A Real 'Winning' Strategy in Afghanistan
by Josef Storm
I’ve just had the pleasure (or lack of pleasure, to be more precise) to read the recent Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy put out by the State Department. I found its summary of key initiatives for Afghanistan to be particularly fascinating:
In short, the Afghanistan central government is still in search of legitimacy, especially out in these so-called "sub-national" areas – AND – we are going to spend millions, if not billions, of dollars and sacrifice a countless number of lives, both Western and Afghan, in trying to rectify that. When I was there in Afghanistan over a year ago, these "sub-national" areas used to refer to the rural and desolate regions that the Taliban would recruit from, but they have since evolved to include pretty much everywhere outside of Kabul. No wonder Afghans and their western counterparts in the country have, for some time, been referring to Hamid Karzai as the "mayor of Kabul." Call me a skeptic, but perhaps if we didn’t elevate Karzai (whose drug lord brother happens to be on the CIA’s payroll) to rule, we wouldn’t have to engage in such superficial "drug trade reduction efforts" in order to improve "legitimacy." Drug trafficking has exploded since the Taliban have fallen from power in 2001. And the poppy fields we now happen to destroy only further Karzai and his minions’ monopoly on the poppy market. Gary Webb must be rolling in his grave. Our clear meddling and interference in the recent Afghanistan election in order to maintain Karzai’s power won’t do our legitimacy efforts any help, either. Nor will our history of putting oppressive and corrupt dictators in power throughout the region (or world for that matter, as John Perkins’ books so clearly elucidate). We’ve played this hand one too many times. No, this Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy is just another "do as we say, not as we do" policy strategy in a long laundry list of duplicitous and insidious drivel that has been pervading and emanating from our nation's capital for some time. Real success in Afghanistan doesn’t involve such complex nation-building, central planning, socialist, or imperialist pursuits. Just ask the Soviets, Brits, Mongols, Macedonians, and countless others that have preceded us in invading this region. The people of this region reject strong central governments as well as any heavy-handed involvement from external powers. They seek and love freedom as much as many Americans. And please spare the retort that this time is different simply because it is us, the United States, who happens to be bringing "freedom," "justice," "rule of law," blah, blah, blah! Those aforementioned empires and their citizenries suffered from the same misguided idealism. The best policy doesn’t involve outside influence The most legitimate political strategy to pursue in Afghanistan is one that the people of the region would naturally pursue…WITHOUT ANY EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE. Any student of Austrian Economics knows that human action will respond in proportion to any governmental intervention that tries to distort the market (i.e., the natural order of things). This is the element that government bureaucrats fail to fully understand. Thus, the only legitimate policy strategies are those that complement, rather than restrict, human action. It is this awareness and ultimate admission that will allow us to save face in the region. Sadly, since we've intervened in that country and region for so long, our only means of salvation is through encouraging each of the region's tribes to pursue political and economic strategies that they would have naturally pursued long ago without any "external interference" (and yes, with us meanwhile sending our troops home). In no way does this mean that the Taliban will come back into power. Let us not forget that the Taliban first arose to power because we empowered them, and thus would probably never have come into existence if it weren’t for our meddling. Their growth in the "sub-national" areas, as mentioned earlier, is due to the distortions stemming from our being there. If we genuinely provide this "encouragement," we will have far more allies there…and we can then move back to having the "Peace, Commerce, and Honest Friendship with all nations – entangling alliances with none" type of foreign policy that Jefferson advocated. The Taliban will not be accepted by the broader constituency, as there would be no one to empower them this time around. And what is the most likely strategy for each of these major tribes? Given the significant bad blood and hostility between tribes in this region, it should come as no surprise that tribes would naturally pursue alliances with those tribes and ethnicities that are closest to them…those they trust the most. As such, Tajiks, who comprise 27% of the Afghan population, would take their people and lands and align with their Tajik brethren to the north in Tajikistan, who happen to share the same tribal affiliation, customs, language, heroes, etc. The Turkmen and Uzbek tribes would naturally take their lands and people and gravitate towards their respective countries, as their lands in the currently demarcated Afghanistan happen to be located adjacent to these countries. The only challenge would be the fates of the Pashtuns and Hazaras. Anyone who’s read The Kite Runner is well aware of the bad blood between these two. The Pashtuns represent 42–43% of the Afghan population, and approximately a third of the population of Pakistan. This tribe has long sought control of all the lands within the current Afghanistan and Pakistan borders in order to create one giant "Pashtunistan." It is this specific objective that the Taliban used to rally support, as the Taliban are merely a militaristic faction representing a slight majority of all Pashtun tribal factions. But the aforementioned Tajik, Uzbek, Turkmen, and Hazara tribes would never accept such an overarching Pashtunistan arrangement, nor would the other two-thirds of Pakistanis. A more plausible scenario would involve the merging of the current Pashtun lands in both countries to form a new "Afghanistan," as the term "Afghan" is merely an ancient term for Pashtuns, and is thus not politically correct in referring to any of the other tribes residing within the current Afghanistan demarcation. The Hazaras, representing 8–9% of the population, are native Persian speakers as well as practitioners of Shiite Islam, which would make them likely candidates to merge with Iran. But they could just as easily merge with the Tajiks to the northeast due to language similarity and a mutual resentment of the Pashtuns, as both of them formed the majority of the "Northern Alliance" that fought in opposition of the Taliban. The Hazaras could also potentially form their own country, but upon further reflection of such a euphoric and utopian idea, they would realize that this would leave them vulnerable and highly susceptible to invasion from the Pashtuns. Whatever they decide, everyone should honor and respect the decision. Why we aren’t pursuing it Quite obviously, the major stakeholders involved in this Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy have no interest in seeing this policy come to fruition. There are no expensive bombs to drop, no new guns to design that can outdo the enemies’ AK-47, and no lives lost to further rally the cause of state-led intervention both at home and abroad. Aid agencies would lose projects that were designed to keep the revenues coming in, as opposed to doing the best possible job and going home. The Federal Reserve wouldn’t be able to print as much money, which would slow its growing control over our government. Both the current leadership in Pakistan and Afghanistan would lose their "gravy train" as they would not only lose control of the territory as currently demarcated, but they would be forced into a position of having to be effective rulers, as opposed to their continued relying on Westerners to "improve" things. They would also lose their Western scapegoats that they rely on so much in their political propaganda to maintain power. Obviously, this Yugoslavia-style strategy, won’t do these major stakeholders any favors, and thus they will fight tooth and nail for the status quo. It is up to the American citizenry to understand that we also happen to be stakeholders in this situation. We’re the ones whose taxes are paying for it, and (will continue to pay for it). Change will come from us Having been to Afghanistan, and befriended many of its people, I genuinely want to help them. But this Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy betrays both countries’ citizens, and us Americans. And so I have a plan. It involves "sub-national" work of a different sort. Let’s call it domestic "sub-national capacity retrenchment." I’m getting out and volunteering in the freedom, liberty, and nullification movements. I encourage you to do the same. LewRockwell.com, the Mises Institute, the Campaign for Liberty, the Free State Project, the Future of Freedom Foundation, FreedomWorks, and Ron Paul Meetup groups are all great places to start. By limiting the power of the state here at home, we will force a change in strategy in the Afghanistan region to one similar to my "encouragement" strategy. In doing so, we will save thousands of lives (both Afghan and American), and genuinely help the region get back on the road to recovery. Yes, Mr. Obama, "yes we can." February 11, 2010 Josef Storm [send him mail] has been an aid worker in Afghanistan, and understands the futility of chasing ghosts. Copyright © 2010 by LewRockwell.com. Permission to reprint in whole or in part is gladly granted, provided full credit is given.
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