National Security by Spreading Democracy?
by
Michael S. Rozeff
by Michael S. Rozeff
Recently by Michael S. Rozeff: 23.7
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Bush II had
an explicit national security strategy of spreading
democracy throughout the world. The 2006 National Security Strategy
goes into this at great length.
Paul Wolfowitz
was a close aide to Bush. He helped get the U.S. to invade Iraq.
He was and is one of the foremost exponents of the policy of spreading
democracy. This Wikipedia
article, for example, is clear on Wolfowitz’s belief that spreading
democracy is a key antidote to terrorism.
Spreading democracy
can be done peacefully or via war or via methods that are in between
peace and war. Bush believed in unilateral and preventive war as
one method.
Now that Bush
is gone, is this strategy also gone? It is not. President Obama
has the same strategy. He is already applying it. He is only applying
it in different ways and with different emphases.
Spreading democracy
is a standard foreign policy of American empire that goes back to
Woodrow Wilson. Obama is following this strategy in Afghanistan.
Wilson’s address
to Congress on April 2, 1917 sought a war declaration against Germany.
He said "The world must be made safe for democracy."
Germany was
at war with Great Britain and had been at war for three years. It
had announced that it would sink any vessels approaching the ports
of Great Britain, Ireland, and other European ports. Wilson looked
upon this as war against all nations, including the U.S. He said
that the U.S. had a right to the sea lanes and a right to supply
Great Britain. He said that armed neutrality is ineffective and
worse. And so he asked for and got war.
In the latter
portion of his speech, he went far beyond asking for war. He made
this fateful declaration:
"Neutrality
is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world
is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to
that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments
backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their
will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of
neutrality in such circumstances. We are at the beginning of an
age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct
and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations
and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens
of civilized states."
He declared
that certain kinds of governments could not again be faced by a
neutral America. He said that states had rights that should be observed
by other states. He was declaring the existence of an international
law among states. He implied that he knew or that it was widely
known what these rights and law were, and that violations were to
be met by armed force. He implied that he or America or some "partnership
of democratic nations" (such as a League of Nations or a United
Nations) would thereafter stand for securing the peace and would
secure the peace. Autocratic governments, he said, could not be
trusted. Wilson declared war on tyranny, just as Bush II did in
his Second Inaugural Address, when he said
"So
it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the
growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation
and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world."
The notion
of making America (and the entire world) secure by ending autocratic
governments overseas is the opposite of George Washington’s policy
of neutrality. It involves making alliances. It involves readiness
and willingness to go to war at any time. It involves continual
war for the goal of continual peace, virtually a contradiction in
terms. It involves some states identifying others as tyrannies and
seeking to change their forms of government. It involves the notion
that the world can achieve a condition of perpetual peace through
the judicious use of armed forces.
Spreading democracy
involves the U.S. being policeman of the world. It involves building
up and maintaining military forces throughout the world. It involves
the U.S. entering wars in which it is not directly a combatant.
It involves the U.S. choosing favorites and enemies among other
nations. It involves the U.S. in choosing the domestic factions
that it supports within foreign nations and making itself the enemy
of others.
Under this
driving umbrella strategy, the U.S. continually constructs threats
where there need not be threats. If it decides to defend Taiwan,
then mainland China becomes a threat to the U.S. and an enemy. If
it decides that Iraq is in the wrong by invading Kuwait, then it
makes war on Iraq. Under this policy, the U.S. for many years supplied
arms and support to various dictators and/or autocrats such as Suharto
of Indonesia, Marcos of the Philippines, Chun Du-Hwan of South Korea,
and Saddam Hussein of Iraq.
The strategy
is open to abuse. Under this strategy, U.S. foreign policies became
shaped by domestic military, financial, agricultural, and other
lobbies. States that are entering fights to spread democracy can
enter them for reasons of self-interest and advantage to themselves.
If two autocratic states like Iraq and Iran are warring, then the
U.S. still finds a way to get involved.
The strategy
faces operational problems. Who is to identify the instances when
states violate rights? Who is to be the judge and jury of the suspected
rights violations, the disputes, and the conflicts arising among
states? What happens when two or more states both think they are
in the right? Is any use of armed force by any state to be taken
as evidence that it is in the wrong? Which disputes will be the
occasion for American force to be used, and which will not?
Even more serious
objections to the strategy are these:
- democracy
itself is not an ideal form of government
- governments
can have democratic forms and still be tyrannies
- governments
can have non-democratic forms and still be peaceful
- democracies
are not necessarily any more peaceful than other forms of government
- democracies
can inhibit other goals like economic well-being and progress
- other
forms of government can be consistent with economic progress
- self-determination
of peoples does not necessarily lead them to choose democracy
The bottom
line is that the supposed link between the security of Americans
and spreading democracy overseas (as well as domestically) is tenuous
and remote. It does not really exist, as will be argued further
below.
Bush was obliged
by law to publish annually a National
Security Strategy document, under the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
It is supposed to be the outcome of a serious effort by our top
officials to plan strategy and make it public. Bush did this in
2002 and 2006, but not in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2007.
Obama hasn’t
yet come out with the 2008 document, even though he has already
announced his Afghanistan strategy.
There is research
by writers on this web site that is critical of the strategy of
spreading democracy. For an outside expert source, Nicholas J. Armstrong
of the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism has
come out with an
article that is highly critical of the strategy of spreading
democracy as Bush operated it. Some of what he says may sound
familiar to LRC readers, although his perspective is very different.
He says
"...the
Bush administration’s recent strategy documents possess significant
shortcomings that led to important policy failures. A problematic
rationale for the preemptive use of force, weak justifications
and inconsistencies in democracy promotion, and a lack of strategic
priorities are just a few criticisms among others."
In other words,
the Bush team didn’t think through their methods and operated haphazardly.
"The
current strategic assessment of the external security environment
suffers from two significant weaknesses: the unrealistic notion
that democracy promotion must underpin the actions of the U.S.
abroad, and the flawed presumption that democracy promotion is
the solution to transnational terrorism. Undoubtedly, terrorism
is a significant threat to U.S. national security, but the most
recent NSS illogically assumes that terrorism demands global democratization."
This is a much
broader criticism. It says two things. Spreading democracy is not
a realistic foundation or center point for foreign policy; and the
nation should not address terrorism by spreading democracy. He goes
on:
"...the
preemptive use of force – supported by an entangled justification
of eliminating future threats while promoting democracy
– creates an imbalance in retributive justice and thereby undermines
the moral legitimacy of all U.S. democracy promotion efforts abroad,
regardless of intent."
This says that
the Bush Doctrine is morally flawed and its application works against
the U.S.
Armstrong mentions
several criticisms of others:
"...the
use of aid packages, military force, or even public diplomacy
can be costly with no guarantee of long-term success – as exemplified
by the $10 billion per month cost of the improving, yet still
uncertain democracy promotion efforts in Iraq. Critics...cite
the interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo as examples
that any success in promoting democracy is associated with high
costs and lengthy time commitments. While the short-term missions
in Somalia and Haiti netted little gain, Bosnia and Kosovo have
shown signs of success roughly a decade later, but only after
considerable time and fiscal investment. Even so, measuring success
of democratization is troublesome due to the difficulties of quantifying
democratic progress in a tangible form."
Before turning
to the empirical side, let us think through some theory to analyze
the question.
Why do people
want security anyway? Security is desirable so that people may enhance
their welfare. If free markets and property rights are suppressed
by means of government measures enacted in democracies, then security
is reduced and, by the same token, welfare may be reduced for many
millions of persons that comprise substantial minorities or even
for most of the entire society.
A relevant
question is then whether or not democracy has a positive effect
on economic growth. If it does not, then it means that democracy
does not really enhance welfare. If democracy enhanced security,
it should have a positive effect on economic growth and welfare.
If democracy fails to enhance even domestic welfare, then the notion
that spreading democracy to foreign lands will enhance domestic
security and thus allow higher domestic welfare has to be seen as
very far-fetched and very unlikely. In fact, if democracy lowers
welfare, and there is evidence that it does, then by actively making
foreign countries poorer, the U.S. is encouraging foreign people
to rise up and resist America.
In those democracies
in which government’s limits are expansible, voting occurs on more
and more goods, such as health care, education, and energy use,
that once belonged to private decision-making. Under these conditions,
democracy brings increasing violation of rights and increasing democratic
totalitarianism. It brings the increasing influence of lobbies for
interest groups. This powerful process hampers economic growth.
It is not easily reversed. Under these conditions, we will observe
that political democracy and economic growth are negatively related.
On the other
hand, in democracies that are replacing rapacious autocracies that
have constricted the property rights and the economy, we may observe
small and weak states and high economic growth if the democracy
is associated with these conditions that free up the economy.
The key variables
in economic growth are not democracy per se. They are such
things as personal responsibility, respect for private property
rights, private solutions to private problems, not collectivizing
the economy and creating commons problems, low taxes, low barriers
to entry, small government, and low regulation. If a state is weak
and democratic, it may be conducive to economic growth. If it is
strong and democratic, it may suppress growth.
A society does
need security so that investment will be encouraged, including investment
in human capital, but democracy is not a form of government that
necessarily increases security.
So much for
theory. What’s the evidence? In 1983, Erich Weede (in the journal
Kyklos) examined the impact of democracy on economic growth.
The time period studied was 196079. He examined data for 124
countries. He found
"There
is a clearly significant (at the 2% level) negative effect of
political democracy on economic growth, however measured."
Weede went
on to look at those countries in which "government revenue
as a percentage of GDP exceeds 20%." His findings are remarkable:
"For
these nations, many of the control variables lose most of their
importance, in particular for GDP growth rates. Truly staggering,
however, are the results in the democracy row of Table 4.
Here it is obvious that political democracy is a major barrier
to economic growth in those countries where the state strongly
interferes in the economy."
While democracy
is not harmful in weak states or states that are small relative
to the economy, it is clearly harmful in strong states or states
that are large relative to the economy. (This includes the U.S.)
Where democracy entails collectivization, it slows down economic
growth. Where government is large, there is pooling of resources
and control of them by government. This creates commons problems
(see here
and here).
Economic growth slows.
In 1992, John
F. Helliwell (in an NBER article) again looked at democracy
and growth. His study covered 98 countries between 1960 and 1985.
He uses several sophisticated methods. The first one leads him to
write
"The
above experiments suggest that the results showing a positive
effect flowing from income to democracy are not due to a positive
effect flowing from democracy to growth. Indeed, whatever feedback
there is seems to be negative..."
Helliwell found
that higher income tends to lead to more democracy, but that the
higher democracy then leads to lower future income. Democracy’s
effect on income growth is negative.
His second
method led him to conclude
"When
the equation is re-estimated...the effect turns fairly large and
negative, but is still not significantly different from zero...The
fact that the estimated effect turns negative...is, however, what
would be expected if there were a positive effect of income on
democracy and a negative reverse effect from democracy to subsequent
economic growth."
Other studies
of this question have mixed results. Some of them have known flaws
and shortcomings. Those who believe that democracy helps economic
growth can find some support for their hypothesis in earlier but
less well-done studies. A 1990 review of a dozen or so studies by
Larry Sirowy and Alex Inkeles (in the journal Studies in Comparative
International Development) concludes there is no robust evidence,
one way or the other. Unfortunately, this study does not conduct
a meta-analysis, but it singles out Weede’s paper as one that more
properly uses control variables. Given that and the Helliwell findings,
a reasonable conclusion is that the empirical evidence does not
support the hypothesis that democracy enhances economic growth,
and there is some good evidence of the opposite.
Those who,
like Paul Wolfowitz, think that spreading democracy overseas enhances
American security and welfare should come forward and present their
theory and evidence that it does.
Where is there
evidence that America is even capable of accomplishing this goal,
much less that the goal makes any sense? The American occupation
of Haiti from 1915 to 1934 certainly did not help Haiti or the average
American. American imperialism seems often enough to be the American
goal.
The rhetoric
of our leaders is not enough. They have had their way for 100 years,
the latest instance being in Iraq. Not only is the theory of spreading
democracy to promote American security subject to many severe criticisms
to the point that it makes no sense, but in practice it runs afoul
of many difficulties. Iraq provides a good illustration of this.
Vietnam provides another.
A foreign policy
of non-neutrality has several truly major inherent and severe problems.
- inability
to recognize politically dynamic forces as they are occurring
- inability
to forecast the path of politically dynamic forces
- catalyzing
new political forces by interfering in another nation
- being
held hostage to events initiated by political forces in another
nation
- having
policy captured by domestic and foreign interest groups
- being
drawn into the fights of others
- having
to deal with the actions and reactions of neighbors who have interests
in the country being interfered with
The leaders
of a nation that is intent on interfering with other nations and
supporting movements that it deems anti-autocratic face all these
problems and more.
As an example,
I point to Woodrow Wilson’s strong support of the Russian revolution
in the spring of 1917. In his speech to Congress cited above, he
said
"Does
not every American feel that assurance has been added to our hope
for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening
things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia?
Russia was known by those who knew it best to have been always
in fact democratic at heart, in all the vital habits of her thought,
in all the intimate relationships of her people that spoke their
natural instinct, their habitual attitude toward life. The autocracy
that crowned the summit of her political structure, long as it
had stood and terrible as was the reality of its power, was not
in fact Russian in origin, character, or purpose; and now it has
been shaken off and the great, generous Russian people have been
added in all their naive majesty and might to the forces that
are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace.
Here is a fit partner for a League of Honor."
In this incredible
passage, Wilson managed to condemn the czarist form of government
as un-Russian. He managed to affirm the Russian Revolution as democratic.
He did not understand the forces and divisions within Russia at
that time. He did not foresee the imminent overthrow of the provisional
government by Lenin and the Bolsheviks a short six months later.
Are Obama’s
strategic positions any better on Afghanistan and Pakistan than
Bush’s on Iraq? Are they any less intent on spreading democracy?
Not at all.
The White House
calls for "realistic and achievable objectives." Their
first objective is not unreasonable as these things go. It is to
disrupt the terrorists in the region and stop them from conducting
terrorist attacks. The next objective is Wilsonian. It is
"Promoting
a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan
that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially
regarding internal security, with limited international support."
It is one thing
to go after terrorists, as Jefferson went after pirates, although
going after them on land has certain difficulties of territory and
sovereignty that need to be ironed out. But putting those things
aside, it is entirely another matter to get involved with building
a government for Afghanistan. That continues the same old policy
of spreading democracy that has no sound basis. It’s the Bush policy
all over again. Mixing that up with hunting down terrorists is strategic
confusion. It is in fact quite amazing to read the White House’s
explicit intention to bolster the legitimacy of the Afghan government!
Obama is also
aiming to strengthen "Afghan security forces." These forces
do not necessarily represent the interests of various warlords in
Afghanistan, which means that Obama aims to interfere in this way
again in Afghanistan politics.
That is not
all. Obama also aims at
"Assisting
efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional
government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity
for the people of Pakistan."
This spells
involvement in the domestic politics of a second large and turbulent
country. Neighboring countries like Iran, India, and China have
interests in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This means involvement with
the reactions of these nations.
The American
empire has had a consistent policy for 100 years: national security
via spreading democracy. Obama is adhering to this policy. However,
overseas democracy is neither necessary nor sufficient for security
in America.
Theory suggests
that democracy has a negative relation to economic welfare, especially
as states get larger and infringe more greatly on property rights.
Empirical studies over a hundred countries and several decades do
not support the hypothesis that democracy enhances economic growth.
If anything, they support a negative relation. To the extent that
economic growth is a form of security and enhances security, domestic
democracy reduces security.
If a foreign
democracy has reduced economic growth, why would that enhance U.S.
security? There is no good reason. One might expect that less prosperous
nations might have a greater tendency and incentive to become trouble
spots.
When
the U.S. actually goes about the practical business of enhancing
democracy in foreign lands, it runs into a host of problems that
necessarily arise from the nature of interfering in the politics
of others. The costs are high, often very high and long continued.
They fall on the average American. Any benefits are showered upon
specific interest groups, like Lockheed Martin, farmers, consultants,
and Halliburton. It may also have appeal to those who mistakenly
think they are doing God’s work through the State.
If there is
no known general benefit to the average American from this strategy
and high costs, the strategy of promoting national security through
spreading democracy appears to be irrational from their point of
view.
It is my guess
that Obama has not thought through the meaning of the strategy any
more than he has thought through his Keynesianism. I think that
our elected government officials do some thinking and questioning
and shaping of positions so that they can get elected, but that,
by and large, they unthinkingly accept the main assumptions of American
strategies. They tinker around the edges but they do not really
alter anything. Even when their rhetoric suggests something more
radical, their actions retreat to the status quo. A Kennedy will
send more advisers to South Vietnam and attempt to control its government.
Domestically, they go about their usual business of making the democracy
more and more totalitarian. Occasionally a Nixon will go to China,
but it won’t matter much because at home he and the American leadership
will ignore the kinds of policies that might liberalize the economy
and instead promote those that destabilize it and slow it down.
And in foreign policy, they will stick to the same old Wilsonianism
that should be thoroughly discredited and that has not served America
well.
July
28, 2009
Michael
S. Rozeff [send him mail]
is a retired Professor of Finance living in East Amherst, New York.
Copyright
© 2009 by LewRockwell.com. Permission to reprint in whole or in
part is gladly granted, provided full credit is given.
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