Lehman Died So TARP and AIG Might Live
by
Mike Whitney
by Mike Whitney
Recently by Mike Whitney: Band-Aids
for the Recession
"Lehman's
fate was sealed not in the boardroom of that gaudy Manhattan headquarters.
It was sealed downtown, in the gloomy gray building of the New York
Federal Reserve, the Wall Street branch of the U.S. central bank."
~ Stephen
Foley, UK Independent
Stephen Foley
is on to something. Lehman Bros. didn't die of natural causes; it
was drawn-and-quartered by high-ranking officials at the US Treasury
and the Federal Reserve. Most of the rubbish presently appearing
in the media, ignores this glaring fact. Lehman was a planned demolition
(most likely) concocted by ex-Goldman Sachs CEO Henry Paulson, who
wanted to create a financial 9-11 to scare Congress into complying
with his demands for $700 billion in emergency funding (TARP) for
underwater US banking behemoths. The whole incident reeks of conflict
of interest, corruption, and blackmail.
The media have
played a critical role in peddling the official "Who could
have known what would happen" version of events. Bernanke and
Paulson were fully aware that they playing with fire, but they chose
to proceed anyway, using the mushrooming crisis to achieve their
own objectives. Then things began to spin out of control; credit
markets froze, interbank lending slowed to a crawl, and stock markets
plunged. Even so, the Fed and Treasury persisted with their plan,
demanding their $700 billion pound of flesh before they'd do what
was needed to stop the bleeding. It was all avoidable.
Lehman had
potential buyers including Barclays who probably would
have made the sale if Bernanke and Paulson had merely provided guarantees
for some of their trading positions. Instead, Treasury and the Fed
balked, thrusting the knife deeper into Lehman's ribs. They claimed
they didn't have legal authority for such guarantees. Its
a lie. The Fed has provided $12.8 trillion in loans and other commitments
to keep the financial system operating without congressional approval
or any explicit authorization under the terms of its charter. The
Fed never considered the limits of its "legal authority"
when it bailed-out AIG or organized the acquisition of Bear Stearns
by JP Morgan pushing $30 billion in future liabilities onto the
public's balance sheet. The Fed's excuses don't square with the
facts.
Here's how
economist Dean Baker recounts what transpired last September 15:
"Last
September, when he (Bernanke) was telling Congress that the economy
would collapse if it did not approve the $700 billion TARP bailout,
he warned that the commercial paper market was shutting down.
This was
hugely important because most major companies rely on selling
commercial paper to meet their payrolls and pay other routine
bills. If they could not sell commercial paper, then millions
of people would soon be laid off and the economy would literally
collapse.
What Mr.
Bernanke apparently forgot to tell Congress back then is that
the Fed has the authority to directly buy commercial paper from
financial and non-financial companies. In other words, the Fed
has the power to prevent the sort of economic collapse that Bernanke
warned would happen if Congress did not quickly approve the TARP.
In fact, Bernanke announced that the Fed would create a special
lending facility to buy commercial paper the weekend after Congress
voted to approve the TARP." ("Bernanke's bad Money,"
Dean Baker, CounterPunch)
The reason
Bernanke did not underwrite the commercial paper market was, if
he had, he wouldn't have been able to blackmail congress. He needed
the rising anxiety from the crisis to achieve his goals.
Here's a clip
from an editorial in the New York Times (admitting most of
what has already been stated) that tries to put a positive spin
on the Fed's behavior:
"Mr.
Nocera says that almost everyone hes ever spoken to in Hank
Paulsons old Treasury Department agrees that without the
immediate panic caused by the Lehman default, the government would
never have agreed to make the loans needed to save A.I.G., a company
it knew very little about. In effect, the Lehman bankruptcy caused
the government to panic, which in turn caused it to save the firm
it really had to save to prevent catastrophe. In retrospect, if
you had to choose one firm to throw under the bus to save everyone
else, you would choose Lehman.... it is quite likely that the
financial crisis would have been even worse had Lehman been rescued.
Although nobody realized it at the time, Lehman Brothers had to
die for the rest of Wall Street to live. ("Lehman Had to
Die So Global Finance Could Live," Sept. 14, 2009, New
York Times)
So, according
to the muddled logic of the NY Times, everything worked out for
the best so there's no need to hold anyone accountable. (Tell that
to the 7 million people who have lost their jobs since the beginning
of the meltdown.) This latest bit of spin is pure cover-your-ass
journalism, an attempt to rewrite history and absolve the guilty
parties. The fact is, Paulson and Bernanke deliberately created
the crisis in order to jam their widely-reviled TARP policy down
the public's throat. The Times thinks the public should be grateful
for that because, otherwise, the crooked insurance giant, AIG, would
not have been bailed out and Goldman Sachs and other Wall Street
heavies would not have been paid off.
The reason
panic spread through the markets after Lehman filed for bankruptcy,
was because the Reserve Primary Fund, which had lent Lehman $785
million (and received short-term notes called commercial paper)
couldn't keep up with the rapid pace of withdrawals from worried
clients. The sudden erosion of trust triggered a run on the money
markets. Here's an excerpt from a Bloomberg article, "Sleep-At-Night-Money
Lost in Lehman Lesson Missing $63 Billion":
"On
Tuesday, Sept. 16, the run on Reserve Primary continued. Between
the time of Lehmans Chapter 11 announcement and 3 p.m. on
Tuesday, investors asked for $39.9 billion, more than half of
the funds assets, according to Crane Data.
Reserves
trustees instructed employees to sell the Lehman debt, according
to the SEC.
They
couldnt find a buyer.
At
4 p.m., the trustees determined that the $785 million investment
was worth nothing. With all the withdrawals from the fund, the
value of a single share dipped to 97 cents.
Legg
Mason, Janus Capital Group Inc., Northern Trust Corp., Evergreen
and Bank of America Corp.s Columbia Management investment
unit were all able to inject cash into their funds to shore up
losses or buy assets from them. Putnam closed its Prime Money
Market Fund on Sept. 18 and later sold its assets to Pittsburgh-based
Federated Investors.
At
least 20 money fund managers were forced to seek financial support
or sell holdings to maintain their $1 net asset value, according
to documents on the SEC Web Site.
When
news that Reserve Primary broke the buck hit the wires at 5:04
p.m. that Tuesday, the race was on." (Bloomberg)
This is what
a run on the shadow banking system looks like. Bernanke and Paulson
pinpointed the trouble in the commercial paper market and used it
to put more pressure on Congress to approve their bailout bill.
Bloomberg again:
"It
was commercial paper and the $3.6 trillion money market industry
that traded the notes that came close to sinking the global economy
not a breakdown in credit-default swaps or bank-to-bank
lending....
Like
ice-nine, the fictitious substance in Kurt Vonnegut Jr.'s 1963
novel Cats
Cradle, a single seed of which could harden all the worlds
water, commercial paper was the crystallizing force that froze
credit markets, choking off the ability of companies and banks
to borrow money and pay bills." (Sleep-At-Night-Money Lost
in Lehman Lesson Missing $63 Billion, Bob Ivry, Mark Pittman and
Christine Harper, Bloomberg News)
Bernanke could
have fixed the problem in an instant. All he needed to do was provide
explicit government guarantees on money markets and commercial paper.
That would have ended the bank-run pronto. But he chose not to.
He chose to wait until Congress capitulated so he could net $700
billion for his banking buddies.
According to
the UK Telegraph:
"On
Thursday night, the Treasury went literally down on his knees
before Nancy Pelosi, speaker of the House of Representatives,
begging her to agree taxpayer money to bail out the financial
system. Bernanke, a scholar of the financial panic that caused
the Great Depression, told fearful lawmakers there wouldn't be
a banking system in place by Monday morning if they didn't act.
Paulson talked openly about planning for martial law, about how
to feed the American people if banking and commerce collapsed."
Despite their
dire warnings, on Monday morning, the banking system was still intact,
just as it was a full month later when the first TARP funds were
handed out to the big banks. It was all a hoax. The problem wasn't
the banks toxic assets at all, but the commercial paper and money
markets. The Fed and Treasury knew that they could count on Congress's
abysmal ignorance of anything financial; and they weren't disappointed.
On October 3, 2008, Congress passed the Financial Rescue Plan (TARP).
Paulson's fear-mongering had triumphed.
Here's a quick
look at the Lehman chronology:
On Sept.
15, 2008, Lehman Bros. filed for bankruptcy sending the Dow plummeting
504 points.
On Sept.
17, the Dow falls 449 points in reaction to AIG bailout.
On Sept.
29, the Dow tumbles 777 points after House votes "No"
on TARP.
On Oct.
3, the House passes Financial Rescue Plan (TARP). The Dow falls
818 points.
On Oct.
7, the Fed creates the Commercial Paper Funding Facility to backstop
the commercial paper market. Two weeks later, Bernanke announces
the Money Market Investor Funding Facility to make loans of longer
maturities.
These are the
two facilities which relieved the tension in the markets, not the
TARP funds. It's clear that Bernanke knew exactly how to fix the
problem, because he did so as soon as the TARP was passed. Here's
economist Dean Baker in The American Prospect:
"Bernanke
was working with Paulson and the Bush administration to promote
a climate of panic. This climate was necessary in order to push
Congress to hastily pass the TARP without serious restrictions
on executive compensation, dividends, or measures that would ensure
a fair return for the public's investment.
Bernanke
did not start buying commercial paper until after the TARP was
approved by Congress because he did not want to take the pressure
off, thereby leading Congress to believe that it had time to develop
a better rescue package. ("Did Ben Bernanke Pull the TARP
Over Eyes?", Dean Baker, The American Prospect)
The American
people have been ripped off by industry reps working the policy-levers
from inside the government. That's the real lesson of the Lehman
bankruptcy. Happy anniversary.
September
18, 2009
Mike Whitney
[send him mail] lives
in Washington state.
Copyright
© 2009 Mike Whitney
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