Inherent Power and Legal Tender
by
Michael S. Rozeff
by Michael S. Rozeff
DIGG THIS
The U.S. constitution,
as a compromise between liberty and a central state, has been degraded
step by step, like The
Picture of Dorian Gray. Liberty has lost. The degradation
is a continuing enterprise, constantly renewed.
How can future
generations do better? They need to know how and why liberty lost.
They need to know the past errors that produced the loss of liberty.
People justified
each step by some ideas or philosophy, and the current generation
continues to support these pro-State and anti-liberty ideas. We
are now immersed in them. They are in the air. They are often subliminal,
catching us unawares and getting under our skin. They lie just beneath
the surface of our consciousness, and they motivate many of us to
support big government.
One of these
ideas is that the government has inherent powers that are constitutional.
The Justice Department, for example, has asserted that "the
Constitution vests in the President inherent authority to conduct
warrantless intelligence surveillance (electronic or otherwise)
of foreign powers or their agents, and Congress cannot by statute
extinguish that constitutional authority." Alberto R. Gonzales
stated: "The President has the inherent authority under the
Constitution, as Commander-in-Chief, to engage in this kind of activity."
The Supreme
Court usually supports the government’s claims to inherent power.
Government power could not have grown without that support. In a
2004 decision (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld), the Court said that the Executive
could detain a U.S. citizen as an "enemy combatant" without
Congressional authorization: "the Executive possesses plenary
authority to detain pursuant to Article II of the Constitution."
The debate between the Legislative and Executive branches about
which one has various inherent powers is secondary to the main claim
that such powers are present in the government and legalized by
the supreme law of the land.
One of the
most serious errors of the Constitution was to make the judiciary
part of the federal government. Since the Executive nominates justices
and the Senate confirms them, they control the judicial philosophy
of the Court. That control while imperfect has resulted in judgments
with a strong bias toward favoring government power. The justice
system should be entirely separate.
The Constitution
has other major errors that supply the pro-State judges with plenty
of ammunition. Chief among these is the "necessary
and proper" clause:
"The
Congress shall have Power...To make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
Money, taxation,
and borrowing are essential for the government to use its powers.
It is therefore no accident that one of the earliest controversies
over this clause concerned the charter of the First Bank of the
United States. And it is no accident that in 1819 Chief Justice
Marshall wrote his famous opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland that
supported the Second Bank of the United States. He found that the
government had the implied power to set up a federal bank under
the necessary and proper clause.
Once the Court
illuminated the road to implied powers, the government traveled
that road as far as it could, even when it ran over other provisions
of the Constitution. Once the national government was established
and a few precedents set of using powers not expressly mentioned
in the Constitution, it became easier and easier for statist ideas
to become the unwritten constitution and for Supreme Court judges
to affirm the constitutionality of far-reaching legislative and
executive powers.
In this article,
I go back to the Supreme Court cases in 1870 that justified making
greenbacks legal tender. There we find a clear statement of the
inherent power ideas that we need to contend with consciously today
if we are ever to gain the liberties that the Declaration of Independence
so passionately supports. These ideas need to be brought to light.
Their glorification of the State and their antagonism to liberty
need to be exposed.
Legal tender
law
Before there
were Federal Reserve notes (our current paper money instrument),
there were U.S. notes. These were issued by the U.S. Treasury, not
the Federal Reserve, which is a central bank created by Congressional
action.
Looking at
a clear
picture of a $20 U.S. note, we see at the top "Legal Tender
for Twenty Dollars." Legal tender means that the note must,
by law, be accepted as payment for all debts, public charges, taxes,
and dues.
The U.S. Treasury
began issuing non-interest bearing notes in 1862 after Congress
passed several Legal Tender Acts authorizing their issue. The notes
came to be known as greenbacks. The law, which did not distinguish
debts contracted before the law was passed from debts contracted
thereafter, read as follows:
"Be
it enacted ..., That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby
authorized to issue on the credit of the United States, one hundred
and fifty millions of dollars of United States notes, not bearing
interest, payable to bearer, ..., and such notes herein authorized
shall be receivable in payment of all taxes, internal duties,
excises, debts, and demands of every kind due to the United States,...,
and shall also be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of
all debts, public and private, within the United States,..."
The existing
U.S. law is not far different:
"Section
5103 of title 31, United States Code
§ 5103. Legal
tender
United States
coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating
notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender
for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues. Foreign gold or
silver coins are not legal tender for debts."
Ex post
facto law
The 1862 statute
conflicted with the Constitution in several ways. In the first place,
it was an ex post facto law. It was retrospective or retroactive.
It impaired contracts made before the date of the law. Article I,
Section 9, which applies to the federal government, says: "No
bill of attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." Article
I, Section 10, which applies to the states, says: "No state
shall...pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing
the obligation of contracts,..."
In his article
written in 1900 titled "Are Our Legal Tender Laws Ex Post Facto?",
Brainerd Taylor DeWitt examines the issue thoroughly. The evidence
that the legal tender laws are retroactive and thus, in his view,
unconstitutional is overwhelming. His own conclusion is this:
"Laws
impairing the obligation of contracts being embraced in the prohibition
of Article I, Section 9, under the terms "ex post facto
law," as explained by the Constitution itself, by The
Federalist and by the usage of our English ancestors long
previous to the formation of the Constitution, the conclusion
is unavoidable that our legal-tender laws are ex post facto,
and that Congress in enacting them violated an express provision
of the Constitution."
To Justice
Strong, who wrote the majority opinion that upheld the legal tender
laws, it did not matter if those laws impaired contracts and violated
some provisions of the Constitution. There were more important fish
to fry. He wrote:
"If,
then, the legal tender acts were justly chargeable with impairing
contract obligations, they would not, for that [79 U.S. 457, 551]
reason, be forbidden, unless a different rule is to be applied
to them from that which has hitherto prevailed in the construction
of other powers granted by the fundamental law. But, as already
intimated, the objection misapprehends the nature and extent of
the contract obligation spoken of in the Constitution. As in a
state of civil society property of a citizen or subject is ownership,
subject to the lawful demands of the sovereign, so contracts must
be understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of
the rightful authority of the government, and no obligation of
a contract can extend to the defeat of legitimate government authority."
In unambiguous
words, Strong asserts that government authority trumps the property
of citizens (subjects) and the contracts they may make in civil
society. He holds this view, as we shall soon see, because he believes
that government itself is entitled to whatever powers it requires
to perpetuate and preserve itself. In other words, we not only must
have government, we must have the government we now have
that was established by the Constitution, and that government has
a right to preserve itself. We are subject to it. It is not subject
to us.
In some cases,
the Framers linked the impairment of contracts by ex post facto
laws to the production of paper notes, known then as bills of credit.
They knew that historically legal tender laws had the intent of
making people accept a devalued currency in place of money instruments
like gold and silver and augmenting the power and resources of the
sovereign while diminishing the liberty of the sovereign’s subjects.
Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth, in recommending the Constitution
to their state, wrote:
"The
restraint on the legislatures of the several states, respecting
emitting bills of credit, making anything but money [gold and
silver] a tender in payment of debts, or impairing the obligation
of contracts by ex post facto laws, was thought necessary
as a security to commerce, in which the interest of foreigners
as well as the citizens of different states may be affected."
In Number 44
of The Federalist, Madison speaks strongly against bills
of credit being issued by the states. The Federal Convention refused
to grant Congress this power as well.
Emitting bills
of credit, then the term for non-interest bearing paper notes to
be used as currency, is not the same as making such bills into legal
tender. The Supreme Court later held that the federal government
could issue bills of credit.
Hepburn
v. Griswold
The first test
of the constitutionality of the legal tender law came in 1869. The
Supreme Court found that the law was unconstitutional.
The Court said
that (1) the Constitution contained no express provision to make
any credit currency a legal tender in payment of debts, and (2)
the legal tender laws were not justifiable under the "necessary
and proper" clause:
"The
making of notes or bills of credit a legal tender in payment of
preexisting debts is not a means appropriate, plainly adapted,
or really calculated to carry into effect any express power vested
in Congress, is inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution,
and is prohibited by the Constitution."
The Court pointed
out another major conflict of legal tender laws with the Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment declares that "no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
The legal tender laws by directly impairing the value of contracts
deprived persons of property without due process of law.
Knox v.
Lee
The Court reversed
Hepburn v. Griswold in the following year in two cases: Knox v.
Lee and Parker v. Davis. Such a reversal was unprecedented. The
majority of 5-3 in Hepburn changed into a 5-4 decision favorable
to legal tender laws with the Chief Justice dissenting. One of the
original five had retired. The remaining four maintained their position.
The minority of three became four when a vacant seat was filled,
and it became the majority of five through a new appointee when
the court was expanded from 8 to 9 seats in December, 1869.
Statements
made by the majority in support of the legal tender laws are what
interest us. They are of the utmost importance to us today, inasmuch
as we hear them echoed on all sides as every government, Democrat
and Republican, reaches for more power.
Justice Strong
made several arguments. He began with this statement:
"If
it be held by this court that Congress has no constitutional power,
under any circumstances, or in any emergency, to make treasury
notes a legal tender for the payment of all debts (a power confessedly
possessed by every independent sovereignty other than the United
States), the government is without those means of self-preservation
which, all must admit, may, in certain contingencies, become indispensable,
even if they were not when the acts of Congress now called in
question were enacted."
This statement
contains justifications for the government power. Not one of them
refers directly to the Constitution. A first technique of subverting
the Constitution is simply to ignore its language and bring in other
considerations. This technique is always in vogue.
Strong mentions
extreme circumstances and emergencies in which Congress should have
power to act, such power being constitutional, even if it be not
present in that document. His idea is that practical necessity is
the real ruler at times. He is saying that there is a tradeoff of
constitutional constraints on power for another urgent need. This
assumes that the Constitution is of second-order or third-order
importance. Necessities hold sway.
A second technique
of subverting the Constitution is thus to cry "Emergency!"
This technique, which relegates the Constitution to secondary status,
is also always in vogue. Any leader can easily find a dozen pressing
needs, problems, disasters, exigencies, and necessities. He will
then urge that they be dealt with no matter what the Constitution
says. The Constitution, being the general document that it is, is
denigrated as being unable to handle events that it could not have
foreseen. Room must be made for stretching its words to fit the
necessities of today. Under this philosophy one may well ask, why
bother to have a constitution?
Obviously,
if the Constitution is ignored in times of emergency or pressing
need, then it is no longer the fundamental or supreme law of the
land. Something else is, namely, practical need or pragmatism. They
are assumed to be more important than the law. The problem with
this approach is that it is lawless. Practical needs are not defined
by law. They are defined by men, and that means there is no constitution
acting as law. Once the Constitution has been ignored or twisted
so as to conform to some supposed need, it is then easy to ignore
it again and again. It cannot retain its former character as a constraint
on government power. When pragmatic matters are primary, the role
of the Constitution is that of providing a patina of legality that
covers over the actual illegality.
Ignoring the
Constitution’s limitations on government power in time of emergency
or practical exigency not only assumes that the Constitution is
of second-order importance, it also presumes that the government
is the only means of possible action. It presumes that the
government is the sole organization that can and must act and that
it must be empowered to find the solution to the supposed emergency.
But this is hardly ever so. In case after case, the government is
the worst possible organization chosen to handle problems.
The question
at issue in the legal tender case is whether or not the government
has the power constitutionally to make everyone accept its paper
money as legal tender. Justice Strong begs that question. He presumes
that we as persons need the government to solve various problems
and have put that government in place as the sole and only means
to solve these questions. He presumes that we are incapable of organizing
ourselves in any other ways to resolve particular problems. Having
made that postulate, he easily deduces the implication that the
legal tender power is necessary and proper for the government’s
exercise of its other powers.
If one glorifies
government to begin with, by placing it on a pedestal, by assuming
that it and no other organizations and associations, it and no other
means, can solve the common problems we as persons face, one then
is ineluctably led to the conclusion that any powers that the government
exercises that are needed to support its unique position in solving
our problems must be necessary and proper to those exercises of
power. If one assumes the uniqueness and singular importance of
a government, one is led away from a government with limited powers.
One is led to a government with unlimited powers. But since the
Constitution established the national government as a unique government,
it left itself open to expansive interpretations such as Justice
Strong’s.
Strong’s second
argument begins in the offhand remark that every other independent
sovereignty had the power to make its note into legal tender. He
views this as an indispensable means to the "self-preservation"
of governments. This argument is false on several grounds, both
theoretical and constitutional.
Mr. Justice
Clifford, dissenting, demolished Strong’s argument. He pointed out
that there was no implied power in the Constitution to make bills
of credit into legal tender. Congress already had ample constitutional
power to conduct war and preserve the government.
"Congress
may appropriate all moneys in the treasury [79 U.S. 457, 630] to
carry on the war, or Congress may coin money for that purpose, or
borrow money to any amount for the same purpose, or Congress may
lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises to replenish
the treasury, or may dispose of the public lands or other property
belonging to the United States, and may in fact, by the exercise
of the express powers of the Constitution, command the whole wealth
and substance of the people to sustain the public credit and prosecute
the war to a successful termination."
In another
dissent, the Chief Justice gave an economic or theoretical argument.
He laid out the basis for a "tax" foundation for U.S.
notes to become currency:
"The
real question is, was the making them a legal tender a necessary
means to the execution of the power to borrow money? If the notes
would circulate as well without as with this quality it is idle
to urge the plea of such necessity. But the circulation of the
notes was amply provided for by making them receivable for all
national taxes, all dues to the government, and all loans. This
was the provision relied upon for the purpose by the secretary
when the bill was first prepared, and his reflections since have
convinced him that it was sufficient."
Governments
do not disappear when they lack the legal tender power. The U.S.
has fifty state governments that lack this power. Nor do paper monies
issued by governments fail if they are not legal tender. A government
can support its note issues as currency, without making them legal
tender, by making them payable for the taxes that it assesses. Since
the notes can be returned to the government to extinguish tax bills,
they can circulate as a money instrument that has value.
Returning to
Justice Strong, we find next an amazing argument:
"...the
powers conferred upon Congress must be regarded as related to
each other, and all means for a common end. Each is but part of
a system, a constituent of one whole. No single power is the ultimate
end for which the Constitution was adopted. It may, in a very
proper sense, be treated as a means for the accomplishment of
a subordinate object, but that object is itself a means designed
for an ulterior purpose. Thus the power to levy and collect taxes,
to coin money and regulate its value, to raise and support armies,
or to provide for and maintain [79 U.S. 457, 533] a navy, are
instruments for the paramount object, which was to establish a
government, sovereign within its sphere, with capability of self-preservation,
thereby forming a union more perfect than that which existed under
the old Confederacy."
Strong argues
that the Congressional powers, as granted in the Constitution, and
the Constitution itself are means to an overriding end: to establish
a perpetual government. Government itself is the paramount end!
It is true that the Constitution’s preamble says that we the people
established the Constitution to form a more perfect union, but it
does not say that union of the states is the premier end or even
anything but a means to the other objects it lists: justice, domestic
tranquility, the common defense, the general welfare, and the blessings
of liberty. For us the people, having a union of states makes no
sense in and of itself unless it is a means to these other ends.
He quotes approvingly
from Justice Marshall:
"Said
Chief Justice Marshall, in Cohens v. The Bank of Virginia, 86
‘America has chosen to be, in many respects and to many purposes,
a nation, and for all these purposes her government is complete;
for all these objects it is supreme. It can then, in effecting
these objects, legitimately control all individuals or governments
within the American territory.’"
Some of our
Justices seem to have had Hobbes at their elbows or for bedtime
reading.
Strong holds
that the government, by the necessary and proper clause, can do
whatever it wants to that it is not prohibited from doing:
"That
would appear, then, to be a most unreasonable construction of
the Constitution which denies to the government created by it,
the right to [79 U.S. 457, 534] employ freely every means, not
prohibited, necessary for its preservation, and for the fulfilment
of its acknowledged duties. Such a right, we hold, was given by
the last clause of the eighth section of its first article."
Mr. Justice
Bradley, a member of the majority, explained at length why the government
had the power to make its paper money a legal tender. He ended up
saying that it is "one of those vital and essential powers
inhering in every national sovereignty and necessary to its self-preservation."
The notion
of inherent powers, supported by Bradley, arises at the inception
of the U.S.A. and carries forward to this day. Hamilton in The
Federalist 23 made incredibly broad claims for government power:
"The
authorities essential to the common defense are these: to raise
armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the
government of both; to direct their operations; to provide for
their support. These powers ought to exist without limitation,
because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and
variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and
variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.
The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite,
and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed
on the power to which the care of it is committed."
Is it really
the case that free people cannot defend themselves without giving
up their liberty? Must they commit their lives and liberties to
a central power and give that power carte blanche? If they
do that, how can they control their controllers? Obviously, a government
with no constitutional shackles concerning the war power is exceedingly
dangerous and inimical to liberty. It seems that the U.S. has taken
the Hamiltonian philosophy to heart. But should it have done so?
The passage quoted seems to express an inordinate degree of paranoia
and fear combined with an inordinate faith in government as the
remedy for that fear. It is hardly wise for an entire country to
follow out intemperate and extravagant rambling that has so little
balance and restraint.
John Yoo’s
memoranda within the Bush administration articulate and justify
the doctrine of inherent executive power with a degree of imbalance
equal to Hamilton’s. In his expansive view, among many other claimed
powers, "the President may deploy military force preemptively
against terrorist organizations or the States that harbor or support
them, whether or not they can be linked to the specific terrorist
incidents of September 11." The nation seems to be perpetuating
in its leadership a highly dangerous degree of power-worship that
is capable of self-fulfillment as it induces the conflicts and wars
it supposedly wishes to avoid.
Was the U.S.A.
to be no different than any Old World nation or any despotic power
elsewhere on earth? Government is government, the U.S.A. being no
exception, Justices Strong and Bradley argued. Bradley spelled this
out in his exposition. His amazing statements could easily serve
as a basis for the absolutist rule of Hitler, Stalin, or any number
of American Congresses and Presidents:
"It
is absolutely essential to independent national existence that
government should have a firm hold on the two great sovereign
instrumentalities of the sword and the purse, and the right to
wield them without restriction on occasions of national peril.
In certain emergencies government must have at its command, not
only the personal services the bodies and lives
of its citizens, but the lesser, though not less essential, power
of absolute control over the resources of the country. Its armies
must be filled, and its navies manned, by the citizens in person.
Its material of war, its munitions, equipment, and commissary
stores must come from the industry of the country. This can only
be stimulated into activity by a proper financial system, especially
as regards the currency."
Sentiments
like these, expressed by a Supreme Court Justice in 1870, are now
and always have been a constant strain in the American system, ranging
as they do at least from Hamilton to Yoo and Gonzales. American
government on many occasions has used these powers. They and more
are now fixtures in American life.
Proponents
of liberty are up against many obstacles, of which the American
willingness to give in to absolutist rule is one. Heightened fear
that is tantamount to paranoia is deeply embedded in the American
experience and philosophy. Any kind of distress or severe problem
is likely to be labeled an emergency whereupon the conditioned and
habitual response is now to yield to the power of government as
the great savior. This is not a characteristic that will be easily
resolved or changed.
Gold and
silver
Justice Clifford
in his dissent began by pointing out that
"Money,
in the Constitutional sense, means coins of gold and silver fabricated
and stamped by authority of law as a measure of value, pursuant
to the power vested in Congress by the Constitution."
The federal
power to coin money does not mention gold and silver, but the very
next section of the same article that restricts the states does.
The two sections are logically connected, and Clifford made the
connection:
"Coined
money, such as is authorized by that clause of the instrument,
consists only of the coins of the United States fabricated and
stamped by authority of law, and is the same money as that described
in the next clause of the same section as the current coins of
the United States, and is the same money also as ‘the gold and
silver coins’ described in the tenth section of the same article,
which prohibits the States from coining money, emitting bills
of credit, or making ‘anything but gold and silver coin a tender
in payment of debts.’"
What did the
Framers intend in the Constitution?
"Paper
emissions have, at one time or another, been authorized and employed
as currency by most commercial nations, [79 U.S. 457, 589] and
by no government, past or present, more extensively than by the
United States, and yet it is safe to affirm that all experience
in its use as a circulating medium has demonstrated the proposition
that it cannot by any legislation, however stringent, be made
a standard of value or the just equivalent of gold and silver.
Attempts of the kind have always failed, and no body of men, whether
in public or private stations, ever had more instructive teachings
of the truth of that remark than the patriotic men who framed
the Federal Constitution, as they had seen the power to emit bills
of credit freely exercised during the war of the Revolution, not
only by the Confederation, but also by the States, and knew from
bitter experience its calamitous effects and the utter worthlessness
of such a circulating medium as a standard of value. Such men
so instructed could not have done otherwise than they did do,
which was to provide an irrepealable standard of value, to be
coined from gold and silver, leaving as little upon the subject
to the discretion of Congress as was consistent with a wise forecast
and an invincible determination that the essential principles
of the Constitution should be perpetual as the means to secure
the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity."
Clifford’s
invaluable review of 70 years of history establishes the firm place
of gold and silver as money instruments in American history and
of the hostile sentiments of the Framers toward paper money. At
the end, he notes that the Court has always "held opinions
utterly opposed to such a construction of the Constitution as would
authorize Congress to make paper promises a legal tender as between
debtor and creditor."
Conclusion
Flaws in the
U.S. Constitution have inevitably led to a loss of liberty in America.
The flaws include the Supreme Court as part of the federal government
and language such as the necessary and proper clause.
The legal tender
cases acquaint us with a number of pro-State points of view that
I summarize as follows. The federal government is premier, over
its citizens and subjects. The federal government is the sole government,
having a constitutional mandate and right to be perpetual and self-preserving.
There are no legal competitors to it. The option for people to organize
themselves in other ways no longer exists; the adoption of the Constitution
foreclosed those options. The existence and survival of this form
of government are forever established by the Constitution. Whatever
implied powers it requires for its existence take precedence over
other liberty-sustaining and power-limiting provisions of the Constitution,
and they may be violated if the government decides that circumstances
warrant such violations.
Furthermore,
the government has inherent powers. In situations of practical necessity,
in emergencies, in cases of great need, the government has powers
to act so as to insure its own security and survival. The government
set up by the Constitution must control the sword and the purse.
These are inherent sovereign powers. If that means impressing every
citizen into armed service and taxing every last resource, the government
has that power by its very existence as government. If that means
controlling the definition of money, making its own bills of credit
into legal tender, it has that power. If that means establishing
central banks, it has that power.
The legal tender
cases of 1870 brought out the conflict between two views. On one
side is liberty and a constitution with enumerated and limited powers
that serves people. On the other side is the predominance of government
with whatever inherent powers it takes for it to survive. In that
view, liberties are dispensable for the greater good of the preservation
of an immortal constitution (as Justice Marshall expressed it in
Cohens v. The Bank of Virginia). We are far down the latter road.
It is a one-way street. It seems to me that we are bound and gagged
by the Constitution. This is why I have called for dissolving the
U.S.A. and ending the rule of this flawed document. Adhering to
it has led us to where we stand today.
Let
us go our many ways. The land is broad enough and we are intelligent
enough to manage our affairs with any number of governments of our
choice. Let there be competition in governance. Why can’t there
be innovation in constitutions, a constitution with a sunset provision,
a constitution with electronic referenda, or any number of other
innovations? Why must governments be territorial? Why must a person
be subject to a government merely because of where he happens to
live? Why must a government control what money is? Why can’t we
have monetary freedom? Why must governance involve forced taxation?
Why can’t we agree to the government of our choice and to paying
our share of its costs?
Sooner or later,
we will get off the one-way street we are on. What we can do now
is prepare ourselves and those who come after us, so that we and
they have a chance to do better.
September
29, 2008
Michael
S. Rozeff [send him mail]
is a retired Professor of Finance living in East Amherst, New York.
Copyright
© 2008 LewRockwell.com
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