A
new book entitled The
Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable by George
Victor and published by Potomac Books Inc. of Washington, D.C. is
well researched and gives a very clear picture of how and why the
Pearl Harbor myth was created. This "patriotic political myth"
states that the attack by the Japanese was unprovoked and was a
surprise to the Roosevelt administration, as well as, the key military
personnel in Washington; but the commanders of Pearl Harbor were
at fault for not being ready. Based on a good summary of the up-to-date
research the author, who is an approving admirer of Roosevelt, concludes
that Roosevelt deliberately provoked the attack and that he and
his key military and administrative advisers clearly knew, well
in advance, that the Japanese were going to attack both Pearl Harbor
and the Philippines. Roosevelt wanted to get into the European War
but he had been unsuccessful in provoking Germany; therefore, he
considered the sacrifice of Pearl Harbor and the Philippines as
the best way to get into the European War through the back door
of Japan. The cover-up of this strategy started immediately after
the attack and continues to this day. The author concludes that
this information of the coming attack was intentionally withheld
from the military commanders because it was known that the Japanese
were depending upon the element of surprise and if warnings had
been sent to the commanders of Pearl Harbor and the Philippines,
their preparation for the attack would have caused the Japanese
to cancel their plans.
The losses
and damages at Pearl Harbor are described by Victor as follows:
"In
the Pearl Harbor attack, the United States lost twenty-four hundred
troops along with a quarter of her fleet. Many military leaders
and Knox, Hull, and Roosevelt had underestimated the harm Japan
could do, even by a surprise attack. And U.S. losses were much
increased by two unlikely events. A Japanese bomb penetrated the
battleship Arizona’s armor at an odd angle, reaching her
magazine and causing her to explode. And the torpedoed battleship
Oklahoma capsized. The explosion of the Arizona and
the capsizing of the Oklahoma resulted in the drowning
of sixteen hundred sailors."
The tremendous
losses in the Philippines have been virtually hidden from the American
public but they were mostly the native soldiers and civilians. Victor
states:
"The
Philippines suffered widespread destruction and was captured.
Twenty-four hundred troops and seventy civilians were lost in
Hawaii. In the Philippines, one hundred forty thousand troops
were lost and civilian deaths – still unreported – are estimated
to have been as high as three million. Nonetheless, the defeat
at Pearl Harbor became a wrenching tragedy, and the administration
sacrificed the commanders there to restore public confidence,
while the defeat in the Philippines became a noble defense. Despite
devastation and loss of the Philippines, a public relations operation
turned MacArthur into a hero and he was promoted. The public reaction
is not strange, however, when seen in the light of government
control of information – a usual wartime practice."
The author
states that the most recent Pearl Harbor investigation by Congress
in October, 2000 resulted in a resolution by Congress "calling
on President William Clinton to restore the reputations of Short
and Kimmel. It provoked the flurry of accusations that Congress
was usurping the job of historians, revising history, and reviving
a long-discredited conspiracy theory. Clinton took no action on
the resolution."
The author,
Victor, includes a chapter from the viewpoint of the Japanese. They
were being pressured strongly by Germany to enter the war by attacking
the Soviet Union, thereby creating a two-front war for the Communist
nation. This strategy came within the actual interests of Japan
since they, like Germany, saw Communism as a great evil and a threat
to their respective nations. Furthermore, Japan had substantial
claims to parts of Manchuria as a result of defeating Russia in
the war of 1905. Both Germany and Japan wanted to avoid a war with
America at almost any cost. Roosevelt was well aware of this pressure
on Japan by Germany but he felt that it was necessary to protect
the Soviet Union as being the best weapon against the Germans, and
therefore, he wanted to prevent Japan from attacking Russia. Roosevelt
began extensive provocations to cause Japan to abandon its attack
on Russia and instead attack America which also served the purpose
of giving Roosevelt the reason to enter the war. Roosevelt launched
an eight-point provocation plan primarily through the cutting off
of oil supplies to Japan so that by the time of the attack on Pearl
Harbor Japan was virtually out of oil and on the verge of industrial
and military collapse. The attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines
also would provide Japan with the ability to attack the Dutch interests
in the Pacific, thereby giving them a new supply of oil.
Victor sees
Roosevelt’s decisions as being based upon the assumption of the
truth of the following statement: "Hitler’s plan to conquer
and enslave most of the world was hardly a secret." The author
cites no authority for this plan of Hitler to conquer the world
and you will not find this in the two books that Hitler wrote nor
in any of his speeches. His intentions were well known before and
during the war. He stated from the beginning, before he took power,
as well as thereafter, that he was against the harsh and unfair
Versailles Treaty which virtually disarmed Germany and it included
the inequities created for Germany in Poland and Czechoslovakia,
which he intended to correct either through negotiation or, if necessary,
by force. He stated and wrote that the only war he wanted was to
fight Communism and to regain some of the living space that Germany
had acquired in their treaty with Russia during World War I, which
was abrogated by the Versailles Treaty. Nevertheless, the defeat
of Hitler, not Germany, appears to be the premise upon which the
author states that Roosevelt acted so that the end justified the
means. Hitler, the man, must be defeated at all costs and these
costs included the sacrifice of Pearl Harbor and the Philippines
in order to get into the European War via Japan.
I need to depart
from a review of Victor’s book momentarily in order to take issue
with his basic assumption that Roosevelt’s main interest was the
defeat of Hitler. If his primary end was simply the death of Hitler,
Roosevelt had an excellent opportunity of letting the key military
officers in the regular German army carry out a plan of assassination.
Allen Dulles
was stationed in Switzerland with the OSS (which preceded the CIA)
and was assigned the primary duty of seeing if there was a resistance
movement in Germany which might overthrow Hitler. Dulles learned
of a very substantial plot to kill Hitler early in the war in 1942
after Germany’s defeat at Stalingrad. While Stalin had murdered
35,000 to 50,000 of his senior military officers prior to the war
in order to put in his loyal officers, Hitler had resisted this
strategy and did not purge the regular German army of its senior
officers. Early in the war a large number of these senior officers,
including his Chief of Staff, General Ludwig Beck, built up a strong
resistance movement with the purpose of assassinating Hitler and
then surrendering to the American and British forces. They intended
then to continue the war against Communism and the Soviet Union.
A new government was to be created with Beck at the head and Dr.
Carl Goerdeler, former mayor of Leipzig, to be the two top people.
There was originally a large group who helped draw up the plan which
included numerous civilians who would serve in the new democratic
government, so it was not just to be a military coup. Dulles stated
that even after the resistance movement had been discouraged by
Roosevelt’s unconditional surrender policy, nevertheless, a small
group of officers who remained committed to the assassination of
Hitler made an unsuccessful attempt on Hitler’s life on July 20,
1944. Hitler rounded up all of the people who were even suspected
of being a part of this plot and this amounted to over 200,000 Germans
who were put in concentration camps and many were killed. The two
principal high-ranking German officers who took part in the plot
met their fate on the next day after the attempt, with one being
shot by a firing squad and General Beck was allowed to commit suicide
in the presence of the Nazi officers.
When Roosevelt
first learned of this significant resistance movement and the plan
of the Germans to surrender immediately to America and the British,
he unilaterally announced the unconditional surrender policy which
caused much of the resistance movement to dissolve and their plans
to be abandoned. Roosevelt’s unconditional surrender policy was
not well received by either Churchill or Stalin. Dulles, as well
as, many key military advisers, were unsuccessful in getting Roosevelt
to abandon or substantially revise this policy. They pointed out
to Roosevelt that it would discourage the assassination of Hitler.
It would make the Germans fight harder, cause the war to last longer
and be more costly than necessary. Roosevelt’s policy required unconditional
surrender to the British, the Soviets and America simultaneously.
No surrender would be accepted unless it was made to all three at
the same time. Many of the German officers decided that they would
rather fight against all three rather than surrender to the Soviet
Union. (See Germany’s
Underground: The Anti-Nazi Resistanceby Allen Dulles and
Unconditional
Surrenderby Anne Armstrong.)
One of the
best writers on World War II was Hanson Baldwin, who covered the
war for The New York Times. After the war he wrote a book
entitled Great
Mistakes of the War, which was published in 1949. Baldwin
says the greatest mistake made was the unconditional surrender policy
of Roosevelt. He states that the policy "probably discouraged
the opposition to Hitler" and adds that it "probably lengthened
the war, cost us lives and helped to lead to the present abortive
peace." Baldwin then points out that it also had a detrimental
effect in the war against Japan. The Japanese had indicated they
were willing to surrender if the unconditional surrender policy
was changed so as to allow them to keep their Emperor but President
Roosevelt ignored the offer in January of 1945. After Roosevelt’s
death, President Truman stated he was going to continue the unconditional
surrender policy and rejected the offer in July, 1945. The war continued
and Truman ordered the atomic bombs to be dropped in August of 1945
and the surrender followed in September. The Japanese were allowed
to keep their Emperor after the war, and so in the end, the unconditional
surrender policy was dropped as to Japan, but only after they were
bombed with two atomic bombs. (See The
Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb by Dennis D. Wainstock
and The
Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb by Gar Alperovitz.)
My argument
is that Roosevelt’s unconditional surrender policy was designed
to stop the resistance movement because Roosevelt did not want an
early end to the war. He wanted a new chance to create a world organization,
which he may have actually believed would end all war for the future.
President Wilson had made this promise with the creation of the
League of Nations. Roosevelt’s plan was to bring all nations under
the cover of the United Nations with America and the Soviet Union
as the remaining two super powers who would be virtually in control
of this new world organization. Roosevelt had been part of the Woodrow
Wilson administration and personally witnessed the worldwide adulation
of President Wilson immediately after World War I when he came to
Europe. Roosevelt saw the admiring mobs of people who lined the
streets in France and Italy to cheer Wilson and the newspaper reports
stated that thousands of people lined the railroad tracks at night
just to watch Wilson’s train go by. Wilson was considered by millions
of people as the greatest man in the world at that time because
it was perceived that he brought peace to the world and had saved
Europe. His vision for the League of Nations was considered by many
as the hope of the future throughout the world to stop all war forever.
(See Paris
1919: Six Months that Changed the World by Margaret MacMillan.)
Roosevelt made 800 speeches in his vice presidential campaign in
1920 praising the League of Nations. Roosevelt felt that America’s
entry into World War II would give him a chance to succeed where
his mentor and idol, Woodrow Wilson, had failed when the American
Senate failed to approve the Versailles Treaty which contained the
provision creating the League of Nations.
In August of
1941, Roosevelt met with Churchill prior to Pearl Harbor and brought
up the United Nations idea to which Churchill objected. Nevertheless,
Churchill went along with it because he needed America in the war.
Stalin also objected to the United Nations idea and both he and
Churchill felt that the postwar settlement should have separate
spheres of influence for each victor rather than a world organization
to which the countries might lose their sovereignty and also lose
control of their special goals.
The best account
of Roosevelt and the United Nations is thoroughly covered in the
book entitled FDR
and the Creation of the U.N.by Townsend Hoopes and Douglas
Brinkley published by the Yale University Press in 1997. Both authors
are admirers of Roosevelt and of his accomplishment in creating
the United Nations. A brief summary of the main points and several
excerpts will tell that story.
"On
November 10, 1939, Pope Pius XII proclaimed the need to establish
‘a stable international organization’ after the war. In a private
response of December 23, President Roosevelt voiced his belief
that, while no spiritual or civic leader could now define a specific
structure for the future, ‘the time for that will surely come’;
meanwhile, the United States would ‘encourage a closer association
between those in every part of the world – those in religion and
those in government – who have a common purpose.’ "
The authors
then point out that extensive planning began to take place by others
in regard to the postwar settlement:
"Into
this planning vacuum stepped the private Council on Foreign Relations
with an offer to study postwar issues secretly and make its deliberations
available to the State Department. The council was a Northeastern
seaboard phenomenon, an elitist mix of prominent New York bankers
and lawyers with European interests and prominent academics and
intellectuals, many of whom had served as advisers to Woodrow
Wilson at the Paris peace conference. The businessmen provided
the money, while the scholars furnished most of the intellectual
leadership. The council operated mainly through off-the-record
conferences, study groups, and small dinners confined to members,
who were addressed by foreign or American statesmen. It published
Foreign Affairs, a scholarly quarterly that had become
the leading American journal of its kind. In an age when fewer
than one thousand Americans could claim a journeyman’s competence,
or even a sustained interest, in foreign affairs, the Council
on Foreign Relations was a rare island of influence and expertise
in the body politic."
In less than
one month after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 and
followed immediately by the declaration of war by Congress, Roosevelt
began forming the United Nations into a specific entity:
"On
January 1, 1942, the Soviet and Chinese ambassadors in Washington
joined with Roosevelt and Churchill (who had arrived at the White
House in late December) in signing the Declaration by United Nations.
The following day, representatives of twenty-two other nations
at war with the Axis powers added their signatures to the document,
which created a wartime alliance of states who promised to wage
war with all of their resources and not sign a separate peace.
The president apparently thought up the name ‘United Nations’
and secured the Prime Minister’s approval by bursting into his
bedroom at the White House while the doughty Britain was taking
a bath."
Roosevelt felt
that Wilson had been partly to blame for the failure of the Senate
to authorize the signing of the Versailles Treaty, thereby causing
America not to join the League of Nations. Roosevelt felt that he
could be more flexible if he only had a war which would give him
an opportunity to succeed where Wilson had failed. Hoopes and Brinkley
give a quick historical review as follows:
"The
Senate’s rejection of the League of Nations treaty on March 19,
1920, was a result of many factors, of which perhaps the most
basic was the enduring fear and contempt for Europe’s continual
intrigues and wars. As most Americans saw it, they had sent their
young men to France in 1917 to fight and die for a worthy cause
– to make the world safe for democracy." But they had recoiled
in disgust and disbelief at the spectacle of greed displayed by
the European victors and embodied in the vengeful Treaty of Versailles.
More direct and immediate reasons for the Senate’s rejection of
the League were the personal bitterness between President Wilson
and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-Massachusetts), chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the misplaced loyalty
of the Democratic Senators to their party leader in the White
House. The primary cause of failure, however, was the absolute
rigidity rooted in moral and intellectual arrogance, of Woodrow
Wilson."
The authors
point out that Roosevelt was much more flexible and willing to compromise
in order to create the United Nations.
After America
entered the war there was a great deal of activity in trying to
help Roosevelt create the United Nations. Hoopes and Brinkley state
the following:
"John
Foster Dulles apparently felt that the Shotwell group was too
secular, for he formed the Commission to Study the Bases of a
Just and Durable Peace, under the auspices of the Federal Council
of Churches. In one of many speeches, he declared, ‘the sovereignty
system is no longer consonant with either peace or justice,’ and
said that he was ‘rather appalled’ at the lack of any agreed peace
aims ‘to educate and crystalize public opinion.’ Yet he too offered
no specific remedies. In a long editorial in Life magazine
entitled ‘The American Century,’ publisher Henry Luce noted the
‘golden opportunity’ for world leadership that the United States
had passed up in 1919, and called on the American people to help
Roosevelt succeed where Wilson had failed. It was now the time,
Luce wrote, to accept ‘our duty and our opportunity as the most
powerful and vital nation in the world.’ "
Hoopes and
Brinkley go on to describe Roosevelt’s immediate public endorsement
of the United Nations in his State of the Union address as follows:
"The
President’s State of the Union address on January 6, 1942 – just
one month after the attack on Pearl Harbor – was praised by George
Orwell on BBC radio as a ‘complete and uncompromising break .
. . with isolationism.’ Roosevelt said, ‘the mood of quiet grim
resolution which here prevails bodes ill for those who conspired
and collaborated to murder world peace. The mood is stronger than
any mere desire for revenge. It expresses the will of the American
people to make very certain that the world will never so suffer
again. He referred to the signing of the Declaration by the United
Nations just six days before, and defined the primary objective
of that act to be ‘the consolidation of the United Nations’ total
war effort against our common enemies.’ His focus was entirely
on the war effort.
But if the
Administration had decided that the public disclosure of postwar
plans were dangerously premature, such inhibitions did not apply
to the press and private sector. Throughout 1942, there was a
steady procession of proposals for shaping the new world and educating
the American people.
The Commission
to Study the Organization of Peace, whose president, Columbia
professor James T. Shotwell, was an occasional adviser to the
State Department planning effort, accepted the need for an ‘Anglo
– American directorate’ to run the world in the immediate postwar
period . . .
On March
5, 1942, the Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable
Peace, headed by John Foster Dulles, proposed a far more radical
solution. It called specifically for a world government complete
with a parliament, an international court, and appropriate agencies.
The world government would have the power to regulate international
trade, settle disputes between member nations, and control all
military forces, except those needed to maintain domestic order..."
"A more
convincing, more sophisticated argument for realpolitik was Walter
Lippmann’s 1943 best-seller, U.S.
Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, a brilliant essay
designed to counter the idealistic one-world internationalism
of which Wendell Willkie was the leading purveyor. It sold nearly
one half million copies. Lippmann, a crusading editor who had
helped Woodrow Wilson prepare his peace program, had been disillusioned
by theVersailles Treaty and the League of Nations, but
retained the conviction that American leadership in world affairs
was an absolute prerequisite of stability and peace. He thought
Willkie’s thesis was founded on sand and that its corollary –
that the United States must undertake to police the world – was
a dangerous doctrine. Lippmann argued that all nations must balance
their commitments with their resources and should avoid being
overextended.
Lippmann’s
formula for peace was no new League of Nations but a basic alliance
of the United States, Britain and Russia. No other nations were
serious factors in the world power equation. China and France
were not great powers. Only Britain and Russia were strong enough
to threaten U.S. security, but given America’s close ties to Britain,
there was no risk from that quarter. The only real danger was
a falling out with Russia, but peace and stability required that
this be avoided at all costs, for an Anglo-American alliance against
Russia would set the stage ‘inexorably’ for a third world war."
Hoopes and
Brinkley summarize the negotiations between Roosevelt, Churchill
and Stalin, pointing out that Roosevelt suggested the Big Four World
Policeman would be America, Great Britain, Russia and China and
then there would be seven representatives of regional organizations.
However, Roosevelt privately stated to his key advisers that Soviet
Russia and America would be the two remaining super powers and would
be actually in charge of the organization. The authors then state:
"Also,
he did not believe that Stalin would join an all – embracing international
organization without the protection of an absolute veto power.
. .
While America’s
postwar planners were thinking in terms of some synthesis of regional
and global organization to replace the League of Nations, the
British Prime Minister was thinking of authoritative regional
arrangements without a global nexus, and his focus was on Europe.
He was dismissive of China, and uneasy at the idea of sharing
responsibility for the future of Western Europe with the Soviet
Union. In a note to Eden of October 12, 1942, Churchill wrote,
‘I must admit that my thoughts rest primarily in Europe – the
revival of the glory of Europe, the parent continent of the modern
nations and of civilization.’ It would be a ‘measureless disaster
if Russian barbarism overlaid the culture and independence’ of
these ancient states. ‘We certainly do not want to be shut up
with the Russians and the Chinese’ in Europe. Moreover ‘I cannot
regard the Chungking Government as representing a great world
power.’ "
The authors
describe Roosevelt’s opinion regarding the necessity of having Stalin’s
cooperation for creating and operating the United Nations as follows:
"Much
depended on Stalin, for the Soviet Union would be the only first-rate
military power on the continents of Europe and Asia after the
war. If the dictator chose cooperation, the foundations of a peaceful
society would be laid with confidence; if he chose another course,
the Western allies would be ‘driven back on a balance of power
system.’ "
The authors
also cover the importance of the Yalta Conference in regard to the
creation of the United Nations:
"Calling
the Yalta Conference a turning point – ‘I hope in our history
and therefore in the history of the world’ – FDR said that whether
it could bring forth lasting results ‘lies to a great extent in
your hands.’ The Senate and the American people would soon face
‘a great decision that will determine the fate of the United States
– and of the world – for generations to come.’ Everyone should
understand there was no middle ground. ‘We shall have to take
responsibility for world collaboration, or we should have to bear
the responsibility for another world conflict.’ The Yalta agreements
‘ought’ to spell the end of unilateral actions, exclusive alliances,
spheres of influence, and balances of power that ‘have been tried
for centuries – and have always failed.’ It was time to substitute
‘a universal organization,’ and the President was confident that
Congress and the American people would accept the Yalta agreements
as laying the foundations of ‘a permanent structure of peace .
. .’ "
The agreement
on Poland was entirely dependant on Stalin’s word, for there was
no practical way to confront Russian power in Eastern Europe.
In part, this stance was dictated by the basic need for Russian
military cooperation to finish the war against Germany and then
join the war against Japan; in larger part it reflected FDR’s
judgment that establishing the United Nations organization was
the overarching strategic goal, the absolute first priority.
He faced, as he viewed it, a delicate problem of balance. To prevent
a U.S. reversion to isolationism after the war, U.S. participation
in the new world organization was the sine qua non, butthe United Nations could not be brought into being without
genuine Russiancooperation, and that depended on Western
accommodation to unpalatable manifestations of the Soviet Communist
system in Eastern Europe." [Emphasis supplied]
The authors
then point out that on April 6, 1945 the president authorized Archibald
MacLeish to prepare the speech he intended to make at the opening
session of the San Francisco conference. There had been some speculation
that he might even resign his position as president in order to
be leader of the United Nations. However, on April 12, he died and
the authors state:
"To
internationalists, the fallen leader promptly became a martyr
and symbol of their cause. Intoned the New Republic, ‘Franklin
Roosevelt at rest at Hyde Park is a more powerful force for America’s
participation in the world organization than was President Roosevelt
in the White House."
If Roosevelt’s
primary aim in World War II was to create the United Nations and
thereby bring world peace forever (in his own mind), and that he
considered the cooperation of Stalin and the Soviet Union as the
essential piece to that puzzle, this helps explain why Roosevelt
was so compromising with Stalin throughout the war. It also helps
explain why he let Harry Hopkins live in the White House and be
his closest adviser. The author, George Victor, in his preface,
addresses the fact that Hopkins was probably a Communist agent and
then he states "there are speculations that Hopkins influenced
U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in 1941, but no evidence of
it." He then defends Hopkins by saying that Hopkins never did
anything without the express direction of Roosevelt, which may defend
Hopkins, but it certainly does not defend Roosevelt. Roosevelt surely
must have been aware of the intercepted cables which show that Hopkins
was an agent of the Soviets. The cables called "The Venona
Cables" were those communications between Soviet spies in America
that were intercepted by American intelligence forces which were
available to Roosevelt. These "Venona Cables" were released
to the public in 1995 and in a sensational book entitled The
Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage and America’s Traitorsby Herbert Romerstein and Eric Breindel they show the fact that
Harry Hopkins was a Soviet agent, being number 19. They point out
that the cables revealed that the Soviets were ordering tons of
uranium in March of 1943 and that Major George R. Jordan objected
to sending the uranium since he and General Groves, head of the
Manhattan project, were concerned about Soviet espionage. Major
Jordan testified that he objected to sending the uranium but that
"Harry Hopkins had told him on the phone to expedite the shipments."
Major Jordan later wrote a book claiming that Hopkins had helped
the Soviets against the interests of the United States.
In conclusion
of my argument, I take issue that the end justified the means, and
therefore disagree with Victor on this point. Roosevelt’s personal
ambitions for greatness, obtaining worldwide adulation, and his
desire to create the United Nations could hardly be considered ends
that justified the means he employed.
Getting back
to Victor’s book, he states in his last chapter entitled "History
and the Unthinkable" that the disaster in Pearl Harbor "needs
to be remembered, not for anything about Japanese treachery or U.S.
blunders. Its main lessons are about sacrifice, deception and political
considerations as common features of military planning." He
points out that other presidents have caused similar sacrifices
of the lives of soldiers and sailors, as well as civilians, with
similar acts of deception for political considerations. He states:
"Polk,
Lincoln and McKinley confronted dilemmas between what they considered
important U.S. interests and popular opposition to war. Lincoln’s
problem was extreme; for years, conflict over slavery had been
tearing the nation apart. As Lincoln saw it, the secession and
the likelihood of further splitting threatened the nation’s existence.
‘However, there was one way out,’ according to historian Richard
Hofstadter, ‘the Confederates themselves might bring matters to
a head by attacking Sumter . . . . It was precisely such an attack
that Lincoln’s strategy brought about.’ Hofstadter added that
‘the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor did for [Roosevelt] what
the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter had done for Lincoln.’"
Victor carefully
analyses the situation with Abraham Lincoln as being comparable
to Roosevelt in starting their respective wars:
"On
becoming president in 1861, Abraham Lincoln’s highest priority
was preserving the Union. To end the secession, he was willing
to guarantee federal noninterference with slavery. He therefore
pushed a constitutional amendment for noninterference through
Congress, and three states quickly ratified it, but the secession
continued. Lincoln was also willing – if necessary for preserving
the Union – to fight a war. But he found his nation – and his
own cabinet – against such a war. Even radical abolitionists opposed
it.
The Confederacy
had taken over most federal installations in its states – installations
surrendered on request by their administrators. Of those remaining
in federal hands, Fort Sumter in South Carolina was exposed to
attack and running out of supplies. Lincoln asked his cabinet’s
advice on whether to supply the fort. With one exception, they
opposed it because doing it risked war. Lincoln then sent the
supplies, prompting an attack on the fort which became the incident
he used to start the Civil War.
If known
at the time, Lincoln’s deliberate exposure of the fort might have
caused serious political repercussions. Later historical accounts
that imputed to him the intention of fostering an incident for
war in order to preserve the Union have created little stir. His
towering place in history is undamaged by them and he, too, is
viewed as a president with a clear idea of his mission, effective
in carrying it out."
The author,
Victor, also goes into some detail in regard to President Polk starting
the Mexican War:
"On
becoming president in 1845, James Polk told his cabinet that California
would be annexed. (His predecessors had offered to buy California,
but Mexico had refused to sell.) To his consul in California,
Polk suggested fomenting a revolution and promised U.S. support
for residents who rose against Mexico. A tiny uprising under Capt.
John Fremont had no effect on California’s status. Polk then sent
an army to the Rio Grande.
History books
describe that area as U.S. territory, Texas territory, or land
in dispute between the United States and Mexico. The area was,
however, recognized by a U.S. treaty as within Mexico’s borders.
As Polk expected, Mexico attacked the army, slaughtering a troop.
On sending
the army, Polk wrote, in advance, a request to Congress for a
declaration of war based on the incident he expected. After it
happened, he submitted his request, claiming that Mexican troops
‘had passed the boundary of the United States . . . invaded our
territory and shed American blood upon American soil . . . . War
exists notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it.’ But Polk,
not Mexico, had sought the war. Congress then declared war on
Mexico and by an easy victory, Polk acquired the southwest for
his nation."
Victor points
out that President McKinley sent the battleship Maine into
the harbor of Havana, which was Spanish territory, as a provocation
to the Spanish and when the ship exploded from within it killed
260 U.S. sailors. The false propaganda was that the Spanish caused
it, thus giving McKinley an excuse to go to war and to acquire from
Spain America’s first empire. McKinley was strongly supported in
his efforts to get into the war by none other than the "Megaphone
of Mars," Teddy Roosevelt, who was serving as the Assistant
Navy Secretary. Roosevelt declared "The Maine was sunk
by an act of dirty treachery on the part of the Spaniards."
The new battle cry for the war was now "Remember the Maine."
The author
expresses no moral judgment against these presidents for starting
their respective wars and states that:
"Deception
is as old as the history of war. According to the classic work
The
Art of War by Sun-tzu ‘All warfare is based on deception.’
It is, of course, practiced on enemies, but deception is also
used on subordinates. A common example is a suicide attack. In
order to have troops carry it out officers may hide the attack’s
hopelessness from them. They may even mislead troops to believe
that it will succeed."
Victor recites
the views expressed by General George C. Marshall at the Pearl Harbor
hearings before Congress in 1945–6, as follows:
"In
my view, General Marshall was indeed an outstanding chief of staff,
upright, honorable, and incorruptible – as much so as his position
permitted. Testifying to various tribunals investigating the Pearl
Harbor disaster, other military officers vigorously denied that
they had withheld vital information from field commanders. The
denials were false. Marshall was the exception; he testified to
a congressional committee that withholding vital information from
commanders was routine practice. World War II documents show not
only withholding of information from field commanders, but also
distortion of it to mislead them."
The author
concludes this extremely disturbing book with the following two
paragraphs:
"Despite
the history of war, the idea that Roosevelt withheld warnings
from Kimmel and Short for the purpose of getting the United States
openly into the European war is still unthinkable to many people,
but to fewer and fewer as the years pass. As has happened over
time with other unthinkable acts, the repugnance aroused by the
idea of using the Pacific Fleet as a lure will probably continue
to fade. Polk’s exposure of an army, Lincoln’s exposure of a fort,
and McKinely’s exposure of a battleship are more or less accepted.
In the Philippines, Midway, Wake, Guam, Samoa, and in other outlying
islands, U.S. forces were exposed to Japanese attack, and that
is also more or less accepted.
The Pearl
Harbor disaster was different from losses of the Philippines and
other Pacific islands because it shattered America’s confidence,
arousing massive fear, a crisis of trust in the nation’s leaders,
and an outcry for scapegoats. The nation seized on the administration’s
explanation of betrayal by Japan and by Kimmel and Short, and
the disaster unified the nation to fight World War II with the
slogan ‘Remember Pearl Harbor!’ The explanation became a major
national myth, which has substantially withstood the unearthing
of secret alliances, war strategies, and warnings received in
Washington."
In the preface
the author states: "I am not the first admirer of Roosevelt
to present him in Machiavellian terms." Victor goes on to quote
an admiring biographer of Roosevelt, James MacGregor Burns, who
stated: "It was not strange that [Roosevelt] should follow
Machiavelli’s advice . . . for this had long been the first lesson
for politicians." Victor’s final assessment is that:
"History
has recorded many, many rulers’ manipulations of their people
into war without their subordinates blowing the whistle. Presidents
James Polk, Abraham Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson did it before Roosevelt;
and others have done it after him . . . .
Presidents
who succeeded Roosevelt also ordered sacrifices, but toward smaller
and sometime meaner ends. Here Roosevelt’s manipulations and the
sacrifices he ordered are compared to those of Polk, Lincoln,
McKinley and Wilson, all of whom were implementing ends considered
noble in the light of traditional values." [Emphasis
supplied]
The author,
George Victor, mentions the deceit of President Wilson in getting
us into World War I but provides no details. However, you can find
this in Charles Tansil’s excellent book entitled America Goes
to War. Justice Brandeis, who was appointed to the U.S. Supreme
Court by Wilson, rendered his opinion to President Wilson that the
alleged sinking of the French cross-channel passenger ship, the
S.S. Sussex, by a German submarine in the English Channel
with the loss of lives of the U.S. citizens justified a declaration
of war against Germany by the United States. The ship was painted
all black and the usual insignia to show it was not a military ship
were missing. The German commander of the submarine wrote that he
took the ship to be a military ship rather than a passenger ship.
Wilson relied on this legal opinion of Justice Brandeis, who was
Wilson’s most influential adviser along with Col. House, and the
president addressed both houses of Congress on April 2, 1917 using
the sinking of Sussex and the loss of American lives as a
reason to declare war on April 7, 1917. It was only after America
was committed to the war that the truth came out, which apparently
was not considered material by the news media, so the public never
was fully informed. The Sussex was not sunk and no American
lives were lost. The ship was torpedoed by the Germans but made
it safely to the harbor at Boulogne where it was hidden for some
period of time.
Victor mentions
that subsequent presidents to Roosevelt have also deceitfully taken
America into wars but provides no names. He could have cited President
Lyndon Johnson and his lies about the Gulf of Tonkin incident to
get Congress to authorize him to retaliate to get America into the
Viet Nam War. He could also have mentioned our current president
and the lies about weapons of mass destruction to get us into the
war with Iraq. In both cases Congress accepted the lies of the president
and unconstitutionally delegated the war making power to the president
rather than declaring war itself, as the Constitution requires.
I agree that
Victor has accurately described the deceitful conduct of the presidents
he cites (see the chapters "Lincoln and the First Shot"
and "Roosevelt and the First Shot" in my book A
Century of War) but I strongly disagree with his conclusion
that the American people have knowingly condoned the deceitful activity
of the presidents Victor mentions because our history books do not
contain this information, it is not taught in the schools and universities
and it is not recited by the news media. You have to have independent
researchers like Victor to find and disclose most of this information.
I
wonder if Victor’s book will be taught or read at West Point, Annapolis
or the Air Force Academy. After finishing it, the famous lines from
Tennyson’s poem The Charge of the Light Brigade came to mind:
"Theirs
not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die.
Into the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred."
