The Fed’s AIG Scam and the Price of Gold
by
Michael S. Rozeff
by Michael S. Rozeff
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Lee Strasberg
has that unforgettable line in Godfather
II about "small potatoes." That's what the Illinois corruption
case is compared to the Fed's hanky-panky with AIG.
Here are the
details, in simple language, of how that scam worked. AIG had insured
bond-like securities called CDOs against default. Default on a bond
occurs when the issuer of the bond can’t make the promised interest
payments. AIG, which is an insurance company, had collected insurance
premiums from the buyers of these bonds for insuring them against
the possible default of those bonds. That insurance it sold is called
a "credit default swap," or CDS. The buyers of the insurance
were banks like France's Societe Generale, Germany's Deutsche Bank,
France's Credit Agricole, and Merrill Lynch. The face value amounts
were large, some $65 billion.
When the loans
that were packaged into the CDOs began to go bad and fail to pay
interest, these CDOs fell in price by half. That meant that AIG
had to put up earnest money as a sign that they'd make good on their
insurance. These are called collateral payments. AIG ran out of
cash to make these payments. These kinds of payments are a common
and legitimate business practice in financial matters in order to
control risk. For example, in borrowing to buy stocks, the broker
calls for more margin (money) if the stocks decline by a certain
amount, in order to make sure that the borrower-buyer will be able
to pay the purchase price.
Enter the Fed.
The Fed formed a company with AIG called Maiden Lane (it's a real
street near Wall Street). The Fed then purchased the CDOs from these
and other banks at their full insured value. The Fed became the
insurer of last resort.
When the Fed
buys Treasury bills, it gets something of value that is backed by
the Treasury's taxes. In the AIG case, the Fed has overpaid for
the CDOs and given away its currency to the insured banks. The Fed
has made good on bets made by a private company. It has the legal
right to do this under the Federal Reserve Act, since it can accept
the notes of a private corporation. This shows the Fed’s enormous
power.
Who gains?
Obviously, the banks that held the CDOs are the main gainers. The
stockholders, bondholders, and depositors of these banks gain. The
stock of Deutsche Bank was falling between September 10 and 17.
It fell from $85.61 to $70.40. On September 18, the stock jumped
to $83.86, a very unusual price increase. Deutsche Bank has been
a large beneficiary of the Fed’s largesse. This is not the whole
story, however. The results of the Fed’s action had more general
effects. All or almost all banks showed similar price movements
at these dates, even banks that probably would not be selling CDOs
to the Fed. The Fed’s action had a systemic impact. For example,
the regional bank index in the U.S. rallied from $35 to $41 on September
18. Despite the Fed’s actions, it appears that the impact has been
temporary or that other events since September have dragged down
bank stock values again. Deutsche Bank stock is now $36.75, and
the regional bank index (KRE) has fallen from $41 to $28. Bank of
America is now $16.69, down from $36.65 on September 19.
Who loses?
Everyone who holds Federal Reserve notes loses. This Fed operation
is like a company that gives away its stock to a select group of
recipients. The rest of the stockholders discover that the stock
has been, in effect, split. There are more shares outstanding but
the firm's assets haven't changed. The result is that the share
price falls. In this case, the value of the dollar falls.
Did the value
of the dollar fall? Yes! The AIG takeover and Fed's participation
occurred around September 1617, 2008. On September 17, the
price of gold had an extraordinary price rise from about $770 to
almost $860. The following day, it settled back to $825. (It is
common in financial research to use a two-day window to evaluate
the impact of an event.) Traders in markets are generally quick
to evaluate and impound public information into speculative prices.
This is an example. The traders attempt to assess the implications
of events. If the Fed issued $65 billion of new currency as compared
with its $832 billion at that time, the dilution would be 7.8 percent
in the value of a dollar. At the $825 price, gold went up by 7.1
percent. We are in the ballpark of understanding why this jump in
gold price occurred when it did and in the amount that it did. Mind
you, traders would be attempting to evaluate not just this particular
bailout but also future bailouts.
Suppose that
the Fed’s holdings of CDOs work out to be even worse investments
than expected. The Fed will then be writing off bad debts, and they
will show up as reductions in its capital account. This will make
the price of gold rise further. On the other hand, if these holdings
turn out to provide better payoffs than expected, then gold may
fall in reflection of that fact.
This
analysis gives us some confidence in understanding the pricing of
gold versus the dollar. The Fed has exploded its balance sheet.
This means it has taken on a huge increase in loans. How good are
those loans? That is what traders are evaluating. If these are bad
loans or if traders get information that these loans are worse than
they thought, then it means dilution of the currency. The result
will be that gold’s price will rise. If these are good loans or
if traders evaluate ongoing information as suggesting that these
loans are better than they expected, then gold’s price will fall.
The existing
price of gold reflects the market’s current consensus expectations
about the strength of the loans that the Fed has made. The gold
price will move up and down on any news about the quality of these
loans and on any news that the Fed is making new loans. It will
be evaluating the quality of any new loans. These considerations
are by no means the only events that affect the price of gold against
the dollar, but they are important ones as the reaction to the AIG
bailout shows.
December
12, 2008
Michael
S. Rozeff [send him mail]
is a retired Professor of Finance living in East Amherst, New York.
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© 2008 LewRockwell.com
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