'Oh, Magoo, You’ve Done It Again!'
by Frederick Sheehan
by
Frederick Sheehan
DIGG THIS
Alan Greenspan’s
instinct for self-exculpation reached new heights in the March 17,
2008, Financial
Times. In "We Will Never Have a Perfect Model for Risk,"
he writes a model essay intended to eliminate risk – the risk he
might be held accountable for the imploding banking system that
he failed to regulate. Nowhere would the reader glean the author
had a hand in the topics he speaks of with such authority. Nowhere
would the reader detect a hint that the practices and models the
former Federal Reserve chairman now condemns were once either blessed
or ignored under his authority.
We read in
the FT: "The crisis will leave many casualties. Particularly
hard hit will be much of today’s financial risk-valuation system,
significant parts of which failed under stress. Those of us who
look to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholder
equity have to be in a state of shocked disbelief."
His shock and
disbelief should be directed to his own failure. If he paid the
least attention to the banking system during his tenure, he would
know that the banks have acted in self-interest. Self-interest took
the form of sucking their institutions dry to pay themselves larger
bonuses. Alan Greenspan stepped down as Fed chairman on January
31, 2006. In March 2006, Bernstein Research reported the banking
system draw down of reserve-to-loan ratios and outright reserve
releases accounted for 75% of the industry’s pre-tax income growth
since 2002. If the bankers hadn’t absconded with the life preservers,
annual earnings growth would have been 3% over the previous four
years rather than the reported 10%. Greenspan allowed this to happen
under his watch, yet, told the FT: "[W]e cannot hope
to anticipate the specifics of future crises with any degree of
confidence." We can’t now and we couldn’t then. "Never
prepared," seems to be his motto.
In the wake
of Bear Stearns’ failure, Greenspan writes: "Risk management
systems – and the models at their core – were supposed to guard
against outsized losses. How did we go so wrong?"
One reason
"we" went so wrong was to trust the then-Federal Reserve
chairman. Derivatives were the cat’s pajamas. He couldn’t tell us
often enough how they diversified risk and removed balance-sheet
liabilities from the banking system. In May 2003, at a conference
on Bank Structure and Competition: "Derivatives have permitted
financial risks to be unbundled in ways that have facilitated both
their measurement and their management… As a result, not only have
individual financial institutions become less vulnerable to shocks
from underlying risk factors, but also the financial system as a
whole has become more resilient."
Alan Greenspan
is ill-equipped to discuss the topic of derivatives vis-à-vis
the financial system. Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a large
hedge-fund with models constructed by two Nobel laureates, brought
the world’s financial system to its knees in 1998. Greenspan was
credited with saving the world (see cover of Time magazine,
February 15, 1999) yet he was ignorant of the relationship between
banks and hedge funds.
On September
29, 1998, the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) met.
(The chairman was apt to be more forthcoming at FOMC meetings since
transcripts are not released for five years.) The staff and Fed
governors briefed Greenspan on Long-Term Capital Management’s counterparties
– the banks that lent to LTCM. He was told that none of the banks,
with the exception of Banker’s Trust, had an up-to-date balance
sheet for LTCM. Even this was "only a small piece of the whole
action." Greenspan was at a loss: "The question is why
it happened in the first place. Is it just that the lenders were
dazzled by the people at LTCM and did not take a close look?"
The Fed, too, may have been dazzled by the entire banking system
since a Federal Reserve staff member told the FOMC that the banks
"were saying the right things in terms of the kinds of risk
management processes they had in place" but "the question
is how effectively the banks were actually implementing them…."
In Greenspan’s remaining decade at the helm, this gap was left to
fester. His competence was never questioned yet, in mid-September
1998, Greenspan had told the House Banking Committee "[h]edge
funds [are] strongly regulated by those who lend the money."
He writes
in the Financial Times: "I hope that one of the casualties
will not be reliance on counterparty surveillance, and more generally
financial self-regulation, as the fundamental balance mechanism
for global finance." Greenspan is not so much a proponent of
self-regulation as of self-promotion. At the same September
29 FOMC meeting, Greenspan remarked: "It is one thing for one
bank to have failed to appreciate what was happening to [LTCM],
but this list of institutions is just mind-boggling." So boggled
was the man that the Greenspan Fed allowed the financial system
to leverage as never before, suck reserves from its balance sheets
and write $400 trillion worth of derivatives between then and now
– without so much as a dollar bill of reserves.
Today,
Greenspan fears "[t]he current financial crisis in the US is
likely to be judged in retrospect as the most wrenching since the
end of the second world war…. The crisis will leave many casualties….
Since summer 2006, hundreds of thousands of homeowners, many forced
by foreclosure, have moved out of single-family homes into rental
housing."
It is a tribute
to the man’s survival instincts that he deflects attention from
his personal endorsement of CDOs – at just the time those derivatives
were beefing up the subprime market. In April 2005 at the Federal
Reserve Community Affairs Research Conference: "Lenders have
taken advantage of credit-scoring models and other techniques for
efficiently extending credit to a broader spectrum of consumers…
Where once more-marginal applicants would simply have been denied
credit, lenders are now able to quite efficiently judge the risk
posed by individual applicants.... These improvements have led to
rapid growth in subprime mortgage lending."
Greenspan’s
chosen topic for the FT article, risk models, is not a surprise.
He built his career by using and abusing them. In a March 1998 FOMC
meeting, the stock-market bubble alarmed him: "We have an economic
policy that is essentially unsustainable…. There is no credible
model of which I am aware that embodies all of this…." In June
1999, he told Congress the Fed could not assess an "unstable
bubble" before it popped. (No models.) Congress accepted the
chairman’s hallucination and the stock market ran wild. When he
met with the FOMC in October 1999, Greenspan dismissed the notion
of a stock market bubble because the models used by the Fed were
"increasingly obsolete."
In December
2000, the bubble fading in memory, but Greenspan not having admitted
there had been one, he told the FOMC: "The key question, and
one that we can not answer, is whether growth has stabilized. At
this point we cannot know.... The problem, as I've indicated on
numerous occasions and as a number of you have commented, is that
we do not have the capability of reliably forecasting a recession."
Anybody outside an economist’s laboratory could have answered that
question: several trillion dollars had been lost in the stock market
and layoffs were in the tens of thousands. But Greenspan exempted
the Fed from addressing the possibility of a recession since one
couldn’t be modeled.
Recusing himself
from responsibility to regulate the banking system, he told an audience
in 2005: "The use of a growing array of derivatives and the
related application of more sophisticated approaches to measuring
and managing risk are key factors underpinning the greater resilience
of our largest financial institutions." The former chairman
squirmed on The Daily Show. He told Jon Stewart in September
2007: "I’ve been in the forecasting business for 50 years.
… I’m
no better than I ever was, and nobody else is. Forecasting 50 years
ago was as good or as bad as it is today. And the reason is that
human nature hasn’t changed. We can’t improve ourselves." (Stewart
lost faith in America at that point: "You just bummed
the [bleep] out of me.")
Yet, his FT
advice column has the solution: "The essential problem is that
our models…are still too simple to capture the full array of governing
variables that drive global economic reality." This advice
will be quoted, university faculties will nod in approval, central
banks will calculate third-derivative proofs of Greenspan’s wisdom,
even as the financial system tries to salvage itself. He can soak
in his bathtub, much as the cartoon character who left ruin behind,
and exclaim, "Oh, Magoo, you’ve done it again!"
March
18, 2008
Frederick
Sheehan [send him mail]
is the co-author with William Fleckenstein of Greenspan’s
Bubbles, McGraw-Hill, 2008.
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© 2008 LewRockwell.com
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