Leisure Socialism

In this piece, I want to lay out some of the reasons that many Americans took up socialist projects in the 60's, 70's, and 80's, and to suggest that some of the motives involved are not themselves incompatible with libertarian approaches. I am primarily interested in more-or-less suburbanite attraction to socialist ideas, such as interest in having the government provide an at least basic level of housing, education, and health care to all citizens. Furthermore, I am not so much focused on all conceivable grounds for this attraction, but rather am centrally focused on the motives of promoting possibilities for what I will term "leisure activities."

In post-WWII America, the major basis for interest in furthering citizens' possibilities for leisure stemmed from the view that we were living in, or would soon be living in, what Galbraith termed a "society of abundance." In short, the idea that many of us had was that America was a land of great wealth, and that many people were working much more than was strictly required for all to enjoy the needed goods of life, such as housing, education, healthcare, transportation, food, etc. It was not merely that people individually accumulated "excess wealth" through over-work, but, more importantly, that most of the work done contributed to the acquisition of additional wealth by those who already had more than enough to secure the "basics" of life. So not only was leisure being undervalued relative to labor by many individuals, but there was a lack of potential leisure time available to citizens, relative to the potential that would be on offer if wealth were more equally distributed, or otherwise seized to bring about greater equality among citizens' levels of wealth.

In some ways, it was odd that interest in leisure should be at all central to interest in socialist policies. One might think that it would be times when there was not "enough to go around" where one would be most interested in getting a larger share. And, indeed, this is the case. But of course, socialism is not about "one" getting a larger share, but about most people getting a larger share. The leisure-socialist motive grows popular only when individuals in society are producing a sufficient level of goods at sufficiently low prices such that most citizens feel "safe" from starvation, homelessness, and similar evils of poverty. Prior to reaching this comfort zone, people are more likely to accept inequalities that further wealth creation, placing their hopes not in achieving goals pursued in leisure, but in greater opportunities for future generation. However, as more individuals become more comfortable with the level of wealth they have attained (as sufficient to avoid starvation, homelessness, etc.), they also, all things being equal, become more comfortable with the idea of reducing economic inequalities, even if this will hamper wealth creation overall. In other words, economic comfort makes a more evenly distributed, but smaller pie a more acceptable idea (psychologically speaking).

In the 60's and 70's, many American suburbanites had reached a level of economic and social comfort that provided fertile soil for socialist ideas. Undoubtedly, individual non-suburbanites would likewise approach this comfort zone. More importantly, all kinds of people had all kinds of different motives for considering socialism. But what I am interested in here is the "leisure motive." And I am interested in this motive among suburbanites in particular because they would seem to be the least likely American "demographic" to favor a socialist order in America, while, at the same, constituting a sizeable chunk of the overall population. Finally, I focus on suburbanites because they were the group most interested in the leisure motive relative to other motives. Among urbanites the overlap with suburbanite consciousness was present, but so were more straightforwardly Marxist ideas, feelings of class resentment, and feelings of ethnic resentment (for example, as stemmed from real or imagined "WASP" wrongs).

What were these socialist ideas that took root in minds of so many suburbanites? In general, they were very gradualist in nature. Opportunities for an immediate life of leisure were noted, and plans for further government expenditure to relieve the need for "excessive" amounts of work entered into day-to-day discourse. Initially, of course, there was the hippie movement, which stressed simplicity of lifestyle, and rejection of lifestyles required to fit into high-pay, high-work positions, such as in standard law firms, banks, brokerages, and other similar office positions. At the same time, new opportunities to live off government financial assistance were pursued, such as spending on student loans, healthcare, un-employment insurance, food stamps, etc. Corresponding to this "direct action," was the adoption of political stances favoring increased government assistance in these areas, along with a desire to have "the well-off" foot the bill. The major focus, excluding the political activities of the "committed," was to pursue of life of music and drugs in a way that had not previously been possible on large scale, due to the demands of work and the providers of work.

Branching out from the hippie movement and parallel counter-cultural activities favored by suburbanites (including those who had transplanted themselves to the city or country), were a variety of other youth-based groups. These were generally of highly diverse nature, and their nature is not well documented. I will limit myself to describing what occurred in California in the late 70's and in the 80's, as this I can address from personal experience: there were punks, "mods" (moderns), & neo-hippies of various flavors. More importantly, there were the much larger group composed of those who had selected out central lifestyle elements from these first three groups: we could simply call this the initial post-punk movement or group.

All of this youth activity was very exciting, at least for those involved. There was the glimpses offered of a future where work did not have to be the individual's focus, such that most of one's time could be spent simply on socializing, making free art, free theoretical works, practicing mysticism, etc.

Indeed, this is quite a noble future, and there are not necessarily very many Americans who reject such a future society in and of itself. There are those of strongly Protestant bent who might have seen something wrong with a future that does not make work central. But, in the main, the objection has not been to this future itself, but either to the proposed means of achieving it, such as massive expansion of the size of government, or to the feasibility of achieving such a future without seriously damaging society in other ways.

Why were many Americans relatively un-daunted by these kinds of objections? I would argue that no answer to this question is going to be credible that does not focus on Americans' understanding of race. A dramatic shift in this understanding occurred starting in the 1950's, and reaching a high point in the late 80's. Growing up in this period of 50's–80's, many elements of the earlier understanding would still be enculturated. In considering these elements, one can of course point to beliefs in the un-suitability of non-whites for carrying out activities central to Western civilization, such as developing and using high technology. Just as important, though, was the understanding that whites would continue to constitute something close to a third of the world's population, and would vastly out-number any racial minorities in traditionally majority white nations.

Armed with elements of these pre-50's beliefs about race, Westerners would plan a future of leisure that was really a future of leisure for the West. They would do this because they could imagine that the non-Western world would return to some suitable, local form of culture now that colonialism had been severely curbed. And they would do so because they imagined that the future of the West would be the significant factor in the overall future of the planet.

However, as Westerners became more widely acquainted with the fact that the globe was largely non-white and growing more so every minute, it was no longer credible to claim that planning for the West was planning for "the future." Moreover, as it became apparent that many Asian nations were approaching or even occasionally exceeding Western technological progress, this lack of credibility became doubly apparent.

In addition, the initial "comfort zone" began to fade, due to the deleterious economic effects of the initial quasi-socialist and socialist policies in Western nations, and the perceived "economic threat" of Asia, as represented by Japan. More generally, changing ideas about the relation of the West to the globe made Westerners adverse to policies of wealth distribution that would hamper their ability to engage in economic competition with Asian nations; or that would limit Westerner's abilities to collect resources to deal with perceived future threats from the overall global population.

Thus lived ideologies favorable to certain leisure socialist ideas had to be reconstructed to embrace a more global awareness. It was no longer feasible to plan just for the West, and let the rest of the world's population more-or-less develop autonomously. Instead, it was necessary to plan for a future of basic goods for all. Given the size and scope of global poverty, even the most optimistic advocate of leisure secured through socialist means would have to admit that a future of leisure was not on the horizon. Add to this a growing, generalized disillusionment with the negative economic effects of state intervention: living and planning for leisure took something of a beating, to say the least. Instead, new plans emerged. From the right, we received a plan involving free trade and America acting as the world's "engine of growth." Many counter-culturally inclined individuals entered into this plan through pursuit of computer and/or entrepreneurial careers. From the left, we received a plan focused on "sharing" the West's resources with the rest of the world, as it continued to develop so as to embrace many Western technological and economic elements. This plan was pursued by many leisurely folk who entered into non-profit work, education, and political lobbying. However, regardless of which of these two plans individuals chose, it is clear that a lot of hard work is involved all around, and not quite so much leisure as might have once been hoped for.

Of course, the leisure socialist can stick to her guns, and demand government spending to allow leisure-centered lives nationally, even if this has no effect internationally, or is even actively harmful to the international effort to see that the basic needs of individuals are met. This is what many European leftists propose.

However, there are other options. If one is actually interested in allowing, in the short term, more individuals belonging to small subgroups of the overall global population to have leisure-centered lives, and is willing to abandon the short-term goal of much greater leisure time for all or most who want it, then there is little point in looking to the state. "Leisure for all," might work to whip up support for state intervention. But "leisure for just some of our fellow citizens, and never mind about the rest of the world" is not going to work. Only a relatively small number of individuals will be willing to see significant portions of their wealth used to support such a limited "leisure initiative," and, of these, most will not accept the forcible direction of their wealth by the state even to projects toward which they are in principle well-disposed. (For one, the state will never fund quite the same projects as a private individual would.)

As such, if one is interested in the goal of leisure for the many, if not the all, then it would be best to promote libertarianism and leisure-directed charity. Many choose to give to those unable to secure adequate food, housing, or education. Nonetheless, some of those of means might be capable of being convinced that it would be good to give to those who perhaps do not have such inabilities, but who would definitely prefer to spend a few years surfing and hanging out with their friends, etc. I suppose it is a question of artistic vision: does it somehow please one that society contains many well-fed, well-housed adults who do very little but play, and perhaps also (at their discretion) engage in un-proven artistic or theoretical activity? I.e., would it please you to see society have more of such individuals? Well, perhaps most of would not be so pleased, or at least, it is not anything close to a high priority. Nonetheless, perhaps other individuals would be so pleased, and have the means to enact their particular vision.

Libertarianism allows for local property arrangements that promote social homogeneity and an ethos of hard work within the local area in question, as Hoppe makes clear in his Democracy: the God that Failed. However, if capable individuals truly have interests that conflict with homogeneity and hard work, these interests will also be expressed in local areas as the state withers away.

Certainly, I did get the impression that Hoppe would be skeptical that such charity-directed interest in leisure as I have sketched would actually be particularly expressed, as the state withered away. I say this because of Hoppe's suggestion that, from a theoretical perspective, conservative attitudes and libertarianism go hand-in-hand. Skepticism is, in any case, in order. But so too is the need to highlight the many possible goals that capable individuals can achieve apart from the state, if they so choose.

January 27, 2004