Israel’s Prior Peacekeeping in Lebanon
by
James Bovard
by James Bovard
As the Israeli
government continues bombing throughout Lebanon in response to Hezbollah’s
seizure of two Israeli soldiers and rocket attacks upon Israeli
cities, it may be helpful to recall prior Israeli invasions and
attacks on Lebanon. The Rules of Engagement that Israel appears
to be using now look similar to the rules adapted for the 1982 invasion
and subsequent occupation of Lebanon. The
Los Angeles Times reported yesterday that Israeli missiles
"struck predominantly Christian neighborhoods." Lebanese
Christians are, for the most part, avowed opponents of Hezbollah,
a Muslim religious party. But Israel acts as if all Lebanese are
guilty and thus worthy of bombing. (Likewise, Hezbollah appears
to consider any Israeli worth killing.)
Few people
recognize that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon was one of the biggest
failures in the history of antiterrorism. There is no reason to
expect the current round of attacks and counterattacks to beget
an era of peace and good feeling along the Israeli-Lebanon border.
Neither Hezbollah
nor the Israeli Defense Force has any right to murder innocent people.
But, as in earlier times, there is a danger that U.S. military forces
will be sent to Lebanon to try to assuage the chaos.
The following
is excerpted from my 2003 book, Terrorism
and Tyranny: Trampling Justice, Peace, and Freedom to Rid the World
of Evil (Palgrave, 2003).
In
June 1982, a terrorist organization headed by Abu Nidal (the Osama
bin Laden of the 1980s) attempted to assassinate the Israeli ambassador
in London. Nidal’s forces had previously killed many Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) officials in numerous bomb and shooting
attacks, since they considered Yasser Arafat a traitor for his stated
willingness to negotiate with Israel.
Israeli Prime
Minister Menachem Begin exploited the shooting in London to send
the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) into Lebanon to crush the PLO. Yet,
as Thomas Friedman noted in his book From Beirut to Jerusalem,
"the number of Israeli casualties the PLO guerillas in
Lebanon actually inflicted were minuscule (one death in the 12 months
before the invasion)." The Israeli invasion was originally
scheduled for the previous summer but was postponed after U.S. envoy
Philip Habib negotiated a ceasefire between Israel and the PLO.
Defense Minister Ariel Sharon told the Israeli cabinet that his
"Operation Peace for Galilee" would extend only 40 kilometers
into Lebanon. However, Sharon sent his tanks to Beirut, determined
to destroy the PLO once and for all. Foreign Ministry Director General
David Kimche announced: "We have no aspirations for a single
inch of Lebanese territory. Our sole aim is to free ourselves from
the threat of terrorism." As David Martin and John Walcott
noted in their 1988 book, Best
Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America’s War Against Terrorism,
the U.S. embassy in Beirut "sent cable after cable to Washington,
warning that an Israeli invasion would provoke terrorism and undermine
America’s standing in the Arab world, but not a word came back."
The Palestinian
Red Crescent estimated that fourteen thousand people, mostly civilians,
were killed and wounded in the first month of the operation. (The
Israeli government stated that casualties were much lower.) When
Palestinians fought back tenaciously, the IDF responded with indiscriminate
bombing, killing hundreds of civilians. The IDF bombed the buildings
housing the local bureaus of the Los Angeles Times, United
Press International, and Newsweek. The Israelis cut off Beirut’s
water and electricity supply and imposed a blockade. The UN brokered
a peace deal by which the United States and other multinational
troops entered Beirut to buffer a ceasefire to allow the PLO to
exit to ships to transport them to Tunisia, which had agreed to
provide a safe haven. The U.S. government signed an agreement with
Arafat, pledging that U.S. forces would safeguard civilians who
stayed behind: "Law-abiding Palestinian non-combatants remaining
in Beirut, including the families of those who have departed, will
be authorized to live in peace and security. The U.S. will provide
its guarantees on the basis of assurances received from the Government
of Israel and from the leaders of certain Lebanese groups with which
it has been in contact." Once the PLO withdrew from Beirut,
the U.S. troops were pulled out and put back on Navy ships.
Shortly after
the U.S. troops withdrew, Lebanese president-elect Bashir Gemayel
was assassinated. The IDF promptly invaded Muslim West Beirut, violating
the fragile peace agreement worked out with Muslim forces and the
government of Syria. Prime Minister Begin declared: "The terrorists
cheated us. Not all of them got out. . . . They left behind a considerable
number of terrorists together with their arms." The Israeli
cabinet announced: "The Israeli Defense Forces have taken positions
in West Beirut to prevent the danger of violence, bloodshed and
anarchy." The Israeli army encircled Palestinian refugee camps
in the area and prohibited anyone from entering or leaving without
its permission. An IDF spokesman announced: "The IDF is in
control of all key points in Beirut. Refugee camps harboring terrorist
concentrations remain encircled and closed." As the New
York Times’ Thomas Friedman noted, "Although the Israelis
confiscated the arms of all of the Moslem groups in West Beirut,
they made no attempt to disarm the Christian Phalangist militiamen
in East Beirut."
Sharon invited
Lebanese Phalangist militia units trained and equipped by Israel
to enter the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. Sharon and IDF chief
of staff Gen. Rafael Eitan met with Phalangist commanders before
they entered the camp, and, as Sharon later explained, "we
spoke in principle of their dealing with the camps." Gen. Eitan
told the Israeli cabinet that when the Phalangists went into the
camps, there would be "an eruption of revenge. . . . I can
imagine how it will begin, but not how it will end." The Phalangists
were enraged about the killing of Gemayel, a Christian Lebanese.
The militia
entered the camps and over the next 48 hours, more than seven hundred
Palestinian women, children, and men were executed; many corpses
were mutilated. Palestinian sources estimated that the death toll
was much higher. Israeli troops launched flares over the camps to
illuminate them throughout the night and provided the Phalangists
with food and water during their respites from the killings. Palestinian
women sought to escape the slaughter but "the Israelis encircling
the area refused to let anyone cross their lines." After the
first day’s carnage, a Phalange leader reported to the IDF that
"until now 300 civilians and terrorists have been killed,"
according to the Jerusalem Post. After the Phalangists finished,
they brought in bulldozers to create mass graves. More Palestinians
may have been killed at the two camps than the total number of Israelis
killed by the PLO in the previous decade. (Thomas Friedman did a
superb job of reporting and analyzing the killings for the New
York Times).
The slaughter
provoked outrage around the world. The government of Menachem Begin
initially blocked proposals in the Knesset for a formal inquiry
into the massacre; Ariel Sharon declared that his critics were guilty
of a "blood libel." One left-wing Israeli paper, Al
Hamishmar, declared: "This slaughter has made the war in
Lebanon the greatest disaster to befall the Jewish people since
the Holocaust." Former Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban denounced
the invasion of Beirut as "the most deadly failure in Israel’s
modern history."
The massacre
at the refugee camps threatened to plunge Lebanon back into total
chaos. Two days afterward, the Lebanese government requested that
the United States send its troops back to Beirut; in a televised
speech Reagan quickly agreed to do so. Reagan repeatedly called
for Israeli withdrawal from Beirut and declared: "Israel must
have learned that there is no way it can impose its own solutions
on hatreds as deep and bitter as those that produced this tragedy."
In late 1982 Congress rewarded Israel for invading Lebanon with
a special appropriation of $550 million in additional military aid
and other handouts, on top of the $2 billion Israel was already
scheduled to receive that year from the U.S. government.
The massacres
of the Palestinian refugees catapulted the U.S. much deeper into
the Lebanese quagmire. As clashes continued between Israelis and
Muslims, the situation became increasingly polarized in the following
months. On April 18, 1983 a delivery van pulled up to the front
door of the U.S. embassy in Beirut and detonated, collapsing the
building and killing 46 people (including 16 Americans) and wounding
over a hundred others. President Reagan denounced "the vicious
terrorist bombing" as "a cowardly act." But the U.S.
embassy was a sitting duck for the terrorist assault: unlike many
other U.S embassies in hostile environments, it had no sturdy outer
wall. Newsweek noted: "Delivery vehicles are supposed
to go to the rear of the building. Why Lebanese police guarding
the embassy driveway would have made an exception in the case of
the black van remained a mystery."(From the late 1970s until
1982 the U.S. government contracted for embassy security with the
PLO; the embassy went unharmed, despite the civil war raging throughout
the country.)
On April 23,
1983, Reagan announced to the press: "The tragic and brutal
attack on our embassy in Beirut has shocked us all and filled us
with grief. Yet, because of this latest crime we are more resolved
than ever to help achieve the urgent and total withdrawal of all
American forces from Lebanon, or I should say, all foreign forces.
I’m sorry. Mistake." But the actual mistake was a U.S. policy
that would cost hundreds of Americans their lives.
As fighting
between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon escalated, the original
U.S. peacekeeping mission became a farce. The U.S. forces were training
and equipping the Lebanese army, which was increasingly perceived
in Lebanon as a pro-Christian, anti-Muslim force. By late summer,
the Marines were being targeted by Muslim snipers and mortar fire.
On September 13 Reagan authorized Marine commanders in Lebanon to
call in air strikes and other attacks against the Muslims to help
the Christian Lebanese army. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger
vigorously opposed the new policy, fearing it would make American
troops far more vulnerable. Navy ships repeatedly bombarded the
Muslims over the next few weeks.
On Sunday morning,
October 23, 1983, a lone Muslim male drove a Mercedes truck through
a parking lot, past two Marine guard posts, through an open gate,
and into the lobby of the Marine headquarters building in Beirut,
where he detonated the equivalent of six tons of explosives. The
explosion left a 30-foot-deep crater and killed 243 marines. A second
truck bomb moments later killed 58 French soldiers.
The Reagan
administration portrayed the attack as unexpected, despite the legions
of prior suicide attacks in Lebanon. The Reagan team effectively
covered up the security failures that preceded the attack and succeeded
in wrapping the American flag around the debacle.
Shortly afterwards,
Reagan withdrew most of the U.S. troops from Lebanon. His actions
enraged neoconservatives who seemed to believe that America was
obliged to pay any price to insure the success of Operation Peace
for Galilee.
Israel’s would-be
whirlwind invasion of Lebanon turned into an 18-year quagmire that
cost the lives of more than 1,500 Israeli soldiers. Israel maintained
control over a swath of land in South Lebanon to protect itself
from terrorist attacks by Hezbollah and others.
Israel also
trained, equipped, and paid the South Lebanon Army (SLA). From 1993
to 1999, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and its SLA proxies killed
at least 355 Lebanese civilians while Muslim guerrillas in Lebanon
killed 9 Israeli civilians, according to B’Tselem, Israel’s premier
human rights organization. In 1993 and 1996 Israel launched massive
shelling campaigns on Lebanese villages in order to stampede hundreds
of thousands of people north toward Beirut. Israeli prime minister
Yitzhak Rabin stated the goal of the 1993 attack: "We want
to cause a wave of flight and damage to everyone involved in Hezbollah
activity."
On April 18,
1996 the IDF artillery shelled a United Nations compound near Qana
that was overflowing with 800 Lebanese civilians "who had fled
from their villages on IDF orders." The barrage killed 102
refugees and wounded hundreds of others. Hezbollah guerillas had
fired Katyusha rockets a few hundred yards from the compound. A
spokesman for United Nations forces in Lebanon quickly denounced
the attack as a "massacre." Maj. Gen. Dan Harel, the commander
of the Israeli offensive, insisted that the shelling of the camp
could not possibly have been deliberate because "that thing
cannot happen in a democratic country like Israel." Israeli
Prime Minister Shimon Peres declared that "the sole guilty
party, still on the ground, is Hezbollah. . . . We are dealing here
with a horrible, cynical and irresponsible organization. Hezbollah’s
grand strategy all along has been to hide behind the backs of civilians."
A United Nations investigation concluded that "it is unlikely
that the shelling of the United Nations compound was the result
of gross technical and/or procedural errors."
The IDF insisted
that it was unaware that the camp was chock full of refugees; the
UN report retorted: "Contrary to repeated denials, two Israeli
helicopters and a remotely piloted vehicle [drone] were present
in the Qana area at the time of the shelling." An Amnesty International
report concluded that the IDF "intentionally attacked the UN
compound." A few weeks after the attack, two of the Israeli
gunners involved in the shelling were interviewed by a Jerusalem
newsweekly. One of the gunners commented: "In a war, these
things happen. . . . It’s just a bunch of Arabs." A second
gunner said that, after bombarding the refugee camp, a commander
told the gunners that "we were shooting well and to continue
this way and that Arabs, you know, there are millions of them."
Haaretz columnist Ari Shavit, who had fought at Qana 18 years
earlier while serving in the IDF, observed: "An Israeli massacre
can be distinguished in most respects from an Arab massacre in that
it is not malicious, not carried out on orders from High Above and
does not serve any strategic purpose. . . . An Israeli massacre
usually occurs after we sanction an unjustifiable degree of violence
so that at some point we lose the ability to control that violence.
Thus, in most cases, an Israeli massacre is a kind of work accident."
Israel
sometimes acted as if its war on terrorism entitled it to absolute
power over Lebanese living in Israeli-declared war zones. Several
Israeli jets were shot down over Lebanon; Ron Arad, the pilot of
one of the downed planes, came to symbolize for the Israeli public
the plight of Israeli servicemen who were either missing in action
or held as prisoners in Lebanon. The Israeli government and its
proxies rounded up 21 Lebanese civilians and held them many years
in Israeli prisons, seeking to use them as leverage to gain the
release of or information on Arad. Hasan Hijazi was 16 years old
when he was seized in his village of Mays al-Jabal in 1986 by Israel
soldiers; he was taken to Israel and held in prison for 14 years.
The Israeli High Court of Justice (the nation’s Supreme Court),
in a 1997 case, ruled that the Israeli government could legitimately
hold innocent people as bargaining chips to achieve the release
of Israelis held captive outside of Israel. The court reversed its
position two years later, declaring that 13 Lebanese must be released.
Moshe Negbi, a prominent Israeli commentator, observed: "The
Supreme Court is finally, after a long time, starting to mark out
the red lines that Israel cannot cross, even when fighting terrorism.
In this case, what they are saying is, no longer will they be able
to kidnap people and keep them hostage." B’Tselem noted: "Taking
hostages for any purpose, no matter how worthy, is the method used
by terrorist organizations, not by modern democracies."
Though
the Israeli army initially justified the incursion as seeking to
"rout out terrorist nests" in southern Lebanon the subsequent
occupation by the IDF would spur terrorist attacks on Israeli forces
far beyond what Israel suffered before the invasion. The clearest
legacy of Israel’s Operation Peace for Galilee, launched in 1982,
is Hezbollah. Muslim guerrillas rallied to fight the IDF throughout
the Lebanon occupation zone. Aided by Iran and later by Syria, Hezbollah
developed into a fighting force that could hold its own against
the IDF.
July
18, 2006
James Bovard
[send him mail] is the author
of the just-released Attention
Deficit Democracy, The
Bush Betrayal, and Terrorism
& Tyranny: Trampling Freedom, Justice, and Peace to Rid the
World of Evil. He serves as a policy advisor for The
Future of Freedom Foundation.
Copyright
© 2006 LewRockwell.com
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