Fraud, Free Markets, and the S & Ls
by
Michael S. Rozeff
by Michael S. Rozeff
We choose between
the liberty of market exchanges and the government control of production
and distribution. In both cases, we want fewer criminals and losses.
In both cases, we want policing, adjudication, and enforcement.
Low or no criminality is a free market norm. It is not a norm exclusive
to government.
We therefore
face this question: Which system better controls wrongful behavior
and losses? Which system has stronger incentives for people to behave
properly?
The savings
and loan (S & L) industry was a creation of the New Deal, regulated
by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation. By 1980 the industry as a whole was
insolvent. The government did not want to close down these institutions
as the insurer (FSLIC) didn’t have enough money. It did not want
to give up its control, and it did not want to fund a bailout. The
"solution" it chose contained several elements, detailed
by George Akerlof and Paul Romer in their article Looting:
The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit. The government
changed the accounting rules pertaining to net income and net worth.
It removed interest ceilings on deposits. It allowed the thrifts
to make much riskier investments, including direct real estate and
real estate development. It allowed thrifts to concentrate more
assets on one borrower. It allowed a single owner to own a thrift.
It weakened capital requirements drastically. It allowed land to
be contributed as capital. It allowed goodwill created by acquisitions
to remain on the books and be depreciated over a 40-year period
(as compared with a previous maximum of 10 years.) It removed the
limit on the ratio of a mortgage loan to the underlying value, so
that loans could be made with no down payments. The FSLIC insurance
limit increased from $40,000 to $100,000.
In common parlance,
the government deregulated the industry by loosening certain restrictions.
The deregulation was far from complete. The government maintained
control over rules and much else.
Again, using
the language of the critics of deregulation, the government had
made the S & L industry much more "free." This way
of thinking is actually dead wrong, because an absolutely critical
element of a free market was not present, despite all the other
regulatory changes.
The one thing
that the government did not do, which was essential in view of its
other measures, was to remove the government-insured deposits. By
retaining government insurance, the government created an extremely
weak control structure for these companies, the result of which
was that many savings and loans were looted. The government’s insurance
of deposits severs the link between those who supply capital and
those who use that capital. The suppliers have no interest (incentive)
to control how the capital that they supply is used; and the users
of that capital (the owners of the S & L) can use that capital
without satisfying the suppliers. If the owners can extract more
money from the S & L (by deploying the deposits on their own
behalf) than its value to them as owners, then they can loot the
S & L and personally profit while it goes bankrupt (since they
face limited liability.)
The subject
of company control structures was not well understood then, and
is still not a matter of common knowledge. Those who supply the
financing of firms ordinarily put in measures to control its use
that have evolved in markets over the centuries. These include extensive
bond covenants, loan agreement terms, boards of directors, board
composition, the financial structure, limitations on management
actions, approval by votes of critical actions, and compensation
agreements. If the deposit insurance had been removed, lenders would
not have supplied capital to these thrifts without this panoply
of financial, operational, and legal safeguards. The thrifts would
then have turned into mortgage loan companies, or else into real
estate development or some such types of companies. Instead, with
deposit insurance left in place, the S & Ls attracted vast amounts
of capital from all over the nation in search of high interest rates,
capital that knew it was insured no matter what the owners did.
The deposit insurance eliminated the role of capital-suppliers acting
as controllers of both the owners and the managers. Without these
controls, with large cash inflows, and with the possibilities of
investing them in land and land development projects whose values
are not well-known, the government had created companies that were
perfect targets for abuse and fraud.
The result
was extensive fraud. Calavita, Pontell and Tillman document and
analyze all sorts of S & L frauds and abuses in their book Big
Money Crime: Fraud and Politics in the Savings and Loan Crisis.
In some states (like Texas), abuses were rampant as S & Ls made
various fraudulent deals with dishonest real estate developers and
appraisers.
The effects
of these deals were felt in widening circles. Some honest real estate
developers at the time observed that S & Ls were extending loans
to newcomer builders who were overbuilding in the face of high vacancy
rates. They withdrew from the market. But other honest developers
were enticed into more building because they thought that
the building activity and higher prices (often the result of fraudulent
sales flipping and appraisals) signaled a greater demand. In this
way, the S & L abuses affected the honest market exchanges of
honest developers and customers. This led to real estate bubbles,
overcapacity, and eventual crashes.
The proponents
of the deregulatory changes had exulted in their triumph of deregulation
and free markets, not realizing that they had set in motion a catastrophe.
They simply did not understand the full economic implications of
their partial deregulation. When the S & L industry came totally
unglued, they had egg on their face. It was very easy for free market
critics to argue for the restoration and maintenance of government
control. Indeed, government control did look better than the alternative
that the government had (probably unwittingly) created. The solution
that was politically unpalatable but correct in these circumstances
was to have entirely deregulated, including the elimination
of deposit insurance. The lesson to be learned is not that the free
market malfunctions, but that the free market cannot be free without
being free in its most critical aspects, one of which is that capitalists
must have the freedom to control their capital. Whenever the government
comes between the supplier of capital and the recipients of capital,
it paralyzes and subverts the market. The same happens when the
government comes between the producer of income and goods and his
disposition of that income and those goods.
Akerlof and
Romer note
"Bankruptcy
for profit occurs most commonly when a government guarantees a
firm's debt obligations. The most obvious such guarantee is deposit
insurance, but governments also implicitly or explicitly guarantee
the policies of insurance companies, the pension obligations of
private firms, virtually all the obligations of large banks, student
loans, mortgage finance of subsidized housing, and the general
obligations of large or influential firms..."
Looting is
an apt and succinct term that covers various control frauds and
abuses that occur when the owners or controlling interests in a
financial (or other) firm use the company corruptly for their gain
while destroying the value of the enterprise. Bankruptcy for profit
means a perverse economic situation in which owners find it profitable
to maximize their cash withdrawals from the company now, which process
is enhanced by twisting accounting rules and using fraudulent devices
and unprofitable deals that end up bankrupting the company.
The S &
L abuses were seen in the market and affected it, but they
were not of the market. They were of dishonest persons
doing dishonest things as a result of bad government policies that
provided incentives to benefit from being dishonest. These
facts do not imply that dishonest persons do not do dishonest things
in markets that are free from government rule-making. They do. Both
free markets and government-control must contend with people doing
bad things. But, as I argue next, free markets are less prone
to fraud and widespread fraud than government-controlled economies
because, for one thing, they provide stronger incentives for wealth-creating
behavior and weaker incentives for wealth-destroying behaviors like
fraud.
If we understand
the incentives built into social arrangements, then we can forecast
potential abuses. Some social or contractual arrangements encourage
abuses (perhaps inadvertently) or fail to control them, as when
S & L owners could aggregate huge amounts of money and dispose
of them without effective controls over their spending or by fraudulently
bypassing the remaining accounting controls. Millions of property
owners turn over vast sums of money to school districts and local
governments without a great deal of monitoring and control over
how that money is spent, although there is of course some. A rather
high degree of official abuse (including waste, incompetence, bureaucracy,
poor education, and poor service) is a predictable consequence.
Depositors
in S & Ls turned vast sums over to bankers and paid no attention
to how that money was used. They did that because they relied on
the guarantee of a government agency (the FSLIC) that the money
was insured. That reliance, over the course of years and decades,
has other major negative effects. There are very few or no innovations
in the monitoring of financial institutions, and the monitoring
by private persons atrophies. Everyone takes for granted that their
money is safe. Meanwhile, unless the investments of the S &
Ls are strictly controlled, their incentive is to take on a higher
degree of risky investments since losses are shifted to society
(the government guarantor) while gains are kept by owners. When
the investments are not controlled, the incentive to bankrupt the
bank for profit is strengthened.
Who then monitored
how these deposits were used when the government deregulated the
S & Ls? That lay in the hands of those whom we customarily call
government regulators (in this case the FHLBB and state bodies).
The term regulator
actually covers six or more distinct functions and responsibilities.
They include rule-making, oversight and monitoring (such as inspection
and auditing), responding to complaints, policing and detecting
rule-breaking, adjudication, and enforcement. We rely on our government
agents, the regulators, to do all these tasks when there is no free
market. But who regulates the regulators? Who makes the rules for
them? Who monitors them? Who polices them? Who controls their behavior
and sees to it that they do their jobs? Who brings cases against
them when they misbehave and/or respond to political forces and
not our welfare? Who controls them when the rules they make cause
us to lose? What do we do when the regulators who are supposed to
police and enforce fail to do so? What do we do when they make rules
that encourage fraud? We pay the price, and it is a very high price.
We the people
do not directly control the regulators, and since there are no markets
involved for their services, we do not have an impact on them via
our market exchanges. Typically our elected representatives control
(or attempt to control) the regulators and also make important rules
that affect the institutions that they regulate. The politicians
find that controlling (regulating) the bureaucracies and agents
that they have created is a formidable task. They do so through
their staffs, whom they then must control. Both the politicians
and their staffs have just as hard a time regulating the regulators
as we have regulating the representatives.
Our control
system has at least four layers: people control their representatives;
representatives control staffs; staffs and representatives control
regulators; and regulators control S & Ls. If we bring in the
state regulators and federal and state enforcement authorities,
then there are even more layers. There is nothing per se
wrong with layers, but when the people in each layer fail to have
adequate incentives to do their jobs, then the system must
deliver poor performance. Voters have almost no incentive to monitor
and control their representatives, and most voters do not do so.
Huge numbers, who realize the futility of it, do not vote at all.
The representatives, who have power, need not be responsive to the
voters; but they are responsive to interest groups who feather
their nests. Staff members have incentives to control information
and access to their bosses. They may, at times, form cozy arrangements
with regulators. The regulators, often in secure lifetime jobs,
have little incentive to be responsive to the public or to provide
full information to politicians. The politicians divide up the oversight
of the regulators among themselves, creating fiefdoms, and then
they scratch each other’s backs and fail to monitor each other’s
behavior.
Business firms
often face similar issues, but, in addition to control structures,
the important difference is that their customers have an immediate
say and large influence on their behavior. The customer directly
controls the money that a business gets from him in return for a
good, so that the businessman has a direct incentive to satisfy
the customer. By contrast, the voter has no direct control over
his representative via an exchange of an identifiable good. What’s
more, the government takes money from the voter at its discretion,
so that it has no monetary incentive whatsoever to satisfy the voter.
Furthermore, a business faces competition. People can start
up new businesses or expand existing ones when old ones fail to
serve public wants efficiently. When is the last time a group of
people started up a new government?
The governmental
regulatory system would fail miserably if it were not for a good
many conscientious and honest people in government who attempt to
do their jobs responsibly. Frequently it does fail miserably
and, when it does not, the outcomes of this arrangement range from
bad to worse. Rarely are we treated to a truly good result. (My
opinion is that this system never works to the public’s benefit,
but since the public puts up with it, who am I to say that they
shall not have the system they prefer? The problem here is that
they are saying what system I must live under. They have forced
me into their game.)
There are those
who set up a straw man version of a free market and then criticize
it. They think that freedom means freedom to abuse others, behave
dishonestly, and commit fraud. They think that a free market has
no monitoring, controlling, policing, adjudicating, and enforcing.
They think that freedom means chaos, a dog-eat-dog world, and the
liberty to starve. None of this is what proponents of liberty think
freedom means. Furthermore, this straw man is a really strange way
of thinking, since these same persons often defend what they call
"personal" freedom and various rights that are frequently
impositions on other people. But freedom does not mean freedom to
commit crimes and abuse others. Proponents of free markets want
such behavior controlled just as much as do proponents of government,
although they have different prescriptions for such control.
We do not have
to look far to find those with these sympathies who blame free markets
and deregulation for such problems as the S & L failures
and now the failures of various financial institutions. They then
call for government re-regulation and/or greater government regulation.
As we have
seen accusations of deregulation muddy the understanding when deregulation
is partial and makes matters worse. Deregulation should be thought
of as the complete removal of government controls from an
industry. After supposed deregulation, the U.S. financial industries
were and still are among the most heavily controlled in our society.
Since regulators have six or more distinct functions, deregulation
typically means changing some rules and functions, wholly or partly,
while leaving others in place. This changes incentives. The overall
result may induce more fraud. Similarly, calls for re-regulation
are actually calls for changes in some aspects of the existing system
of regulation.
Neither deregulation
nor re-regulation, as used in conventional discourse, alter the
basic government control. Neither one addresses the fact that the
existing structure of regulation by government is deeply flawed.
We do not have a market system that is controlling, monitoring,
policing, adjudicating, and enforcing honest behavior of financial
firms. We have the four-layer and more governmental system outlined
earlier. When this system of government regulation fails so miserably,
as in these cases of financial institution failure, it cannot be
blamed on free markets and deregulation.
Akerlof
and Romer warned of government guarantees in 1993. Unfortunately,
past government guarantees remain in place and new ones have grown
up beside them. It is not surprising then to find that fraud or
at least abuses of various kinds have played a major role in the
most recent financial vicissitudes. There are already numerous reports
and investigations of mortgage fraud on the part of borrowers, mortgage
brokers, and mortgage companies. As time passes, forensic loan and
financial statement audits will probably provide evidence of the
involvement of more major lenders as well. The AIG company, which
already has a record of fraud, is a reasonable case in point. Its
rapid growth, earnings manipulation, and especially its intra-company
accounting among its subsidiaries, all make it a prime candidate
for further revelations. The entire financial industry of the U.S.
has had its capital control incentives distorted by a variety of
government measures favoring housing, by deposit insurance guarantees,
by past bailouts, by friends in Congress, by campaign contributions,
by lobbying efforts, by loose controls over its lending practices,
and by creative accounting practices.
Wrongful behavior,
abuses, and fraud by officials and people in high positions are
serious matters both in markets and in government. When people in
high places enrich themselves through criminal and criminal-like
behavior, they can impose far greater losses on the general public
than the amounts of their own gains. By distorting prices, they
can induce honest consumers and producers into mal-investment, causing
costly bubbles and crashes. Government has not only not been proven
to be adept at controlling these matters, the theory and the evidence
tell us that it causes and encourages them. The incentives provided
in free markets should prove superior in controlling and mitigating
frauds and associated abuses.
January
12, 2009
Michael
S. Rozeff [send him mail]
is a retired Professor of Finance living in East Amherst, New York.
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