises when the long-term rates
go up, as this reduces the value of the mortgages. Usually when
short-term and long-term interest rates rise, the short-term rate
rises more than the long-term rate, and the bank’s position deteriorates.
When mortgage
loans were illiquid, the bank had to be careful to maintain alternative
sources of funds in case interest rates rose. It had to be careful
in managing its mortgage and loan portfolio so that they were diversified.
It could not concentrate too heavily in one type of loan, one maturity
of loan, or one borrower.
The bank also
had to maintain the quality of its mortgages, because if interest
rate rises were associated with hard times or brought on hard times,
then its bad mortgage loans might rise. The bankers managed these
risks partly by knowing their customers. The three C’s of credit
were Character, Credit, and Capital. The bank looked into the borrower’s
past history, how much credit he could handle, and what his other
assets were. The loan officer’s own reputation and prospects of
rising within the bank through promotion depended on his being careful
in making the loans.
In recent years,
the three C’s became a joke. Banks made loans on no character, no
credit, and no capital. Why not? They sold these loans to Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, or to some other intermediaries who then repackaged
them into pools (called securitization) and resold them to other
investors. These included all sorts of institutions including large
banks overseas.
The secondary
market, combined with the innovations in securitization and the
ready pools of money seeking high yields in a low-yield environment,
altered the incentive structure in mortgage origination. Mortgage
lenders no longer cared as much to whom they lent; and the guidelines
for how much they loaned deteriorated.
The stocks
of a heap of banks and mortgage companies are now falling in price
drastically, the main reason being that they are holding bad loans.
Washington Mutual (WM), a bank known for its mortgage loans in overheated
markets in California and Florida, is down to $11 from $47. Citibank
(C) is down to $21 from $55. They, not I or you or the taxpayer,
made these bad loans, and they (and their suppliers of capital)
should suffer the consequences. If those who took the loans walk
away, and that is their choice, so be it. If the lenders have to
deal with the costs of foreclosures, that is how it should be. Why
should you or I bail them out? If we do, they will give us a repeat
performance (this is called moral hazard).
I’m hoping
to see the bankruptcies roll along unimpeded, but realistically
what I expect is a roll call of political rhetoric, name-calling,
blame-placing, and misguided government attempts to halt the truth
of the ticker tape, which is that the boom is over and its excesses
are now being liquidated. So I have to take what little enjoyment
I can get from watching the stocks of these enterprises collapse.
A good, solid,
scary bear market that chastens all concerned is just what we need,
that is, if it were allowed to provide its salutary effect, which
it won’t. Many more people need to be taught many lessons.
Among our influential
leaders, I see no evidence of any truth-telling. Was there ever?
I seem to remember at least occasional flashes of truth emanating
from an occasional Senator or Representative or novelist or artist.
But in recent years, there is not even the smallest sign from any
of the rich and powerful who command the nation and the airwaves
that they are prepared to lay aside their demoniacal control over
this country.
There are two
Americas: the official America of endless b.s., and the real America
glimpsed in the unhampered and uninhibited writings beneath the
surface in the blogosphere. I do see hopeful signs of light in the
blogosphere.
I
will keep my computer running while I continue to make sure that
my Mute button works on other media so that I can tune out the waterfall
of official baloney that such bankruptcies or a grinding bear market
will elicit. The rich and powerful cannot halt a bear market or
all its ramifications. But, sad to say, they know how to use it
to their advantage in order to propagandize and solidify still further
their grip on the lives of Americans.
March
8, 2008
Michael
S. Rozeff [send him mail]
is a retired Professor of Finance living in East Amherst, New York.
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© 2008 LewRockwell.com
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