The Fed's Desperation Move
by
Gary North
by Gary North
DIGG THIS
I do not
have a new message here; we have known for a long time that advance
preparation and a strong balance sheet are the keys to riding
out a financial storm. As I have emphasized before, the Federal
Reserve can deal with liquidity pressures but cannot deal with
solvency issues.
~
William Poole, President,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (February 29, 2008)
The Federal
Reserve System announced a new program on March 11. The announcement
was not quite gibberish, but it was close. This much was clear:
it is a $200 billion program.
The stock
market bulls thought, "Wow! That's huge! That will solve the problem!"
They did not read the details of the proposal.
The announcement
was an implicit admission of a looming credit crisis of monumental
proportions: an unprecedented write-down of bank assets. Why? Because
these assets, rated AAA by the big three ratings agencies, are nowhere
near AAA. Banks are facing new rules on financial reporting: mark
to market, meaning the end of the book value (face value) game that
they have played for decades. This is the Financial Accounting Standards
Board Rule 157. It goes into effect for banks this quarter, which
ends on March 31.
Bankers are
going to have to report the truth or else face criminal penalties.
Why, they even might turn into Eliot Spitzer! That's what happens
when you play fun and games, as accountants have been allowed to
do.
The solution?
Sell these promises to pay at market prices. This would have included
the promises to pay issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two
mortgage-investing companies that account for 40% of the American
mortgage market, and which have accounted for at least 70% of new
mortgages written over the last six months.
That solution
would have brought economic reality to the investment world's attention:
the AAA ratings have been overly optimistic.
The FED rushed
to the rescue. It offered to auction off U.S. Treasury debt in its
portfolio, which is always AAA-rated, in exchange for AAA-rated
private debt. This will allow banks to transfer to the FED questionable
assets in exchange for assets that cannot be downgraded in today's
markets: Treasury debt.
The FASB's
Rule 157 does not apply to the FED. It will not have to report a
capital loss.
This program
was seen by mutual fund managers as an increase in liquidity. It
was in fact a last-minute desperation move by the FED to stop a
free-fall in the credit markets and possibly even a lock-up of the
banking system. If that is the meaning "increased liquidity," fine.
But this was not how the FED or anyone in the media explained the
new program. For
my explanation, click here.
The FED timed
its announcement of this proposed "temporary" $200 billion asset
swap just in time for the opening bell of the New York Stock Exchange
on March 11. Sure enough, the Dow soared 416 points that day. The
next day, it fell by 46 points, after having climbed early in the
morning by 150 points.
We have learned
that a FED press release can goose the stock market for one day.
Then the market sinks.
Stock market
optimists who have lost money all year want to believe that the
FED can achieve the following with a new program:
1.
Overcome the liquidity crisis
2. Overcome the solvency crisis
3. Overcome sinking residential real estate markets
4. Avoid the imminent fall in the commercial real estate markets
5. Restore bankers' confidence in other bankers
6. Restore confidence in the credit rating services' credit rating
services
7. Reverse the dollar's slide
8. Reverse the falling stock market
If the FED
could do any of this, don't you think it would have done so by now?
We have seen
all of this unfold since last August. The stock market recovered
its July high by mid-October. In fact, it was even a bit higher.
The optimists thought the FED was on top of things when it announced
the new, "temporary" Term Auction Facility. It also announced lower
federal funds target rate. Happy days were here again. Then reality
reasserted itself. Down, down, down the market fell. Take
a look at the chart of the S&P 500.
The optimists
grab at straws. FED programs are convenient straws.
A LOSS
OF CONFIDENCE
We are seeing
a broad-based loss of confidence in the American economy. This is
affecting just about everything: housing prices ("the great American
dream"), the stock market, the international currency market, the
commodities market, the municipal bond market, and the banking system.
Only the T-bill market seems immune. There has been a rush into
T-bills, driving rates below 1.5%. This indicates looming panic
in the other capital markets: a flight to safety. This loss of confidence
is forcing huge changes in America's capital markets. We are seeing
a move from confidence to doubt. Such a move always has a price:
an increased risk premium on loans.
The Friday
before the FED's announcement, a media story appeared on a looming
default by the Carlyle Capital Corporation, the legally separate
mortgage investment entity of the giant Carlyle Group, whose investors
include George H. W. Bush and the Bin Laden family. Carlyle Capital
Corp. could not meet margin calls. The margin call was $400 million.
Understand,
this was not the total value of the fund. This was just the initial
margin call.
On March 13,
the bad news came true. The company could not meet these margin
calls. The price of the shares fell by 95% in the Amsterdam market,
where it is traded. It announced that it had defaulted on $16.6
billion.
When some
poor guy in a Fannie Mae-funded home leaves because he cannot make
the monthly payment, this is called walking away. When it is done
by a corporation set up on the Channel island of Guernsey, it is
not called walking away. It is called going bankrupt.
In July, the
fund had tapped the public for $300 million in capital. In July,
things were still rosy. The Dow was at 14,000. That was then. This
is now.
"If
Carlyle's lenders want their money right away, they'll liquidate
the fund," said Hank Calenti, a London-based analyst at RBC Capital
Markets. "That will put pressure on already stressed credit markets."
It sure will!
"At
this point we are exploring all options" for Carlyle Capital, Emma
Thorpe, a spokeswoman for Carlyle Group in London, said in a telephone
interview. She declined to specify the options being considered.
I think what Ms.
Thorpe meant was that she is sending out her résumé to everyone in
her Rolodex. But I could be wrong.
The organization
at one point held $22 billion in mortgages issued by Fannie Mae.
Its debt to equity factor, according
to the New York Times (March 7), was 32 to 1.
This seems
a tad high to me. I guess I'm old fashioned.
The Carlyle
Capital Corporation was confident in its portfolio confident
enough to establish a 32 to 1 debt-to-equity ratio. But why?
Carlyle's
fund has said its so-called agency debt has an "implied guarantee"
from the U.S. government.
I believe
the appropriate phrase here is this: "There's a sucker born every
minute." P. T. Barnum never said it, but it's true. Some of them
are (or were) rich.
There will
be similar events. Count on it.
"This
is not only a problem for Carlyle," Jochen Felsenheimer, the Munich-based
head of credit strategy at UniCredit SpA, wrote in a note to clients
today. "We expect a further flood of downgrades especially of higher-rated
securities, putting enormous pressure on the system."
Now, we must get
to the famous bottom line. Carlyle
Capital Corp. was not acting alone. There were "counterparties."
Carlyle's
counterparties are a dozen Wall Street firms including Citigroup
Inc. and Deutsche Bank AG, according to the fund's annual report.
The banks use repurchase agreements to lend money and require securities
be put up as collateral. As the perceived creditworthiness of asset-backed
bonds declined, the amount of money that can be borrowed using them
as collateral fell.
Who else? The
New York Times (March 7) listed these lenders: UBS, Merrill
Lynch, Lehman Brothers, JPMorgan Chase, ING, Deutsche Bank, Credit
Suisse, Citigroup, BNP Paribas, Bear Stearns, and Bank of America.
Do you begin
to get the picture? This was why the FED announced its credit swap
plan in March 11. The economists saw what is obviously coming.
"Carlyle
won't be the end of it," said Greg Bundy, executive chairman of
Sydney-based merger advisory firm InterFinancial Ltd. and a former
head of Merrill Lynch & Co.'s Australian unit. "There's more to
come. The problem is no one can give you an educated guess about
how much."
If you go
to the Carlyle Capital
Corporation's website (act now this offer is limited!),
you will read the following: "Quality diversified assets, steady
current income." Diversified? Did they think that $22 billion of
Fannie Mae debt was diversified? Then we read this:
Carlyle
Capital Corporation Limited ("CCC") is a closed-end investment fund
domiciled and registered as a limited company under the laws of
Guernsey, Channel Islands. CCC invests in a diversified portfolio
of fixed income assets including high-grade mortgages and credit
products. CCC's day-to-day activities and investment portfolio are
managed by Carlyle Investment Management L.L.C., whose investment
professionals have extensive experience in the areas of mortgage
finance, leveraged finance, capital markets.
These were
clever people too clever by half. They are now overseers
of a stricken company, which was incorporated so far away, so distant
from lawsuits. The best and the brightest put their money in this
company, which was the financial equivalent of the Hindenburg.
In January,
2005, William Poole, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis, gave a speech on the GSE's: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
He
sounded a warning.
An
understanding of the risks facing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
which I will sometimes refer to as "F-F" to simplify the exposition
is important from two perspectives. First, investors should
be aware of these risks. Although many investors assume that F-F
obligations are effectively guaranteed by the U.S. Government, the
fact is that the guarantee is implicit only. I will not attempt
to forecast what would happen should either firm face a solvency
crisis, because I just do not know. What I do know is that the issue
is a political one, and political winds change in unpredictable
ways.
A second
reason to understand the risks is that sound public policy decisions
depend on such understanding. To reduce the potential for a financial
crisis, risks need to be mitigated.
He ended with
a strongly worded warning that the managers of Carlyle Capital Corp.
did not take seriously enough.
One
thing I think I know for sure is this: An investor who ignores the
risks faced by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under the assumption that
a federal bailout is certain should there be a problem is making
a mistake.
THIS
WILL GET MUCH WORSE
We are in
the early stages of a write-down of assets not seen since the Great
Depression. This is going to go into the history textbooks.
The man who
predicted this most eloquently was Dr. Kurt Richebächer. He died
on August 24, 2007, two weeks after the events he had long predicted
began. He regarded the expansion of credit under Greenspan as laying
the foundation of the worst post-World War II economic contraction.
He seemed like John the Baptist, crying in the wilderness. He seems
today more like Jeremiah, the author of Book of Lamentations.
These stories
of busted investment companies will continue for the rest of 2008
and well into 2009. My fear is that the stories will get worse as
time goes on. Because the financial industry is at the center of
this recession, the economy is at great risk. It is one thing for
manufacturing firms to go bust in a recession. There are fewer of
them these days inside the United States.
We are now
seeing huge banks in trouble. When they cease lending, the economy
will topple. Declining capital due to credit market defaults will
cause banks to reduce lending. They will not be operating on a 32-to-1
ratio.
Economic growth
comes mainly from small companies that get big. So does employment.
These are the companies that the capital markets generally ignore.
Local banks are their source of loans. They will find that when
local banks are in the middle of an international credit crisis,
loans become very difficult to obtain. I saw this in Texas in the
S&L crisis, 198487.
If this recession
lasts only a year, I will be pleasantly surprised. The recovery
will be weak. Why? Because this time confidence in the FED will
be at rock bottom. Confidence of the Federal government is already
low. Congress is impotent. There will be a new President. None of
the candidates inspires confidence in people with money to invest.
CONCLUSION
We hear the
phrase "systemic crisis" too often. Systemic crises are real, but
they rarely manifest themselves until after time has run out. In
the interim, nothing is done to correct them.
The FED is
facing what appears to be the early phase of a systemic crisis.
The stock market has not reflected this yet. It is slowly declining,
with fits and starts. It is not collapsing.
My
suggestion is that you do not pay much attention to upward moves
in response to new programs offered by the Federal Reserve System.
If it could do anything other than inflate the money supply, it
would not be coming up with late-night emergency bailouts to be
announced just before the opening bell of the New York Stock Exchange.
March
17, 2008
Gary
North [send him mail]
is the author of Mises
on Money. Visit http://www.garynorth.com.
He is also the author of a free 20-volume series, An
Economic Commentary on the Bible.
Copyright ©
2008 LewRockwell.com
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