The COGC
Proposal
The Continuity
of Government Commission (COGC), spearheaded by the Brookings
Institution and the American Enterprise Institute, recently issued
proposals for the operation of Congress following a catastrophic
terrorist attack. Specifically, COGC advocates a constitutional
amendment calling for the appointment of individuals to
the House of Representatives to fill the seats of dead or incapacitated
members, a first in American history. An examination of the proposal
reveals that it is both unnecessary and dangerous.
Note that
COGC is self-commissioned, its members being neither
elected nor appointed by any government body. The biographies
of the commissioners demonstrate that COGC is made up mostly of
professional lobbyists. Of course COGC is well-intentioned, but
the nation should know exactly who is trying to substitute their
wisdom for that of James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and other
framers of the Constitution. I think most Americans would prefer
that proposals to amend the Constitution come from elected lawmakers
or grassroots efforts, not from think tanks and lobbyists.
One reading
the COGC proposal cannot help but sense the familiar Washington
conceit at work, a conceit that sees America as totally dependent
on the workings of Capitol Hill. It is simply unthinkable to many
in Washington that the American people might survive a period
in which Congress did not pass any new laws. But the truth is
that the federal state is not America. The American people have
always been remarkably resilient in the face of emergencies, and
individual states are far more equipped to deal with emergencies
and fill congressional vacancies than COGC imagines.
COGC is
Unnecessary
Every generation
seems to labor under the delusion that it lives in the most dangerous
and turbulent time in human history. COGC certainly proves this
point. Its proposal provides doomsday scenarios designed to make
us believe that the threat of modern terrorism poses a much greater
risk to our government institutions than ever existed in the past.
Yet is Congress really more vulnerable than it was at the height
of the Cold War, when a single Soviet missile could have destroyed
Washington? Surely Congress faced greater danger in 1814, when
the British army actually invaded Washington, routed the city,
and burned down the White House! Somehow the republic survived
those much more perilous times without a constitutional amendment
calling for the emergency appointment of Representatives.
The scenarios
offered by the commission, while theoretically possible, are highly
unlikely to disable Congress. Remember, a majority of members
assemble together in one place only rarely; even during votes
most members are not on the floor together at the same time. Inauguration
ceremonies and State of the Union addresses often bring together
a majority of members in the same place, but simple precautions
could be taken to keep a sufficient number away from such events.
Even a direct terrorist attack on the Pentagon failed to disrupt
the operation of the Department of Defense. The COGC proposal
exaggerates the likelihood that a terrorist strike on Washington
would incapacitate the House of Representatives, and exaggeration
is a bad reason to amend the Constitution.
Existing
Constitutional Provisions Are Adequate
It is important
to understand that the Constitution already provides the framework
for Congress to function after a catastrophic event. Article I
section 2 grants the governors of the various states authority
to hold special elections to fill vacancies in the House of Representatives.
Article I section 4 gives Congress the authority to designate
the time, manner, and place of such special elections if states
should fail to act expeditiously following a national emergency.
As Hamilton explains in Federalist 59, the time, place,
and manner clause was specifically designed to address the
kind of extraordinary circumstances imagined by COGC. Hamilton
characterized authority over federal elections as shared between
the states and Congress, with neither being able to control the
process entirely.
COGC posits
that states could not hold special elections quickly enough after
a terrorist act to guarantee the functioning of Congress. But
even COGC reports that the average length of House vacancies,
following the death of a member until the swearing in of a successor
after a special election, is only 126 days. Certainly this period
could be shortened given the urgency created by a terrorist attack.
We should not amend the Constitution simply to avoid having a
reduced congressional body for a month or two.
In fact,
Congress often goes months without passing significant legislation,
and takes long breaks in August and December. If anything, legislation
passed in the aftermath of a terrorist event is likely to be based
on emotion, not reason. The terrible Patriot Act, passed only
one month after September 11th by a credulous Congress, is evidence
of this.
Also, advances
in technology can be used to reduce the risk of a disruption in
congressional continuity following an emergency. Members already
carry Blackberry devices to maintain communications even if cut
off from their offices. Similar technology can be used to allow
remote electronic voting by members. Congress should focus on
contingency plans that utilize technology, not a constitutional
amendment.
States have
a wide variety of electronic and telephonic technology at their
disposal to speed up the process of special elections. Consider
that popular television shows hold votes that poll millions of
Americans in a single night! Yet COGC ignores alternatives to
standard voting and incorrectly assumes that states will be in
disarray and unable to hold elections for months.
COGC Is
Dangerous because the House Must Be Elected
At its heart,
the COGC proposal is fundamentally at odds with the right of the
people always to elect their members of the House of Representatives.
The House must be elected. Even temporary appointees
would be unacceptable, because the laws passed would be permanent.
The problems
with appointment of representatives are obvious. COGC
calls for a general constitutional amendment that gives Congress
wide power to make rules for filling vacancies in the event
that a substantial number of members are killed or incapacitated.
Such an amendment would be unavoidably vague, open to broad interpretation
and abuse. In defining terms like vacancy, substantial,
and incapacitated, Congress or the courts would be
setting a dangerous precedent for a more elastic constitutional
framework. Members of Congress simply cannot appoint their colleagues;
the conflict of interest is glaring.
Alternate
proposals allowing state governors to appoint representatives
from a list of successors nominated by members are no better.
The House of Representatives represents the people, not the states.
Single states often exhibit wide variations in political makeup
even among voters of the same party. Appointment by governors,
even though the successors represent the dead members party
choice, could change the ideological composition of Congress contrary
to the will of the people. Furthermore, voters choose an individual
candidate, not a panel. They should not be required to consider
the qualifications of a candidates potential successors.
COGC focuses
on government legitimacy, arguing that a House of Representatives
with only a handful of surviving members would not be seen as
legitimate by the public. In fact the opposite is true: appointed
representatives will never be seen as legitimate and
in fact would not be legitimate. Without exception, every member
of the House of Representatives has been elected by voters in
the members district. Madison states in Federalist 52 that
The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded
as a fundamental article of republican government. The very
legitimacy of the House of Representatives is based on its constitutional
status as the most directly accountable federal body.
The House
passes numerous laws, often by voice vote, with very few members
present. The legitimacy of those laws is not called into question.
Even a House made up of only five elected members would have more
legitimacy, as the living continuation of the only elected entity
in government, than a House composed of five surviving members
and 430 appointees. Furthermore, even a decimated House membership
would have to pass legislation with the concurrence of the Senate,
which could be restored to full strength immediately by state
governors.
Consider
a scenario COGC forgot to mention. Imagine a terrorist strike
kills a majority of members of the House of Representatives. 200
members survive, and 235 are appointed by state governors on a
temporary basis. This new body considers a bill that
drastically increases taxes to pay for emergency measures, while
suspending civil liberties and imposing martial law. The bill
passes, with 195 elected members opposed and all 235 appointed
members in favor. Only 5 elected members support the measure.
Would the electorate consider this legislation legitimate? Hardly.
Yet this is the type of outcome we must expect under the COGC
proposal.
Conclusion
To
quote Professor Charles Rice, a distinguished Professor Emeritus
at Notre Dame Law School: When it is not necessary to amend
the Constitution, it is necessary not to amend the Constitution.
We must not allow the understandable fears and passions engendered
by the events of September 11th to compel a rushed and grievous
injury to our system of government. The Constitution is our best
ally in times of relative crisis; it is precisely during such
times we should hold to it most dearly. Rather than amending the
Constitution, Congress should be meeting to discuss how to preserve
our existing institutions including an elected House in the
event of a terrorist attack. The Constitution already provides
us with the framework, while technology gives states the ability
organize elections quickly. The COGC proposal not only makes a
mountain out of a molehill, but also acutely threatens the delicate
balance of federal power established in the Constitution.
July
3, 2003