Disarm: The Lesson of the Georgia Fiasco
by
Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.
by Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.
DIGG THIS
George Bush,
with the clock ticking down the last months of his presidency, nearly
started yet another war that might have escalated in the manner
of World War I: a diplomatic failure backed by arms that resulted
in a superpower clash.
It is a wonder
that the world has survived his "war on terror," which turned out
to be a war on American liberty and anyone in the world who got
on his nerves. His confrontation with Russia in defense of a belligerent
little client state of the US could have sealed his fate and ours
too.
We need to
examine Bush's actions and see how the US nearly stumbled into a
calamity. For in the last weeks, we have gained a picture of the
future with this continued push for a secure American world empire
with its endless webs of payments, relationships, jockeying for
power and treasure, and a diplomatic corps honeycombed with belligerents
and lobbyists for foreign governments. The peace, such as it is,
can be shattered through small screwups that will end in massive
death.
Make no mistake
about it: the flare-up was caused entirely by US diplomatic failures.
You wouldn't know this, however, if all you did was watch television
news. Fox and CNN have portrayed Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili
as a benevolent leader of a "young democracy" struggling in the
shadow of the mighty bear Russia.
In fact, Saakashvili
was elected on a "National Movement" ticket with a centralizing,
revanchist platform of retaking the autonomous provinces in the
Caucasus, and he has ruled this country the size of South Carolina
with an iron fist under a state of emergency for years. He had every
intention of ruling these non-Georgian peoples who do not want to
be ruled by him, as even the CIA admits. As for his domestic program,
it has consisted mostly of cracking down on tax evasion and beefing
up state coffers.
After smashing
the province Ajaria in 2004 following his rigged election, and then
crushing Kodori Gorge in Abhkazia (which even has a separate language)
in 2006, he moved on to South Ossetia (which also has its own language)
this year, where Ossetians and Russians live and Russian peacekeepers
patrol.
A young democracy?
Ossetians never voted for Saakashvili. But he insisted on ruling
them anyway, moving militarily and bombing the capital in the middle
of peace talks on the opening day of the Olympics.
Tin-pot, fascist
mini-dictators like this are a dollar a dozen, and such territorial
disputes will always be with us. The critical question is: what
gave Saakashvili the confidence that he could pull this off? He
believed that the United States would back him as a quid pro quo
for his having sent troops to Iraq. The US responded to his cooperation
in Iraq – sending Georgian citizens to kill and be killed – by sending
him military training support and guns and bombs, and wining and
dining him in Washington.
In all the
confusion of the last days, there is no question, then, that Georgia
was the aggressor in South Ossetia. Russia responded within its
sphere of influence both against Georgia but mostly against an incredible
show of arrogance by the Bush administration. According to the New
York Times, which interviewed many officials who refused to be named,
the Bush administration began backpedalling very quickly, claiming
that they never gave permission to Georgia to crush any separatist
movement.
But by that
time, the politics began. In a very scary editorial and series of
speeches, John McCain all but threatened nuclear war against Russia,
failing to mention that his own foreign policy adviser was a paid
lobbyist for Georgia. Had McCain had his way, the US very well might
have a hot war going on right now on the Russian border, fighting
for the privilege of a dictator to crush the rights of South Ossetians
to their own self-determination.
No
doubt that had the conflict continued – and it still might – we
would have been told that we were fighting for the rights of the
poor Georgian people against Russian imperialism. The American media,
even before looking at the facts, had already decided who wore the
halo and who wore the horns in this struggle, giving loving interviews
to liars of all stripes, so long as they took the US line.
None of which
is to say that Russia wears the halo and Georgia the horns. In war,
blood ends up on the hands of everyone involved, and there is no
shortage of evidence to prove the case against any and all governments
involved.
What we need
to fix on here are the first principles. It's an upside-down world,
not all that different from the one that existed at the start of
World War One, another conflict which was said to be about fighting
against aggression and fighting for democracy and self-determination.
As Francis Neilson said in his 1915 classic How
Diplomats Make War: "No country thinks of putting these
principles into practice, but somehow they seem to be worth fighting
for."
If we are to
follow Neilson further, we will see that in his lessons of the start
of that war, he takes aim at a central pillar of diplomacy then
and now, namely the claim that the proliferation of arms guarantees
the peace. He quotes Richard Cobden: "the greatest evil connected
with these rival armaments is that they destroy the strongest motives
for peace."
So it has been
in these diplomatic games played by our rulers. They believe they
are controlling the world, when suddenly they are controlled by
events. Then they rope the rest of us into it, following the usual
plan of war: forcing the rest of us to adopt the government's view
of who is wearing the halos and horns, regardless of the facts:
During
a war it is no easy task to prevent your sympathy clouding your
reason. The whole social system seems to be organized against
any individual attempt to concentrate the attention dominantly
upon the causes of the war. Governments, churches, theatres, the
press, and local authorities, direct their efforts, in the main,
warwards; the whole thought of society and commerce seems to be
occupied with war; and all desire to question the reasons given
by statesmen for participating in the war must be suppressed.
It has been ruled already by certain 'leaders of thought' that
it is unwise, unpatriotic, and un-English, to suspect the motives
of Governments, or waver for a moment in swearing wholehearted
allegiance to the authorities: you must think only of the war.
If you dare ask for the truth, you are helping the enemy; if you
suggest an early peace, you are hindering the militarists who
desire no peace until their enemy is utterly crushed. Insidious,
bewildering, and plausible, are the reasons given by statesmen
and journalists for inflicting a humiliating defeat; without it,
they tell us we must not hope for disarmament. No patriot is supposed
to ask if disarmament is at all probable. No one must ask if a
single statesman really believes such a blessing will follow if
the enemy be annihilated.
Over just a
few short days, we saw this whole process beginning to play itself
out, in an ominous sign for the future. But it is a future that
can change. As Neilson wrote, "Citizens who desire peace can indulge
in no greater folly than that which is summed up in the phrase,
'the best way to preserve peace is to prepare for war.' … Governments
have made the war; only the peoples can make an unarmed peace."
August
22, 2008
Llewellyn
H. Rockwell, Jr. [send him
mail] is founder and president of the Ludwig
von Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, editor of LewRockwell.com,
and author of Speaking
of Liberty.
Copyright
© 2008 LewRockwell.com
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