Should We Absolve the Fed?
by Thomas E. Woods, Jr.
by Thomas E. Woods, Jr.
Recently by Thomas E. Woods, Jr.: Kill
the Monster
Are supporters
of the free market engaged in special pleading when they identify
the federal government and its central bank, the Federal Reserve,
as the most significant factors behind the financial crisis? Absolutely,
says Bruce Ramsey in the August issue of Liberty magazine.
Ramsey’s argument
comes in the context of a review of two books: Paul Muolo and Matthew
Padilla’s Chain of Blame: How Wall Street Caused the Mortgage
and Credit Crisis and my own Meltdown:
A Free-Market Look at Why the Stock Market Collapsed, the Economy
Tanked, and Government Bailouts Will Make Things Worse.
He likes the Muolo and Padilla book better, because in his view
it merely tells the story. Since my book applies a theoretical apparatus
to the events of the past several years, it is a case of ideology
masquerading as analysis.
How, according
to Ramsey, is a good book written? "You immerse yourself in
the facts, see what the connections are, and let the story itself
tell you what the explanation is. This is what Muolo and Padilla
try to do. It is what many libertarians ought to learn how to do."
Consider yourselves
rebuked, all you libertarian propagandists out there.
The way we
are supposed to proceed, according to this view, is to look around,
try our best to collect the raw data of what happened, and then
write it all down.
Ludwig von
Mises had another view. "History," he wrote, "cannot
be imagined without theory. The naïve belief that, unprejudiced
by any theory, one can derive history directly from the sources
is quite untenable…. No explanations reveal themselves directly
from the facts." "Historical experience," he wrote
elsewhere, "is always the experience of complex phenomena,
of the joint effects brought about by the operation of a multiplicity
of elements…. The ‘pure fact’…is open to different interpretations.
These interpretations require elucidation by theoretical insight."
The stunted
and superficial approach Ramsey recommends, on the other hand, would
lead us to the unfruitful (if unfortunately conventional) conclusion
that margin trading led to the stock market crash of 1929. That’s
what we get from immersing ourselves in the facts, as he puts it,
and letting the events themselves tell us what the explanation is.
Now yes, there
was margin trading, and yes, there was the stock market crash of
1929, but the more interesting question looks beyond this trivial
observation to the root cause – namely, how was so much margin trading
able to take place, and why were lenders so ready to give so many
people the use of so much of their money for such purposes?
Likewise, although
I’m sure Ramsey could draft an interesting study of the dot-com
boom and bust of the late 1990s, the finished product would be more
a series of human-interest stories – interesting in themselves,
to be sure – about the spectacular rises and falls of particular
firms than a rigorous investigation of the fundamental causes
of the whole episode. Don’t get me wrong: there is without a doubt
a place for studies that delve into the minutiae of a particular
business cycle. But what makes (for instance) Murray Rothbard’s
book America’s Great Depression so valuable is that it makes
sense of the minutiae with reference to a sensible theory. We should
want to understand the phenomenon of the business cycle. But it
is futile to expect the full understanding to jump out at us from
a series of figures and charts or from a collection of anecdotes.
It is only by means of economic theory that we can make sense of
the figures and charts, which in the absence of theory are altogether
inscrutable.
Getting down
to specifics, Ramsey is not at all satisfied with my treatment of
the ratings agencies. He writes, "Woods says that the private
rating agencies are ‘an SEC-created cartel,’ with the unstated but
obvious-to-a-libertarian implication that no defender of the private
sector is obliged to defend them. Problem solved!"
Here I must
refer Ramsey to Larry White’s article in the forthcoming (vol. 21,
nos. 2–3) issue of Critical Review, "The Credit-Rating
Agencies and the Subprime Debacle." Professor White may enjoy
a certain immunity to insult that I for some reason lack, so maybe
Ramsey might consider his evidence with an open mind. White’s thesis
is, in summary: "A combination of their fee structure, the
complexity of the bonds that they were rating, insufficient historical
data, some carelessness, and market pressures proved to be a potent
brew. This combination was enabled, however, by seven decades of
financial regulation that, beginning in the 1930s, had conferred
the force of law upon these agencies’ judgments about the creditworthiness
of bonds and that, since 1975, had protected the three agencies
from competition."
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Ramsey alleges
that I essentially let the private sector off the hook while searching
around for causes of the crisis that originate with government or
its monopoly central bank, the Federal Reserve. I do not quite understand
this accusation, given that one of the book’s central points is
that imprudent and reckless firms should be allowed to fail in order
to shift resources away from their obviously incapable hands and
into the control of more sensible market actors. In calling them
imprudent and reckless and arguing that resources should be yanked
away from them, I thought I was criticizing them.
It is true,
though, that I am more interested in getting to the root causes
of the crisis than I am in dwelling lovingly on story after story
of foolish loan origination. Maybe stories like that are interesting
to someone, but they sure aren’t to me. I am not seeking to excuse
people who did stupid things. I’m trying instead to show that the
regulatory and banking regimes that exist in the U.S. provide ample
incentives for financial institutions to behave as they did. Therefore,
any attempt to prevent future crises by focusing on micro-level
regulation instead of systemic reform is bound to fail. It is the
system itself, which departs radically from the free market, that
gives rise to these violent swings and encourages riskier behavior
than would exist otherwise.
Ramsey will
object that he recognizes the role of the Fed, and that in his review
he rebukes (very mildly, compared to the vitriol he sees fit to
unleash on Meltdown) Muolo and Padilla for failing to mention
the Fed’s cheap credit. This won’t do. The Fed, and the structure
of the commercial and investment banking sectors to which its perverse
incentives give rise, are not mere adjuncts to the main story that
we may slightly criticize, but generally excuse, popular writers
for overlooking. We have a system in which credit can be created
out of thin air, and we’re going to pretend this is a mere sideshow
of a story that involves the gigantic accumulation of debt?
Ramsey makes
much of the "private lenders" supposedly at the heart
of the crisis. But once central banking and irredeemable paper money
are introduced into the picture, it is only in the most trivial
sense that we can refer to a "private" banking system.
What we have now is a kind of corporatist system that has never
in history emerged spontaneously within the peaceful nexus of social
cooperation, and has always been imposed by force. It is a system
shot through with moral hazard, artificially elevated risk tolerance,
bailout expectations, artificially cheap credit, and special protections
against failure. There is nothing laissez faire about it.
In Money,
Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles, Jesús Huerta de
Soto offers numerous reasons not to call ours a "private"
system (the words are his, the numbering mine):
- The entire
system rests on the government monopoly on currency.
- The management
of the whole system is performed by the central bank, as an independent
monetary authority which acts as a true planning agency with respect
to the financial system.
- Banks are
commonly excluded from the general bankruptcy proceedings stipulated
in mercantile law and are instead subject to administrative law
procedures such as intervention and the replacement of management.
- Bank failures
are prevented by externalizing the effects of banks’ liquidity
crises, the costs of which are met by the citizenry by loans from
the central bank at prime rates or non-recoverable contributions
from a deposit guarantee fund.
- The system
is based on the privilege which permits banks to create loans
ex nihilo by holding only a fractional reserve on deposits.
- There is
little or no supervision of government intervention in bank crises.
In many cases such intervention is determined ad hoc, and principles
of rationality, efficiency, and effectiveness are disregarded.
"Deregulation"
in the context of such a system can actually be worse than the status
quo. Genuine deregulation, in which government removes itself and
its perverse incentives from the banking industry altogether, is
one thing, but deregulation of this kind is never on the table.
Instead, "deregulation" usually involves allowing banks
to make more reckless decisions than before, while keeping the lender
of last resort in place and continuing to insure their deposits.
Regulation and deregulation, in other words, are beside the point.
It is the system itself that is the problem. According to Guido
Hülsmann, in his indispensable book The
Ethics of Money Production:
The banks
must keep certain minimum amounts of equity and reserves, they
must observe a great number of rules in granting credit, their
executives must have certain qualifications, and so on. Yet these
stipulations trim the branches without attacking the root. They
seek to curb certain known excesses that spring from moral hazard,
but they do not eradicate moral hazard itself. As we have seen,
moral hazard is implied in the very existence of paper money.
Because a paper-money producer can bail out virtually anybody,
the citizens become reckless in their speculations; they count
on him to bail them out, especially when many other people do
the same thing. To fight such behavior effectively, one must abolish
paper money. Regulations merely drive the reckless behavior into
new channels.
One might
advocate the pragmatic stance of fighting moral hazard on an ad
hoc basis wherever it shows up. Thus one would regulate one industry
after another, until the entire economy is caught up in a web
of micro-regulations. This would of course provide some sort of
order, but it would be the order of a cemetery. Nobody could make
any (potentially reckless!) investment decisions anymore. Everything
would have to follow rules set up by the legislature. In short,
the only way to fight moral hazard without destroying its source,
fiat inflation, is to subject the economy to a Soviet-style central
plan.
We can imagine
a scenario in which government imposes a $1 price ceiling on Porsches,
and people rush out frantically to buy them. Naturally resources
would be misallocated and wasted as a result. In telling this story,
would Ramsey really want us to focus on the avarice of the individual
buyers, instead of on the political regime that made the scenario
possible?
Ramsey, in
short, misses the forest for the trees. In that respect he resembles
Alan Greenspan himself, who once declared his inability to discern
any kind of common pattern between the various boom-bust cycles
in American history. "There is always something different,"
Greenspan said, "something that does not look like all the
previous ones. There is never anything identical and
it is always a puzzlement."
In fact, there
is something identical – namely, artificial credit expansion.
It is evident throughout all the nineteenth-century panics, and
we likewise find it in the depressions and recessions of the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries. Other features of the cycle may vary
– there may be a spectacular rise in tech stocks in one case and
in real estate in another – but this factor is consistently present.
It is bad enough
to look at our financial sector and claim to see a free market,
as opposed to the corporatist cartel we actually have. It is even
worse to then criticize someone for (1) refusing to call this witches’
brew the private sector, and (2) rejecting the idea that shenanigans
emanating from this quarter should count as demerits against the
free market. I would expect analysis like this from Newsweek
and the New York Times. I’d hope for something a little more
serious in Liberty.
July
16, 2009
Thomas
E. Woods, Jr. [visit
his website; send
him mail] is a senior fellow at the Ludwig
von Mises Institute. He is the author of nine books,
including two New York Times bestsellers: Meltdown:
A Free-Market Look at Why the Stock Market Collapsed, the Economy
Tanked, and Government Bailouts Will Make Things Worse and
The
Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Read Congressman
Ron Paul's foreword
to Meltdown.
Copyright
© 2009 by LewRockwell.com. Permission to reprint in whole or in
part is gladly granted, provided full credit is given.
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