Busting
Empty Bunkers
by
Gordon Prather
by Gordon Prather
On
April 12, Bloomberg
News "reported" that:
Iran,
defying United Nations Security Council demands to halt its nuclear
program, may be capable of making a nuclear bomb within 16 days,
a U.S. State Department official said.
Iran
will move to "industrial scale'' uranium enrichment involving
54,000 centrifuges at its Natanz plant, the Associated Press quoted
deputy nuclear chief Mohammad Saeedi as telling state-run television
today.
"Using
those 50,000 centrifuges they could produce enough highly enriched
uranium for a nuclear weapon in 16 days,'' Stephen Rademaker,
U.S. assistant secretary of state for international security and
nonproliferation, told reporters today in Moscow.
Well,
the Security Council made no such demand, and the "sense" of what
neo-crazy Rademaker said has deliberately been misrepresented to
you.
Rademaker
did not say that Iran would be "capable" of "making" a nuclear
bomb within 16 days after installing and getting to operate satisfactorily
uranium-enrichment cascades, involving more than 50,000 gas-centrifuges.
The
"sense" of what Rademaker said is that when and if the Iranians
have manufactured an additional 50,000 or so gas-centrifuges, installed
them in cascades in the underground "bunker" at Natanz, and gotten
the cascades to operate satisfactorily – all done under the watchful
sensors of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Safeguards
and Physical Security regime – they could then withdraw from
the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, could then
throw out the IAEA, could then perhaps reconfigure their
gas-centrifuge cascades so as to produce several hundred pounds
of bomb-grade [almost pure U-235] enriched uranium, rather than
the tons of reactor-grade enriched-uranium the cascades were designed,
built and operated to produce.
It
takes about 120 pounds to make a simple gun-type nuke like the one
we dropped on Hiroshima. It takes maybe 40 or 50 pounds of bomb-grade
enriched uranium to make an implosion-type nuke.
Of
course, virtually every implosion-type nuke that has ever been made
– including the one we dropped on Nagasaki – used almost pure Pu-239,
not almost pure U-235. (It is not possible to make a simple gun-type
nuke with Plutonium.)
Furthermore,
making an implosion nuke is not easy. If it were, then there would
be no doubt whatsoever that North Korea, or DPRK, now has a dozen
or so Pu-239 implosion-type nukes. And if they do, it is President
Bush's fault.
When
Bush became president, all DPRK nuclear materials, reactors and
associated facilities were "frozen" under IAEA lock and key, subject
to the US-IAEA-DPRK Agreed Framework of 1994. But, shortly after
the White House Iraq Group was set up to manage the Operation Iraqi
Freedom pre-war propaganda campaign, Bush unilaterally abrogated
the Agreed Framework.
The
Koreans responded by withdrawing from the NPT – which made the DPRK-IAEA
Safeguards Agreement null and void – restarting their weapons-grade
plutonium-producing reactor and chemically separating out the weapons-grade
plutonium they had already produced.
By
neo-crazy logic, the North Koreans now have at least a dozen plutonium
implosion-type nukes. And if they do, it is without any question
Bush's "bad."
Bush
claimed he abrogated the Agreed Framework because he had "intelligence"
that the Koreans has a secret nuke-oriented uranium-enrichment program,
unknown and undetected by the IAEA.
No
evidence has ever been found for such a program.
You
may recall that the principal rationale Bush gave for launching
a pre-emptive war – neither authorized by Congress or sanctioned
by the U.N. Security Council – against Iraq in 2003 was that he
had "intelligence" that the Iraqis had a secret nuke-oriented uranium-enrichment
program, unknown and undetected by the IAEA.
No
evidence has ever been found for such a program.
Now
comes Seymour Hersh's stunning article, "The
Iran Plans" in the New Yorker magazine – plus interviews
of Hersh on Wolf Blitzer's Show and by
Amy Goodman on Democracy Now – about Bush plans to pre-emptively
"take out" the Iranian secret nuke-oriented uranium-enrichment program,
unknown and undetected by the IAEA.
According
to Hersh, one of the options that the White House adamantly refuses
to take "off the table" – despite the pleading of Pentagon military
planners and our allies – is the use of bunker-busting nukes.
It
seems military planners told the White House that if they wanted
to be sure to destroy the underground uranium-enrichment bunker
at Natanz – which is to eventually hold those 50,000 gas-centrifuges,
but is now empty – they'd have to nuke it.
According
to Hersh, plans to destroy all Iranian nuclear facilities, combat
aircraft, anti-aircraft batteries and command-control centers are
in the early stages of implementation.
No
one in the Bush-Cheney administration is denying that.
Even
the option to nuke an empty bunker.
April
17, 2006
Physicist
James Gordon Prather [send
him mail] has served as a policy-implementing official for national
security-related technical matters in the Federal Energy Agency,
the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Department
of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department
of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for
national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla.
ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the
Senate Energy Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather
had earlier worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in California and Sandia National Laboratory
in New Mexico.
Copyright
© 2006 Gordon Prather
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