Defenders
of the drug companies say: well, sure it is cheap to produce mass
quantities of drugs after they have been developed. But the costs
of getting there are sky high. If companies can't charge high
prices, they won't develop the drugs in the first place.
Boldine and
Levine, in chapter four, offer an interesting response to this
claim but it requires a bit of thought. They point out that the
drugs can still be sold profitably at vastly lower prices, in
the same way that many other products can be sold profitably at
low prices. Items of super high cost – think of passenger airlines
or cruise ships – recoup those costs through volume sales over
time. It is the same with drugs, or could be.
So why wouldn't
the pharmaceutical companies budge in the African case? It is
due to the fear of re-importation, that is, that the drugs would
make their way back to the US and Canada and be sold at cheap
prices, thereby undercutting the monopolistic price.
Why not just
price discriminate? It not so easy to price discriminate in a
global economy. Rather than take that risk, companies settled
for not selling at all. This reflects a general principle articulated
by Boldine and Levine: "Intellectual monopolists often fail to
price discriminate because doing so would generate competition
from their own consumers."
Think about
this principle. It helps explain why large software manufacturers
routinely degrade their products available to consumers while
reserving their better products for the more lucrative corporate
market. This is why the versions of operating systems and end-user
software are dumbed down on the consumer market. The companies
don't want to permit cross-selling between markets, even though
the costs of selling better products across markets are virtually
identical. Only IP allows them to get away with this sort of behavior.
So, yes,
there are some benefits to patents in the same way there are benefits
to all monopolists. The Post Office benefits from the prohibition
against private delivery on letters. Public schools benefit by
regulations on private education and mandatory funding. The electric
company benefits from its statutory guarantee against competitive
intrusion.
But that
is not the same as saying that all groups benefit. Boldrine and
Levine examine data from Total Factor Productivity in cross-national
studies and show that the astounding increase in patents in the
1990s – rising more than three-fold from a stable rate in previous
decades – has had no effect on increase prosperity and innovation.
Meanwhile,
there are huge costs, even for those who acquire and own the patents.
Oracle software, for example, spends vast resources on what can
be called defensive patents. They must get them before someone
else does else risk having to pay huge fees to someone else. Cross-licensing
is the only way to develop software now, so the patent route has
been forced on everyone. The word "thicket" is the one everyone
uses. What it really amounts to is a cold war between patent holders
– a patent race that is very much like an arms race. This is why
Nokia own 12,000 patents and Microsoft is adding 1,000 patents
a month to its arsenal. Intel's CEO spoke for many when he said
he would be glad to cut patents to a tenth of its current rate
provided that others did the same.
Conventional
patent theory says they are necessary for generating revenue to
fund research and development, and to inspire innovation. This
is supposedly the economically valuable contribution of patents.
Then there is the real world. A Carnegie Endowment survey of firms
shows that businesses themselves report that this function of
patents is mentioned as important only 6% of the time. The main
reason businesses say that they want patents is to enforce monopoly
– preventing people from developing similar but better and cheaper
products – and to prevent lawsuits.
They authors
describe the result of patents as not a competitive market for
innovation but an oligopolistic market structure around patent-pool
mechanisms. This affects every industry, as patent battles hinder
economic development. A good example is the ongoing battle over
who and what can lay claim to the title "basmati" rice. A Texas
company called RiceTec won a patent in 1997, infuriating Indian
and Pakistani companies that have been making Basmati for hundreds
of years. These companies have been fighting back with their own
attempts to register patents on the rice. What this has to do
with the consumer and the dinner table and the need for cheap
and delicious food being made widely available is the unanswered
question.
A peculiar
form of patent abuse comes in the form of the submarine patent.
This is a patent taken out early while the production of the product
itself is delayed as long as possible. When someone else finally
goes to market with a product, the patent emerges from the deep
as a method of blackmailing the company that has gone to market.
Boldine and
Levine explain that this tactic dates to George Seldon's patent
on the "road engine" in 1895. It commanded 1.25% on the sale of
every car in the US. He sold his patent for $10,000 and 20% of
royalties to a syndicate in 1899. As the car actually started
to make it to market, the Associated of Licensed Automobile dealers
formed a cartel around the patent. The authors comment: "if you
were wondering why the U.S. automobile industry developed so quickly
into the oligopoly we know and hate, a fair share of the roots
lie in bad 'intellectual property' legislation and the intellectual
monopoly it created."
Personally,
I find that revelation remarkable. More than a hundred years later,
we are still paying the price for this car-cartel-creating patent.
Something similar happened to airplanes, when the Wright Brothers
managed to get a patent on anything resembling an airplane, despite
their own meager contribution to the technology. They were so
aggressive in blasting all competitors that all serious innovation
in airline technology ended up taking place overseas in France.
The authors
make a statement that I wish could be made more prominent, since
it comports with everything I know about businesspeople and patents.
It is the most common thing in the world for a businessperson
to use every market-oriented skill to get a product to market:
a good product at a good price that becomes the market leader.
At this point, and for some odd reason, the businessperson gets
confused. He thinks that it his IP that is the key to his success
and ends up fighting for it with all his might, even at his own
expense.
Here is the
statement by Boldrine and Levine: "'Being a monopolist' is, apparently,
akin to going on drugs or joining some strange religious sect.
It seems to lead to a complete loss of any sense of what profitable
opportunities are and of how free markets function. Monopolists,
apparently, can conceive of only one way of making money, that
is bullying consumers and competitors to put up or shut up. Furthermore,
it also appears to mean that past mistakes have to be repeated
at a larger, and ever more egregious, scale."
A clear case
in point concerns the Recording Industry Association of America,
which managed to make itself appear as the devil incarnate in
the eyes of an entire generation of music downloaders. Another
example concerns Google Print. This work of genius would have
brought all the world's libraries to one central location so that
users could search the books and purchase them. Wonderful! But
the Authors Guild sued, and the suit has gutted Google Print as
a useful tool. The dream of all educated people from the ancient
world to the present – a single accessible repository of all the
world's wisdom – was stopped for no good reason.
The authors
conclude chapter four with a restatement of the theme: the benefits
of patents are small and narrow, while the costs are large and
broad. The biggest costs are the unseen ones that Bastiat speaks
of. These are innovations we don't see, the products that don't
come to market, the efficiencies that we never experience, the
companies that don't come into existence, and the investment that
would have taken place with the resources that are expended on
patent acquisition and enforcement. Here are the real costs of
patents, and they are incalculable.