Appendix: An Incidental History of US-Israel Relations
by
Richard Wall
by Richard Wall
 Avi
Shlaim’s The Iron Wall contains many interesting references
to Israel’s relations with the United States of America. Although
the narrative focus of the book lingers only intermittently and
generally quite briefly on Israel’s relationship with the US, the
moments when it does so are revealing. Here is a summarized chronology
of those points in the book which have struck me as being of particular
significance:
-
In April
1952, Ben-Gurion spoke to his senior officials about Israel’s
vital interests and stated: "First and foremost, we have
to see to Israel’s needs, whether or not this brings improvement
in our relations with the Arabs. The second factor in our existence
is American Jewry and its relationship with us (and the state
of America, since these Jews live in it). The third thing –
peace with the Arabs. This is the order of priorities."
(~ The Iron Wall, p.78)
-
In 1956,
after the Suez invasion, "President Eisenhower was fuming
with anger at having been deceived [by Britain, France, and
Israel]… Privately [foreign minister] Abba Eban was told that
if Israel did not withdraw, all official aid from the US government
and private aid from American Jewry would be cut off and that
the United States would not oppose the expulsion of Israel from
the UN." (~ The Iron Wall, p. 181)
-
In 1963/4,
after President
Kennedy had "continued to tilt
America’s Middle Eastern policy in Israel’s favor" (p.
211), "Israel’s relations with America continued to improve
when Lyndon Johnson became President…In early June [prime minister]
Eshkol went on a state visit to the United States, an honor
that had been denied to Ben-Gurion…. No less important than
the contribution the visit made to Israel’s power of military
deterrence, said Eshkol, was the enhancement of its power for
political deterrence. The visit thus carried Israel a significant
step closer to the goal that had persistently eluded Ben-Gurion,
namely, an American guarantee of the country’s territorial integrity"
(~ The Iron Wall, p. 222)
-
1975
saw an early documented instance of Israel calling the bluff
of American threats. Writing about the negotiations for peace
with Egypt and Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy mission to
this end, Shlaim states, "On 21 March, President Ford sent
Rabin a very tough message, warning that the failure of Kissinger’s
mission would have far-reaching consequences for the region
and for US-Israel relations. The message achieved the opposite
effect to the one intended. Even the waverers in the cabinet
now resolved that the negotiating team must remain adamant in
its policy. Kissinger’s mission failed, and Kissinger blamed
Israel for the failure."
In
the steps which were subsequently taken to mend fences, both a public
and a secret ‘memorandum of agreement’ between Israel and the US
were signed. In the public document the United States pledged American
support "on an on-going and long-term basis to Israel’s military
equipment and other defense requirements, to its energy requirements
and to its economic needs." In the secret document, the United
States "confirmed that it would not negotiate with or recognize
the PLO, nor initiate any moves in the Middle East without prior
consultation with Israel… Israel now had an alliance with America
in all but name. The cost of the agreement to the United States
was roughly $4 billion annually for the next three years, or 200
percent above the existing level of American aid to Israel. The
package was criticized in some American quarters as being excessive,
and even extortionate…" (~ The Iron Wall, p. 338)
-
In 1977,
President Carter became "the first American president to
champion the Palestinian right to self-determination… Convinced
that the PLO was ready for compromise, he used the terms PLO
and Palestinians interchangeably…" (~ The Iron Wall,
p. 350)
-
By 1982,
we have Ronald Reagan – and it may seem surprising to read this
– continuing in similar vein: "He said that the departure
of the Palestinians from Beirut dramatized more than ever the
homelessness of the Palestinian people. His plan was for self-government
by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association
with Jordan. He ruled out both a Palestinian state and annexation
to Israel. Additional Israeli settlements in the territories
would be an obstacle to peace, said Reagan" (~ The Iron
Wall, p. 415)
-
May
1989 saw the speech of James Baker at the annual convention
of AIPAC. "In a pointed reference to Shamir’s ideology,
Baker said ‘For Israel, now is the time to lay aside, once and
for all, the unrealistic vision of a greater Israel. Israeli
interest in the West Bank and Gaza – security and otherwise
– can be accommodated in a settlement based on Resolution 242.
Forswear annexation. Stop settlement activity. Allow schools
to reopen. Reach out to the Palestinians as neighbors who deserve
political rights.’ Baker’s speech was not well-received by his
large American-Jewish audience, and it raised worries in Israel."
(~ The Iron Wall, p. 469).
Murray
Rothbard had the following to say about James Baker and the position
of George Bush Sr. on US-Israel relations, just before the Presidential
elections of in 1992 which pitted George Bush Sr. against Bill Clinton:
"Bush
has by far the most pro-American policy on the Middle East since
Jack Kennedy; he is the only president since Kennedy not to serve
as a lick-spittle for the State of Israel, the only one not to
function as an abject tool of the powerful Zionist lobby, led
by AIPAC (the American Israel Political Action Committee, which
somehow escapes being a registered agent of the State of Israel).
The greatest credit, of course, goes to Secretary of State James
Baker, who formulated this policy, and maintained it under the
most vicious pressure. But Bush deserves credit for picking Baker
and backing him up; further, with only a little stretching, Bush/Baker
can take credit for the Israeli election that deposed the little
monster Shamir, and brought in a more rational government in Israel.
Bush-Baker stood firm on delaying the $10 billion loan guarantee
until Zionist settlements are slowed down on the Arab lands of
the West Bank." (Murray N. Rothbard, The
Irrepressible Rothbard, "Working
our way back to the President").
-
August 1990 to January 1991 saw the Gulf Crisis. Shlaim comments
(my own comments are in italics):
"Likud
leaders used the invasion [of Kuwait by Iraq] to drive home their
point that Iraq was a greater threat to Middle Eastern stability
than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They compared Saddam Hussein
to Adolf Hitler (sounds familiar?) …This analogy was usually
accompanied by calls on the Western world, and especially the
United States, to intervene in order to stop the Iraqi dictator
in his tracks. The underlying fear was that unless the Western
powers intervened, a showdown between Israel and Iraq would become
inevitable sooner or later, and the unstated hope was that Israel’s
greatest ally would seize the opportunity to defeat Israel’s powerful
enemy." (It is salutary to remember that these words were
written in 1999 and referred to policies which were being advocated
in 1990/91)
One
of the peculiarities of the Gulf crisis was that Israel found
itself on the same side as the great majority of the Arab states…
But there was fundamental difference…. The Arabs ...wanted the
reversal of the Iraqi aggression… while Israel wanted the destruction
of the Iraqi war machine and war-making potential. Syria in particular
was worried that the destruction of Iraqi power would tilt the
overall Arab-Israeli military equation in Israel’s favour. It
was precisely for this reason that Israel wanted to see a thoroughgoing
devastation of Iraq. Some Israeli experts, including Rabin, were
of the opinion that nothing short of unconventional arms would
stop Iraq in the wake of its invasion of Kuwait."
~
The Iron Wall, p. 474
- In February
1991, Operation Desert Storm was brought to a close with the
executive decision not to press on to Baghdad. "From Israel’s
point of view, Operation Desert Storm ended too soon. Israel’s
objectives were three-fold: the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the
destruction of Iraq’s war machine, and the neutralization of its
capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction (sounds familiar
too…). The first aim was not achieved by the [first] Gulf
War, and the last two were achieved only in part."
"The
most important consequence of the Gulf War for Israel, however,
concerned its special relationship with America. One way of
looking at the Gulf War is to say that Israel was the greatest
beneficiary because, without having to lift a finger itself,
it witnessed the defeat of its most formidable foe at the hands
of its most faithful friend. But such a view involves a serious
oversimplification. For Israel had traditionally been regarded,
not least by itself, as a strategic partner and a strategic
asset to the United States in the Middle East. The Gulf conflict
was a real eye-opener in this respect. Here was a conflict that
threatened America’s most vital interests in the region, and
the best service that Israel could render its senior partner
was to refrain from doing anything. Far from being a strategic
asset, Israel was widely perceived as an embarrassment and a
liability."
(~
The Iron Wall, p. 483/4)
At
this point, things had come almost full circle to the moment (in
1958) when John Foster Dulles had described the Jewish state privately
as "this millstone round our necks" (~ The Iron Wall,
p. 204). But the Democrat administration of Bill Clinton was yet
to come:
- 1992:
"As soon as Bill Clinton entered the White House, the pro-Israeli
bias in American policy became more pronounced. The even-handed
approach of the Bush administration was replaced by an Israel-first
approach reminiscent of the Reagan days. Clinton refused to put
pressure on Israel and adopted a hands-off approach to the peace
process" (~ The Iron Wall, p. 511).
Shlaim
outlines a case for seeing Bill Clinton’s ‘master of ceremonies’
role in the Oslo accords as being more showmanship than real substance.
I plead ignorance and leave the question open. What is certain is
that the arrival of Democrat administrations has tended to be viewed
with greater delight in Israel than the arrival of Republican ones,
and the public positions of Democratic Party candidates for the
forthcoming presidential elections would seem to justify such an
attitude. However, the administration of George Bush the younger
may yet turn out to be the exception which proves the rule.
Back
to main article
 August
2, 2003
Richard
Wall (send him mail) has a Master's
degree in International Relations from the London School of Economics
& Political Science, and lives in Estoril, Portugal, where he currently
works as a freelance writer and translator.
Copyright
© 2003 LewRockwell.com
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