Moderates and Radicals
by Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.
by Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.
In
all times of state dominance, the instability of the system gives
rise to two types of reformers: the moderates who want to work within
the system but end up defending it, and the radicals who have the
clarity to see that the only real solution is upheaval. If the latter
prevail and they often have in the history of politics it is only
after having endured the slings and arrows of the former.
The
history of liberty is strewn with heroes who courageously championed
radical reform, but in every case I can recall, these same people
were traduced and reviled not only by the regime, but also by the
moderate reformers, who always claimed to be working within the
system. The moderates say that their efforts are being frustrated
by the voices of the radicals, who are said to discredit the cause
they purport to support.
This
line of attack was used against the French liberal economist Frédéric
Bastiat, and still is. So it was with A.R.J. Turgot, the liberal
reformer who served as finance minister under Louis XVI Simon
Schama says that his position in favor of radical reform discredited
the efforts of the moderates. It was said of Cobden and Bright,
as they sought to embarrass and disgrace the government and its
bread tax. Their erstwhile allies constantly sought to muzzle them,
with the idea that their extremism was harming an otherwise respectable
cause.
So
it was for Patrick Henry, who was urged to drop his agitations for
revolution and, later, his attacks on the Constitution. F.A. Hayek
was dogged by complaints that his radicalism was losing liberty
more friends than it was gaining. Ludwig von Mises faced a blizzard
of critics from German classical liberals, who somehow came to believe
that liberalism's greatest enemy was the scholar who refused to
compromise.
Of
course Rothbard faced a lifetime of tut-tutting from people who
said his libertarianism was dangerously irresponsible. Today it
is the same with this website, the Mises Institute, Antiwar.com,
FFF.org, the Independent Institute, and every radical libertarian
blogger, academic, or journalist who stands accused of harming the
cause of reform by holding out an ideal.
The
pattern repeats itself so often that it almost seems to be a law
of history: the radicals who change history must do so over the
resistance of the moderates, who claim to be friendly to the same
cause, but somehow always end up on the side of established interests.
Thus can we conjure up this conjectural conversation in the Kremlin,
circa 1955:
Comrade
Liberal: "Khrushchev knows the failures of Stalinism in economics.
He should seize the chance and allow full private property in
land, give the factories to the workers, allow people to work
where they want, and empty the prisons of economic criminals."
Comrade
Conservative: "The way you talk! You are only discrediting the
cause of reform! Our plan is to permit more personal production
on public land, allow more flexibility in wages, speed up the
applications process for permits to move, and give more power
to regional economic councils so they can be more responsive
to the people. Don't make the perfect the enemy of the good!"
Comrade
Liberal: "But these are just cosmetic changes, and when they
do not work, the cause of reform will have lost. We must tell
the truth even if the powers that be don't want to hear it."
Comrade
Conservative: "Don't enlist me in your disloyal extremist efforts.
What you propose is anarchy. You and your ideas remind me of
the enemies of socialism we have worked so hard to eradicate.
Better that you be silenced, else responsible reformers will
never make any progress."
Of
course Khrushchev did reform along the conservative lines, and his
failure ended up harming the idea of liberalization, thus delaying
the inevitable and much needed upheaval for many decades. The upheaval
happened anyway, and it occurred against the wishes and efforts
of the moderate reformers, who had made their peace with the regime
in the hopes of changing the system from the inside. The radicals
on the outside couldn't help but notice that the reformers seemed
to be increasing, rather than reducing, the size of the state.
Concerning
the dispute between moderates and radicals, the glaringly obvious
is seldom pointed out: it is a heck of lot easier to be a moderate
than a radical. To be a moderate means to side, at least partially
and often largely or completely, with conventional wisdom. It means
that you can be friendly with powerful people because you are no
threat to them. It means you accept the legitimacy of the established
mechanisms for change, and thereby implicitly approve them.
Think
of a prison populated by those who are planning a break and those
who seek better food and more exercise time. To look at the two
groups, there is no visible difference between the way they treat
the wardens, except that internally those who plan to escape regard
them as the enemy, while those who seek prison reform reconcile
themselves to the warden-prisoner relationship, and try to get the
best terms for themselves.
Who
do the reformers fear most? Not the wardens, but the radicals whom
they believe are setting back their cause. The radicals know that
the reformers are not friends at all, but sideliners seeking favors
from the privileged elite, for to seek and gain favor from powerful
people, even in an ostensibly sensible cause, is to infuse the existing
system with a legitimacy it does not deserve.
The
analogy works in a huge range of cases from taxes to social security
to education to foreign policy. Reformers are forever congratulating
themselves for their respectability, etc., but in fact they are
part of the problem. If the cause of freedom wins, it will be because
of the pressure from the radicals felt by those in power.
As
Mises said, no government is liberal by nature. Governments grant
liberty only when forced to do so by public opinion. What causes
a government to act is fear of opposition. But somehow, against
all evidence, moderate reformers continue to believe that the powerful
can be influenced by praise, cocktail parties, and the suggestion
of marginal reforms.
The
difference between the radical and the moderate is not one of degree.
It is an intellectual and mental outlook of a completely different
sort, one that goes to the very heart of whether one views the people
in power as the source of the problem, or the source of the solution.
Let’s
consider an example.
A
radical says: get the troops out of Iraq now! The implicit message
is: the state cannot be trusted, the troops are causing trouble
rather than helping, the US never should have invaded, and almost
everything you hear from the government about this war is a lie.
A
moderate reformer says: yes, get the troops out, but not yet. The
implicit message is: we can trust the state to make the right judgment
about when to leave, for now the troops are performing a service
of some value, the invasion has done some good and we should complete
the job, and the state is right that it is a source of some degree
of order and justice in Iraq.
Now,
this is a small change in words and political orientation that masks
a massive difference in world view. The radical doesn't trust the
state to reform itself. The moderate does. The radical does not
seek the state's favor. The moderate depends wholly on it.
History,
I believe, is on the side of the radical, for the moderate wants
to play it safe. Now, for the most part, the moderate is a harmless
creature, neither here nor there in terms of the overall direction
of history, except in the following sense: he is useful to the powers-that-be
as an instrument to keep the radicals in line.
This
is precisely the role that the moderate critics of the Iraq War
are now playing. They are blasting away at the antiwar crowd on
the ostensible grounds that they too want to end the war, but we
are making it harder for them to do so. What they are saying is
that they favor the troops staying up until a certain point.
This is the same as siding with the warmongers, just with different
rhetoric.
The moderates always seem
to come down on the side of the prison wardens. Only when the radicals
have broken through the wall, and the path is perfectly clear and
safe, do they grab the chance and make a run for it. In retrospect,
for example, even moderate libertarians grant that the American
Revolution, repealing the Corn Laws, and overthrowing Soviet central
planning were wonderful things. But they know in their hearts that
they would have lacked the courage to do their part.
February 2, 2005
Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr. [send him mail] is president of the Ludwig
von Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, editor of LewRockwell.com,
and author of Speaking
of Liberty.
Copyright © 2005 LewRockwell.com
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