First Step – Fire the Fed
by Fred Sheehan
by
Fred Sheehan
DIGG THIS
Treasury Secretary
Hank Paulson has proposed the Federal Reserve be given broad powers
to regulate the financial industry. He could not have nominated
a more incompetent body. The Coast Guard would do a better job.
Financial upheaval
owes homage to derivatives that shrouded the massive growth in debt
and leverage. This murky world inflated the incentives of those
who ran the machinery over the cliff – bankers, mortgage brokers,
law firms, appraisers, rating agencies, politicians, and on it goes.
This is well known. Despite protestations, the parties knew they
were behaving either recklessly or criminally at the time. The Federal
Reserve encouraged them.
With a straight
face, Hank Paulson proposes that the Fed quash future imbroglios.
Yet the terracotta soldiers of Xian would bring more initiative
to the assignment.
In September
1998, the Federal Reserve didn’t have the slightest idea of how
the banking system functioned; it hadn’t the slightest idea of the
banks’ exposure to hedge funds; nor had it the slightest idea of
the leverage within the financial system. Maybe these deficiencies
are excusable, although the Federal Reserve was responsible for
regulating bank holding companies (the holding companies being where
much of the risk was housed). It is unpardonable in the aftermath,
having learned of its own deficiencies, the Federal Reserve made
no effort to improve its oversight or to warn of the dangers it
had recently discovered. Instead, the Fed encouraged devious practices.
In the first
three weeks of September 1998, Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM),
a Greenwich, Conn., hedge fund, lost half a billion dollars per
week and everyone knew it. Except, possibly, Alan Greenspan. In
mid-September, the Federal Reserve chairman told the House Banking
Committee that "Hedge funds [are] strongly regulated by those
who lend the money." On Sept. 21, LTCM lost $550 million. In
a virtuoso rejection of every financial institution’s model, all
security prices went down. This is normal. In a panic, everyone
sells.
The Fed’s lackluster
oversight was partly to blame. On May 2, 1998, Alan Greenspan gave
a speech in which he emphasized the advantages of "private
market regulation." Greenspan explained, "Rapidly changing
technology has begun to render obsolete much of the bank examination
regime established in earlier decades. Bank regulators are perforce
now being pressed to depend increasingly on ever more complex and
sophisticated private market regulation… One of the key lessons
from U.S. banking history [is] that counterparty supervision is
still the first line of regulatory defense." He also noted
the Federal Reserve’s decision to supervise "risk management
procedures, rather than actual portfolios." The Fed now evaluated
how banks monitored their own risks (e.g., their modeling techniques,
the process used to monitor counterparties) in lieu of examining
specific securities.
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) held a conference call
on Sept. 29, 1998. The staff and Federal Reserve governors briefed
Greenspan on Long-Term Capital Management’s counterparties – the
banks that lent to LTCM. He was told that none of the banks, with
the exception of Bankers Trust, had an up-to-date balance sheet
for LTCM. Even this was "only a small piece of [Bankers’] whole
action because so much of the latter is off balance sheet."
When assets are off balance sheet, the bank’s motivation to "strongly
regulate" is diminished.
The Federal
Reserve chairman was at a loss: "The question is why it happened
in the first place. Is it just that the lenders were dazzled by
the people at LTCM and did not take a close look?" Vice Chairman
William McDonough replied there "was in place a credit system
that made a great deal of sense." In the next sentence – which
simply cannot have been an explanation of this sensible
system – McDonough told the FOMC: "For at least some of the
lenders, there was no initial margin requirement." McDonough
went on to suggest the Federal Reserve might have taken more initiative:
"We do not regulate the firm. But given the number of institutions
they dealt with around the world, was there a way that should have
enabled us to be more aware of their overall position? One is inclined
to say, ‘You bet.’ But exactly how we could have done that I am
not so sure."
This was not
the time for the FOMC to design a regulatory apparatus, but the
Greenspan Fed never did attempt to fill this gap. In retirement,
Greenspan reminds his audiences that the Fed does not regulate hedge
funds. True, but the Fed could have worked backward from the foundation
that McDonough had suggested. (The SEC is responsible for monitoring
broker-dealers. It, too, has failed miserably.) The need for adult
supervision of banks was obvious when a staffer commented on the
conference call, "It is something of a signature for [LTCM]
to insist that if a counterparty wanted to deal with them, there
would be no initial margin. Not many other firms have gotten away
with that." For this reason alone, the Fed should have geared
up its watchdogs to better monitor the suicidal banking system it
regulated.
Another staff
member enlightened the FOMC with a frightful prospect: "The
counterparties…get comfortable with zero percent margin. But from
the [financial] system’s point of view, zero initial margin permits
an essentially unlimited amount of leverage. There is no constraint
other than the exhaustion on the part of the counterparties."
Greenspan and Bernanke fiddled with their slide rules as financial
derivatives grew to 10 times the world’s GDP. In 2007, Bernanke
should have known that banks, in a desperate attempt keep dancing,
were borrowing at five percent to lend at four percent.
Greenspan was
vexed: "It is one thing for one bank to have failed to appreciate
what was happening to [LTCM], but this list of [banks without knowledge
of LTCM’s positions] is just mind-boggling." So boggled was
the man that the Greenspan (and Bernanke) Fed allowed the banks
to lever as never before and write $400 trillion worth of derivatives
between then and 2008 – without so much as a dollar bill of reserves:
Nor a peep that maybe these off-balance-sheet liabilities might
bear closer attention.
A staff member
described what he had learned on his field trip to LTCM. On Aug.
31, the hedge fund had a $125 billion balance sheet. It also had
$1.4 trillion of off-balance-sheet assets. On Sept. 21, when it
appears (from the transcript) the Fed first saw LTCM’s balance sheet,
its leverage was 55-to-1 and the "off-balance-sheet leverage
was 100-to-1 or 200-to-1 – I don’t know how to calculate it."
He wasn’t alone. Greenspan’s "first line of regulatory defense"
didn’t know if LTCM was trading interest rate swaps or stolen cars.
The models of LTCM’s "counterparty supervision" were so
"complex and sophisticated" that the hedge fund’s portfolio
had been translated into a Greek salad – gammas, thetas, and epsilons.
For practical
purposes, LTCM had no capital by Sept. 29. It was not able to meet
margin calls. The hedge fund had not been required to post margin,
but was required to post collateral worth 100 percent of the assets
it borrowed. Even this looked amateurish. Greenspan, a former director
of J.P. Morgan, shared his view: "If I am a bank lender and
I lend $200 million to a hedge find, ordinarily, I would be overcollateralized.
I would hold more than $200 billion in, say, U.S. Treasury bills."
Greenspan asked if the collateral was U.S. Treasuries. A staffer
replied: "U.S. Treasuries, Danish government bonds, BBB credits
– you name it." Beanie Babies were next on the list. The value
of LTCM’s collateral was falling. The balance sheets of the banks
LTCM traded with were sinking.
A staffer explained
the risk: "I’m going to say this in plain English. If markets
keep moving away from [LTCM] in the wrong direction, their future
exposure could be large and they might not have the collateral at
that point in time to cover the exposure." McDonough had described
the house of cards earlier: "The firm’s position in a variety
of instruments was very large. What my contacts were talking about
was the effect that the failure of the firm would have on world
markets if all these positions had to be dumped on the markets.
People who thought they had an offsetting position with [LTCM] would
suddenly find that they did not have one. They would suddenly find
themselves with big open positions…" Globalization might end
in a financial meltdown.
A Fed staffer
thought the banks "were saying the right things in terms of
the kinds of risk management processes they had in place" but
"the question is how effectively the banks were actually implementing
them…" The Fed staff had not taken the initiative to check.
Greenspan was told the Federal Reserve had not examined the banks
since December 1997. In Greenspan’s remaining decade at the helm,
his bureaucrats produced masterful studies on counterparty risk,
but permitted the banks’ risk models to optimize executive bonus
compensation.
This is interesting,
but not of great utility in 2008. The 1998 Fed weaknesses are important
because the molehill grew into a mountain. Greenspan and Bernanke
chaired the most egregious administrative failure in financial history.
Paulson’s proposal is on a par with Caligula’s decision to name
his horse consul.
In March 1999,
Greenspan gave a speech on derivatives. He might have wandered onto
the podium from Mars. Derivatives "are an increasingly important
vehicle for unbundling risk." He doused the post-LTCM movement
toward a better form of regulation: "Some may now argue that
the periodic emergence of financial panics implies a need to abandon
models-based approaches to regulatory capital and to return to traditional
approaches based on regulatory risk schemes. In my view, this would
be a major mistake." The regulators’ risk models "are
much less accurate than banks’ risk measurement models." The
Federal Reserve is not the institution to lead the much-needed bank
regulation.
The nominal
value of derivative contracts held by U.S. commercial banks (those
over which the Fed has direct regulatory authority) leapt from $33
trillion at the end of 1998 to $101 trillion at the end of 2005,
about the time Greenspan left office. We mustn’t ignore Greenspan’s
successor: By the second quarter of 2007, 18 months later, these
banks held $153 trillion in derivatives. The collapsing financial
system is in the early stage of unwinding. Ben Bernanke has had
time as Fed chairman to do something – anything – to slow the production
of bad debt. Instead, the rate of financial claims in the economy
accelerated.
The virtues
of derivatives (their ability to diversify risk away from the banking
system) received full approval from Greenspan and, more to the point,
from his audiences. Bernanke is considered a monetary genius. Will
we ever learn? Someday, we might ridicule, rather than praise, the
Fed. On that day, it should be disbanded.
April
15, 2008
Fred Sheehan
[send him mail] is
finishing a biography of Alan Greenspan. He writes frequently for
the Gloom, Boom & Doom Report, Whiskey & Gunpowder and the Prudent
Bear website. He has worked in the financial industry for more than
two decades. This was reprinted from Whiskey
& Gunpowder.
Copyright
© 2008 Fred Sheehan
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