The Non-Orwellian View of American History
by Thomas E. Woods, Jr.
by Thomas E. Woods, Jr.
Recently by Thomas E. Woods, Jr.: Krugman
Failure, Not Market Failure
The other day
I was briefly quoted in a segment for National Public Radio that
dealt with the changes in American capitalism that will come about
as a result of the current crisis. Everyone agreed that we needed
major changes, though my proposed changes were in rather a different
direction from those of everyone else. (I spoke to them for half
an hour, though in this segment they used only a few sentences.)
The segment
gave us a neat little history of the expansion of government power
and the various transformations of the economy that have taken place
over the past 150 years. Each time, the segment explained, a terrible
problem created by the free market was followed by a brilliant government
response. For example: "When the free-market system allowed
monopolies to emerge in the nineteenth century, the Interstate Commerce
Commission was created to control them."
I love that
sentence. It has fourth-grade teacher written all over it,
as in: You see, children, our wise overlords, when they saw greedy
people taking advantage of the public, did just the right thing,
as usual. Without them, we’d all be living in rickety tenements
begging for food, and at the mercy of men with white mustaches carrying
money-filled sacks with dollar signs on them.
It is just
this kind of thing that it gave me so much pleasure to take apart
in The
Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. And it
comes up so often that I can’t resist addressing it here.
For the sake
of argument we can overlook the capture theory of regulation, which
holds that the industries being regulated tend to "capture"
the regulatory agencies themselves, transforming them, beneath a
rhetorical nod to the common good, into engines of privilege and
protection. We can be extremely good sports and even overlook Gabriel
Kolko’s argument in Railroads and Regulation that the railroads
themselves pushed for the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
That would unduly complicate the little cartoon version of American
history it’s the job of the regime’s mouthpieces to impart.
We’ll stick
just to the claim that the "free-market system" gave rise
to "monopolies." (For our purposes we can define a "monopoly"
in the colloquial sense of a single or overwhelmingly dominant supplier
of a good or service, since this is clearly the sense in which people
who peddle this view intend it.) This is pretty much what every
child is fed in our official propaganda centers, as indeed was I
all through high school. Put forth in tandem with this claim are
lurid tales of the so-called robber barons, who we’re told ruthlessly
exploited the public to satisfy their insatiable greed – a human
inclination that never seems to afflict our selfless public servants,
I might add.
To be sure,
no one should try to excuse those who sought to use state power
to cripple their competitors. Burt Folsom made a helpful distinction
between political entrepreneurs, who got ahead using underhanded
tactics like this, and market entrepreneurs, who prospered because
they produced what the public demanded at prices people could afford.
Andrew Carnegie
almost single-handedly managed to reduce the price of steel rails
from $160 per ton in the mid-1870s to $17 per ton in the late 1890s.
Given the importance of steel to a modern economy, that massive
price reduction yielded greater wealth and a higher standard of
living for everyone. Carnegie was so efficient, in fact, that the
4000 people who worked at his Homestead plant in Pittsburgh produced
three times more steel than the 15,000 workers at Germany’s Krupps
steelworks, Europe’s most modern and renowned facility.
Likewise, John
D. Rockefeller was able to reduce the price of kerosene from one
dollar per gallon to ten cents per gallon. People could finally
afford to illuminate their homes. Rockefeller also developed 300
products out of the waste that remained after the oil was refined.
Claims that Rockefeller was an "unfair" competitor (whatever
that means), the usual gripe of those who cannot deliver a product
at prices that sufficiently please consumers, were laid to rest
half a century ago in John S. McGee’s study for the Journal of
Law and Economics. (John S. McGee, "Predatory Price Cutting:
The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case," Journal of Law and Economics
1 [October 1958]: 13769.)
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We might also
mention James J. Hill, who grew up in poverty but whose entrepreneurial
skill helped make the Great Northern Railroad, which extended from
St. Paul to Seattle, a major success without any government subsidies
at all. In 1893, when the government-subsidized railroads went bankrupt,
Hill’s line was able both to cut rates and turn a substantial profit.
Still another
of the alleged robber barons was Cornelius Vanderbilt. In 1798 the
government of New York had granted Robert Livingston and Robert
Fulton a monopoly on steamboat traffic for thirty years. Vanderbilt
was hired to run a steamboat between New Jersey and Manhattan in
defiance of that monopoly. Vanderbilt evaded capture while at the
same time charging only one-quarter of the monopolists’ fare.
After Gibbons
vs. Ogden (1824) overturned New York’s steamboat monopoly, the
fare for a trip from New York City to Albany dropped from seven
dollars to three. The trip from New York to Philadelphia, which
had been three dollars, fell to one dollar. Travelers going from
New Brunswick to Manhattan now paid only six cents, and ate for
free. When he moved his steamboat operation to the Hudson River,
Vanderbilt charged a fare of ten cents, as opposed to the previous
three dollars. Later he dropped the fare entirely, running his operation
on the proceeds from concessions aboard the ship.
Even when his
competitors had unfair advantages, Vanderbilt came out on top. Edward
Collins received a government subsidy for his steamship business
to provide mail delivery across the Atlantic – to the tune of $858,000
a year by the 1850s. When Vanderbilt entered the field in 1855,
he outperformed Collins in passenger travel and mail delivery with
no subsidy at all. Congress did away with Collins’ subsidy in 1858,
and before long he went bankrupt.
Meanwhile,
Vanderbilt was also outperforming two subsidized steamship lines
that brought passengers and mail to California. They charged $600
per passenger per trip. The unsubsidized Vanderbilt charged $150
per passenger, and nothing to deliver the mail.
Forgive me,
but I am supposed to fear and despise these benefactors of mankind
why, exactly?
These men were
able to acquire such substantial portions of their industries because
they consistently produced goods at low prices. When they stopped
innovating, they lost market share. The cartoon version of events
notwithstanding, competition was vigorous. It was only after voluntary
efforts – pools, secret agreements, mergers, and the like – failed
to stabilize this highly competitive environment that some firms
began to look to the federal government and its regulatory apparatus
as a way to reduce competition coercively. "Ironically, contrary
to the consensus of historians," writes Gabriel Kolko, "it
was not the existence of monopoly that caused the federal government
to intervene in the economy, but the lack of it."
Speaking of
the situation that faced Standard Oil, Kolko writes:
In 1899 there
were sixty-seven petroleum refiners in the United States, only
one of whom was of any consequence. Over the next decade the number
increased steadily to 147 refiners. Until 1900 the only significant
competitor to Standard was the Pure Oil Company, formed in 1895
by Pennsylvania producers with $10 million capital…. By 1906 it
was challenging Standard’s control over pipelines by constructing
its own. And in 1901 Associated Oil of California was formed with
$40 million capital stock, in 1902 the Texas Company was formed
with $30 million capital, and in 1907 Gulf Oil was established
with $60 million capital. In 1911 the total investment of the
Texas Company, Gulf Oil, Tide Water-Associated Oil, Union Oil
of California, and Pure Oil was $221 million. From 1911 to 1926
the investment of the Texas Company grew 572 percent, Gulf Oil
1,022 percent, Tide Water-Associated 205 percent, Union Oil 159
percent and Pure Oil 1,534 percent.
Standard Oil’s
decline preceded the antitrust ruling against it in 1911, and was
"primarily of its own doing – the responsibility of its conservative
management and lack of initiative."
As a matter
of fact, it was very difficult for top firms to maintain their positions
in a great many industries in the United States in the late nineteenth
century. This was true of industries as diverse as oil, steel, iron,
automobiles, agricultural machinery, copper, meat packing, and telephone
services. Competition was extremely vigorous.
Whenever business
leaders criticize the free market, be assured that they are hoping
to replace it with an arrangement that is more likely to guarantee
their profits. Any rhetoric we might hear from them about the evils
of alleged cutthroat competition, or of the need to put private
concerns aside for the sake of the common good, is window dressing
intended to distract the dupes – who sing the praises of these firms’
"social responsibility" – from what they are really up
to.
It
became especially fashionable in the 1920s to suggest that laissez
faire was a thing of the past, a foolish, discredited system
that needed to give way to rules of "fair competition"
to be established in each industry. One businessman, for instance,
complained that "our profits are absolutely unprotected."
Poor baby. A trade association executive condemned any private
actor who operated his business "in entire disregard of the
effects on his competitor and the rest of the industry."
The American Bottlers of Carbonated Beverages declared: "My
desire shall not be to undersell my fellow bottlers, but to contend
with them for first place in the quality of my products and the
service I render my patrons." Appeals like this were all over
the business magazines.
During the
initial years of the New Deal these conspiracies against the public
were given the force of law in the form of the National Industrial
Recovery Act, which administrator Hugh Johnson called "the
greatest social advance since the days of Jesus Christ." Butler
Shaffer’s important study In
Restraint of Trade: The Business Campaign Against Competition, 19181938,
provides all the details.
The reason
that business firms have so often been eager to employ government
power on their behalf is that coercion solidifies their positions
far more effectively than does the free market, the system through
which consumers keep them on their toes every single day. On the
free market, these firms must serve the consumer effectively or
close their doors, period. Even the mightiest corporations have
learned this lesson.
It is government,
with its subsidies, special privileges, and restrictions on competition,
not to mention the looting of the public and rewarding of privileged
interests that go on within the military-industrial complex, that
promote monopoly properly understood and grant truly unfair advantages
to some at the expense of everyone else. (On this subject in general
see this
article; on the military-industrial complex see this soon-to-be-published
paper [.pdf].)
What a different
country this would be if the drone factories that imprison the minds
of American children permitted them to hear the non-Orwellian version
of American history.
June
25, 2009
Thomas
E. Woods, Jr. [visit
his website; send
him mail] is a senior fellow at the Ludwig
von Mises Institute. He is the author of nine books,
including two New York Times bestsellers: Meltdown:
A Free-Market Look at Why the Stock Market Collapsed, the Economy
Tanked, and Government Bailouts Will Make Things Worse and
The
Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Read Congressman
Ron Paul's foreword
to Meltdown.
Copyright
© 2009 by LewRockwell.com. Permission to reprint in whole or in
part is gladly granted, provided full credit is given.
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