Major Interests of the State
by
Michael S. Rozeff
by Michael S. Rozeff
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Importance of interests
States too often get a free pass from people who think they try
to do good for society. How can we show that states do not act out
of a merciful concern for humanity? One method is to show that the
nature of the state demands a very different type of behavior.
In this article I ask: Why do states behave as they do? Why do
they select the interests or concerns that they exhibit? How do
we prove that their interests are not humanitarian? Economists have
answered these questions by suggesting that politicians act out
of self-interest. I take a different tack. I seek answers to these
questions by asking: What interests of the state are implied by
its very nature as an organization?
The answers are simple and obvious, which makes them no less true
and powerful. Yet I doubt that they are fully and widely realized
or appreciated. One implication, also simple, is well-known among
libertarians: The state is not a humanitarian institution.
I will stress that the state naturally is an organization whose
members’ acts are designed to keep the state going with its powers
intact so as to maintain the benefits that flow to members of the
state. While free market organizations also wish to survive and
benefit their members, the difference is that they can’t lawfully
achieve those aims without benefiting society; while the state can’t
achieve its aims without harming society.
Maintenance of state power
To begin at the beginning, the state is the top and unique political
organization ruling over a nation or a society who live in a given
area. As such it has the final power to enforce law; it has the
legal power of taxation; and within limits that are often very broad,
it has the power to say what is lawful and unlawful. Where there
are subsidiary state, province, regional, or local governments that
have powers, the (national) state usually possesses distinctive
and unique powers that reach to the individual citizens and other
political units under its administration.
As is true of most organizations, the prime concern or interest
of any state is to maintain its existence to survive. Only
by surviving can benefits flow to the state’s members. This interest
in surviving, I now show, implies a necessarily strong interest
in maintaining its unique powers intact. To see why this is so,
I start by contrasting the state with the business firm.
Business concerns in free markets survive in one way only: by satisfying
customers without going broke, for they cannot exclude other firms
from luring customers away. In addition, free market firms have
no power to make suppliers of capital contribute resources to the
firm.
Since a state has official monopoly powers, it has far more latitude
in not satisfying its "customers," primarily the citizens
or sub-governments under its jurisdiction. Since the state can tax
those citizens, it can obtain capital at its command. These powers
in and of themselves facilitate the state’s survival as compared
with business enterprises. They allow the state to create a system
of rewards and punishments that helps the rulers maintain political
control; and they help finance this system. Furthermore, these powers
are essential attributes of what the state is, and, most importantly
they are the wellsprings of the rewards that the members of the
state garner for themselves. Were the state to face competition,
its members would suffer. As a matter of fact, the state would disappear
since its essence is this set of monopoly powers. Therefore, directly
derived from its interest in survival, the state has an exceedingly
important and overwhelming interest in maintaining its powers intact.
The argument is very simple, but it has interesting implications
that I explore in what follows. From it, we deduce that to interpret
a state’s actions, we should always look first and foremost to their
relation to the survival of the state and the maintenance of its
powers.
For instance, many states throughout the world have social security
programs. We know that these impose net costs on society, but the
costs are often hidden and deferred. At the same time, the financial
burden of such programs need not be excessive if the citizens both
pay in and receive most of the money. This recycling itself perhaps
suggests that there is nothing humanitarian about social security
programs. The political rhetoric, however, emphasizes their wise
kindness. At the signing of the Social Security Act in 1935, Franklin
Delano Roosevelt idolized the law as "a structure intended
to lessen the force of possible future depressions, to act as a
protection to future administrations of the Government against the
necessity of going deeply into debt to furnish relief to the needy...in
other words, a law that will take care of human needs and at the
same time provide for the United States an economic structure of
vastly greater soundness." The Social Security system, of course,
does none of these things. It is well known that its effects undermine
society. Why then do states enact such programs? The reasons why
states love these programs are that these programs enmesh vast numbers
of people, create state dependency, and are hard to dismantle. In
turn and more fundamentally, these factors help ensure the state’s
survival and maintenance of its powers.
State survival is a balancing act
Because of its interest in maintaining its powers, it follows that
ordinarily the state will not willingly give up or cede any of its
powers of taxing, law-making, law-interpreting, law-enforcement,
etc. to either the citizens or the sub-governmental units under
its control. All such cessions diminish the state and represent
threats to its survival. This does not mean that we will never observe
such cessions. There will be circumstances when the state has made
itself too burdensome and/or grown too large such that citizens
or provinces under its control grow restive and make demands for
retrenchment. At such times, the central government may choose to
make concessions so as to forestall rebellion and prolong its existence.
Or it might elect to use overwhelming force to secure its power
and suppress discontent. In either event, the goal will still be
to maintain itself and its powers intact insofar as possible.
No matter how clever it is, the state’s survival is not 100 percent
assured. As it always imposes costs upon its subjects through its
taxes, laws and regulations and by increases in its powers, they
are always more or less discontented and prone to throw off their
shackles. Their discontent rises as the costs imposed on them rise.
Historically, the time it takes for a movement to culminate in a
radical revamping of the state (hopefully to reduce it but not always
succeeding at that objective) varies greatly depending on factors
that are not difficult to recount and whose details are the specialty
of historians. It took 73 years for the Soviet Union (1917 to 1990).
In that dreadful empire, the costs borne by citizens were very high,
but the state’s strength and repression were also high. The American
Revolution occurred after 155 years (1620 to 1775), the colonists
being exceptionally sensitive to impositions that today do not look
heavy. The Ottoman Empire lasted for 620 years or so (12991920)
by using enlightened policies. It was known for its policy of avoiding
military rule and relying upon local rule in which religious and
ethnic minorities managed their own affairs via their own customs,
laws, and courts. It held the Balkans for a long time by introducing
improvements in land tenure and property rights that benefited the
peasants. Although its taxes may not have been especially low, they
were fixed and held constant between censuses, making them easier
to bear. Its demise was associated with its defeat in World War
I.
The further the state goes in increasing discontent, the more that
it increases the chance of struggle against its power. Naturally,
the state takes many steps to prevent discontent from arising and
crystallizing into serious challenges to its authority; indeed the
modern state pro-actively attempts to stimulate demand for its redistributions
in such a way as to consolidate its existence. Nevertheless, the
state faces basic problems that lead to errors on its part. It cannot
gauge discontent perfectly. If it over-estimates it and clamps down
too much or too soon, it creates further unhappiness. If it under-estimates
it and lets it grow, the forces of rebellion can become costly to
contain. The state cannot control shifts in the levels of discontent
psychologically perceived by its subjects. If Americans became as
sensitive today to loss of freedom as they apparently were 200 years
ago, the current state would have to retrench drastically. The state
cannot completely control migration and exit. It can’t completely
control thought. It can’t control organizations determined to change
the state or even rebel. It cannot completely control communications,
tax evasion, and guerilla tactics. It cannot control infiltration
and subversion.
Great Britain and other European states lost their colonies. Scotland
and England, joined in union for 300 years, are close to parting.
The Soviet Union is gone, replaced by 15 separate states. These
breakups frequently occur when enough "customers" or subjects
of the state abandon it. In other cases, external forces contribute.
Being aware of these possibilities, states have an overwhelmingly
important interest in foreclosing scenarios that threaten their
survival.
Continuity and permanency
States will, of course, seek to legitimize themselves and prevent
opposition from arising in a myriad of ways, many of which I have
recounted here.
An important method, going rather unnoticed, is for the state to
represent itself as a permanent and continuously operating organization,
or at least an organization that does not routinely contemplate
its own willing dissolution. By emphasizing its continuity and the
virtues of such, the state seeks to assure a continued life for
itself even if it undergoes transformation. It wants its subjects
to envision their lives as impossible if they are not being ruled
by the state.
It may be that a state’s Constitution, if there is one, contains
procedures for altering the state; but the usual unstated assumption
is that there will always be a state and that it will largely retain
its present form. "Empire and liberty, one and inseparable,
now and forever." To be sure, states dissolve peacefully at
times. The confederation of Serbia and Montenegro ended in 2006
with the establishment of two separate republics. Other states are
peaceably contested: The Vlaams Belang party seeks separation of
Flanders from Belgium. Yet other states have wars of secession,
as between the Tamils and the state of Sri Lanka. Overall, the lengthy,
difficult, and often bloody process of ending a state or even seceding
from one suggests that states do not go quietly into the night.
As a general matter, they vigorously contest being dissolved, dissected,
or dismembered. This is because their prime interest is in surviving
with their powers intact.
Making the most of taxes
As compared with the overall population of the society they govern,
a tiny number of men and women comprises the state. Being vastly
outnumbered by the nation’s population, their most critical aim,
above all other aims, must be to continue to retain their control
over the people under them. They can only do that using the state’s
unique powers, which is why their every act has to take into consideration
how it affects the maintenance of those powers.
Chief among these powers is the power to tax. The level of taxes
imposed upon a population by a state is therefore by no means random.
The state selects the level of taxes so as to maximize its survival
and maintenance of its powers. The use of the taxing power is dual-edged,
bringing both costs and benefits to the state. Taxes that are too
high crimp productivity and create unrest. They raise the probability
that the state will be destroyed or diminished. However, higher
taxes have a benefit for the state. They can be used for purposes
that prolong the state and cement its control. Despite the net losses
to society, a state might raise taxes to build a highway system
if it believes that the high visibility and constant use of the
system might endear the state to enough citizens while the losses
that are felt by society are not attributed to the system. A state
might raise taxes to fight wars on poverty and drugs, even if these
impose net losses on society, if those losses are not tied back
to these wars and enough citizens applaud the state’s actions. A
state might use taxes to make war if it expects that making war
causes the citizens to embrace the state, overlook its defects,
and allow the state to expand its powers.
The level of taxes is therefore ultimately determined by the state’s
perceptions of the costs it is imposing on citizens as weighed against
the benefits the state receives in terms of citizen approval that
allow the state to survive and maintain its powers. The never-ending
rhetoric of the state glorifying its service to humanity as it recycles
tax revenues is strictly to cement citizen approval. The fundamental
reasons for programs are to ensure the state’s survival and maintain
its powers intact.
State corruption
Corruption and waste by states are certainly noticeable, as are
its inefficiencies in everything it attempts. Yet citizens rarely
rebel on account of them. That is because (a) the state usually
keeps corruption and waste within bounds, (b) the state persuades
citizens that these problems are necessary and in any event are
being mitigated, and (c) corruption and waste are kept hidden most
of the time. Point (a) is not always appreciated. I explain it as
follows.
The key feature of any modern state is its ability to tax the population
under its control. Without the power to enforce tax collections,
the modern state can’t function. The taxes they collect amount to
enormous sums of money compared with what leaders are paid. It is
true that in many states, the leaders simply steal large amounts
of money through taxes and bribes, which they then siphon off to
their personal Swiss bank accounts and such. It is also true that
in other states, the leaders obtain personal wealth in other devious
ways, as through pensions, campaign contributions, and high-paying
positions after they leave office. But no matter how the leaders
feather their personal nests, the main body of tax monies serves
another purpose than personal theft. The state recycles the tax
monies to selected groups and persons in the society or undertakes
foreign ventures so as to maintain the general compliance of those
whom it controls. Once the state has the power to tax, it will,
if clever, use the tax revenues to enhance its own stability and
survival. If it is clever, it will choose projects that impress
many of its subjects as being important and useful; while at the
same time choosing projects whose losses either go unnoticed or
cannot easily be attributed to the state’s inflictions.
If the state openly steals and/or wastes tax revenues, brazenly
confronting the citizens with its knavery and improvidence, this
can only undermine its standing in the people’s eyes and raise the
chances of losing its unique position and powers. It therefore has
incentives to keep corruption and waste within bounds and to use
the tax revenues with some degree of care. That it invariably fails
to accomplish these objectives efficiently has to do with organizational
problems that I have outlined before.
Conclusion
The story told here is relatively simple, but it sheds a good deal
of light on the major state interests and what they entail. The
state’s major interests are two-fold: its survival as an organization
and its maintenance of its powers. These derive directly from the
nature of the state.
Looking at the state’s activities through this lens, we better
understand that the state’s rhetoric is offered merely to persuade
its citizens that the state is a beneficial and necessary institution
with noble and humanitarian concern for its subjects. This rhetoric
could not be further from the truth, which the state obviously wishes
to conceal. If the state aimed for benefits, it would fold up its
welfare/warfare/regulatory tent and fade away to a watchman state;
for we know praxeologically that the welfare/warfare/regulatory
state’s acts by and large inflict harm.
The
analysis tells us that because the state has a monopoly on its powers
that benefits its members, it necessarily seeks to survive as an
organization and maintain its powers intact. Every act of the state,
from the level of its taxes to its programs and to its level of
corruption, therefore can be measured against those objectives so
as better to understand them.
January
3, 2007
Michael
S. Rozeff [send him mail]
is a retired Professor of Finance living in East Amherst, New York.
Copyright
© 2007 LewRockwell.com
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