The Next Bubble Is Here. Have You Bought In?
by
Gary North
by Gary North
Recently by Gary North: Pushing
on a String
I have identified
the next bubble. It has already begun. It is in full swing.
Investors
want to identify the next big bubble. Some investors want to buy
in now, maybe using borrowed money (margin loans) to make a killing.
They are confident that they will sell out near the top. They won't.
Other investors just want to avoid getting trapped. They prefer
to let the first group bear the uncertainty of profiting from a
bubble sector.
The trouble
with investment bubbles is that nobody seems to recognize them when
they are making investors rich. Alan Greenspan denied that it is
possible for central bankers to identify a bubble. He
gave a speech in 2002, before his easy money policies had created
the final stage of the worldwide housing bubble. He insisted on
the following:
We
at the Federal Reserve considered a number of issues related to
asset bubbles that is, surges in prices of assets to unsustainable
levels. As events evolved, we recognized that, despite our suspicions,
it was very difficult to definitively identify a bubble until after
the fact that is, when its bursting confirmed its existence.
Moreover,
it was far from obvious that bubbles, even if identified early,
could be preempted short of the central bank inducing a substantial
contraction in economic activity the very outcome we would
be seeking to avoid.
First, he
was blind to what the FED's policies had done in the second half
of the 1990's to create the dot-com bubble. Second, he was equally
blind to what these same expansionist policies were doing to the
housing market policies adopted in mid-2000, in response
to the bursting of the dot-com bubble.
He was incorrect.
Some of us did see that the dot-com bubble was a bubble. I told
my subscribers in February and March of 2000 that the NASDAQ was
a bubble at a price-earnings ratio of 206. The NASDAQ burst the
week my second warning arrived in the mail.
With respect
to the housing bubble, in late 2005, I wrote an article on "Surreal
Estate on the San Andreas Fault," which warned against the coming
bursting of the real estate bubble. It was clear to me what Greenspan
had done to the economy.
If
you remember the S&L crisis of the mid-1980s, you have some indication
of what is coming. The S&L crisis in Texas put a squeeze on the
economy in Texas. Banks got nasty. They stopped making new loans.
Yet the S&Ls were legally not banks. They were a second capital
market. Today, the banks have become S&Ls. They have tied their
loan portfolios to the housing market.
I think
a squeeze is coming that will affect the entire banking system.
The madness of bankers has become unprecedented. They have forgotten
about loan diversification. They have been caught up in Greenspan's
counter-cyclical policy of lowering the federal funds rate. Now
this policy is being reversed. Rates are climbing. This will contract
the loan market. Banks will wind up sitting on top of bad loans
of all kinds because the American economy is now housing-sale
driven.
You may
think that you are shielded. But your banker is not shielded.
You may not deal with bankers. But your employer does.
If I saw it
coming, why didn't Greenspan? Why didn't the pundits on CNBC? Why
didn't the entire investment community? The real estate market still
boomed through the first half of 2006. Then it began to falter.
We all know what happened next.
It is not
that no one can perceive a bubble while it is in progress. The problem
is that investors who do not understand Ludwig von Mises' theory
of the business cycle can't. They don't believe that central bank
inflation causes the bubbles, and that these bubbles burst when
the banks reverse their policies of monetary inflation. So, they
and the advisors who cheer them on desperately want to believe the
assurances by government officials and Federal Reserve Chairmen
that no bubble is in progress, that there will be no regression
to the mean.
The best way
to identify a bubble is to look for investors who are rushing into
an asset market and driving prices up to ludicrous ratios.
You can get
4.5% on a 30-year Treasury bond today. You pay $100 to get a guaranteed
$4.50 a year in return: real money in your bank account (before
income taxes). Meanwhile, the P/E ratio of the Standard & Poor's
500 index is at 120, if as-reported earnings are used instead of
expected earnings. See
the chart here.
At a P/E of
120, you pay $120 to get a hoped-for dollar of earnings (profits)
for the latest reporting period. These profits are not dividends,
just corporate profits.
This is a
replay of 1999.
TODAY'S
BUBBLE
Two words:
"consumer confidence."
We are told
that consumer confidence has bounced back from its February 2009
low. It moved from 22 in February to 55 in May. This was a big jump.
A
spokesperson for the Conference Board, one of the main sources for
this monthly survey, put it this way:
After
two months of significant improvements, the Consumer Confidence
Index is now at its highest level in eight months (Sept. 2008, 61.4).
Continued gains in the Present Situation Index indicate that current
conditions have moderately improved, and growth in the second quarter
is likely to be less negative than in the first. Looking ahead,
consumers are considerably less pessimistic than they were earlier
this year, and expectations are that business conditions, the labor
market and incomes will improve in the coming months. While confidence
is still weak by historical standards, as far as consumers are concerned,
the worst is now behind us.
Consumers
listen to news reports. News reports speak of green shoots, parroting
Ben Bernanke's pet phrase. That phrase has been picked up by the
media, the same way that Greenspan's "irrational exuberance" was
picked up when Greenspan used it in late 1996. Note: We should not
ignore the context of Greenspan's remarks. It applies quite well
to Bernanke's green shoots. Greenspan
said this:
But
how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset
values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions
as they have in Japan over the past decade? And how do we factor
that assessment into monetary policy? We as central bankers need
not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not
threaten to impair the real economy, its production, jobs, and price
stability. Indeed, the sharp stock market break of 1987 had few
negative consequences for the economy. But we should not underestimate
or become complacent about the complexity of the interactions of
asset markets and the economy. Thus, evaluating shifts in balance
sheets generally, and in asset prices particularly, must be an integral
part of the development of monetary policy.
Balance sheets
are crucial, he said. The #1 balance sheet in the American economy
is the Federal Reserve's. It has doubled since last September. The
Federal Reserve's economists did not see in August 2008 what a few
weeks later Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Paulson described to
senior members of Congress as a looming collapse of America's financial
markets. They ignored the fact that the world's capital markets
had seized up a year earlier, in August 2007. They did not see that
a recession had begun in December 2007. They were caught flat-footed.
Today, Bernanke
faces what Greenspan called "the complexity of the interactions
of asset markets and the economy." His two-part policy has been
to double the monetary base and to swap liquid Treasury debt for
toxic assets held by the banks. He has allowed the banks to keep
these borrowed assets on the banks' books at face value, as if they
belonged to the banks. He has not challenged the Financial Accounting
Standards Board reversal of its mark-to-market rule (FAS 157) in
the week it would have gone into effect: April 1, 2009.
Consumers
have not understood this FED-sanctioned policy of keeping bad assets
on the books at Treasury debt prices. Bernanke has said that banks
must be more transparent. Meanwhile, the FED has covered the entire
banking industry with a security blanket that keeps economic reality
from intruding.
Consumers
are therefore confident. For now.
UNDERMINING
CONFIDENCE
California's
unemployment rate in May hit 11.5%. The state will go technically
bankrupt on July 1. It is about to have its bonds downgraded to
junk status. There are no green shoots in California. There is the
equivalent of dead brush in forest fire season. No one seems to
care.
The
World Bank estimates that the world economy will sink by 2.9%
in 2009. How scientific! Not 3% exactly 2.9%. This, from
an outfit that predicted with equal scientific rigor in March that
the world economy would fall by 1.7%. Last November, it predicted
that the world economy would grow by .9% not 1%.
Regular gasoline
is selling for about $2.70 around the country, up from $1.95 in
February. The cost of getting from here to there is rising rapidly.
Yet the consumer
says he is confident. "No problem!"
The summer
will bring more news about rising unemployment. There will be more
foreclosures. The real estate market will continue to decline. By
how much? No one knows.
But aren't
there statistics on foreclosures? Yes, but nobody knows if they
are accurate. The U.S. government relies on a private firm, RealtyTrac,
for its information. States use different ways to assess foreclosures.
In
April, the number of foreclosures reported for Atlanta by the national
press was half of what the published local legal notices said.
The Case-Shiller
index of 20 cities will show that housing prices are still falling.
Commercial real estate prices will fall as vacancies rise. There
will be more closed banks. The FDIC's assets will go below $12 billion.
Then $11 billion. Then . . . ?
All of this
is obvious. The public ignores it. This is why consumer confidence
is a bubble. It keeps rising, yet it is not supported by the facts
that count, which are data on the state of the real estate industry
in relation to the solvency of the banks.
Doug French
is a former banker. It was his warning at a conference in November
2005 that persuaded me that the real estate market and the banks
were jointly entwined and headed for a disaster. His recent article,
"Dead Banks Walking,"
appeared on June 16. His assessment indicates that we are nowhere
near the bottom for either real estate or the banking crisis.
Bankers,
pressured to earn returns for shareholders and protected from bank
runs by FDIC insurance, have over time lent not only more of their
deposits but advanced the money for riskier projects. James Grant
in a recent Grant's Interest Rate Observer reminisced about National
City Bank, which back in 1954 had only lent out 41 percent of its
deposits, with less than one percent of the portfolio being real-estate
loans.
By the end
of last year, the total loan-to-deposit ratio for all US banks
and thrifts was 87 percent, and 60 percent of all loans were classified
as real-estate secured.
The public
has never heard of the loan-to-deposit ratio. That does not change
the fact that the ratio is historically high, and way too much of
it is tied up in real estate.
I keep thinking
on Mr. T's threat, 27 years ago: "You're going down!" The question
is this: Is Ben Bernanke Apollo Creed or Rocky Balboa?
CONCLUSION
Optimism is
as optimism does.
The American
consumer may be less pessimistic today than in March, but he has
less money to spend. His outlook has not been confirmed by the labor
market. Unemployment is rising.
Then
which market will confirm his optimism? Housing? No. Auto sales?
In the second half of the worst year in decades? People are going
to rush out to buy a new car, when the new models are due in October?
We'll see in October. But the industry needs sales now.
Where will
the hoped-for deliverance come from? Not from private industry.
Private industry must compete for capital with the Federal government.
Lenders must supply the Treasury with about $85 billion in loans
each week to roll over the existing debt and pay for this year's
deficit. From China? China is spending money on commodities and
domestic bailouts. From Japan? With trade down, its surplus is down.
From Europe? It is in recession. Then where?
There is no
economic recovery yet. There is only a reduction in the decline
of the economy. Earnings are still falling. Mortgage rates have
risen. There is no end in sight for the real estate contraction.
The banks will be squeezed. State budgets are running large deficits.
They do not have money to offer more unemployment benefits. They
are facing over $120 billion in red ink in the fiscal year beginning
on July 1.
Tax revenues
are down. Expenditures are up. Debt is rising. Interest rates will
follow. State and local bonds will be downgraded.
So, consumer
confidence is a bubble market. Stay out of it.
June
24, 2009
Gary
North [send him mail] is the
author of Mises
on Money. Visit http://www.garynorth.com.
He is also the author of a free 20-volume series, An
Economic Commentary on the Bible.
Copyright ©
2009 Gary North
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